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Decentralised Collective Bargaining in CEE: Framing the 




The pressures on collective bargaining posed by the recent economic and financial crisis 
raise questions about the ways in which standards for labour and work are set in the new 
member states. For more than 25 years, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE)1 have witnessed a profound transformation of their labour laws. While the hope 
was that EU membership would bridge the social gap between the new and old member 
states, the reality is that the previous rounds of enlargements have brought greater 
diversity to the landscape of industrial relations in the EU. More than a decade after the 
enlargement round in 2004, in comparison to the other member states, the CEE 
countries still have weak trade unions and employer’ associations and an 
underdeveloped system of collective bargaining. The recent economic and financial 
crisis has illuminated the growing polarisation between the new and old member states 
and the need to revitalise the industrial relations systems in the former group, in order to 
ensure the sustainability of the economic and social reforms.2 
This thesis scrutinises the current legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the ways in which it has been 
developing in the past two decades. The decentralisation of industrial relations, 
amounting to vaguely developed sectoral and cross-sectoral dialogue in CEE, was 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of this study, the notion of Central and Eastern Europe shall refer to the countries that 
have joined the EU in the three previous enlargements; namely, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
2 This was one of the findings of the European Commission report on industrial relations in Europe for 
year 2012, in a dedicated section on CEE countries. See European Commission (2013) Industrial Relation 
in Europe 2012, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, pp 53-91. Similar concerns 
have been expressed by Kohl, H. (2015) ‘Convergence and Divergence – Ten Years since EU 
Enlargement’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 21, no 3, pp 285-311. 
2 
 
addressed as problematic in the literature and expert reports more than a decade ago,3 
but the concerns remain valid today.4  
With these concerns in mind, this thesis aims to analyse the ways in which the 
legal and institutional framework in CEE actually supports and provides stimulus for 
collective bargaining at different collective bargaining levels. Ultimately, the thesis 
aims to reach a conclusion on whether the reasons for less developed centralised 
collective bargaining structures can be attributed to the legal environment. To 
streamline the analysis, the study concentrates on four CEE countries with different 
models of industrial relations: Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. 
The aim of this chapter is to further explain the research problem, the research 
questions and the structure and design of the study. To that end, this chapter begins with 
an explanation of decentralised collective bargaining in CEE (section 2), which is 
followed by a statement of the research aim, the research questions, and the approach 
and relevance of the study (section 3). Section 4 poses and explains the normative 
model which will guide the research and serve as a benchmark to analyse the legal and 
institutional framework of the CEE countries. Finally, section 5 explains the 
methodology of the study and the country selection, while section 6 explains the 
structure of the thesis. Some terminological clarifications should be offered at this point. 
In this thesis, collective bargaining will be broadly understood as negotiations between 
trade unions or organisations of workers, and individual employers or employers’ 
associations, with a view to determining terms and conditions of work and employment 
or relationship among them, by concluding a collective agreement. Social dialogue will 
be understood as all types of negotiations and consultations regarding all possible issues 
                                                          
3 The issues of undeveloped sectoral and cross-sectoral structures in CEE have been particularly 
addressed in Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2003) EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain 
Future of the European Social Model, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Pollert, A. (2000) ‘Ten Years of Post-
Communist Central Eastern Europe: Labour’s Tenuous Foothold in the Regulation of the Employment 
Relationship’ Economic and Industrial Democracy, vol 21, no 2, pp 183-210; Ghellab, Y. and Vaughan-
Whitehead, D. (2003) Sectoral Social Dialogue in Future EU Member States: The Weakest Link, 
Budapest: ILO, pp 377-410; Kohl, H., Lecher, W. and Platzer, H.-W. (2000) ‘Transformation, EU 
Membership and Labour Relations in Central Eastern Europe: Poland – Czech Republic – Hungary –
Slovenia’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 6, no 3, pp 399-415. 
4 Perez-Solorzano Borragan, N. and Smismans, S. (2012) ‘The EU and Institutional Change in Industrial 
Relations in the New Member States’ in S. Smismans (ed) The European Union and Industrial Relations: 
New Procedures, New Context, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp 116-138; Meardi, G. 




of common interest between state authorities, representatives of employers and 
representatives of employees.5 
 
2. Decentralised collective bargaining in CEE 
The industrial relations data show persistent decentralised collective bargaining trends 
in most CEE countries in the past decades. Around a decade ago, a study by Ghellab 
and Vaughan-Whitehead warned against a low number of sectoral collective agreements 
and weak structures for centralised (sectoral and cross-sectoral) collective bargaining 
arrangements.6 Recent data re-confirmed these weaknesses.7 As Table 1 demonstrates, 
in the group of CEE countries, collective bargaining predominantly takes place at 
company level. The mechanisms for broadening the coverage of concluded collective 
agreements to third parties are not widely used in CEE.8 The cross-sectoral collective 
activity is virtually non-existent in the CEE countries. At the same time, although 
tripartite structures are in place, there is limited output in terms of concluded social 
pacts.9 The weakness of collective bargaining structures is accompanied by persistently 
falling trade union density rates on average from 59% in 1990, to 19% in 2008.10 
Nevertheless, collective bargaining practices are not uniform among the CEE 
countries and the four countries on which this study focuses – Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic and Poland – have different models of collective bargaining. Slovenia 
has the most developed tradition of sectoral collective bargaining and in the past 
decades it has also had cross-sectoral collective agreements.11 Slovakia has a fairly 
                                                          
5 These definitions of social dialogue and collective bargaining are based on ILO understandings, see 
Olney, S. and Rueda, M. (2005) Convention No 154: Promoting Collective Bargaining, Geneva: ILO, pp 
5-6. 
6 Ghellab and Vaughan-Whitehead (2003).    
7 European Commission (2013) Industrial Relation in Europe 2012, Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
the European Union. 
8 ibid., p 64. 
9 ibid., p 80. Even though social pacts may not be labelled as collective agreements in a strict sense, given 
that they still represent a form of collective accord which arose in post-transitional CEE context and 
consequently shaped the industrial relations of these countries, their regulatory importance will be duly 
addressed in this study.  
10 European Commission (2013), p 62. 
11 Kanjuo Mrčela, A. (2015) ‘Slovenia: Working Life Country Profile’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovenia/slovenia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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well-developed sectoral activity, with collective agreements in the most of the sectors.12 
Poland and the Czech Republic have more decentralised collective bargaining than 
Slovenia and Slovakia. The Czech Republic has a certain level of sectoral activity, but 
Poland has almost no collective agreements concluded at this level.  
 
Table 1: Collective bargaining levels in CEE 
Country National Sector Company 
Poland 3 3 1 
Czech Republic - 3 1 
Hungary 3 2 1 
Croatia 3 2 1 
Slovakia - 1 2 
Slovenia 2 1 2 
Bulgaria 2 1 2 
Romania 1   2* 2 
Estonia 3 3 1 
Latvia 3 3 1 
Lithuania n/a 3 1 
Notes: 1 - predominant level of collective bargaining; 2 - important level, but not predominant; 3 - 
existing level. 
*since 2011, the predominant level is company. 
Source: Kohl (2009) and ICTWSSS database 5.0,Visser (2015). 
 
The industrial relations data for these countries underpin the arguments presented. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1,13 the coverage rates of collective agreements have been 
generally decreasing since the early 1990s. Except for Slovenia, these data lead to the 
conclusion that collective agreements have limited regulatory power as a source of 
standard setting. It can also be established that a large percentage of employees in the 
labour markets in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland are not covered by the terms 
and conditions of collective agreements, which means that their conditions of work and 
employment are regulated by statutory legal rules only (and, where applicable, internal 
regulation issued unilaterally by employers at workplace level).  
                                                          
12 According to Kohl, H. (2009) Freedom of Association, Employees’ Rights and Social Dialogue in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Results of a Survey of 16 Formerly Socialist 
Countries in Eastern Europe, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
13 Coverage can be defined as a proportion of all employees covered by a collective agreement, calculated 
as the number of employees enjoying bargaining rights covered by collective agreements and as a 
proportion of all wage earners in employment adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations 
are excluded from the right to bargain, as in: Visser, J. (2015) The ICTWSS Database: Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries 
between 1960 and 2012, version 5.0,  Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour Studies.  
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Figure 1: Coverage rates in four CEE countries 
 
Notes: Coverage rate is defined as in Visser (2015) as the proportion of all employees covered by a 
collective agreement, calculated as the number of employees enjoying bargaining rights covered by 
collective agreements and as a proportion of all wage earners in employment adjusted for the possibility 
that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain. Data covering the period 1990-
2013; for Poland and Slovakia data not available for all years, as shown in this graph.    
Source: ICTWSSS database 5.0,Visser (2015). 
 
At the same time, as Table 2 demonstrates, collective bargaining has predominantly 
taken place at company level in the Czech Republic and Poland since the early 
transition period, while Slovakia has been subject to some degree of decentralisation 
since the late 1990s. Slovenia’s collective bargaining was centralised at the beginning of 
transitional period, but the trend towards decentralisation came after accession to the 
EU.  
Given that collective bargaining practices had only a marginal role in the 
communist setting, CEE industrial relations had to undergo a major transformative 
process from the 1990s. In an effort to enhance the standard-setting role of trade unions 
and employers’ associations, the post-1990s legal and institutional developments sought 
to reinstate a culture of social dialogue. This task was particularly challenging since the 
6 
 
trade unions were inexperienced at collective bargaining, while the employers’ 
associations were mostly being established from scratch in the early 1990s.  
 
Table 2: Dominant bargaining levels in four countries 
Slovenia Slovakia Czech Republic Poland 
1990 3 n/a  n/a 1 
1991 3 n/a 2 1 
1992 3 n/a 2 1 
1993 3 3 2 1 
1994 5 3 2 1 
1995 5 3 1 1 
1996 5 3 1 1 
1997 3 3 1 1 
1998 3 3 1 1 
1999 5 2 1 1 
2000 3 2 1 1 
2001 5 2 1 1 
2002 3 2 1 1 
2003 5 2 1 1 
2004 3 2 1 1 
2005 3 2 1 1 
2006 3 2 1 1 
2007 5 2 1 1 
2008 3 2 1 1 
2009 3 2 1 1 
2010 3 2 1 1 
2011 3 2 1 1 
2012 3 2 1 1 
2013 3 2 1 1 
2014 3 2 1 1 
Notes: 1 - bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or company level, 2- intermediate or 
alternating between sector and company bargaining, 3 - bargaining predominantly takes place at the 
sector or industry level, 4 - intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining, 5 - 
bargaining predominantly takes place at central or cross-industry level and there are centrally determined 
binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements negotiated at lower levels. 
Source: ICTWSS database 5.0, Visser (2015).        
                                                                   
The salience of boosting social dialogue has been recognised by the EU. The European 
Commission, which was guiding the accession negotiations with the CEE countries, 
consistently warned against low social dialogue culture and insisted upon boosting 
social partners’ involvement in the socio-economic transformation of the CEE 
societies.14 At the same time, the industrial relations reform was accompanied by a legal 
                                                          
14 The assessment reports can be accessed at the European Commission webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/slovakia_en.htm 
[accessed 1 August 2016].  
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transformation which was aiming to align the CEE legal systems with the acquis 
communautaire. The refashioning of labour law was also taking place against the 
background of a wider market reform agenda in the CEE. The market reforms were by 
and large understood as an emanation of individual economic freedoms, which would 
replace the rigidity of the previous communist setting. In many CEE countries, the spirit 
of individual freedom brought radical macroeconomic restructuring, inspired labour law 
reform15 and provided a stimulating climate for decentralised industrial relations. Also, 




3.1. Research aim, approach, and research questions  
In the 1990s a fundamental transformation of CEE labour law commenced. Voluntary 
organisation of social partners and free and voluntary industrial relations, which had 
played only a marginal role in the previous system, had to be properly enshrined in law. 
Unlike the continental European countries, where the institutionalisation of industrial 
relations arose from a long-standing tradition, the CEE collective bargaining practices 
did not have time to establish a firm foothold. And yet, with their markets now open, 
CEE labour laws had to cope with the same set of international and transnational 
pressures as the other countries in Europe, from globalisation and competitiveness, to 
the recent economic and financial crisis.  
 More than two decades since the beginning of the economic and political 
transition, it is time to reflect on the current state of CEE labour laws and to assess the 
legal and institutional foundations of collective bargaining in these countries. How did 
CEE labour laws fare with respect to the regulation of collective bargaining and 
collective agreements? Have the labour laws enabled an adequate institutionalisation of 
industrial relations to allow free and voluntary collective bargaining at all bargaining 
levels? Or, has the decentralisation of collective bargaining been in some way 
underpinned by a lack of legal institutionalisation, particularly with respect to collective 
bargaining above company level? These questions are the core of the present study. In 
                                                          
15 Kollonay Lehoczky, C. (2004) ‘European Enlargement: A Comparative View of Hungarian Labour 
Law’ in G. A. Bermann and K. Pistor (eds) Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp 210-211. 
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other words, the research aim is to scrutinise whether the legal and institutional 
frameworks of the selected countries have been conducive to collective bargaining 
taking place at various bargaining levels. This task goes beyond the formal acceptance 
of the principle of the social partners’ independence and the principles relating to free 
and voluntary collective bargaining: that was accomplished in the early 1990s when the 
CEE countries ratified the relevant ILO treaties.16 This task requires a comprehensive 
scrutiny of the entire legal framework. To the fullest extent possible, the study will 
strive to point out legal shortcomings in the institutionalisation of collective bargaining 
in the four countries and to pinpoint how the existing legal framework(s) can be 
enhanced in order to facilitate collective bargaining at three major levels.  
 This study takes a legal approach and it is focused on investigating the role and 
content of law in the context of on-going industrial relations developments. The study is 
focussed on a specific time frame. The study understands that process of economic, 
social and political transition commenced in the early 1990s, with the collapse of 
centrally planned economies. The developments which have taken place since the early 
1990s, after the onset of the transitional period, and up until mid-2015, are taken into 
consideration. Where possible, events taking place before the 1990s are taken into 
account. The data regarding the four selected countries have been collected to include 
events up to mid-2015.  
Two research questions arise from the research aim: 
(1) To what extent does the current legal and institutional framework in the four 
selected countries support and promote collective bargaining at different levels (cross-
sectoral, sectoral and company)?  
(2) How can the development of the legal and institutional framework of rules for 
collective bargaining in the selected CEE countries be explained? What role does the 
EU play in this respect?   
The first research question aims at scrutinising the current state of play regarding 
the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining. The assessment includes 
the overall legal framework in the four countries, starting from the legal provisions 
pertinent to the entire collective bargaining system, followed by the legal provisions 
                                                          
16 ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No 87, 1948 and ILO 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, No 98, 1949. Slovakia ratified these two 
conventions in 1993, Slovenia in 1992, the Czech Republic in 1993. Poland has been considered a party 
to these two conventions since 1957.  
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pertinent to collective bargaining at the three main levels (cross-sectoral, sectoral and 
company). Ultimately, answering this research question gives insights into whether the 
overall legal system is conducive to collective bargaining taking place at different 
levels. 
To answer the first research question, it is necessary to set a normative benchmark 
against which the legal and institutional framework of CEE countries can be scrutinised. 
Setting the benchmark in the first place requires defining the normative function of 
labour law vis-à-vis collective bargaining system. In this respect, the study understands 
that the role of labour law should be one of supporting and promoting collective 
bargaining and autonomous legal regulation by social partners. Section 4.3 will 
elaborate further on this topic. 
Second, in order to be able to scrutinise legal and institutional rules at three major 
collective bargaining levels, this study establishes a normative model against which 
CEE laws will be assessed. However, there are inherent limits in defining such a model: 
fundamental principles of collective agreements and collective bargaining are 
differently understood across the member states of the EU and they usually reflect the 
country specific tradition of collective bargaining. There is no uniform formula on how 
laws should look and how they can be transferred from one national setting to another. 
The normative model proposed in this study is therefore not based on a firm set of legal 
rules, but rather on a set of principles and traits. This model, to be referred to as an 
articulated multi-employer bargaining model, will be proposed and further explained in 
section 4. 
The answer to the first research question will be delivered from different angles 
throughout the first and second part of this study. Some general insights on major labour 
law issues pertinent to collective bargaining in the four countries will be provided in 
Chapter 3. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will provide answers to the research question from the 
perspective of the different collective bargaining levels. The final answer to this 
research question will be given in the concluding Chapter of this book.  
The second research question arises from the fact that the transformation on 
labour laws in CEE did not occur in isolation, but as a reference to the wider, 
multidimensional context. After the onset of the transitional period in the early 1990s, 
and following the opening up of the CEE economies, the economic, welfare and 
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industrial relations systems began a process of profound transformation. Answering the 
second research question therefore requires two steps. Firstly, it is necessary to explain 
the environment which provided a pretext for labour law transformation in CEE. To do 
that, Chapter 2 will look into the existing theoretical knowledge that explains models of 
capitalism, welfare and industrial relations in CEE. Chapter 2 will also provide insights 
into economic, welfare and industrial relations processes in the four selected CEE 
countries. 
The second step in dealing with this research question will be to evaluate the 
development of the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in each 
of the four countries, following the events which have unfolded in the past 25 years. 
This will take into account the beginning of the economic transition, the process of 
accession to the EU and the recent financial and economic crisis. This evaluation entails 
accounting for the explanatory weight of the different factors in shaping legal 
provisions during this time. Given the immense scale of labour law transformation in 
the CEE countries, it would be unsurprising to find that certain legacies, originating 
from the communist based legal rules and legal principles, have continued to play a role 
in these countries. Additionally, part of the second research question is dedicated to 
influences coming from the EU, which the four selected countries joined in 2004. A 
major source of EU influences originated in the accession process, under which the CEE 
countries were engaged in transposing and implementing social acquis, which also 
involved social dialogue. At the same time, the recent financial and economic crisis 
raises questions about the EU’s competence over national collective bargaining systems, 
ultimately deeming necessary further (re)appraisal of the EU’s pre-accession role in 
boosting social dialogue in CEE. As far as other international organisations are 
concerned, the study takes into account the role of the ILO, given that these countries 
were transposing and ratifying landmark ILO treaties, particularly in the 1990s.17 The 
role of external financial organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD will not be the 
focus of the study, given that their influence over CEE labour laws was a secondary 
concern while their pressures were primarily directed towards the economies. Yet, 
because of the dependence of CEE economies on international capital in the past 
                                                          
17 ibid.  
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decades, these pressures cannot be underestimated in terms of having had potential 
effects on the development of industrial relations.18 
The second research question is addressed from different angles throughout this 
study. How the economic, welfare and industrial relations environment presented a 
pretext for labour law transformation in the CEE will be assessed in Chapter 2. Further 
analytical identification of the factors which were pertinent to labour law transformation 
is given in Chapter 3, which also provides general insights into how the legal 
framework for collective bargaining developed in these four countries. Chapter 4 
provides insights about the role of the EU. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 approach the second 
research question from the angle of different levels of collective bargaining 
respectively. Chapter 8 provides concluding answers and thoughts on the second 
research question.  
 
3.2. Relevance 
The issue of outstanding differences between “new” and “old” member states in the 
social sphere was accentuated first and foremost on the eve of accession of the CEE 
countries to the EU. Some optimistic thoughts were expressed that the EU might help in 
boosting social dialogue in the future member states.19 Since the very beginning of the 
accession process, the EU has recognised the importance of the difference between the 
social models in the CEE countries and those existing in the member states. It was the 
European Council that in 2000 programmed accession policies towards “success in the 
social field”.20  Closing the “gap” in industrial relations was deemed important not only 
for the sake of social and labour standards in the accession countries, but also because 
the functioning of several EU policies and agendas depended on meaningful collective 
bargaining mechanisms at national level.21 More than ten years after the four countries 
entered the EU, the issue of the “gap” between CEE countries and the rest of Europe 
remains topical, provoking pessimistic observations, such as that expressed by Meardi, 
                                                          
18 Cook, L. J. (2010) ‘More Rights, Less Power: Labour Standards and Labour Markets in East European 
Post-communist States’ Studies in Comparative International Development, vol 45, no 2, pp 170-197.  
19 Mailand, M. and Due, J. (2004) ‘Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe: Present State and 
Future Development’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 10, no 2, p 195; Meardi, G. (2002) 
‘The Trojan Horse for the Americanisation of Europe? Polish Industrial Relations towards the EU’ 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 8, no 1, pp 77-99. 
20 European Council (2000) Presidency Conclusions, Nice, 7-9 December 2002. 
21 Perez-Solorzano and Smismans (2012). 
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that the rounds of enlargement have debunked the myth of a socially cohesive Europe.22 
So far, at least in the area of industrial relations, existing knowledge of CEE prompts 
the conclusion that their industrial relations in no way resemble the existing models of 
continental European countries.23 This study approaches the concern over the “gap” 
between new and old member states from a legal perspective, which has so far not been 
the predominant focus of the discussions. The ambition of this study to provide new 
insights into the debate is reflected in the design of the normative model, which will be 
presented in section 4. This normative model will reflect, to the fullest extent possible, 
the reality of labour law systems in continental Europe and their collective bargaining 
practices. 
More than two decades after the onset of transition and after several profound 
challenges to collective bargaining systems – including EU accession and recent 
economic and financial crisis – it is the time to evaluate how CEE labour law developed 
and the direction in which it is expected to further develop. The legal aspects of 
industrial relations in CEE countries have not had sufficient study in the past two 
decades, while the industrial relations aspects of collective bargaining decentralisation 
and industrial relations in CEE countries attracted considerably more attention in the 
empirical studies and academic literature. A few large-scale comparative studies 
undertaken on the eve of, and for a few years after the accession of the CEE countries to 
the EU, whilst primarily addressing industrial relations concerns, drew attention to the 
salience of a supportive legislative framework for collective bargaining.24 The academic 
literature on CEE industrial relations has been flourishing in the past two decades, and 
in some instances this literature has also offered valuable legal insights. Likewise, it has 
been particularly underlined that inadequate implementation of existing legal provisions 
                                                          
22 Meardi (2012a), p 184.  
23 Kohl, H. and Platzer, H.-W. (2007) ‘The Role of the State in Central and Eastern European Industrial 
Relations: the Case of Minimum Wages’ Industrial Relations Journal, vol 38, no 6, pp 616-620; Perez-
Solorzano Borragan and Smismans (2012), p 117. 
24 Parissaki, M. and Vega Vega, S. (2008) ‘Capacity Building for Social Dialogue at Sectoral and 
Company Level in the New Member States, Croatia and Turkey’ Dublin: Eurofound; Welz, C. and 
Kauppinen, T. (2004) Social Dialogue and Conflict Resolution in the Acceding Countries, Dublin: 
Eurofound; Kohl, H. (2009) Freedom of Association, Employees’ Rights and Social Dialogue in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Results of a Survey of 16 Formerly Socialist Countries in 
Eastern Europe, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Ghellab and Vaughan-Whitehead (2003). 
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represents a worrying tendency.25 Some views were expressed that sectoral collective 
agreements have poor content and do not seem to be effective regulatory instruments.26 
Otherwise the scholarship was mostly focused on describing general features in all CEE 
countries or in several of them. When it comes to decentralised industrial relations, 
scholarship has described the general weaknesses of collective bargaining,27 particularly 
at the sectoral and cross-sectoral level, mostly looking for reasons behind the 
weaknesses in specific historical circumstances and in the market-oriented 
transformation path.28 Trade unions have been identified as particularly weak, lacking 
collective bargaining experience and having a declining membership base.29 The 
tripartite level has probably been the most researched aspect of industrial relations 
literature, with well-documented analysis of the emergence of tripartite bodies in the 
CEE, mostly pointing out their weaknesses and their expectations of playing a more 
prominent role in social and economic transformation.30 Given the dependency of CEE 
economies on international capital, the ways in which the EU and international 
organisations in different ways affected the CEE policy making and industrial relations, 
was also discussed in the literature.31  
                                                          
25 Bluhm, K. (2008) ’Resolving Liberalisation Dilemma: Labour Relations in East-Central Europe and the 
Impact of European Union’ in M. A. Moreau and M. E. Blas-López (eds) Restructuring in the New EU 
Member States: Social Dialogue, Firms Relocation, and Social Treatment of Restructuring, Brussels: 
Peter Lang, pp 59-79; Mailand and Due (2004), pp 179-197; Treib, O. and Falkner, G. (2008) 
‘Conclusions – The State of EU Standards in Central and Eastern European Practice’ in G. Falkner, O. 
Treib and E. Holzleithner (eds) Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights Or Dead 
Letters?, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp 157-182. 
26 Lado, M. and Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2003) ‘Social Dialogue in Candidate Countries: What For?’ 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 9, no 64, p 76; also, Mailand and Due (2004), p 
187. 
27 E. g. Crowley, S. (2004) ‘Explaining Labor Weakness in Post-Communist Europe: Historical Legacies 
and Comparative Perspective’ East European Politics and Societies, vol 18, no 3, pp 394-429; Meardi, G. 
(2007) ‘More Voice after More Exit? Unstable Industrial Relations in Central Eastern Europe’ Industrial 
Relations Journal, vol 38, no 6, pp 503-523; Pollert, A. (1999) ‘Trade Unionism in Transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 5, no 2, pp 209-234.  
28 E.g. Meardi (2012a); Pollert (2000). 
29 Ost, D. (2000) ‘Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism and Postcommunist 
Class Identities’ Politics & Society, vol 28, no 4, pp 503-530; Crowley (2004), Meardi (2012a). 
30 E.g. Ost (2000); also, Avdagic, S. (2010a) ‘Tripartism and Economic Reforms in Slovenia and Poland’ 
in L. Fraile (ed) Blunting Neoliberalism: Tripartism and Economic Reforms in the Developing World, 
Basingstoke: ILO, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 39-84; Iankova, E. A. (2002) Eastern European Capitalism in 
the Making Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
31 E.g. Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2012) Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, Ithaca: Cornel 
University Press; Perez-Solorzano Borragan and Smismans (2012); Marginson, P. and Meardi, G. (2006) 
‘European Union Enlargement and the Foreign Direct Investment Channel of Industrial Relations 
Transfer’ Industrial Relations Journal, vol 37, no 2, pp 92-110. 
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Yet, so far the scholarship has not given a comprehensive comparative overview 
of the legal and institutional frameworks for collective bargaining in CEE, although in 
several instances the scholars called for their evaluation. Bronstein, likewise, noted that 
while the rules and legislation concerning social partners and industrial relations are in 
place, they have not been yet consolidated and, as such, might easily come under review 
in years that follow.32 As Bronstein further explained, different rules might come to the 
attention of law makers, for example, rules on representativeness or on extending 
collective agreements to third parties.33 In 2003, Casale provided a comparative 
overview of legislative trends in the CEE countries, including relevant mechanisms and 
institutions of collective bargaining and collective agreements.34 Concluding that there 
is a positive trend in legislation promoting collective bargaining, Casale underlined that 
efficient implementation of provisions still remains a challenge in CEE countries.35 
Several ideas expressed in the legal scholarship have particularly inspired the design of 
current study. In Bronstein’s opinion, the legal reform on collective bargaining in CEE 
has involved the processes of “enriching” the existing legal framework with concepts 
which were previously unknown to the communist systems, for example industrial 
action or freedom of association.36 Another process which Bronstein saw as important 
was the liberalisation of industrial relations, which necessitated review of individual 
labour laws with the aim of bringing them closer to the “accepted wisdom in market 
economies”.37 What Bronstein labelled as market wisdom was, for Kollonay-Lehoczki, 
essentially the process of restoration of contractual freedom: the contract-void 
communist labour laws were replaced with post-transitional legislation inspired by a 
logic of entrepreneurial freedoms, private property and the laissez faire mantra which 
was undermining employee protection.38 
 
 
                                                          
32 Bronstein, A. (2006) ‘Trends and Challenges of Labour Law in Central Europe’ in J. D. R. Craig (ed) 
Globalisation and the Future of Labour Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 214. 
33 ibid. 
34 Casale, G. (2003) ‘Evolution and Trends in Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern European 
Countries’ The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol 19, no 1, 
pp 5-32.  
35 ibid., pp 31-32. 
36 Bronstein (2006), pp 194-198. 
37 ibid. 
38 Kollonay Lehoczky (2004), p 211. 
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4. Framing the study: Normative model of articulated multi – employer bargaining 
 
4.1. Decentralisation of collective bargaining: concept and rationale  
Decentralisation is a generic term describing the process of shifting the focus of 
collective bargaining from higher to lower levels. The idea of decentralisation merely 
indicates that such downward movement exists, but it does not provide precise 
information about the substantive context of collective bargaining. Thus, the precise 
context of decentralisation can be given only in relation to national industrial relations 
practices. The downward movement may indicate decentralisation from sectoral to 
company level, as well as decentralisation from cross-sectoral to sectoral level. Also, 
the mere notion does not explain the extent to which the different collective bargaining 
levels are involved in standard setting. It also does not clarify the relationship between 
different bargaining levels, which is vital for explaining the national-specific context, as 
collective bargaining normally takes place at more than one level in any country.  
In most of the countries in Europe, collective bargaining is predominantly 
developed at one particular level (the national or cross-sectoral, sectoral or branch and 
company or enterprise), while the other levels can play a more or less prominent role. 
Which collective bargaining level will be dominant is a complex question, the answer to 
which is determined in accordance with a range of social, political and economic 
factors, and can be also a matter of tradition. In countries such as the UK and the CEE 
countries, industrial relations take place predominantly at local level. In the case of the 
UK, centralised collective bargaining has disintegrated due to downward pressures, but 
in the CEE countries, centralised collective bargaining had to be built from scratch in 
the post-transitional period.  
In most of continental Europe, sectoral collective bargaining has traditionally 
formed a cornerstone of the collective bargaining systems.39 Nevertheless, in previous 
decades, many European systems have been experiencing a trend towards 
decentralisation, moving the standard setting downwards in various forms and degrees 
and thereby shifting the centre of gravity from cross-sectoral to sectoral, and from 
                                                          
39 Marginson, P. (2014) ‘Coordinated Bargaining in Europe: From Incremental Corrosion to Frontal 
Assault?’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 21, no 2, p 97. 
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sectoral to company level.40 Yet, the picture of decentralisation has not been uniform in 
Europe – in some countries, in parallel to the top-down decentralisation movement, an 
opposite process took place, involving centralisation in the form of social pacts 
concluded between national organisations of trade unions and employers’ organisations 
(for example, in Spain, Italy, France and the Netherlands).41 Recent studies have shown 
that the financial and economic crisis has further underpinned decentralisation trends 
across European countries, albeit to varying degrees.42 
The division between the UK and the other continental European countries largely 
corresponds to the dichotomy between “disorganised” and “organised” decentralisation 
as coined by Traxler.43 The systems of organised decentralisation are based on local 
level bargaining taking place under conditions and rules from higher (multi-employer) 
bargaining levels. In other words, the power and authority of lower bargaining levels 
derives from higher-level arrangements. In unorganised systems, the predominant local 
level arrangements do not take place under the framework of higher level collective 
bargaining. A legal framework can facilitate organised decentralisation in various ways; 
for example, by stipulating the possibility of derogation from a number of statutory 
provisions to the detriment of employees (in peius).44 Moreover, organised 
decentralisation can be facilitated by national (peak) level social partners in form of 
social pacts determining cross-sectoral rules and conditions under which collective 
bargaining can take place at lower bargaining levels.45 
The previous paragraphs demonstrated that the general pattern of CEE 
decentralisation is unique when contrasted to other countries in continental Europe. In 
the first place, the CEE style of decentralisation does not entail downward movement. 
                                                          
40 Jacobs, A. (2009) ‘Collective Labour Relations’ in Hepple, B. and Veneziani, B. (eds) The 
Transformation of Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of 15 Countries 1945-2004, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, pp 201-231; Marginson (2014), p 99. 
41 Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (2006) European Integration and Industrial Relations: Multi-Level 
Governance in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 16 and 118. 
42 Jacobs, A. (2014) ’Decentralisation of Labour Law Standard Setting and the Financial Crisis’ in N. 
Bruun, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law 
in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p185 and p 186. 
43 Traxler, F. (1995) ‘Farewell to Labour Market Associations? Organised versus Disorganised 
Decentralisation as a Map for Industrial Relations’ in F. Traxler and C. Crouch (eds) Organised Industrial 
Relations in Europe: What Future?, Aldershot: Avebury. The notion of organised decentralisation has 
been often referred to as centrally coordinated decentralisation, see Ferner, A. and Hyman, R. (1992) 
(eds) Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p xxxvi.  
44 Some country examples presented by Jacobs (2014), pp 175-177.  
45 Marginson and Sisson (2006), p 16 and p 118. 
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Specifically, the decentralised industrial relations in CEE result from the general 
underdevelopment of higher-level bargaining levels, originating in the pre-1990s 
systems when sectoral collective bargaining had not existed (or at least it was not free 
and voluntary), and where, for the same reason,  social dialogue culture could not yet 
establish a foothold. The sectoral level weaknesses described have paved the way for 
the company level bargaining to occupy a dominant position, as well as for managerial 
prerogatives at company level. In any case, the downward movement has not 
necessarily developed in CEE in the past two decades. As Table 2 demonstrated, some 
form of decentralisation has been visible in Slovenia and Slovakia. Bearing in mind the 
absence of genuine downward movement in the Czech Republic and Poland, these two 
countries should be labelled as “decentralised”, rather than following the trend of 
“decentralisation”.  
There are many factors driving the decentralisation trend across Europe. The most 
obvious explanation is that it is a necessary by-product of competitive pressures and 
quests for flexible labour relations, as the local levels can most appropriately reflect the 
needs and conditions of the local labour market.46 Growing market internationalisation 
has additionally underpinned decentralisation.47 It has been furthermore underpinned by 
a combination of the effects of technological changes, changes in economic demands, 
shifts in trade union powers and the ideological shift of many governments towards the 
free market narrative.48 Statutory legal rules may only set broad provisions, and as such, 
are the most appropriate locus for setting minimum standards, even though it is not 
unimaginable that certain sectors and companies would not be able to comply.49 
Similarly, sectoral and cross-sectoral arrangements may not be able to reflect local level 
needs. 50 However, cross-sectoral and sectoral standard setting may have other distinct 
benefits. Sectoral and cross-sectoral agreements, given their comprehensive scope, can 
set the floor for competition, particularly on wages or working time.51 This benefit is 
particularly valid from the legal and social perspective, as synchronisation of rights and 
                                                          
46 ibid., p 146.  
47 Particularly EMU, see Marginson and Sisson (2006), p 15. 
48 As summarised by Soskice, D. (1990) ‘Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in 
Advanced Industrialised Countries’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol 6, no 4, p 52.  
49 Jacobs (2014), p 172. 
50 Miarginson and Sisson (2006), p 146.  
51 ibid., p 145. 
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conditions of work can be used to prevent a “race to the bottom” and the lowering of 
overall social standards.52  
Yet, the question whether centralised or decentralised systems score better in 
terms of economic performance does not have a single answer. For a long time 
scholarship has been been dominated by the work of Calmfors and Driffill,53 who 
claimed that the best performing systems are those fully centralised or fully 
decentralised, unlike systems which occupy the middle position – neither fully 
centralised nor fully decentralised. However, the findings of Calmfors and Driffill have 
been mitigated by newer studies.54 
This study presupposes the existence of three major bargaining levels across 
European countries: (a) national or cross-sectoral level (b) sectoral, industry or branch 
level and (c) company or enterprise level. To streamline the discussion, the study uses 
the generic term “sectoral collective bargaining” to denote the bargaining level which 
takes place at a level intermediate to the national/cross-sectoral level and the local 
(company or enterprise) levels, without further designation of industry or branch 
structure. Similarly, the term “company collective bargaining” is employed regardless 
of whether the bargaining takes place at the level of the entire company or in one of its 
units. Furthermore, the current study focuses on collective bargaining in private sector 
only, given that public sector – not being subject to same degree of market pressures, 
internationalisation and return to entrepreneurial freedoms in post-transitional years – 
may not adequately reflect the challenges of the decentralised collective bargaining in 
CEE.  
The following section sets out the analytical framework for further research, by 
putting forward a model that will serve as a benchmark against which CEE systems will 
be scrutinised. 
                                                          
52 Traxler notes that these negotiations are by default so encompassing that the macroeconomic 
perspective cannot be avoided; in Traxler, F. (2003a) ’Bargaining (De)centralisation, Macroeconomic 
Performance and Control over the Employment Relationship’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 
41, no 1, p 3. 
53 Calmfors, L. and Driffill, J. (1988) ’Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic 
Performance’ Economic Policy, vol 3, no 6, pp 13-61.   
54 The most influential argument involved the notion of coordinated bargaining that can be roughly 
understood as the synchronisation between the bargaining levels and various bargaining parties. It has 
been claimed that coordination must be accounted for when discussing the economic performance of 
different models, as the systems which are decentralised may be coordinated and consequently amount to 
full centralisation. On the other hand, systems that are highly centralised may not be coordinated. For 
explanations over the role of coordination as well as the other critiques of Calmfors and Driffil thesis, see 
e.g. Traxler (2003a); also, Soskice (1990). 
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4.2. Articulated multi-employer bargaining model  
This section presents the model of articulated multi-employer bargaining as a normative 
benchmark against which the legal and institutional framework in the four selected 
countries will be scrutinised in this study. The elements of the model come from 
industrial relations: in a nutshell, the terms “articulated multi-employer bargaining” or 
just “multi-employer bargaining” is widely used by scholars of industrial relations to 
describe the collective bargaining models of most of the countries of Europe.55 Multi-
employer bargaining essentially denotes the type of collective bargaining in which 
employee organisations can generate binding decisions for their constituents, after they 
have joined the associations and obtained the mandate to negotiate.56 Thus, this term 
implies the existence of collective bargaining structures at levels above company: 
sectoral and cross-sectoral. This multi-employer bargaining has remained the 
cornerstone of industrial relations across Europe despite being under strain because of 
several decades of the downward decentralisation pressures.  For the purpose of this 
study, the concept of multi-employer bargaining will be further analytically 
deconstructed and translated to the extent possible into the legal sphere. As a contrast to 
multi-employer bargaining, single-employer bargaining takes place when employers 
negotiate individually, as is the case in those countries with dominant company level 
bargaining. Traxler explained that, as opposed to single-employer bargaining, multi-
employer bargaining follows the inclusive pattern: it is associated with higher coverage 
rates, extension practices (allowing the extensions of powers of collective agreements to 
the third parties) and/or bargaining coordination at sectoral or central level.57 Moreover, 
Traxler delineated three preconditions for functional multi-employer bargaining 
practices: strong trade unions, strong employer’ associations and a supportive state.58 
Traxler also underlined the salient role of the legal framework underpinning multi-
                                                          
55 Among many sources, for example, Marginson (2014); Marginson and Sisson (2006); Sisson, K. and 
Marginson, P. (2002) ‘Coordinated Bargaining: A Process for Our Times?’ British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol 40, no 2, pp 197-220. 
56 Visser, J. (2000) Trends in Unionisation and Collective Bargaining, Geneva: ILO. 
57 Traxler, F. (1998) ‘Collective Bargaining in the OECD: Developments, Preconditions and Effects’ 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 4, no 2, pp 211-212. 
58 ibid., p 213. 
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employer bargaining systems, noting that it is a decisive determinant of the collective 
bargaining structure in a country.59 
  Moreover, as underlined by Marginson, the effectiveness of multi-employer 
bargaining arrangements rests on articulation or coordination, which can be facilitated 
vertically across levels or horizontally across the bargaining units.60 Coordination can 
be broadly explained as “the extent to which the different levels are integrated so as to 
prevent them from mutually blocking their respective purposes”.61 In this sense, 
coordination is an inherent element of multi-employer bargaining models. Biagi has 
underlined that the paradox of effective decentralised systems is that a certain degree of 
coordination is needed.62 
In the context of this study, articulation will be the preferred term, and it will be 
used in a vertical sense to denote a procedural mechanism defining the relationship 
between higher and lower levels of standard-setting. Therefore, articulation will be used 
to determine the relationship between collective agreements and statutory labour law; 
but also the relationship between collective agreements at different collective bargaining 
levels. The reason for using the term articulation rather than coordination is that it 
captures more adequately the two-way relationship, as explained by Marginson.63 This 
study also follows the explanation of articulation by Marleau:   
“If globalisation means that pressures and readjustments downward are unavoidable, there is a 
need for structural adjustment or articulation that would allow existing systems to continue to 
serve the purpose for which they were designed. In a fully decentralised regime, no such 
articulation is possible because there is no central power or level vested with a power to intervene 
(nor even coordinated strategies between jurisdictions) to contain existing debasing pressures.”64  
Furthermore, this study closely follows Marleau’s explanation that decentralisation can 
be articulated on the basis of complementarity, allowing shared competences between 
                                                          
59 Traxler, F. (2003b) ‘Coordinated Bargaining: A Stocktaking of its Preconditions, Practices and 
Performance’ Industrial Relations Journal, vol 34, no 3, p 20.  
60 Marginson (2014), p 98, citing Crouch, C. (1993) Industrial Relations and European State Traditions, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Traxler F., Blaschke S. and Kittel B. (2001) National Labour Relations 
in Internationalised Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
61 Traxler, F. (1994) ‘Collective Bargaining: Levels and Coverage’, OECD Employment Outlook, Paris: 
OECD, p 171. 
62 Biagi, M. (2003) ‘Changing Industrial Relations’ in M. Biagi and M. Tiraboschi (eds) Marco Biagi: 
Selected Writings, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 34. 
63 ibid. 
64 Marleau, V. (2006) ‘Globalisation, Decentralisation and the Role of Subsidiarity in the Labour Setting’ 
in J.R. Craig and M. Lynk (eds) Globalisation And the Future of Labour Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p 120. 
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different standard-setting venues and levels.65 By using the complementarity 
mechanism, a balance between broad and narrow, central and local is reached with a 
view to establishing the “checks and balances” of the entire model.66 
This section has so far sketched the major analytical traits and objectives of the 
model which will be guiding the current study. Defined in this way, the analytical traits 
bear close resemblance to the model which was proposed by Lafoucriere and Green 
with the aim of being presented to CEE countries, entitled a concerted regulation 
model. The ways in which the authors have defined this model conform to the 
objectives of the proposed model in the current study:  
 “Concerted model of regulation is triggering a process of competition and deregulation at the 
national level but with a view to integrating and re-regulating at all other possible levels, thereby 
ensuring the participation of all social forces, including wider involvement of workers”.67 
The authors explain that this model focuses more on “process” than “content”.68 It is 
based on active involvement of social partners in standard setting and therefore it 
represents an alternative to state legislation. While Lafoucriere and Green did not aim to 
present its analytical elements, this thesis aims to go one step further. It will analytically 
deconstruct the articulated model of multi-employer bargaining, translate it to the legal 
realm and use it as a benchmark for scrutiny of the selected CEE countries.  
Before doing so, it is also important to stress the underlying rationale for claiming 
that this model can benefit CEE countries. The articulated multi-employer bargaining 
model presented is used as a normative benchmark for this study, not only because it 
reflects the reality of most of the systems in Europe, but also because it offers certain 
advantages and as such can help to close the “social gap” between the member states. 
This chapter explained the advantages of sectoral and cross-sectoral collective 
agreements. In addition, the advantage of the articulation between different standard-
setting levels, as noted by Marleau, is that it may offset the negative effects on working 
conditions generated by decentralisation which can lead to a regulatory “race to the 
                                                          
65 Marleau further develops her arguments by establishing subsidiarity as the articulating device; ibid.  
66 ibid, pp 108-109. 
67 Lafoucriere, C. and Green, R. (2006) ‘Social Dialogue as a Regulatory Mode of the ESM: Some 
Empirical Evidence from the New Member States’ in M. Jepsen and A. Serrano Pascual (eds) 
Unwrapping the European Social Model, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 234-235. 
68 ibid., p 234.  
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bottom”.69 By its very nature, the model promotes the active role of social partners, in 
this way enhancing the legitimacy of industrial relations. As already underlined by 
Lafoucriere and Green, greater involvement of a wider set of actors assures that 
standard setting is based not only on economic needs but also on social factors.70   
 
4.3. The legal architecture of the articulated model of collective bargaining 
There are some legal traits that are easily detectable from the previously proposed 
analytical model. Essentially, since this model is based on the standard-setting role of 
social partners, the collective agreements represent the predominant substantive source 
of rules, rights and conditions of work and employment. The model is furthermore 
based on complementarity between collective agreements and statutory law as two 
different forms of standard setting, as well as complementarity between collective 
agreements at different levels. The legal definition of such a model comes with inherent 
limits. Bearing in mind the variety of legal solutions across European continental 
countries on even fundamental concepts pertinent to collective bargaining, such as the 
definition of collective agreements or the way in which freedom of association and 
collective autonomy is inserted into the legal systems,71 this model cannot bring a 
clearly defined set of rules for the CEE countries. The model is therefore based on 
shared features of the existing models in continental Europe, which will form guiding 
principles for further research. To further explain the model, what follows is 
presentation of three analytical elements which represent the cornerstone of articulated 
multi-employer bargaining. Starting from the premise that standard setting within the 
articulated model of multi-employer bargaining arises from two different sources: (a) 
statutory labour law and (b) collective agreements; the nature, and the role in standard 
setting of both sources will be examined. After that, as a third element (c) it will be 
                                                          
69 Marleau (2006), pp 119-120. 
70 Lafoucriere and Green (2006), p 235. Deakin and Ewing in this vein called for achieving “an 
appropriate balance between cooperation and competition, rather than always seeking to maximise the 
intensity of competition as such” in Deakin, S. and Ewing, K. (1996) ‘Inflation, Economic Performance 
and Employment Rights’ Working Paper no 45, Cambridge: ESRC Centre for Business Research 
University of Cambridge, p 12. 
71 For example, agreeing on the meaning of basic principles, such as collective autonomy, would be 
notoriously difficult: this concept is rarely used in some countries (France), but more frequently in the 
others (Germany and Italy); on the comparative dimension of collective autonomy in Europe, see Le 
Friant, M. (2013) ‘Collective Autonomy: Hope or Danger?’ Comparative Labour Law and Policy 
Journal, vol 34, pp 627-654.  
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necessary to explain how the articulation between the two sources, as well the 
articulation between collective agreements at different levels is reached. This 
explanation will be based on the principles of complementarity and shared competences 
in a multi-level system as explained above. 
 
Nature and role of labour law 
It has already been noted in this chapter that the role of labour law vis-à-vis industrial 
relations is understood as one that supports and promotes collective bargaining and 
autonomous regulation by social partners.72 The role of the state in promoting collective 
bargaining has been also underlined by the ILO framework; although the ILO 
underlines that “promotion” may not translate into imposition of collective bargaining.73 
Although the basic function of labour law has been traditionally seen as one of 
protecting employees, in recent decades, there has been a growing understanding that 
labour law should also serve the economic objectives of productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness.74 Although the protective function of labour law – the function of 
protecting the employee as a weaker party – has been increasingly challenged, it has 
never ceased to play a vital role.75 Labour law exercises a protective function by setting 
a legal minimum standard that can be further upgraded by collective agreements or 
individual contracts of employment. This is what Kahn-Freund termed regulatory 
legislation: it consists of rules giving rise to individual rights and obligations on the part 
of workers and employers, observation of which is mandatory.76 At the same time, 
labour law has another function which is more procedural in nature and has the aim of 
                                                          
72 As posed in section 2. 
73 Gernigon, B., Odero, A. and Guido, H. (2000b) ’ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ 
International Labour Review, vol 139, no 1, p 40. Otherwise, of the four countries examined in this study, 
the ILO Convention No. 154 concerning the promotion of collective bargaining of 1981 has been ratified 
only by two – Slovenia (2006) and Slovakia (2009). 
74 Davidov, G. and Langille, B. (2011) ‘The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic and Human 
Development’, in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
75 Even more, the interventionist nature of the state, in the sense of directly regulating matters and 
substituting for collective bargaining has been on the rise in some European countries since the 1980s; see 
Howell, C. (2012) ’The Changing Relationship Between Labour and the State in Contemporary 
Capitalism’ Law, Culture and the Humanities, vol 11, no 1, pp 6-16.   
76 Davies, P. and Freedland, M. (1983) Kahn Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd edition, London: Stevens 
& Sons, p 60. 
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enabling and promoting autonomous regulation by social partners. This function Kahn-
Freund explained in the following terms as auxiliary:  
”The legislation here envisaged seeks to promote collective bargaining, to ensure the observance 
of collective agreements, to define and to delineate the freedom of organisation and the freedom to 
strike, and the right to promote union interests at the level of the plant or enterprise, for instance, 
by means of the closed shop.” 77 
Kahn-Freund further explicated that auxiliary legislation should promote and support: 
(a) the process of collective bargaining (b) the conclusion of collective agreements (c) 
the application and observance of collective agreements.78 In a similar vein, Supiot has 
underlined that general tendency of law is to become:   
“devoid of substantive provisions and to be supplemented by procedural rules designed to 
guarantee right to collective bargaining”. 79  
Following this argument, Supiot furthermore held that the role of a general legal 
framework is to establish the overall principles and objectives of the system of social 
policy; to ensure balance between parties to collective bargaining and to encourage 
bargaining to favour its extension to areas reluctant to undertake dialogue.80 Deakin and 
Wilkinson with a similar objective delineated three types of standards contained in 
labour law: (a) substantive standards, directly regulating labour relations; (b) procedural 
standards, regulating terms and condition of collective bargaining; (c) promotional 
standards, underpinning various forms of active labour policies.81  
The transformation of the CEE labour laws which commenced in the early 1990s 
was profound, involving the process of transformation from the overly protective and 
regulatory role of the state, to one which supports and promotes the regulatory 
importance of collective agreements. It is questionable to what extent this process has 
been accomplished. The arguments presented above thus suggest the need to investigate 
whether CEE labour laws have indeed managed to transform their role during the last 
25 years. This study will examine whether CEE countries managed to change the 
overwhelming regulatory role of labour law (while not losing the core protective role), 
                                                          
77 ibid. 
78 Three elements were substantiated by Kahn Freund, ibid., p 87. 
79 Supiot, A. (2001) Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 98.  
80 ibid., p 99.  
81 Deakin, S. and Wilkinson, F. (1994) ‘Rights vs Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational 
Labour Standards’ Industrial Law Journal, vol 23, no 4, pp 290-292.  
25 
 
and at the same time ask whether the auxiliary approach towards self-regulation by 
social partners has been developed. This assessment will be made from different angles 
in several chapters: Chapter 3 will provide more general remarks while Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 will contribute from the different angles of particular collective bargaining levels.   
 
Nature and role of collective agreements 
The changing nature of collective labour agreements has been at the heart of debates on 
modernisation of labour law in most countries in Europe. With top-down 
decentralisation pressures, collective labour agreements underwent significant 
transformation, and according to Supiot acquired new functions.82 One of the most 
prominent changes involved the introduction of the “flexibilisation function” of 
collective agreements, allowing adaptation of their provisions to the needs of company 
competiveness. Supiot has also added that collective agreements have become a 
company management tool. Moreover, Supiot underlined that collective agreements 
have started implementing legal regulations and performing legislative functions. The 
collective agreements’ functions presented largely correspond to Bruun’s delineation. 
Bruun observed the greater responsibility of collective agreements in implementing 
legal provisions (regulatory function), collective agreements becoming an instrument of 
adaptability (flexibility function) and involving employees in policy making 
(management function).83 Given that in the past decades, and particularly with the 
recent financial and economic crisis,84 the pressures for decentralisation have increased, 
the function and role of sectoral collective agreement has been particularly challenged. 
Hence, Visser noticed the tendency for sectoral level agreements in Europe to be 
redesigned “as a menu rather than a norm”,85 or, in other words, becoming more 
procedural in the sense of becoming predominantly concerned with providing rules and 
conditions for company-level bargaining, rather than setting universal standards 
applicable throughout a specific sector.  
                                                          
82 Supiot (2001), pp 97-100.   
83 Bruun, N. (2003) ’The Autonomy of Collective Agreement’ in R. Blanpain (ed) Collective Bargaining, 
Discrimination, Social Security and the European Integration, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 
no 48, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 9. 
84 Jacobs (2014). 
85 Visser, J. (2005) ’Beneath the Surface of Stability: New and Old Modes of Governance in European 
Industrial Relations’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 11, no 3, p 297.    
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In the past 25 years, the labour laws of CEE countries have evolved from the 
previous system in which collective agreements have played only a marginal role, and 
were not considered free and voluntary. It is therefore vital for this study to investigate 
the current function of collective agreements in the selected countries. There are 
practical limitations as to the extent to which this task can be performed, given that it 
would require thorough analysis of the contents of concluded collective agreements. 
Given the lack of comprehensive and comparative data on this topic in CEE, this study 
will therefore primarily focus on investigating the current legal framework and how it 
regulates collective agreements in CEE countries and on what functions it allows them 
to develop. This task will be performed from a general perspective in Chapter 3, but 
chapters 5, 6, and 7 will also contribute to the discussion. 
 
Articulation 
As explained above, the articulated multi-employer bargaining model rests on 
procedural mechanisms which ensure the complementarity between various sources of 
standard setting. Articulation refers to the relationship between (1) statutory labour rules 
and collective agreements as two distinct systems of regulation and sources of standard 
setting, and (2) collective labour agreements concluded at different levels (cross-
sectoral, sectoral and company). The labour laws of all the European countries are based 
on the hierarchical top-down relationship between different sources of labour 
regulation.86 In all European countries, statutory labour law has priority over collective 
agreements.87 With respect to the hierarchy of collective agreements, a rule is that 
collective agreements at a higher level (broader agreements) will prevail over collective 
agreements at a lower level (narrower).88 As long as such legal ordering ensures that the 
main source of substantive regulation of work and employment is in practice set at local 
levels, these legal models do not run counter to the logic of decentralisation of industrial 
relations. Otherwise, if the standards are being drawn (predominantly) from higher level 
                                                          
86 As Goldin notes, however, is that “certain weakening of law in the face of collective agreements can be 
verified” and “collective bargaining agreements are assigned competence that used to be within the 
purview of the statutory law; see Goldin, A. (2011) ‘Global Conceptualisations and Local Constructions 
of the Idea of Labour Law’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p 74. 
87 Jacobs (2014), p 171. 
88 ibid., p 175. 
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agreements, then the system is centralised. In a formal legal sense, there are two 
different ways in which the established ordering can be upset:89 
(a) By applying the principle of the most favourable rule, allowing the provisions 
of lower collective agreements to prevail over the rules which are applied at the higher 
level.  
(b) Allowing lower sources to deviate to the detriment of employee (in peius), by 
different techniques. 
The latter legal possibility has been widely used by many European countries. A 
specific example is France, where the 2004 Loi Fillon introduced the principle that 
lower collective bargaining agreements should have priority over the agreements at 
higher level, even when they set less favourable standards than higher level 
provisions.90 There are many other legal possibilities allowing such deviation; for 
example, since the 1980s in Germany it has been possible to include opening clauses in 
sectoral collective agreements, which define the terms under which less favourable rules 
can be set at a lower bargaining level.91 The role of these mechanisms described is to 
provide checks and balances for uncontrolled decentralisation, by defining conditions or 
upper boundaries for derogations at lower (company) level. 
The aim of the thesis is to identify the legal principles which keep the system 
articulated in selected countries, as well as the rules at higher bargaining levels and/or 
the statutory legal rules that play a procedural role in stimulating standard setting at 
lower levels.  
 
5. Research methodology and country selection 
Four countries are selected for in-depth analysis. The selection process aimed at 
reflecting different industrial relations trends in CEE and different collective bargaining 
                                                          
89 Based on Jacobs, ibid., pp 172-181. 
90 Freedland, M. and Kountouris, N. (2011) The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Oxford: 
Oxford Monographs on Labour Law, p 71.  
91 Jacobs (2014), p 177. 
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practices at various levels. As a first step, a delineation presented in one study by 
Eurofound was taken into account. It outlined two groups of CEE countries:92  
(a) the countries where sectoral collective agreements have higher coverage rates, 
combined with the practice of concluding company level agreements (Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); 
(b) a second group of countries where company agreements prevail and sectoral 
collective agreements have a less prominent role. As a result, collective bargaining has 
lower coverage in general (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland).  
As a second step, after a close examination of industrial relations trends within 
both groups, four countries with the following distinct features were selected. 
(1) Slovenia’s model of collective bargaining is unique in comparison to the other 
CEE countries. This country has the most developed practice of bargaining at sectoral 
level and the organisational capacities of social partners at this level are comparatively 
more developed than in the other CEE countries. Moreover, Slovenia has nurtured a 
tradition of concluding legally binding cross-sectoral collective agreements (at least, 
until the mid-2000s), for which it is also unique.  
 (2) Slovakia also has a relatively developed sector-level activity when compared 
to the other CEE countries, even though not all sectors have collective labour 
agreements in place. An additional argument for its selection is that Slovakia has been 
going through numerous labour law reforms in the past two decades, potentially 
suggesting that labour law transformation is still on-going. 
 (3) The Czech Republic has predominantly company-level bargaining, with 
sectoral collective bargaining playing a certain role in industrial relations, but not as 
much as in Slovakia. The Czech Republic has also gone through a number of legislative 
reforms in the past two decades. Moreover, Slovakia and the Czech Republic share 
common legal and cultural legacies from the former federal state of Czechoslovakia. 
Bearing in mind that these two countries have different industrial relations trends today, 
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the comparative analysis of their laws could yield useful insights regarding the two 
research questions.  
 (4) Poland is an example of a country where sectoral bargaining is less developed 
than in the other three countries and where agreements at this level cover a marginal 
percentage of the labour market. Its labour law has also undergone a great number of 
revisions in the past two decades: it is noteworthy that the Labour Code originates back 
to 1974 (after being amended a number of times) and that Poland never underwent a 
thorough, complete re-codification of its labour law. 
 
This research is based on two data sources: the analysis of existing literature and 
interviews. The former consists of available English language academic studies and 
policy data on law and industrial relations in the four countries, including the available 
English translations of the relevant legal acts.  
Interviews were conducted with legal and policy experts from social partners' 
organisations and with staff within the ministries for social affairs in the selected 
countries. The aim was to gain deeper insights into country-specific legal and collective 
bargaining issues at different bargaining levels. Sometimes different specialists in the 
same organisation were in a position to provide answers from the perspective of their 
specific expertise. In these cases, interview meetings were attended by more than one 
specialist. In total, 25 interviews were conducted in the four selected countries in 2012; 
these interviews are listed in the annex.  
While the majority of interviews were conducted during visits to the capital cities 
of the chosen countries, one interview was conducted by telephone and one was based 
on the completion of the questionnaire in writing. Most of the meetings were conducted 
in English, with translators attending some of the meetings in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Some of the interviews in Slovenia were conducted in the native 
language of the researcher. 
While designing the interviews, the initial idea was to target experts from the 
ministries of social affairs and experts among social partners on both sides, at central 
and sectoral level. Ideally, these interviews would have comprised of seven interviews 
per country: one from the ministry of social affairs, two from the social partners 
organisations at the central (peak) level on both sides, two from the social partners 
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organisations on both sides of the metals sector and two from the social partners 
organisations on both sides of the construction sector. The metals and construction 
sectors were selected for their economic relevance in the selected countries and because 
of their comparatively more developed collective bargaining tradition compared with 
the other sectors. Furthermore, the metals and construction sectors are traditionally 
more exposed to international competition and labour mobility.  
In practice, it proved impossible to conduct or schedule interviews with all of the 
organisations initially anticipated. This is reflected in the number and composition of 
the interview participants, as listed in the annex of this study. For example, data from 
the construction sector are particularly scarce. Also, in Slovakia one interview was held 
with specialists on the trade union side in the energy and chemical sector (the trade 
union ECHOZ). In addition, useful information on Polish industrial relations was 
retrieved from an academic interview.  
The interviews conducted were semi-structured. A general questionnaire was 
prepared containing questions about the legal regulation of collective agreements and 
collective bargaining, in general, and at different levels; tripartite social dialogue; recent 
legal and industrial relations developments; the relationship between collective 
agreements and statutory legal rules; the relationship between collective agreements at 
different levels; EU influences on collective bargaining; any other issue which the 
interviewees considered relevant, including, if applicable, wage bargaining. The 
questionnaire was designed in a general fashion in order to stimulate open-ended 
discussions on issues seen as relevant from the viewpoint of each interviewee. Each 
interview data, thus, largely reflected viewpoints pertinent to each collective bargaining 
level and the organisations represented by the interviewees. 
The interview data has been used in two ways. Firstly, the interviews conducted 
furthered the knowledge of the researcher on country-specific legal and industrial 
relations issues. Secondly, the interviewees' perceptions and interpretations of legal and 
industrial relations issues were used to build some of the conclusions of this study, 
particularly in the second part of the study, and the conclusions within Chapter 8. This 
study relied on the interviewees' interpretations especially in those areas where "hard" 
and precise data are not to be found - this is particularly the case regarding the content 
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of collective agreements (matters covered by collective agreements) and the regulatory 
importance of company versus sectoral collective agreements. 
The study has been designed to cover developments within a specific time frame. 
Principally, it focuses on developments which took place after the onset of the 
transitional period (the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s), but also, where possible, 
the post-transitional developments are considered against the backdrop of the legal and 
institutional framework that had existed before the 1990s. The study takes into account 
developments up until June 2015.  
 
6. Structure of the thesis 
This study is divided in two parts. The first part is devoted to topics which are pertinent 
to the general legal and institutional framework, including the interlinked relevant 
aspects of industrial relations, economic and welfare models, and the EU-related issues 
(chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) while the second part of the study is focused on the legal and 
institutional aspects of collective bargaining at three major bargaining levels (chapters 
5, 6 and 7).  
This Chapter aimed at introducing the research topic, questions and research 
design.  
Chapter 2 takes a non-legal approach and explains how the specific economic 
climate, welfare reforms and the corresponding industrial relations landscape provided a 
pretext for decentralised collective bargaining in these countries. This chapter relies on 
existing theoretical knowledge explaining models of capitalism, welfare and industrial 
relations in CEE, permitting deeper understanding of the general environment in which 
labour law transformation has been taking place in the past decades. 
Chapter 3 discusses the development of labour law in the four selected countries. 
In this sense, it contributes towards the second research question, by looking into the 
national-specific responses to issues and challenges surrounding the development of a 
legal and institutional collective bargaining framework in these four countries in the 
past two and half decades. At the same time, given that such analysis provides insights 
into major national labour law traits and issues pertinent to collective bargaining, it 




Chapter 4, in an effort to provide tentative answers to the second research 
question, aims to deconstruct the ways in which the EU has affected the development of 
a legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in the four countries. The 
chapter first scrutinises the role of the EU during the accession process, and then re-
appraises this role in view of the developments that took place during the recent 
financial and economic crisis.   
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, respectively, provide comparative country analysis of the 
legal and institutional framework of rules at cross-sectoral, sectoral and company 
collective bargaining level. These chapters contribute to answering both research 
questions from the perspective of specific bargaining levels.  
Chapter 8 summarises the answers reached in the different chapters of the study 

















The institutional configuration of communist systems was not identical throughout 
the CEE countries, but several key traits were common, including centralised 
decision making on all relevant aspects of working life (including wages), and state 
ownership of the means of productions.93 In addition, terms and conditions of work 
and employment were centrally set and the employees enjoyed high (at least de iure, 
prescribed by law) protection in a one-size-fits-all manner. With the demise of 
communist ideology, the CEE countries began a profound transition to new 
economic, political and social systems in the early 1990s. Building markets and 
boosting economic growth represented the overarching aim of the post-communist 
period. Centrally planned economies had to be reconstructed on the basis of free 
market principles, which involved becoming internationally competitive and 
undertaking privatisation of public (state owned) property. However, the CEE 
countries came increasingly under the influence of transnational and international 
actors, including international financial institutions, EU and multinational 
corporations, given that foreign investments had started playing a vital role in 
building post-transitional economies. The post-transitional policies also had to deal 
with the large social costs of economic reform due to rapidly increasing 
                                                          
93 Aslund provides one of the most comprehensive lists of traits and accurate description of the 
previous communist systems, see Aslund, A. (2007) How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation 
of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 
11-29.   
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unemployment and inflation,94 posing further questions about the type of social 
policies that should accompany the economic transformation.  
The pace and content of the reforms, however, differed significantly from one 
country to another. For many CEE countries, transition from command-and-control 
systems to free market economies involved radical macroeconomic changes, seen as 
an antipode to the previously controlled systems. These radical policies, as one 
observer explained, advocated the move towards a “market on all fronts, as quickly 
as possible” with the aim of catching up with the western countries.95 Such a radical 
and comprehensive agenda was pursued in Poland, under the Balcerowicz program 
invented in 1989 and often referred to as “shock therapy”.96 An even more radical 
programme was launched in Czechoslovakia in 1991.97 Neoliberalism became a 
catchphrase to describe the interpretative framework for carrying out these reforms in 
CEE.98 Such policy orientation has been embodied in the already-seminal quote of 
the former Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, who called for building “capitalism 
without adjectives”.99 Yet, not all countries adopted this approach, or at least, not to 
this extent. At the other end of spectrum, there was Slovenia, which adopted a more 
                                                          
94 Martin, R. (2013) Constructing Capitalisms: Transforming Business Systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 52. 
95 ibid., p 11. 
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Czech Sociological Review, vol 3, no 2, p 180.  
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gradual approach towards economic transformation, with a low level of international 
investments, generous welfare and slow privatisation.100 
It is in the midst of these reform processes that the institutionalisation of 
industrial relations began. The transformation of industrial relations was country 
specific, developing in relation to the pace and content of economic and social 
reforms, but also with inherited legacies from the communist period playing a role. 
The Polish trade unions emerged as influential actors in the post-1990s 
developments, mainly thanks to the legacy of the trade union movement Solidarity 
which was formed after a massive wave of strikes in 1980.101 Moreover, the Polish 
trade union movement managed to play a vital role in the privatisation process, by 
gaining concessions from the political elites at the beginning of the 1990s.102 The 
trade union landscape in the former country of Czechoslovakia was completely 
different. It could not benefit from such favourable legacies as its Polish counterparts 
and followed a different path in post-transitional transformation, mainly in 
subordination to the political elites.103 Finally, there was Slovenia, which, following 
the philosophy of gradualism and a balanced approach between social and economic 
gains, shaped the post-transitional industrial relations landscape to have a close 
relationship with a favourable paradigmatic legacy of “self-management” and pro-
market orientation from pre-transitional socialist Slovenia.104  
 This chapter builds on the fact that post-communist labour laws did not 
develop in isolation, but as a response to the complex post-transitional setting. 
Hence, the content of labour laws developed in relation to a number of inter-linked 
elements, including, but not limited to, market transformation, type of privatisation 
of state ownership, industrial relations developments and attitudes towards welfare. 
Furthermore, this chapter understands that processes guiding economic, welfare and 
industrial relations transformation were country-specific. Hence, the aim of the 
chapter will be to elaborate on how the specific economic climate and corresponding 
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welfare reforms affected the industrial relations landscape, particularly decentralised 
collective bargaining, and provided a pretext for legal regulation of collective 
bargaining. The chapter therefore takes a non-legal approach and draws on existing 
theoretical knowledge explaining models of capitalism, welfare and industrial 
relations in CEE. At the same time, it provides a closer explanation of the relevant 
processes in the four countries selected for this study by providing deeper 
understanding of the country-specific traits and issues. It offers useful ground for the 
subsequent analysis that will be provided within the framework of the study. 
The chapter is structured in the following manner. Explanations from a more 
general point of view about of the type of capitalism (section 2.1), welfare (section 
2.2) and industrial relations (section 2.3) in CEE are provided at the outset. 
Following that, an overview of national developments in the four countries (section 
3) is given. Finally, some concluding thoughts for further research are given in 
section 4. 
 
2. Explaining capitalism, welfare and industrial relations in CEE 
 
2.1. Capitalism in CEE 
So far, the literature has recognised that there can be more than one type of 
capitalism. Yet, more than two decades after the transitional processes involving 
transformation from state-commanded to open market systems started in CEE, 
judging from the volume of scholarship which this topic attracted, how to explain 
and classify the CEE economies remains unclear. The ambiguity is further 
exacerbated by some views that the CEE countries are still in a “transiting” phase, 
and hence, the discussion should revolve less around the type of capitalism in a 
country, but more around the scale of capitalism in CEE.105 Thus, in an effort to 
explain capitalism in CEE, a list of questions appears relevant: what type of 
economies have the CEE countries developed more than two decades after the 
demise of centrally-coordinated communist regimes? Do the modern CEE economies 
resemble the existing models of capitalism in Europe? Above all, have these 
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economies managed a complete transformation to a market system? What follows 
aims to provide a concise overview of the flourishing literature on CEE capitalism. 
The ambition of the section is not to provide a comprehensive overview of existing 
literature, but its particular focus will be on those approaches offering analyses 
relevant to the four countries that are the subject of this study. 
The next subsection starts with a brief analysis of the most influential approach 
in comparative political economy, Varieties of Capitalism (VoC). A large volume of 
CEE literature uses this as an analytical framework to explain the CEE countries. 
After that, the ways in which scholars have applied the VoC approach to develop 
their classifications on CEE capitalism will be presented. In addition, because there 
are authors who did not base their work on VoC, the regime classification of Bohle 
and Greskovits will be presented as the most prominent in this category. 
 
2.1.1. Varieties of Capitalism 
The approach of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) was originally developed by Hall and 
Soskice in 2001,106 after which it was widely accepted, in integral or modified form, 
by other scholars. This approach distinguished two major national production 
regimes with distinct institutional features: (a) liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
(b) coordinated market economies (CMEs). Hall and Soskice based the VoC 
classification on formal and informal rules which companies develop with other 
actors in the market. Several market areas were taken into account, including 
industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, 
research and development, as well as the interaction between managers and 
employees.107 Hall and Soskice reached the following conclusions. In LMEs, the 
competitive market mechanism is the key coordinating tool and firm behaviour is 
determined on the basis of conditions of demand and supply.108 In CMEs, firm 
behaviour is determined on the basis of non-competitive market institutions and 
results from strategic interactions between firms and other actors.109 Hall and Soskice 
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designated the UK as a typical model of LMEs, while Germany represents an 
archetypal model of CMEs.  
In the field of industrial relations, the difference between the two models is 
easy to spot. As a rule of thumb, because the market functions on the basis of 
competition, in LMEs the role of social partners in decision making is less 
prominent, there are substantial managerial prerogatives, and there is a lack of an 
economy-wide wage coordination.110 On the other hand, CMEs have comparatively 
more developed social dialogue mechanisms, particularly at the sectoral level. 
Centralised collective bargaining in CMEs represents a coordinating mechanism, as 
the result of which the social partners are more powerful and better organised when 
compared with LMEs.111 
Hall and Soskice’s approach on VoC is one of the most influential views in 
comparative political economy, and it has inspired a large volume of alternative 
explanations and classifications of capitalism.112 This chapter will not present these 
views, but what matters here is that neither VoC nor subsequent approaches included 
CEE countries in the research. At best, the existence of CEE countries has been 
acknowledged under broad concepts, such as “emerging market economies” by 
Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher.113 Such broad and general conceptualisations have 
been designed with the aim of demonstrating the presence of some form of 
capitalism in CEE, obviously different from the existing models in Europe and 
unable to be explained using the existing classification.  Further research on CEE 
capitalism has been left entirely within the competence of CEE scholarship, which 
will be examined in the following section. 
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2.1.2. Explaining CEE capitalism 
In seeking ways to explain the economic transformation and the type of economic 
model(s) that developed in CEE, some attempts were made to adapt the existing VoC 
approach to CEE. However, no consensus has been reached among the scholars that 
this is viable or, to be more precise, whether the CEE countries can fit the VoC 
dichotomy, or whether alternative categories need to be invented. It has been claimed 
that the CEE economies might not fit the LME/CME dichotomy, given their specific 
traits and development in the past decades. This statement has been further 
underpinned with various arguments from more than few scholars. For example, 
Crowley argued that CEE institutional transformation evolved in a reverse logic from 
VoC, because VoC rests on the equation that institutions determine competitiveness, 
while in CEE the states have chosen a competitiveness strategy based on 
liberalisation.114 Crowley also claimed that the central variable of VoC, which is firm 
behaviour, cannot represent the only factor explaining the development of CEE 
capitalism, given that the role of the labour (its presence or absence) should be also 
accounted for.115 Other authors, such as Nölke and Vliegenthart, but also Bohle and 
Greskovits, stated that, unfortunately, VoC does not account for the role of external 
actors in explaining the development of capitalism, while it must be underlined that 
the role of international financial organisations or multinational companies has been 
vital for shaping the CEE economies.116 King argued that, in principle, it is possible 
to extend VoC to CEE, but that further classification should be adapted and 
contextualised to historical and structural features of these countries.117 
 There are views in the literature claiming that, despite the criticism, VoC can 
be applied to the CEE countries, in integral or modified form, although there is no 
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consensus in the literature on how these countries should be classified. Two strands 
of literature can be found here: 
(a) Firstly, there are scholars who extend the VoC approach to the CEE 
countries by offering alternative categories. Nölke and Vliegenthart developed a third 
VoC category, “dependent market economy” as an extension to the existing ones, 
with the major trait being the dependence on international capital.118 Yet, these 
authors have not provided further country classifications that would show variations 
between the countries belonging to this general cluster. In a similar fashion, King 
designated the CEE countries as “liberal dependent”, a category which represents an 
extension of the VoC dichotomy, but with proto-CME and-LME elements.119 As in 
the previous view, the major trait of this category is dependence on foreign direct 
investment and relations with customer firms.120 Lane labelled the following 
countries as being closest to the continental type of market capitalism, yet more 
state-led: Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, having in mind their 
reasonably well-developed welfare state, which contrasts them sharply with the other 
post-transitional countries that have more hybrid forms of capitalism.121  
(b) Secondly, there are authors who follow the VoC approach and classify the 
CEE countries as either LME or CME. Based on their institutional legacies and 
policy choices, Feldmann established two archetypal models of VoC in Eastern 
Europe: Slovenia as CME (having institutionalised coordination) and Estonia as 
LME (having market-based coordination). However, other countries were not 
explored in this study, even though the authors noted that the other CEE countries 
belong on a continuum between these two archetypical models.122 In a similar 
fashion, Crowley and Stanojević designated Slovenia as CME, because of the 
existence of coordinated market institutions, but while contending the use of VoC as 
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an analytical framework given that it cannot fully explain all the factors relevant to 
the formation of the institutions, such as the role of strikes.123  
As this brief overview of approaches demonstrates, it is not possible to 
unambiguously designate the CEE countries examined in this study under the VoC 
classification: to that end, there are scholars who have proposed their own 
typologies. Possibly the most comprehensive theoretical framework by far has been 
provided by Bohle and Greskovits. Moving away from the VoC logic, these authors 
were inspired by Polanyi’s seminal understanding of the market society based on 
conflicts and compromises between the economic liberalism and social protection.124 
Bohle and Greskovits defined regimes as capitalist political economies where 
marketisation and social protection were institutionalised with differing degrees of 
vigour,125 and explained that they develop in relation to several different factors.126 
Firstly, the authors have argued that the role of the initial policy choices at the 
beginning of the transitional period mattered, including the role of the legacies and 
the ways they have been perceived by the policy makers. Secondly, Bohle and 
Greskovits claimed that the role of the external influences in shaping the CEE 
economies must be accounted for, including pressures originating from the EU and 
multinational corporations. Following these arguments, the authors have 
differentiated three types of regime:127 
(a) Neoliberal in the Baltic countries, featuring a strong neoliberal economic 
trajectory and less pronounced social protection; 
(b) Embedded neoliberal, existing in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) featuring a balancing act between social and 
neoliberal policies; 
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(c) Neocorporatist, which can be found in Slovenia, with the institutionalised 
balance between economic and social policies, including decision making, based on 
consensus between the state and social actors, including social partners.  
In a recent publication, the two authors have examined the effects which the 
recent economic and financial crisis had on the three types of regime. While noting 
that embedded neo-liberal regimes and neocorporatist Slovenia were, in principle, 
less affected by the crisis, the analysis has shown that all three regime types showed 
signs of erosion and that the crisis managed to emphasise already existing social and 
political tensions.128 The crisis has moved all three regimes further in the direction of 
markets, rather than towards social protection, and exposed the weaknesses of 
institutional foundations and capabilities in solving the ensuing tensions and 
preventing social disintegration.129 As a result, Bohle and Greskovits concluded that 
the CEE region will face the post-crisis environment with substantially weakened 
institutional foundations.130 
The delineation of regimes presented by Bohle and Greskovits represents 
perhaps the most comprehensive overview of post-transitional traits in CEE that 
exists. The current study largely builds on the observations of Bohle and Greskovits. 
In the first place, these observations provide useful insight into the type of 
transformation undertaken by the four countries examined in this study. Furthermore, 
this study takes on board the factors which Bohle and Greskovits deemed essential 
for explaining post-transitional developments (policy choices, including the legacies, 
and external factors) as part of the explanatory framework for the second research 
question which will be further explained and elaborated in Chapter 3. Specifically, 
these factors will be adapted and translated into the realm of labour law and used for 
analytical purposes in the context of this study. 
 
                                                          





2.2. Welfare regimes in CEE 
During the communist period, the CEE welfare states resembled each other,131 given 
the common underlying features including, amongst others, guaranteed employment, 
subsidised prices and free health and education services. The welfare provision was 
universal and wage inequalities were rather marginal. However, after 1989, the 
question of post-transitional welfare transformation in CEE became topical, given 
that it implied the transformation of one of the lynchpins of the communist systems, 
namely, the extensive welfare provision. The quest for welfare transformation faced 
two challenges. In the first place, it was questionable to what extent the CEE 
countries could afford the all-encompassing extensive welfare provision, particularly 
in a context of obvious neoliberal policy orientation. The second issue facing post-
transitional welfare policies was the social cost of the economic transition: growing 
unemployment, inflation and poverty, with gross domestic product declining sharply 
in all countries.132 At the same time, the CEE countries were seeking ways to 
reinstitute their historically rooted welfare provision which was honed under German 
and Austrian-Hungarian tradition at the beginning of the 20th century.133   
The literature explaining the post-transitional CEE welfare development 
evolved in two major phases, which will be briefly presented in the following lines.   
Firstly, in the early 1990s, it was too soon to cluster the welfare regimes in 
CEE. Thus, the early scholarship restricted itself to enumerating and describing what 
was seen as the common characteristics of emerging welfare models. Deacon noted 
that transformation had just commenced and that it was not yet evident how the CEE 
welfare regimes would evolve, and that this prevented clustering these countries.134 
Deacon therefore laid down a catalogue of the common characteristics of emerging 
welfare models, including, inter alia, trends of ad hoc welfare policies, privatisation 
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of some health and social provisions, a shift in the nature of social inequalities and 
deconstruction of social security systems.135  
Secondly, as of the 2000s welfare literature has flourished. Yet, explaining 
welfare models was just as challenging as explaining models of capitalism in CEE. 
The general welfare literature, which inspired debates on CEE welfare regimes, is 
dominated by Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes.136 Esping-Andersen 
took into account criteria of decommodification (understood as the degree to which 
individuals are emancipated in the market), stratification (social citizenship that 
includes the class structure in the society) and employment. With these in mind, 
Esping-Andersen distinguished three regimes:137 (a) liberal, characterised by means-
tested and modest social assistance; (b) conservative-corporatist, characterised by 
prioritisation of welfare provision over market pressures; (c) social-democratic, 
inspired by the ideas of social democracy and the universal provision of social 
services.  
The post-2000s CEE literature has not reached a consensus about explaining 
and classifying welfare in CEE and whether mainstream approaches can be applied 
to these countries. Even though the literature was not so much focused on clustering 
the existing CEE regimes, there were views that the CEE regimes can be clearly 
distinguished from the traditional welfare regimes,138 and that they represent 
institutional hybrids which in no way resemble the typology of Esping-Andersen.139 
Possibly the most comprehensive comparative overview so far that involves the four 
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countries selected for analysis in this study has been offered by Lendvai140 who 
distinguished three clusters of countries:  
(a) Neoliberal (Slovakia and in the Baltic countries), with low welfare 
spending and radical neoliberal reforms; 
(b) Dual welfare (Poland and Hungary), combining neoliberalism and welfare 
populism, the latter being used as a counteracting tool for neoliberal policies;  
(c) Social corporativist welfare regime (Slovenia and the Czech Republic), as 
“Scandinavian islands” in CEE, with the most comprehensive social protection and 
favourable economic situation inherited from the previous system.  
In a similar fashion, Potucek provided a summary of the state of the art of 
welfare regimes in CEE: Slovenia most resembles the traditional welfare state 
models in Europe, while the Czech Republic has a less generous welfare state. 
Poland and Hungary have residual restrictive policies in some areas, while Slovakia 
moves closer to a liberal welfare state.141 
Another comprehensive comparative insight into the CEE countries has been 
provided by Inglot, who observed the development of welfare states in the Visegrad 
countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) in a historical context 
(from the early 20th century until the modern post-communist period). By describing 
the evolution of social security systems in these countries, Inglot underlined the role 
of legacies in developing Visegrad welfare. Likewise, while demonstrating that these 
countries exerted strong commitment to social spending, Inglot showed that they 
share some common features which originate from the “Bismarck-style” of their 
legacies.142 
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2.3. Industrial relations in CEE  
Industrial relations in the CEE countries share more than a few common features. In 
addition to what has been already presented in Chapter 1, the common features 
involve weaknesses of social partners, a rapid fall in the trade union membership 
base during the past two decades and weak sectoral and cross-sectoral bargaining 
structures.143 Wage bargaining coordination is fragmented and decentralised, while 
the sectoral collective bargaining is underdeveloped.144 Moreover, the CEE countries 
share the trend of declining coverage rates of collective bargaining, which can be 
linked to the lower degree of bargaining coordination and weak enforcement of 
collective agreements.145 It can also be attributed to a failure to use available legal 
instruments for extension of collective agreement (to enlarge its coverage to the 
sector or economy).146 In reality, the CEE countries remain heterogeneous even when 
one takes into account all these parameters, particularly collective bargaining 
coverage and the relative regulatory importance of sectoral collective bargaining in 
relation to company level, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.147 Yet, it remains unclear 
whether it is possible to establish any meaningful comparison of the industrial 
relations regimes in CEE. 
The discipline of industrial relations, as Meardi noted, has not so far offered 
any “integrated effort in understanding comparative industrial relations”,148 given the 
lack of large scale studies involving a greater number of countries and comparable 
dimensions. As much as there is no comprehensive classification in general 
literature, there are no comprehensive typologies of CEE industrial relations. As a 
matter of fact, in the scholarship the CEE countries are usually denoted as a single 
group with loosely defined common characteristics. This has been also the case in, so 
far, the most comprehensive typology of comparative industrial relations as 
presented by Visser, who delineated the four following regimes: social partnership in 
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continental (Western) Europe, Nordic organised corporatism (in Scandinavian 
countries), liberal pluralism in the UK and the polarised or state-centred regime 
found in Southern Europe.149 In addition, Visser denoted CEE countries as 
fragmented or state-centred, saying that it is a matter of debate whether this group of 
countries can form a separate regime or should be classified within the existing 
typologies. In trying to explain the CEE countries, Visser set out the mixed character 
of their industrial relations – because of the underdeveloped sectoral collective 
bargaining and low bargaining coverage rates, these industrial relations tend to 
resemble the “liberal model”, but because of the strong role of the state, the CEE 
countries resemble the “state-centred” model of southern Europe. But the CEE 
fragmented or state-centred model differs from the state-centred model in the south 
because of the weak role of trade unions and the confrontational relationship between 
social partners.150 
 In the CEE-focused literature there have been very few attempts to classify the 
existing industrial relations regimes in this group of countries. Such an attempt has 
been made by Kohl and Platzer, who on the basis of the attitudes towards works 
councils, sectoral level dialogue developments and the role of tripartite dialogue 
distinguished between (a) the transitional northern group (Poland and Baltic states) 
(b) the southern group consisting of Slovenia and Hungary, being the most advanced 
in terms of meeting the standards of  continental Europe and (c) the countries in the 
middle, the Czech Republic (having similar traits to the northern group) and Slovakia 
(having similar traits to the southern group).151 Yet, Kohl and Platzer noted that CEE 
industrial relations do not fit any existing model of EU-centred classifications, even 
though Slovenia to some extent resembles the continental social partnership model. 
As a matter of fact, the CEE countries do exhibit certain similarities to some of the 
traits of the existing models in Europe, such as the degree of state influence and 
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involvement as in the Latin systems152 and the underdevelopment of sectoral 
collective bargaining in the Anglo-Saxon systems.153  
 The literature on CEE industrial relations has rather focused on the analysis of 
general traits than on proposing any classifications. Pollert emphasised the 
hybridised character of industrial relations in CEE, which stems from the 
combination of “formal neocorporatist structures, with heavy leanings on the German 
model, and voluntarism and fragmentation” and the emphasis on local standard 
settings and local trade union branches.154 Moreover, creeping sectoral deregulation 
leads to trade union fragmentation and decline.155 In addition to what has been 
already stated, Kohl and Platzer observed that CEE countries share unstable 
structures of fragmented employee representation, as well as a tension between 
deregulation and the development of social rights.156 Meardi, as well as Ghellab and 
Vaughan-Whitehead, have noted that in the CEE system of industrial relations, 
sectoral collective bargaining represents the “weakest link”,157 with sectoral 
collective agreements having meagre content and poor coverage.158 The general 
weaknesses of trade unions and the ambiguous role of the state failing to promote 
collective autonomous bargaining have been stressed as the factors contributing 
towards the underdevelopment of sectoral dialogue.159 The company level dialogue is 
described as featuring fractured and decentralised trade union representation, which 
is a trait further underpinning the decentralisation of collective bargaining.160 Much 
of the CEE literature has focused on tripartite bargaining, which has been described 
as being too weak and unable to generate meaningful negotiated outcomes, despite 
the fact that all CEE countries established tripartite institutions early in the transition 
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period. Likewise, in now-famous words, Ost labelled it as “illusory corporatism”,161 
and Pollert as a “fragile shell of tripartism”.162 On a more general level, Bluhm saw 
CEE countries as facing the liberalisation dilemma: states risking strengthening 
managerial unilateralism to cover for the weaknesses of social partners and collective 
bargaining.163  
 
3. Four CEE countries: major traits 
In addition to what has been said already about the four countries selected for this 
study, the following sections provide a brief introduction to their key economic, 
welfare and industrial relations traits in an effort to provide understanding of their 




Slovenia came into being in 1991 after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. In 
more than twenty years of transition, Slovenia has developed a substantially specific 
economic and social landscape in comparison to the other CEE countries. As the 
previous sections have indicated, the current literature describes Slovenian economic 
and welfare model in a variety of terms. Bohle and Greskovits consider Slovenia as a 
neocorporatist state.164 Several authors designate it as a coordinated market economy 
(CME).165 According to Lendvai, in terms of its social development Slovenia is a 
corporatist social welfare state and a “Scandinavian island” in the CEE countries.166 
Unlike the other CEE countries, Slovenia did not resort to neoliberal policy making 
in the 1990s. As the country embarked on economic and social transformation with a 
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relatively favourable economic situation at the beginning of the 1990s, 167 the policy 
makers could afford slow privatisation and gradual economic reforms. This gradual 
approach facilitated economic stability and avoided the high social costs of 
transition, such as high rates of unemployment.168 
Slovenia also entered the transitional period with a more favourable industrial 
relations situation: trade union density figures were higher than the average in CEE 
countries169 and collective bargaining coverage rates were also higher than in the 
other CEE countries (as demonstrated in Chapter 1).170 A specific feature of 
Slovenian industrial relations has been the active involvement of employers’ 
organisations in collective bargaining during the past decades, mainly facilitated by 
mandatory membership of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for individual 
employers, something which was in force until 2006. That is, since the Chamber was 
the main bargaining partner on the employers’ side, the collective agreements it 
concluded were binding upon its constituencies and this assured relatively higher 
coverage rates of collective agreements in Slovenia than in the other CEE countries.  
A further feature, specific to Slovenian industrial relations and contributing to higher 
coverage rates, were the legally binding cross-sectoral collective agreements, 
regularly concluded until the mid-2000s.  
The specific traits of Slovenian industrial relations as described above can be 
explained with two key elements:   
(a) Legacies: The specific type of communism, honed in the former 
Yugoslavia, provided a vital pretext in developing market institutions. The Yugoslav 
variation of communism, which developed outside the Soviet bloc, was built on the 
paradigm of “self-management.” Under this paradigm, the workers were considered 
to be the owners of the means of production and the decision makers in the 
enterprises; and additionally, the property of the enterprises in this model of 
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communism was not considered to belong to the “state” but to “society”.171 Even 
though these systems were evaluated as in reality being devoid of any real influence 
on the part of the workers,172 the self-management represented a useful legacy for 
organised labour in the post-communist period. Another factor contributing to post-
transitional developments was the relative openness of the self-management 
economy and its pro-market orientation.173 
(b) Policy choices: Slovenia did not introduce extreme liberal economic 
reforms and “shock therapy”, but opted for gradual policy transformation, combined 
with slow privatisation and low dependency on international capital. This also helped 
create inclusive and centralised bargaining structures.174 At the same time, as has 
been underlined in the previous sections, Slovenian policy making was based on a 
balanced combination of social and economic principles.  
The Slovenian economic and social traits presented here have been exposed to 
certain changes since the mid-2000s, including decentralisation from cross-sectoral 
to sectoral level.175 There were a few reasons driving this decentralisation, in the first 
place, the legally binding cross-sectoral collective agreements, which otherwise 
ensured wide coverage rates, had ceased to exist and were no longer being 
concluded.176 In addition, around this time, the mandatory membership of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry was abolished. As the result of the on-going 
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decentralisation, coverage rates dropped significantly after the mid-2000s, as 
evidenced in Chapter 1.177 
With the recent economic and financial crisis, the social dialogue structure in 
Slovenia has further weakened and the policy making has shifted to some extent in a 
neoliberal direction.178 Whilst the coverage of collective agreements is still estimated 
to be considerably higher than in the other CEE countries, the interview participants 
estimated that the incidence of collective bargaining has substantially dropped since 
the crisis.179 Nevertheless, sector remained dominant level of collective bargaining.180 
 
3.2. Slovakia 
Slovakia was formed following the dissolution from the federal country of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993. As already noted in this chapter, Bohle and Greskovits 
labelled this country as an “embedded neoliberal” system.181  Claiming that certain 
neoliberal features prevail in Slovakia, Miklos puts forward the view that Slovakia 
has fully achieved a transition from a predominantly continental socio-economic 
model to a predominantly Anglo-Saxon economic model.182 
Bohle and Greskovits held that two factors were pertinent to the specific shape 
of the capitalism formed in Slovakia: accentuated nationalist policy making and 
exclusion from the international arena at the beginning of transitional process.183 
More specifically, the economic and welfare reform went through different phases. 
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A feature at the beginning of the transitional period was international isolation, 
economic exclusion and a difficult economic situation.184 The government, however, 
kept a close relationship with the trade unions, as the result of which basic social 
dialogue institutions were formed during this period. The policy making in the early 
1990s was labelled as a version of social democratic ideology.185 
With the new government formed in the late 1990s, economic and welfare 
policies altered. The policy making in this “Dzurinda era” (1998-2006) was 
characterised by neoliberal features, aiming at structural economic reforms and 
involving restrictive welfare policies.186 This period also marked an end to the 
political and economic isolation of the country internationally.187 To boost economic 
growth, the government was promoting flexible labour relations. As a result, major 
legislative change took place in this period:  the new Labour Code was promulgated 
in 2003, leading to a deregulated labour market, even though that was opposed by 
trade unions.188 According to some views, this phase was not a complete turning 
towards neoliberalism since the welfare state had not been completely wiped out.189 
After 2006, (labelled as the “Fico era”), more balanced policy making took 
place, and also involved coordination with trade unions.190 Building a social state had 
been declared as one of the objectives of the policy making.191 Moreover, as noted by 
Bohle and Greskovits, the legacies of the previous “Dzurinda era” had rendered 
Slovakia’s economy less vulnerable in the upcoming financial and economic crisis 
period.192 
Overall, Slovakian post-transitional developments majorly varied in relation to 
the political constellation of the time. As interviews with the Slovak social partners 
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demonstrated, the actual powers of trade unions depended greatly on the political set 
up and the enforced legislative changes of the moment, although the basic 
institutions for collective bargaining and social dialogue had been established in the 
early 1990s. In comparison with the other CEE countries, and despite the market-
oriented economic policies, Slovak industrial relations are based on a relatively high 
degree of coordination,193 with a reasonably well organised central representation of 
social partners.194 As Chapter 1 demonstrated, almost all sectors have concluded 
collective agreements, which can be to a certain extent attributed to the central 
organisation of trade unions and the employers’ organisations. As demonstrated by 
Table 2 in Chapter 1, some level of decentralisation can nevertheless be observed 
from sectoral to company level since the beginning of the 2000s. Scholars have noted 
that such decentralisation has been additionally underpinned with declining trade 
union and employers’ organisations density rates.195 
As the recent studies have demonstrated, the reasonably well-developed 
industrial relations at sectoral level had an important mitigating effect on the 
economic and financial crisis, helping the recovery of the economy. Industrial 
relations were not substantially affected by the crisis.196 On the other hand, the crisis 
has deeply affected the economy, particularly wages and employment rates, with 
austerity measures being promulgated in 2012.197  
 
3.3. The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic emerged from the former state of Czechoslovakia in 1993. As 
this Chapter already demonstrated, Bohle and Greskovits have identified this country 
as belonging to embedded neoliberal economic systems. The style of capitalism that 
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has developed in the Czech Republic can to a great extent be attributed to the pro-
market legacy of former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, who closely followed 
neoclassical approaches, and criticised the past as overwhelmingly paternalistic and 
overregulated.198 This style of capitalism enjoyed wider societal support, evidenced 
by fewer strikes.199 Even so, the inclination of the Czech Republic to liberal market 
policies, seen from a longer-term perspective, has been less pronounced than in some 
other CEE countries, Poland for example.200 Also, the Czech model of capitalism did 
not exclude social policies although the welfare provision was based on mixed 
elements: in some areas, welfare provision resembled a liberal market approach, 
while in other areas, social-democratic elements prevailed.201 
To better understand the processes behind the Czech developments, it is useful 
to delineate several phases in the development of the economy and welfare:202 
(a)  Unlike some CEE countries that already begun some reform during the 
communist period, the Czech Republic started post-transitional reform from scratch 
in the 1990s.203 Between 1992 and 1997, policy making was inspired by neoclassical 
and neoliberal thoughts, advocated by then Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus.204 Despite 
the neoliberal turn, the Czech Republic established principles of social policy during 
this time. Specifically, in the early 1990s, the Parliament of the federal country of 
Czechoslovakia had already endorsed a programme of social reform, aiming at 
counterbalancing the social costs of economic transformation.205After 1992, 
observers note that the social policy had become more market oriented, given the 
introduction of some restrictive social policies.206 
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(b)  After 1998, social policies were promoted more, but their implementation 
was constrained because of budgetary limits.207 Nevertheless, the formal orientation 
of policy makers towards the social sphere sufficed to label the Czech welfare state 
as exhibiting typical features of the continental, Bismarckian and corporatist welfare 
model.208 
A few remarks about Czech industrial relations can be made. Firstly, the 
development of industrial relations was greatly affected by the steady and continuous 
decline of the trade union membership base since 1989,209 as well as by the lack of 
support of policy makers for autonomous regulation by social partners,210 and 
specifically for tripartite social dialogue.211 Also, the trade union picture in the Czech 
Republic can be described as decentralised and fragmented. To some extent, these 
traits can be ascribed to the legacy of the communist principle of organising one 
single trade union per workplace.212 Moreover, the sectoral organisation of social 
partners was less developed than in the other CEE countries (such as Slovakia and 
Slovenia), and this underpins the decentralisation of collective bargaining. In fact, 
sectoral collective bargaining was in continuous decline since the 1990s.213 However, 
available data for the recent crisis period show that the collective bargaining system 
has not experienced substantial change,214 and that the area of welfare was not 
affected by any radical liberal reforms.215 
 
3.4. Poland 
The size of the country and its unique trade union legacy dating back from the 1980s 
are the reasons that Poland attracted comparatively more attention in the literature 
than the other CEE countries. This chapter has already noted that Bohle and 
Greskovits labelled Poland as an “embedded neoliberal regime”.216 Unlike Slovenia 
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which honed a gradual model of transformation, Poland went through a resolute 
liberalisation of its economy from the early years of transition, embodied in a 
macroeconomic “shock therapy” approach. In contrast to the Slovenian gradualism, 
the main objective of the Polish economic policy in the early 1990s was to create a 
free market as quickly as possible.217 However, the downside of this “shock therapy” 
was a sharp deterioration of the social conditions, including large unemployment and 
inflation rates and a fall in production.218 This has led to the development of what 
Inglot explained as an “emergent welfare state”: welfare policies aimed to respond to 
acute and emergent needs in the 1990s, and to mitigate the harsh social effects of the 
“shock therapy”.219 In a similar fashion, Lendvai described the Polish welfare state as 
incongruous: shaped by duality of pressures and institutionalised responses to 
political, social and economic challenges.220 Moreover, Lendvai divided Polish 
welfare state transformation into two phases, pre- and post-1995.221 According to this 
author, the pre-1995 phase had been dominated by efforts to preserve the social 
sphere during the shock therapy. The second phase, after 1995, had been almost 
solely devoted to pension reforms. 
Industrial relations in Poland are highly decentralised since collective 
bargaining predominantly takes place at company level. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, 
the coverage rates are the lowest among the four countries selected. At the same 
time, as the interviews have demonstrated, in the past two decades the state has 
provided only modest support for building the social dialogue infrastructure, which 
represents one of the reasons behind the weaknesses of central bargaining levels. 
Another reason has been the fragmentation of the trade union movement itself since 
the 1990s, with the so-called “competitive pluralism” between large numbers of trade 
unions coexisting in the same companies and competing with each other.222 It is 
interesting to note that in comparison with the other three countries, industrial 
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relations have been the least affected by the recent economic and financial crisis, 
even with evidence of increased tripartite activity in 2008-10.223  
The shape of modern industrial relations in Poland can to a great extent be 
ascribed to the legacy of its pre-transitional industrial relations traits. The year 1980 
marked the establishment of the trade union movement Solidarnosc (“Solidarity”), 
which had a vital role in facilitating the post-1990s transitional developments.224 In 
1982, the Trade Union Act was enacted, setting out the basis for a decentralised trade 
union landscape which endured in the post-transitional period. Specifically, this Act 
allowed trade union formation at company level with a high level of autonomy vis-à-
vis associations of trade unions at federal and confederal level.225 Also, in the mid-
1980s, another large trade union was formed – a confederation OPZZ,226 but 
politically motivated competition between Solidarity and OPZZ in subsequent years 
contributed towards the fragmentation of trade union movement in the country.227 
Polish scholars distinguished three phases of industrial relations developments in the 
post-transitional period:  
(a) the period between 1989 and 1993 has been characterised by trade union 
pluralism, the establishment of tripartite structures and increased strike activity; 
(b) after 1993, the collective bargaining landscape was characterised by a 
weakly unionised private sector; 
(c) the third phase took place after 2001 and was characterised by stronger 
institutionalisation of the tripartite institutions and increased trade union activity in 
the private sector.228 
Unlike the other CEE examples, Polish industrial relations have not undergone 
a process of decentralisation from sectoral to company level in the past two decades. 
This would not be possible, given the marginal importance which sectoral collective 
bargaining has had since the beginning of the1990s. Another specific feature of the 
Polish landscape was the support of the trade union movement for the neoliberal 
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transformation,229 a feature that further underpinned the trend to decentralised 
industrial relations.  
 
4. Conclusion: comparative remarks  
This chapter demonstrated that industrial relations in the CEE countries, as well as 
their economic and welfare models, substantially differ from those in other European 
countries. At the same time, this chapter demonstrated that the CEE group is 
extremely heterogeneous and that using the simple term “CEE industrial relations” 
alongside the terms “CEE economies” or “CEE welfare” can be fairly misleading, 
since it is vital to account for country-specific characteristics and issues. However, 
despite obvious national differences, in the area of collective bargaining, the four 
CEE countries share some important traits. These traits have been depicted in section 
2.3, in addition to what has been already presented on this topic in Chapter 1. The 
key common feature which distinguishes the CEE countries from most of the 
industrial relations systems in Europe is decentralised collective bargaining coupled 
with weak sectoral and cross-sectoral infrastructure. Slovenia is somewhat an 
exception to this trend, even though this country has also experienced some trend 
towards decentralisation since the mid-2000s.  
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated that the peculiar economic style of 
reforms undertaken in the 1990s underpinned the decentralisation of industrial 
relations in CEE. This is more evident in the countries that opted for a shock-therapy 
style of macroeconomic reform, because the ideological orientation towards 
individualism and personal freedoms provided a pretext for decentralisation, sectoral 
deregulation and emphasis on company-level collective bargaining. Unfortunately, a 
comprehensive understanding of the factors conducive to collective bargaining 
decentralisation is somewhat hindered by the lack of a clear and sophisticated 
comparative classification of the CEE economic and welfare models, as well as 
models of industrial relations, as section 2 demonstrated. Nonetheless, the 
approaches on capitalism and welfare presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 lead to the 
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conclusion that the style of economic reform in CEE was not rendered incompatible 
with the reform of welfare and institutionalisation of industrial relations. In this way, 
social and welfare policies have played a role in different forms and to varying 
degrees in all the selected CEE countries in the past two decades. 
In addition, it is important to reiterate that the CEE literature has not yet been 
able to present a comprehensive framework for classifying and contrasting CEE 
industrial relations, as demonstrated in section 2.3. Notwithstanding the lack of such 
theoretical framework, this chapter delineated several common characteristics of 
CEE industrial relations, and presented the major country-specific developments in 
the four countries.  
While understanding that the factors driving the institutionalisation of 
industrial relations are multifaceted and complex, and that their comprehensive 
analysis would go well beyond the scope of this study; there are certain remarks that 
can be made at this point about the four countries. These remarks subsume the 
country elements and findings presented in section 3, as well as the country regime 
clustering proposed by Bohle and Greskovits in section 2.1. These remarks 
furthermore build upon the collective bargaining features depicted in Chapter 1, 
namely that Poland has the most decentralised collective bargaining, followed by the 
Czech Republic, while, at the opposite end of the spectrum, Slovenia has the most 
centralised collective bargaining system, followed by Slovakia. Out of the four 
countries, Slovenia’s industrial relations resemble most the style of continental 
European industrial relations and this can be traced back to the favourable role of 
legacies, gradual approaches to policy making and the more favourable market 
position of the country in contrast to the other CEE countries at the beginning of the 
transformation period.230 At the other end of the spectrum, Poland‘s economic 
reforms have emanated from a resolute “shock therapy” approach which was 
combined with the above described “emergent welfare state”. At the same time, 
industrial relations developed in close relation to the legacies of the 1980s, in the first 
place aided by the establishment of the trade union movement Solidarity, but also by 
the legacy of a fragmented trade union landscape which was legally postulated in 
1982. The Slovak and Czech examples come somewhere between the other two 
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countries. Slovakia has managed to develop more centralised collective bargaining 
structures than the Czech Republic, despite the fact it is unique among the Visegrad 
countries for having developed a more pro-liberal and pro-market orientation on 
economic reforms. The Czech Republic was pursing resolute market-oriented 
reforms in the early 1990s, but after 1998, the policies included more socially 
oriented reforms.   
 On the basis of the country-specific characteristics depicted in this chapter, the 
task of the following chapter will be to further explore processes of labour law 





The Genesis and Positioning of Collective Agreement in 
CEE Labour Laws 
 
 
1. Explaining the genesis of modern CEE labour laws  
No labour law systems have undergone such dramatic transformation as those in the 
CEE countries, following the demise of communism in the early 1990s. That 
transformative process essentially challenged the very foundation of labour laws 
because communist legal regulations were deemed incompatible with the needs and 
functions of open economies. Specifically, communist labour laws were founded on 
the ideology of maintaining full employment, and they applied work standards with a 
rather comprehensive, “one size fits all” approach to the entire economy. The trade 
unions were subservient to the ideology of the regime. Collective bargaining was not 
widespread, and in any case played a negligible role. The transformation and 
internationalisation of markets and economies therefore inevitably raised questions 
about the rationale of CEE labour laws. From the earliest stages of economic 
transition, CEE policy makers were faced with the fundamental issue of how labour 
law might be conceptualised. The major predicament facing the policy makers was 
clarification of the regulatory role and function of collective agreement, and its 
position and relationship with statutory labour laws. Determining the status and role 
of collective agreement went hand in hand with re-clarifying the regulatory role and 
function of the state in industrial relations – a role in the pre-1990s period that had 
been deemed all-encompassing. 
The responses of the CEE countries to these fundamental challenges were 
shaped in a nation-specific context. The national pathways were all but identical, 
having been developed as a result of various influences, ranging from internal to 
external factors, and from policy choices to legalistic path-dependant solutions. In an 
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effort to obtain guidance for labour law transformation, the CEE countries were 
looking towards continental European countries, hoping that mimicking the 
economically-developed models would bring a comparable level of economic 
development and welfare within a reasonable time frame. Nevertheless, this has not 
been an easy task, given that the international setting in which this transformation 
was taking place was a dynamic one: continental European labour laws themselves 
were evolving in an effort to accommodate the pressures of international competition 
and globalisation. The recent economic and financial crisis exemplifies this point.231  
 This chapter is not built on the premise that CEE labour law transformation has 
been accomplished. However, the events that CEE labour laws have had to confront 
during the last two decades, starting from the onset of transition and economic 
transformation, accession to the EU and the recent economic and financial crisis, 
justify critical appraisal of the current CEE labour laws and an understanding of the 
processes surrounding their development. Bearing this in mind, this chapter has a 
twofold aim. In the first place, it will explain national responses to common 
challenges surrounding CEE labour law transformation. By seeking explanations for 
the development of the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in 
the four countries, the chapter contributes to the second research question of this 
study. However, it does not aim to provide a conclusive answer to that question: to 
that end the analysis in the second part of this study will also be taken into account. 
Second, this chapter provides valuable insights on labour laws in the four countries. 
In this context, it also represents a useful introduction to the analysis which will be 
conducted in the second part of the study. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The following section (2) explains the 
common factors and triggers driving labour law transformation in CEE, and aims at 
identifying the leading paradigm of the transformation of labour law. The chapter 
then presents the overview of processes in the four CEE countries (section 3). Based 
                                                          
231 The process of “modernisation” and “transformation” of labour laws in continental Europe inspired 
a number of scholarly debates, e.g. see Hendrickx, F. (2010) ‘The Future of Collective Labour Law in 
Europe’ European Labour Law, vol 1, 59-79; Hepple, B. (2011) ’Factors Influencing the Making and 
Transformation of Labour Law in Europe’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 30-42. The recent economic and financial crisis has further 
spurred debate on the topic, see e.g. Coutu, M., Le Friant, M. and Murray, G. (2013) ‘Broken 
Paradigms: Labour Law in the Wake of Globalisation and the Economic Crisis’ Comparative Labour 
Law and Policy Journal, vol 34, pp 565-584. 
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on the analysis and data presented, section 4 sets out to explore how collective 
agreements emerged as the standard-setting instruments in CEE. Section 5 provides 
concluding notes on the genesis of labour law in the four countries and offers a guide 
to the further analysis contained in the second part of this book.  
 
2. Deconstructing labour law development in CEE 
 
2.1. Factors pertinent to labour law transformation 
Although shaped under nation-specific mixes of circumstances, the underlying issues 
and challenges driving labour law transformation were similar across the CEE 
countries. In an effort to group the factors driving labour law transformation into 
distinct categories, this study builds on the elements which Bohle and Greskovits 
considered crucial for explaining capitalism diversities in CEE,232 and translates 
them into the vocabulary of labour law: 
i. The policy choices undertaken by policy makers in the last two decades, 
including the stances taken and support put in place for the building of the legal and 
institutional framework for collective bargaining.  
ii. Labour law legacies originating in the communist setting. While Bohle and 
Greskovits understood legacies as a distinct influence on policy making (in the sense 
of whether policy makers see them as threats or assets), their role will be separately 
considered in this study. The traces of these legacies may exist in specific legal 
solutions or they can serve as a source of inspiration within the principles of labour 
law. The idea of legal legacies originates from path dependency: it is not strange to 
legal scholarship that legal ideas can be deeply embedded in the shared knowledge of 
the legal community and, as such, can be difficult to reverse, thereby creating a 
preference towards more “familiar” choices.233  
                                                          
232As presented in Chapter 2, Bohle and Greskovits explained regime diversity in CEE by taking into 
account two major factors; in the first place, initial policy choices, including the legacies of the past 
and their perception as threats or assets by policy makers, and secondly, the formative role of the 
transnational and international influences; see Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2007) ‘Neoliberalism, 
Embedded Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism: Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern 
Europe’ West European Politics, vol 30, no 3, pp 443-444.  
233 As explained by Chirico, F. and Larouche, P. (2008) ’Conceptual Divergence, Functionalism, and 
the Economics of Convergence’ in S. Prechal and B. Roermund (eds) The Coherence of EU Law: The 
Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 469. 
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iii. External influences, coming from the EU and other international 
organisations. 
 It is reasonable to assume that the weight of each element has differed across 
the countries examined. To the extent that it is possible, this study, and this chapter 
in particular, will aim to account for the different nuances of these factors in 
explaining the processes of legal developments in the four selected countries. The 
role of the EU as an external influence will be specifically addressed in Chapter 4.  
 Apart from being subject to similar sets of issues and challenges, the 
transformation of the CEE labour laws was triggered by the same events: 
 (a) First, transition from command to open economy per se initiated the labour 
law change, questioning the very legal foundation of the communist labour setting. 
Already at the onset of transitional period, the CEE countries had started introducing 
the first “modern” labour law provisions, which were salient in allowing for the first 
time free and voluntary collective bargaining and free operation of trade unions and 
employers’ associations. All four CEE countries examined in this study saw the first 
legal provisions on collective bargaining during this period. The former state of 
Czechoslovakia introduced the Collective Bargaining Act in 1991, Poland introduced 
Labour Code amendments in 1994, containing rules on collective bargaining, and 
Slovenia regulated collective bargaining matters in the Act on Basic Rights of 
Employment Relationship of 1989 and the Employment Relationship Act of 1990. 
Another landmark feature of this initial transformation period was the 
institutionalisation of tripartite bodies, which took place in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in 1993, and in Poland and Slovenia in 1994. Many of the legal changes 
that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s were inspired by ILO architecture. As a 
matter of fact, the beginning of the transitional period was marked by transposition 
of ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98, which brought the introduction of free and 
voluntary collective bargaining into their legislative systems.234  
(b) Second, the accession to the EU brought specific challenges to CEE labour 
laws, given that the EU requires candidate countries to build meaningful social 
dialogue infrastructure. Social dialogue also represents part of the acquis 
                                                          
234 ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No.87, 1948 and 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, No.98, 1949. As noted in Chapter 1, 
Slovakia ratified these two conventions in 1993, Slovenia in 1992, the Czech Republic in 1993. 
Poland has been considered a party to these two conventions since 1957. 
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communautaire which the candidate countries are asked to transpose and implement. 
Yet, the ability of the EU to initiate and inspire changes pertinent to the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining is challenged, as Chapter 4 will 
demonstrate in more detail.  
(c) Third, the recent economic and financial crisis brought multi-faceted 
challenges to European labour law systems, affecting mechanisms for setting 
working conditions, and involving changes to the collective bargaining systems 
across the continent.235 The existing data demonstrate that those systems which 
already possessed centralised collective bargaining mechanisms at the onset of the 
crisis could more easily generate collective agreements in response to the detrimental 
effects of the crisis.236 From this viewpoint, the recent crisis period represents a 
genuine test for the CEE countries, questioning whether the overall legal framework 
is conducive to promoting and supporting centralised collective bargaining.    
 
2.2. In search of a leading paradigm of labour law transformation  
The CEE countries originally belonged to the European civil law tradition: their legal 
systems had deeply-entrenched German and Austrian-Hungarian roots before being 
substantially transformed by communist ideology.237 With the inception of 
communist rule in the mid-20th century, labour laws underwent dramatic 
transformation. Despite the fact that the common trait in all communist systems was 
large-scale state intervention in all matters relating to work, it would be misleading 
to claim that the labour laws were identical in CEE. To begin with, the variation of 
Slovenian communism, grounded on the paradigm of “self-management”, differed 
starkly from the rest of Soviet-based models. Self-management was the model in 
                                                          
235 Two recent publications have been particularly devoted to the overview of ways in which the 
recent crisis period affected labour law systems across Europe: Countouris, N. and Freedland, M. 
(eds) (2013) Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Bruun, N., Lörcher, K. and Schömann, I. (eds) (2014) The Economic and Financial Crisis and 
Collective Labour Law in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
236 See Glassner, V. (2013) Central and Eastern European Industrial Relations in the Crisis: National 
Divergence and Path-Dependent Change, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 
19, no 2, p 156. 
237 The German and Austrian-Hungarian roots of CEE countries and, in particular, the ways in which 
the legacies from the period between two world wars influenced today’s CEE settings has been 
researched by Inglot, T. (2008) Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 23. 
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which employees were considered to be the owners of the “socialist property”, rather 
than the political party or the state, as in the other communist-based systems. 
According to this principle, they were entitled to organise production and to decide 
on relevant conditions of work.238 At the same time, the Slovenian pre-transitional 
system was particular in being the most market-oriented in comparison to the other 
three CEE countries.239 Conversely, the variation of communist ideology honed in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland was comparatively more state-commanded, and 
conceptually tied to the notion of state property rather than the engagement of 
employees.  
With the beginning of economic transition, the CEE countries embarked on yet 
another dramatic transformation of labour laws. In that respect, several landmark 
features of the communist systems were particularly subjected to post-transitional 
scrutiny: 
(a)  The function of law was to support socialism and a planned economy.240   
(b) There was a lack of autonomous regulation of working conditions, as 
collective agreements were not a predominant form of standard setting, and the major 
regulator was the state (statutory law and administrative regulations).241 The lack of 
contractual relationship, either collective or individual, was a distinct feature of these 
systems.242 For instance, as explained by Kollonay Lehoczky, the law was not based 
on contractual freedoms, but, rather, it was tied to the status subsumed under the 
concept “worker taking part in building up socialism”.243 Slovenia was a bit of an 
exception to this, at least in paradigmatic sense, given the particular self-management 
                                                          
238 As explained by Crowley, S. and Stanojević, M. (2011) ‘Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, 
and Historical Legacies: Explaining the Slovenian Exception’ Politics & Society, vol 39, no 2, p 287.  
239 ibid., p 275. 
240 Sajo, A. (1990) ‘New Legalism in East Central Europe: Law as an Instrument of Social 
Transformation’ Journal of Law and Society, vol 17, no 3, pp 330-331. 
241 Which derived from the overall regulatory style, whereby the state role was perceived as one of 
securing broad rights for all citizens. Conversely, the post-communist task was to ensure that the state 
may set only minimum rights, beyond which the citizens could set their own rules, see Sewerynski, 
M. (1997) ‘Prospects for the Development of Labour and Social Security Law in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the Twenty-First Century’ Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol 18, p 184.  
242 As pointed out by Kollonay Lehoczky, C. (2010) ‘The Future of Labour Law: Insights from an East 
European Country’ European Labour Law Journal, vol 1, no 1, pp 33 - 43; Kollonay Lehoczky, C. 
(2004) ‘European Enlargement: A Comparative View of Hungarian Labour Law’ in G. A. Bermann 
and K. Pistor (eds) Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p 
211. The author explained the development of CEE labour law on the ground of lack of contractual 
relationship before the transitional period and its subsequent restoration in post-transitional terms. 
243 Kollonay Lehoczky (2004), p 211. 
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relationship amongst employees. It is relevant, furthermore, to underline that being 
such meagre sources of standard setting, communist collective agreements performed 
specific functions in comparison with the other European countries. As noted by 
Fahlbeck, these agreements nominally represented instruments for cooperation at the 
workplace level and, to some extent, instruments for protecting employees, but with 
“the overall impression that their main thrust lies elsewhere”.244 The focus of these 
agreements, as explained by Fahlbeck, was not to regulate the obligations of 
employers, as might have been expected of collective agreements, but rather to lay 
down the commitments of employees and to set down rules aiming at improving 
efficiency at work.245   
(c) Correlative to the underdevelopment of autonomous regulation was the 
peculiar regulatory style of the communist labour codes. In correlation to the scarcity 
of collective agreements, the statutory legal provisions were fairly detailed, 
bestowing a wide range of rights to employees in coercive and mandatory fashion.246   
With the onset of the transitional period, the foundations of collective 
bargaining and collective agreements changed profoundly. But what was the guiding 
paradigm shaping their transformation? To answer this, it is vital to note that the 
creation of the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining was set 
within a twofold narrative. 
(i) Regulation/Institutionalisation of industrial relations. The lack of 
meaningful collective bargaining practices in the communist period meant that, with 
the onset of the 1990s’ reformative processes, the CEE countries had to introduce 
basic provisions allowing free collective bargaining and free operation of trade 
unions and employers’ associations. In other words, the legal systems had to be 
                                                          
244 Fahlbeck, R. (1987) ’Collective Agreements: A Crossroad between Public Law and Private Law’ 
Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol 3, no 2, p 283.  
245 ibid., pp 283-286. 
246 For example, this was the case with the 1965 Czechoslovakian Labour Code, see Barancová, H. 
(1996) ‘Labour Law in the Slovak Republic, Present Situation and Future Trends’ in R. Blanpain and 
L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (from Planned to 
Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 31, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, p 139. Similarly, it was the case with the 1974 Polish Labour Code, Pichrt, J. and 
Štefko, M. (2015) ‘Labour Law in the Czech Republic’ International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. There are, however, views that the 
CEE communist law did not differ much in substantive terms from the laws in the western part of 
Europe at the time, but that the former group of countries were prone to adopting different forms of 
administrative rules which regulated each aspect of work in more detail, see Sajo (1990).  
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“enriched”247 with the new institutions alien to the previous legal setting. The most 
important ILO provisions on freedom of association and free operation of trade 
unions were an inspiration to that end.248 This seemingly simple task was 
successfully accomplished at the earliest transition stage. However, the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining cannot be understood as a simple step of 
inserting provisions guaranteeing free and voluntary collective bargaining. 
Institutionalisation entails a broader scrutiny of all legal provisions in labour law 
with a view to ensuring that the overall legal system is conducive to free and 
voluntary collective bargaining and to free organisation of social partners. It is 
therefore a long-term task that requires more than a declaratory adoption of leading 
legal principles. This process of institutionalisation will be explored in the second 
part of this study (chapters 5, 6 and 7), asking whether it has been fully accomplished 
in the four countries.  
(ii) Insertion of free market rationale. With the onset of economic transition, 
the market narrative entered the CEE legal sphere with the twofold objective: in the 
first place, in contrast to the contract-devoid basis of communist labour relations, the 
post-transitional CEE countries were faced with the task of building labour law 
systems based on a contractual relationship between employers and employees. This 
process was explained by Kollonay-Lehoczky as a restoration of contractual 
freedoms.249 Secondly, the CEE policy makers had to respond to the challenge of 
ensuring that legal provisions facilitated, rather than hindered, economic growth. The 
latter task seemingly played more prominent role in the countries that opted for non-
gradual “shock therapy”, such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The wide support 
for what were essentially free market ideas was described by Kollonay Lehoczky: 
“an allergic response to anything that resembled the institutions of the past appeared in almost 
all social fields, but it was particularly intense in economic, employment and labour law since 
these areas of the law had been at the core of the ideology and foundation of the fallen 
regime.”250  
                                                          
247 Bronstein, A. (2006) ‘Trends and Challenges of Labour Law in Central Europe’ in J. D. R. Craig 
(ed) Globalisation and the Future of Labour Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 195. 
248 Particularly, ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No 
87, 1948 and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, No 98, 1949. 
249 Kollonay Lehoczky (2004), p 212. 
250 ibid., pp 210-211.  
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The misconception of the post-transitional legal thinking was that the insertion of a 
free market narrative should go hand in hand with outright deregulation.251 On one 
hand, the insertion of a market narrative entailed lessening state involvement in 
labour relations in order to create faster economic growth. Inspired by belief that free 
market ideas should govern labour, this approach represented a counter-narrative to 
the previous communist setting. But on the other hand, the application of market 
narrative and commitment to free market ideas paved the way to unfettered freedom 
for entrepreneurs and managerial powers at local levels. Taken together, these 
aspects rendered the process of institutionalisation of collective bargaining difficult 
and also underpinned the creation of decentralised industrial relations in CEE.  
The previous observations demonstrated that there were substantial ambiguities 
in the introduction of market rationale. However, the policy reasoning described 
could not be applied to all the CEE countries to the same degree. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the policy makers’ degree of dedication to the neoliberal reforms varied 
across CEE. It can be concluded that, overall, CEE labour law transformation did not 
have clear normative and conceptual underpinnings, but that the guiding paradigm 
lay in a continuum between institutionalisation and free market narrative. Judging 
from the national processes presented in Chapter 2 (and particularly the support 
which trade unions enjoyed from policy makers), it can be assumed that the 
institutionalisation narrative played a more prominent role in Slovenia and, within a 
certain time frame, in Slovakia. Meanwhile, in Poland and the Czech Republic, one 
may imply the predominant role of the market narrative. The following sections will 
deconstruct the national processes of the four countries more precisely, with a view 
to providing more detailed explanations of these narratives. 
 
 
                                                          
251 As far as deregulation is concerned, Regini has criticised the fact that regulation in terms of policy 
debates has been too often confused with regulation in economic terms. The former relates to the 
functioning of the market as opposed to state regulation, while the latter denotes various ways in 
which economic resources are produced and distributed. Thus, Regini emphasised that deregulation is 
basically an ambigous term; see Regini, M. (2000b) ‘The Dilemmas of Labour Market Regulation’ in 
G. Esping-Andersen and M. Regini (eds) Why Deregulate Labour Markets, Oxford: Oxford 




3. The development of labour law in the four countries 
 
3.1. Slovenia 
The lynchpin of the labour law framework in the federal country of Yugoslavia was 
the so-called self-management system. In contrast with the other CEE countries, 
Slovenia’s labour law paradigm was a “socialist” conception of a labour relationship 
where the workers worked in socially owned enterprises.252 Since the enterprises 
were socially owned, workers were enabled to engage in decision making about the 
enterprise’s operation, and to establish various forms of workers’ representatives’ 
bodies at the level of the workplace.253 Despite the “socialist” construction of the 
system, collective bargaining practices were limited in Slovenia and linked to the 
otherwise economically less important private sector.254 At the same time, the 
collective agreements concluded were deemed not fully autonomous, as their purpose 
was to implement legal provisions set out in statutory regulation.255  
The transformation of the economy began in 1988, with the law which 
instigated the process of privatisation by delineating between private, mixed and 
social ownership (the latter originating from the previous self-management 
system).256 According to Slovenian scholars, given the fact that privatisation took 
place gradually, and that as a consequence social property was legally protected 
throughout the 1990s, the process of institutionalising collective bargaining was 
rather slow.257   
                                                          
252 Explanation of the self-management paradigm can be found in several sources, e.g. Končar, P. 
(1996) ‘Changes and Adaptations of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain 
and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (from Planned 
to Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 31, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, pp 157-172; Stanojević, M. (2005) ‘Avoiding Shock Therapy: Trade Unions’ Role in 
the Transition to a Market Economy in Slovenia’ in Dimitrova and Vilrokx, J. (eds) Trade Union 
Strategies in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards Decent Work, Budapest: ILO, p 202; Grdesic, M. 
(2008) ‘Mapping the Paths of the Yugoslav Model: Labour Strength and Weakness in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Serbia’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 14,  no 2, p 138.   
253 Crowley and Stanojević (2011); Grdesic (2008). 
254 Skledar, S. (2003) ’Collective Bargaining Legislation Examined’ Dublin: Eurofound, avaliable at: 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-bargaining-legislation-examined 
[accessed 1 August 2016]. 
255 Končar (1996), p 158. 
256 Končar (1996), pp 157-159. 
257 Vodovnik, Z. (2004) ’Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain (ed) The Actors of Collective Bargaining, Bulletin 
of Comparative Labour Relations, no 51, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, no 51, p 233. 
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Slovenia introduced the first modern collective bargaining rules and principles 
in the early 1990s. To start with, following the dissolution from the federal state of 
Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s Constitution introduced provision on freedom of association 
(Article 76). This period also saw the adoption of two vital pieces of legislation 
facilitating trade union operations, which are still in force today – the Act on Trade 
Union Representativeness of 1993 and the Act on Trade Union Organisation of 1990. 
The first legal provisions facilitating collective bargaining were initially introduced 
in the Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship of 1989 and the Employment 
Relationship Act of 1990, which were eventually replaced with the 2003 
Employment Relationship Act. The Slovenian legal system underwent its most 
comprehensive reform in 2006, when the Act on Collective Agreements was 
adopted. Until that time, certain traits specific to Slovenian labour law developed, 
which were pivotal to the shape of post-2006 developments:  
i. Firstly, the Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship of 1989 and the 
Employment Relationship Act of 1990 did not introduce comprehensive regulation 
of collective agreements.258 These legal acts contained general regulation only of all 
types of collective agreements, regardless of the type of property and companies 
(private, mixed or socially owned).259 
ii. Secondly, a specific trait of Slovenian industrial relations until 2006 was the 
mandatory membership of individual employers in the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.260 Given the fact that individual employers were obliged to be members of 
the Chamber, which was at the same time the major bargaining party on the 
employers’ side, the collective agreements concluded had wide coverage. In this 
way, the mandatory nature of membership of the Chamber has been linked to the 
comparatively higher coverage rates of collective agreements achieved in Slovenia 
than in the other CEE countries. However, criticised for contravening the free and 
voluntary nature of collective bargaining,261 mandatory membership was lifted in 
2006.  
                                                          
258 Končar (1996), p 158; Vodovnik (2004), p 232.  
259 ibid. 
260 Gospodarska Zbornica Slovenije (GSZ). 
261 Vodovnik, Z. (2015) ’Labour Law in Slovenia’ International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 267.  
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iii. Thirdly, a peculiarity of the system was that the collective agreements were 
in a certain sense considered mandatory, particularly with regard to collective 
agreements at cross-sectoral (in Slovenia called “general collective agreements”) and 
sectoral levels. The quasi-mandatory nature was inherited from the socialist period 
and comes from the peculiar regulatory style of statutory law. Specifically, the law 
did not regulate certain areas with enough precision, making it necessary to conclude 
collective agreements.262 This “mandatory” nature of collective bargaining was 
honed until 2006, when it was abolished after criticisms about incompatibility with 
the voluntary nature of collective labour agreements and for allegedly being in 
contravention of the ILO conventions.263  
The major overhaul of the legal framework on collective bargaining took place 
in 2006 with the adoption of the Act on Collective Agreements, which represents a 
seminal piece of law in the current legislative framework. No new law regulating 
collective bargaining has been enacted since. Drafted with the aim of facilitating free 
and voluntary collective bargaining, this Act addressed the three described 
peculiarities of the previous setting.264 Mandatory membership to the Chamber was 
lifted.265 The 2006 Act also regulated the most salient aspects of collective 
agreements and collective bargaining, including who should be the parties to these 
agreements, their validity and the procedure for concluding the agreements. It is 
crucial to add that, even though the 2006 Act was pivotal to implementing free and 
voluntary collective bargaining, as a matter of fact industrial relations had already 
developed at three major bargaining levels throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In this 
sense, the 2006 Act represented an endorsement of the already established collective 
bargaining practice.  
On a final note, it is useful to add that, based on historical developments, 
Slovenian scholar Vodovnik distinguished three “generations” of collective 
agreements that have been in existence over the past two decades.266 This division 
                                                          
262 Končar (1996), p 169 and p 157.  
263 Skledar, S. (2003) ’Collective Bargaining Legislation Examined’ Dublin: Eurofound, avaliable at: 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-bargaining-legislation-examined 
[accessed 1 August 2016]; also, Končar (1996), p 169.  
264 Vodovnik (2015), p 286 and p 267. 
265 Vodovnik (2015), p 267.  




roughly explicates the gradual process of the institutionalisation of collective 
agreements in Slovenia:  
(a) The first generation of collective agreements was concluded shortly after 
the 1990 Slovenian Constitution was promulgated. These were two cross-sectoral 
agreements (in Slovenian terminology “general agreements”), covering public and 
private sector. On their basis, collective agreements at sectoral and company levels 
were concluded. Yet, bargaining autonomy was limited under the law because 
privatisation has not yet begun. 
(b) The second generation of collective agreements was concluded after 
privatisation of socialist ownership had started. However, collective agreements were 
deemed mandatory and hence were not fully autonomous: statutory law required that 
certain conditions of work and employment should be regulated by collective 
agreements. 
(c) The third generation of collective agreements, concluded in line with the 
2006 Act on Collective Agreements, were based on the free and autonomous will of 
social partners.  
 
3.2. Slovakia 
Collective agreements were of marginal importance in the former country of 
Czechoslovakia. The major reason behind the limited regulatory space occupied by 
communist collective agreements was the specific regulatory style of the 1965 
Labour Code: statutory legal provisions consisted of a fairly elaborated mandatory 
and comprehensive regulation of most aspects of work and employment which did 
not leave much space for autonomous regulation. In addition, there was a further 
major legal constraint: the 1965 Labour Code allowed collective bargaining only on 
designated matters.267  
The legal reform of collective bargaining had already begun in the early 1990s 
within the federal country of Czechoslovakia. The organisation of trade unions and 
employers’ associations was made possible by the 1990 Act on the Association of 
                                                          
267 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 94. 
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Citizens,268 and in 1992, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic inserted freedom of 
association into its provisions (Article 37). The 1965 Labour Code remained valid, 
although in an amended version, until recodification in 2001.269 Collective 
bargaining was legally postulated with the 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining which 
was adopted in the former country of Czechoslovakia, and which is still in force (as 
amended).  
Although the legal system was modified a number of times (particularly 
regarding collective agreements extensions and, more recently, on trade union 
representativeness), the building blocks of collective bargaining system were legally 
anchored with the 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining and the Labour Code 
provisions regulating the procedure of collective bargaining, validity of collective 
agreements and other pertinent matters. These provisions have basically remained 
unchanged since the early 1990s. What has been subject to gradual transformation is 
the content of collective agreements, and it very much depended on the regulatory 
style of the Labour Code that was changing over the time. Likewise, whilst the 1965 
version consisted of mainly mandatory and comprehensive provisions, the 
subsequent legal amendments managed to gradually introduce more space for 
autonomous regulation by social partners. The most radical overhaul of the labour 
law framework took place in 2001. After 2001, subsequent legal amendments were, 
in general, introducing gradual deregulation, and a move towards more flexible 
labour relations.270 
A specific feature of Slovak labour law is its tendency to frequent amendment, 
validating the argument that the process of labour law transformation is still on-going 
in this country.271 The recent economic and financial crisis has had particular impact 
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on labour law, and has led to certain innovative changes.272 As explained by 
respondents in the interviews, the frequent legal amendments of the past two decades 
have been unsystematic and ad hoc, and involved the political balancing of the 
interests of employees and employers. The most contentious collective bargaining 
issue has been extensions of collective agreements – the subject of a number of legal 
reforms (which will be further discussed in Chapter 6).   
 
3.3. The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic shares its legal foundations with Slovakia. The 1965 
Czechoslovakian Labour Code, which in a comprehensive and mandatory manner 
regulated labour relations, continued to be in force in the post-transitional period, 
given that it was re-codified only in 2006.273  
As has been the case in the other CEE countries, in the Czech Republic the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining began in the 1990s, with the Act on 
Collective Bargaining (adopted in the former country of Czechoslovakia), which set 
out the building blocks of a collective bargaining system. This Act applies in its 
basically unaltered structure today. The 1990 Act on the Association of Citizens 
enabled free trade union organisation.274 Freedom of association has been officially 
guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the provisions of which are of 
constitutional nature.275  
Several phases pertinent to labour law development can be distinguished: 
(a) The 1965 Labour Code has remained valid until 2006, even though it was 
amended more than 50 times.276 One scholar noted that the version of the 1965 
Labour Code which was at force in the early 1990s – thus, the version with which the 
                                                          
272 Likewise, in the area of collective bargaining, the 2011 amendments to the Labour Code allowed 
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Czech Republic entered the transitional period – was not radically different from its 
communist version.277 In fact, in the early 1990s, only the provisions of the Labour 
Code characteristic of the communist setting and regarded as “embarrassing to the 
new order” were deleted.278 For example, the principle upon which all people were 
entitled to a job was deleted.279  
(b) The major re-codification of the Labour Code took place in 2006. The 2006 
Labour Code has introduced far-reaching changes to labour law, principally inserting 
the market rationale and founding labour relations and collective bargaining on the 
freedom of contract.280  
(c) Since 2006, the new version of the Labour Code has been amended more 
than 40 times, with a view to gradually introducing flexible working patterns to the 
Czech legal system.281 The recent economic and financial crisis also induced salient 
labour law modifications. In the first place, in 2012, a legal amendment was 
introduced with the objective of facilitating labour market flexibility, and in the area 
of collective bargaining it was significant in curbing the trade union position at 
company level.282  
As the previous observations demonstrated, Czech and Slovak laws share 
common features, due to their common heritage anchored in the 1965 Labour Code 
and the 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining. While the legal foundations of collective 
bargaining were postulated in both countries early in transition, the actual function 
and scope of collective agreements depended on numerous Labour Code changes in 
the subsequent decades. As is the case in Slovakia, labour law in the Czech Republic 
has a tendency to frequent change. And, as the respondents explained in the 
interviews, the changes made to the legal framework were done so in an ad hoc and 
unsystematic fashion, involving frequent balancing of the interests of employers and 
employees.  
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In communist Poland, the practice of collective bargaining was not far reaching. 
Collective agreements had been concluded only in a limited number of enterprises, 
and they had limited substance because of the comprehensive regulatory style of 
statutory rules.283 The nature of collective bargaining was not autonomous, as the 
substance of collective accords had to conform to the economic policies and plans 
issued along with the government regulations.284  
In comparison with the other three countries, the Polish example is different in 
that certain legal developments that had occurred in the 1980s paved the way for the 
forthcoming events. It can be claimed that the labour law transformation began 
officially earlier than in the other CEE countries, in parallel to the process of raising 
awareness that economic reform was necessary. Also, in the 1980s the major trade 
union movement “Solidarity” was formed, subsequently playing a central role in the 
process of transition.285 The first trade union provisions were adopted under the Act 
on Trade Unions in 1982, almost a decade before the other three CEE countries.286 
Laws regulating work in the state-owned enterprises were adopted in the 1980s, and 
were prominent for establishing the future legacy and foothold for the upcoming 
decentralisation of industrial relations in the post-transitional context. From 1982, 
state enterprises were allowed to fix wages, firstly unilaterally with the decision of 
the plant management, but after 1984 through negotiated agreements at the plant 
level.287 These plant level agreements, however, were not fully autonomous, given 
that they were subject to approval by the “founding organs” of the state enterprise.288 
Another law was passed in 1986 introducing two-level collective bargaining at 
branch and plant level, but these collective agreements were also not fully 
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autonomous. They had to conform to a set of governmental resolutions, and their 
provisions would have been more advantageous to employees only if expressly 
allowed by the law.289  
As in the other three CEE countries, the legal transformation began with laws 
enabling free and voluntary collective bargaining being promulgated in the 1990s. In 
addition to the 1982 Act on Trade Unions (replaced by the 1991 Act on Trade 
Unions), the establishment of employers’ associations was enabled by the 1991 Act 
on Organisation of Employers. The 1974 Labour Code, even though it was amended 
a number of times, has remained the main source of labour law in the post-
transitional context. Section XI of the Labour Code, postulating collective bargaining 
freedoms was laid down in 1994.290 The 1974 Labour Code has not been re-codified 
since. The collective bargaining framework anchored in Chapter XI of the Labour 
Code, however, has remained largely unchanged since 1994. As is the case with the 
other CEE countries, the function and scope of collective agreements developed in 
line with the numerous Labour Code amendments.  
 
4. The emancipation of collective agreements in CEE 
The previous section underlined that during the communist era the regulatory role of 
collective bargaining was marginal and the collective agreements were not fully 
autonomous, as their power and substance was limited by statutory labour law and 
administrative regulation. With the insertion of the principles of free and voluntary 
collective bargaining, the transformation of labour law involved the task of 
remodelling collective agreements. In order to become autonomous instruments of 
regulation, collective agreements had to widen their substantive scope, essential so 
that collective agreements could regulate far more substantive matters than in the 
pre-1990s. At the same time, becoming autonomous instruments of regulation was 
vital for enabling collective agreements to perform far more functions than in the 
previous pre-1990s period. In turn, this was necessary to accommodate market 
requirements. It has already been explained in Chapter 1 that the tendency of modern 
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collective agreements is to perform several functions; for example, to be instruments 
of adaptability or to allow employees to participate in policy making.291 At the same 
time, a correlating tendency of statutory law in Europe, also mentioned in Chapter 1, 
is to become “devoid of substantive provisions and to be supplemented by procedural 
rules designed to guarantee the right to collective bargaining”.292 Thus, this study 
understands the process of collective agreements becoming autonomous sources of 
regulation from the pre- to post-1990s as their “emancipation”.  
In order to assess to what extent such emancipation has actually occurred in the 
four CEE countries, it is essential to look at: (1) changes in the legal nature of 
collective agreements and (2) changes in the relationship between collective 
agreements and statutory labour law.  
 
4.1. Collective agreements - defining the legal nature 
The aim of this section is to explore how the legal nature of collective agreements in 
CEE has changed in the past decades. Under the previous communist systems, the 
state was the primary regulator of working life and labour law had a pronounced 
public law character. It is therefore important to ask whether labour law and 
collective agreements lost their public law nature and if they became connected to 
the private law sphere.  
Comparative labour law in Europe provides no single answer as to whether 
labour laws and collective agreements should have private or public law nature. In 
some countries, collective agreements have a prevailing private law character, such 
as in the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries and Italy, while in France, Spain 
and Belgium these agreements belong to the realm of public law.293 German law 
considers collective agreements to be mixed private and public instruments.294 The 
legal scholarship underlines that collective agreements have at least some public law 
features. In a seminal explanation by Fahlbeck, collective agreements are accorded 
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an essentially private contractual nature, but enriched with public law qualities.295 
The public law aspect is most obvious when it comes to legally extending powers of 
collective agreement,296 but, even without it, collective agreements have a certain 
statutory quality by virtue of the fact they may cover large percentages of employees 
in the labour market.297 At the same time, legal scholarship emphasises distinctive 
traits of labour law which delineate it from private law. Deakin and Wilkinson have 
underlined distinct objects of regulation (the employment relationship), distinctive 
forms of labour law regulations (labour standards) and distinctive types of 
institutions (trade unions, for example).298 Lord Wedderburn emphasised the 
collective character of labour law which clearly distinguishes it from private law.299 
However, it has been also underlined that this autonomy of labour law from private 
law can never be absolute,300 given that labour law intersects with the other legal 
disciplines (such as contract law).301 Notwithstanding this statement, for labour law 
to “attain a satisfactory level of functional coherence”, Freedman notes that it should 
“evolve and operate as an independent subsystem of the general legal system within 
which it is located”.302  
When examining the current CEE labour laws one can note the following. In 
contrast to the pronounced public law nature that had pertained previously under the 
communist system, the current frameworks of the four countries stipulate that private 
law applies to labour law matters when the latter contains no regulation on the 
subject. This provision can be found in labour laws of all four countries. What can be 
inferred, therefore, is that that labour law occupies a space distinct from private law, 
but at the same time, it intersects with it. Yet, the process of reconnecting labour law 
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to private law roots has been contentious in some CEE countries. In the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia provision of this kind has been the result of the gradual 
processes taking place over the past two decades, involving a gradual disconnection 
of labour law from the public sphere and its reconnection to the sphere of private 
law. In Slovakia, the separation of labour law from private law, originating in the 
communist period, was embodied in a separation between the provisions of Labour 
Code and Civil Code. Only in 2001 was the Labour Code to some extent reconnected 
to the Civil Code, by establishing a relationship based on subsidiarity.303 Under this 
principle, the Civil Code provisions are applied whenever matters are not regulated 
by the Labour Code. In the Czech Republic, the discussion about the relationship 
between private law and labour law has been the most contentious of the four 
countries. As in the other CEE countries, the two branches of law were completely 
separate in the pre-1990s period, but the gradual process of their reconnection began 
only in 2006. Firstly, the relationship between the two sets of laws was based on the 
principle of delegation, which was established in 2006. Pursuant to this rule, the 
provisions of the Civil Code applied only when expressly stipulated in the Labour 
Code.304 After 2008, following a Constitutional Court judgment, the relationship was 
redefined on the basis of subsidiarity and this solution was enacted in the 2014 Civil 
Code: the Civil Code rules shall apply whenever matters are not regulated by the 
Labour Code.305 The Slovak and Czech cases demonstrate something striking: the 
beginning of the process of (re)connecting labour law to private law came more than 
a decade after the official start of the transition process. At the same time, these two 
countries demonstrate the gradual and contentious nature of this process which was 
clearly driven by legacies (in the shape of the predominantly public nature of labour 
laws in the previous pre-1990s setting). 
At the same time, what can be concluded is that the CEE collective agreements 
have a legal basis in the general provisions of private law. When it comes to the 
notion of collective agreement in CEE, its definition and legal nature is conceived 
similarly in all four countries in a rather broad way. The statutory legal definitions 
present collective agreements through their parties by specifying that they can be 
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concluded by trade unions and employers’ associations or employers. As observed 
by Casale, the understanding of collective agreements in CEE largely corresponds to 
the ILO definition of collective agreement which is provided in Recommendation No 
91: 
“The term collective agreement means all agreements in writing regarding working conditions 
and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a group of employers or one or 
more employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and one or more representative workers’ 
organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly 
elected and authorized by them in accordance with national laws and regulations, on the 
other”.306 
Moreover, the legal scholarship in the four countries provides a similar 
understanding of the legal nature of collective agreement, which, in the end, has lost 
its predominant public nature and transitioned into an instrument legally anchored in 
private law. Yet, its legal nature is best described as mixed: the legal basis of 
collective agreements in the four countries is in private law, but it is also possible to 
claim that collective agreements have some public law elements. Likewise, the 
statutory legal rules afford the legally binding status of the normative parts of 
collective agreements (which stipulate rules and conditions for work) to its parties.307 
In some views, the normative parts of collective agreements are even elevated to the 
status of a source of law for the subjects to whom these agreements apply.308  
 
4.2. The scope of collective bargaining freedom 
This Chapter has so far demonstrated that collective agreements were entrenched in 
the realm of public law in the previous communist setting, and that transition 
involved the reconnection of labour law to the sphere of private law. It will be the 
aim of this section to provide some thoughts on how this transition reshaped the 
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relationship between collective agreement and statutory legal regulation as two 
distinct, yet interlinked sources of standard setting for work and employment, while 
taking into account that these topics will be more deeply explored in subsequent 
chapters. There are two elements that are relevant for the discussion: (a) 
determination of the extent to which the substantive scope of collective agreements 
has widened in the past two decades, allowing collective agreements to regulate 
matters that had been in the hands of the state in the pre-1990s period, (b) 
understanding how the principle of collective autonomy is inserted in CEE. These 
two elements will be respectively discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1. Widening the substantive scope of collective agreement 
Being overwhelmingly detailed and mostly regulating terms and conditions of work 
in a mandatory manner, the communist laws did not provide much substantive space 
for autonomous regulation by virtue of collective agreements. Widening the 
substantive scope of collective agreements so that they can regulate matters that had 
been the subject of state regulation in the previous regime was a hallmark process in 
post-transitional labour law transformation. At the same time, this process was 
essential to facilitate both the institutionalisation narrative and the market narrative 
of labour law transformation.309 Enabling social partners to regulate matters as they 
wish is obviously an emanation of a free and voluntary system of collective 
bargaining and is a step in facilitating the institutionalisation of industrial relations. 
At the same time, broadening the scope of collective bargaining is a necessary 
prerequisite for facilitating the market narrative, allowing collective agreements to go 
beyond the role which had been assigned to them in the previous setting and to 
develop new and wider market-friendly set of functions.310 In this respect, it should 
be underlined that the ILO system of rules contains no specific instructions on what 
the collective agreements should look like. The ILO in principle affords wide 
substantive scope to collective agreements, involving in the first place terms and 
conditions of work and employment, as well as provisions regulating the relationship 
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between employers and trade unions.311 At the same time, very few matters are 
excluded from the scope of collective agreements, mainly those relating to the 
management of enterprises.312 
As the following comparative analysis demonstrates, broadening the 
substantive scope of collective agreements has been a long and gradual process in 
CEE. 
(a) The Slovenian 2006 Act on Collective Agreements does not contain legal 
restrictions about matters that can be covered by collective labour agreements. 
However, this bargaining freedom is a result of the gradual processes of the past two 
decades. The previous sections have already demonstrated that the Slovenian 
collective agreements that were concluded in the 1990s were not fully voluntary, 
given that for a long period of time they retained a mandatory nature.313 It is only the 
above mentioned “third generation of collective agreements”,314 concluded pursuant 
to the 2006 Act on Collective Agreements, that emanated from free and voluntary 
bargaining. However, the Slovenian legal framework still has a tendency to suggest 
certain matters to be regulated by collective agreements (in this sense, the collective 
agreements have a role of implementing statutory legal rules).315 
(b) In Slovakia, the scope of bargaining freedom was subject to gradual 
widening. The 1965 Labour Code had an overwhelming regulatory style that had 
consisted of predominantly coercive provisions, in this way restricting the regulatory 
scope of collective agreements.316 The provisions introduced at the beginning of the 
1990s amended the Labour Code’s provisions and to some extent managed to soften 
its coercive and mandatory nature.317 However, the 1965 Labour Code remained 
valid until the new recodification in 2001, when social partners were enabled to 
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negotiate on any matters they saw fit.318 Further legal amendments also liberalised 
labour market relations.319 
(c) In the Czech Republic, the scope of collective agreements has been also 
shaped in distinctive phases. The 1965 Labour Code marginalised the role of 
collective agreements by setting mandatory and extensive statutory provisions on 
work and employment. Collective bargaining was possible only on matters explicitly 
allowed for in the statutory provisions.320 The 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining 
formally introduced collective bargaining freedoms. Nevertheless, the practice of 
collective bargaining was at the time still overwhelmed by the mandatory provisions 
of the 1965 Labour Code,321 containing extensive protection of labour and work. It 
was only the 2006 Labour Code 322 that formally liberalised the scope of bargaining. 
The principle of “anything that is not expressly forbidden by the law is permitted” 
had been introduced with the 2006 Code, allowing social partners to exercise 
collective bargaining to a much larger extent.323 However, even though the formal 
insertion of this principle represented a major step forward, its practical implication 
was mitigated by the mandatory and extensive regulatory style of the 2006 Labour 
Code.324 The interviews with Czech social partners revealed that the content of 
collective agreements is still majorly predetermined by the Labour Code provisions 
and their extensive regulatory style.  
(d) In Poland, as the interviews revealed, the social partners still consider the 
Labour Code to be fairly extensive. As explained throughout interviews, this is a 
major reason for employers not to enter into collective bargaining. The 
comprehensive regulatory style of statutory provisions is to be considered something 
of a legal remnant from the communist period, since the 1974 Labour Code 
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originally introduced fairly mandatory and coercive provisions.325 In the communist 
era, freedom of bargaining was heavily restricted – the agreements could contain 
more favourable provisions than the Labour Code only when authorised by the law 
or justified by the specific circumstances of the given sector or profession.326 
Moreover, the concluded agreements needed a registration and authorisation from the 
ministry responsible for labour affairs.327 The legal framework emerging at the 
beginning of the 1990s retained the mandatory and coercive regulatory style of the 
1974 Labour Code. The 1994 Labour Code liberalised the scope of collective 
bargaining, but it was only in 2000 that the law introduced provisions guaranteeing 
social partners’ freedom to self-regulate on any matter they see fit.328 However, the 
Polish social partners claimed during the interviews that Labour Code provisions still 
comprehensively regulate areas of work and employment, and this limits the 
incentives of social partners to engage in collective bargaining. 
As the comparative analysis demonstrates, the expansion of the scope of 
collective agreements took place in each country with a national-specific dynamic. 
However, there are two distinct, yet interlinked phases that must be carefully 
delineated and accounted for: (a) insertion of legal rules officially recognising the 
rights of social partners to conclude collective agreements on any matters they see 
fit; (b) the dynamic of de facto liberalisation of the substantive scope of collective 
bargaining. De facto liberalisation involves gradual transformation of statutory 
regulation style from the predominantly mandatory style to the one which postulates 
minimum rights and further encourages collective bargaining by virtue of auxiliary 
legislation (the latter explained in Chapter 1).   
When it comes to formal insertion of the legal rules (a), as the national data in 
this section demonstrated, it took place in the four countries more than a decade after 
the onset of the transitional period. As the comparative data show, the provisions 
annulling bargaining restrictions of these kinds were introduced in Slovenia and the 
                                                          
325 Sewerynski (1993), p 444, notes that in the communist period, the collective bargaining was 
limited to regulating specific conditions of work for a given sector or profession.  
326 ibid., p 460. 
327 Florek, L. (1992) ’Problems and Dilemmas of Labour Relations in Poland’ Comparative Labour 
Law Journal, vol 13, p 118.  
328 Hajn, Z. (2003) ‘Collective Labour Agreements and Contracts of Employment in Polish Labour 
Law’ in M. Sewerynski (ed) Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts of Employment, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp 192-193; Swiatkowski (2002), p 179.    
91 
 
Czech Republic only in 2006 and in Poland and Slovakia at the beginning of the 
2000s. Thus, throughout the 1990s, the social partners in the four countries could not 
freely determine the substance of collective agreements. To determine the exact 
extent of de facto liberalisation (b), it would be necessary to engage in all-
encompassing comparative consideration of all individual labour law provisions in 
the four countries with a view to determining the extent of the mandatory and 
coercive regulatory style of the legal provisions. Given that this task would go well 
beyond the current research limits, it is only possible to rely on the observations of 
the interviewees, as well as existing knowledge in the scholarship. Both underline the 
fairly comprehensive regulatory style of the legislation. As highlighted during the 
interviews in Poland, the Polish Labour Code from 1974 (as amended) seems to be 
particularly extensive, containing fairly elaborated regulations on many aspects of 
work (working time, telework, remuneration and many other items). A similar 
observation was reported by the Czech interviewees. The interviewees have 
explained that such regulatory style can be interpreted as a factor rendering collective 
bargaining difficult, since employers do not see any advantage in engaging in 
negotiations. Among the four countries, it is the Slovenian legal regulations that 
seem to be the least detailed. Slovenian legal rules are also unique in the fact they 
often do not contain precise regulation of elements of work and employment, instead 
suggesting alternative regulation by collective agreements.  
 
4.2.2. Collective autonomy 
Collective autonomy is an emanation of collective bargaining freedoms, vital for 
rendering distinct regulatory space to collective agreements in relation to statutory 
labour law. The notion of collective autonomy was seminally coined by Sinzeimher, 
who claimed that equal opportunities in the area of social and economic conditions 
can only be achieved through collective self-determination, that is, through collective 
bargaining between the organisations of employers and employees.329 However, 
collective autonomy, even though vital for shaping national labour laws, has been 
differently understood in European law. Despite obvious differences in 
                                                          
329 As interpreted by Le Friant, M. (2013) ‘Collective Autonomy: Hope or Danger?’ Comparative 
Labour Law and Policy Journal, vol 34, p 631.  
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understanding and defining the concept,330 the country variations essentially 
safeguard the autonomy of social partners to conclude collective agreements and to 
negotiate and execute agreements.331 The notion of autonomy has also been inserted 
into the ILO architecture, first and foremost in Convention No 87, under which the 
exercise of the right to collective bargaining is subject to independence from trade 
unions and lack of interference from the public authorities.332 
From an analytical point of view, the introduction of collective autonomy in 
CEE can be understood as the process of opening and guarding the regulatory space 
of collective agreements as autonomous sources of law. The exercise of collective 
autonomy requires space for the production of negotiated norms. Thus, collective 
autonomy implies that collective agreements should be viewed as distinct sources of 
standard setting, enjoying a substantial level of autonomy from the statutory legal 
rules. Thus, corollary to the process of introducing collective autonomy into CEE is 
the process of building the auxiliary role of the state, which was explained in Chapter 
1 (section 4.3). This has been succinctly underlined by Sciarra: 
“The autonomy of a collective bargaining system is measured comparatively in relation to the 
degree of incisiveness exhibited by statute law, whether as an instrument of support for 
voluntary negotiating systems or as a substitutive regulatory instrument, or one fulfilling a 
purely alternative and subsidiary role with respect to solutions freely adopted by the collective 
actors. It was a central concept in the development of European labour law during the 
immediate post–war period, around which the rules of democratic systems for the 
representation of interests were constructed and barriers against legislative intervention 
violating freedom of association were erected.”333 
But how can collective agreements relate to statutory law? According to Supiot, 
collective labour agreements typically replace, prolong, develop or implement 
legislation.334 It is clear from the quoted statement by Sciarra that statutory law can 
play different roles in relation to collective agreements; to reiterate, it can be an 
                                                          
330 The overview of European practice has been provided by Le Friant, M. (2013) ‘Collective 
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333 Sciarra, S. (2007) ‘The Evolution of Collective Bargaining: Observations on a Comparison in the 
Countries of the European Union’ Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, vol 29, p 7. 
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instrument of support, a substitutive regulatory instruments, or an alternative and 
subsidiary instrument for collective bargaining.  
The legal and constitutional provisions of the four selected countries have 
formally recognised rights to collective bargaining and freedom of association early 
in the transitional period. Collective agreements, in that sense, have been recognised 
as autonomous sources of standard setting since the very beginning of the 
transformative processes, and this represented a first step towards the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining. Yet, the brief analysis in this chapter can 
provide no further recourse as to how collective autonomy was implemented in the 
legal system. What the previous section (4.2.2) demonstrated is that statutory labour 
law still exhibits considerable level of “incisiveness” in the sense of predefining the 
substantive scope of collective agreements. But further assessment of the relationship 
between collective agreements and statutory laws requires more detailed exploration 
of the legal framework for collective agreements, which will be performed in the 
second part of this study. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the labour laws of the four CEE countries have 
not only been exposed to a similar sets of factors and trigger events in the past 25 
years, but also that the process of development of the legal framework for collective 
bargaining has had certain common or, at least, similar traits across the countries. 
While the points discussed in this chapter will be further elaborated in the second 
part of the thesis, there are some common traits that can be highlighted at this stage, 
and some important remarks to be made in relation to the two research questions. 
In the first place, the institutionalisation narrative has played a prominent role 
in facilitating the formal adoption of provisions that formed the building blocks of 
the collective bargaining systems in the early transition period. In the early 1990s, 
the four CEE countries adopted basic constitutional and legal provisions 
guaranteeing collective bargaining and freedom of association, alongside the first 
labour codes, as a first formal prerequisite for the institutionalisation of collective 
bargaining. However, the institutionalisation of collective bargaining is a longer 
process going beyond the formal and declaratory acceptance of major collective 
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bargaining freedoms, and this was a process which took place gradually over years. 
This process of gradual institutionalisation was facilitated by legacies and path-
dependencies. This chapter demonstrated that there were some common legacies that 
predetermined the path in all four countries, but also some legacies which were 
country-specific. 
The common legacy, in the first place, has been the all-encompassing 
regulatory scope of communist statutory labour law, which affected the substantive 
scope of collective agreements in the post-transitional period. As argued in section 
4.2, the collective agreements’ substantive scope has been gradually liberalised in the 
four countries. This point has been the most blatantly demonstrated by the example 
of three generations of collective agreements in Slovenia. At the same time, it is 
striking that the gradual liberalisation has been a complex two-phase process: in the 
first place, involving the insertion of the statutory legal provision allowing 
bargaining on any matters social partners see fit, and in the second place, involving 
the relaxation of the mandatory and coercive style of statutory labour law. The first 
phase was accomplished in the four countries more than a decade after the onset of 
the transitional process, but the accomplishment of the second phase is still 
questionable, as the Polish case exemplifies best. Another semi-common legacy of the 
pre-1990s setting, shared by two of the countries examined – Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, was the generally predominant public character of labour law, and its slow 
reconnection to private law.  
Next to common legacies, one may also observe country-specific legacies 
which were vital for facilitating the institutionalisation narrative. In Slovenia, the 
legacy of self-management was vital factor shaping the post-transitional industrial 
relations.335 In Poland, the 1980s legislation played vital role in predetermining the 
shape of trade union decentralisation in post-transitional terms.336 
Another significant trait in the four countries, demonstrating slow 
institutionalisation and the strong role of legacies, has been the momentum with 
which the legal reforms took place. As inferred from section 2, whilst the first 
“modern” legal provisions were adopted in the early 1990s, no substantial legal 
reforms took place in any of the four countries before the mid-2000s. Moreover, 
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except for Slovenia, which entered the transition period with new labour laws, the 
other three countries were notably “recycling” their communist-based labour codes 
for more than a decade after the official start of legal transformation. The most 
blatant example is Poland, where the (re)codification has never taken place, and the 
Labour Code originates from 1974, even though it has been modified a number of 
times.  
The comparative findings presented allow some preliminary insights on the 
two research questions of this study. The significance of these findings for the first 
research question is the following: the substantive scope of collective agreements is 
somewhat restricted because statutory legal provisions often contain extensive 
mandatory regulation of conditions of work and employment. This has been 
particularly exemplified in Poland and the Czech Republic, where the interviewees 
claimed that social partners are not motivated to engage in collective bargaining on 
matters which have been already covered in law. The importance for the second 
research question is clear: the institutionalisation of collective bargaining was 
gradual, with the slow and gradual “emancipation” of collective agreements which 
can be attributed to the role of legacies from the pre-1990s phase. 
Whether the source of slow institutionalisation and gradual emancipation of 
collective agreement stems from the lack of (adequate) legal regulation, is a different 
question given that the answer is deeply embedded in a broader set of issues related 
to social partners’ weaknesses at all bargaining levels and to the lack of a general 
social dialogue tradition in CEE. It seems that the problem of overwhelming 
statutory regulation cannot simply be solved by relaxing the statutory regulation and 
providing a broader scope for collective agreements. This conclusion is amply 
demonstrated by the statement of the Polish trade union representative during the 
interview in Warsaw: 
“The argument that the Labour Code is extensive is often used by the employers. But, this as 
such is not an issue. We could agree on making the labour code more flexible, and give more 
competence to the social partners, but there is one danger. There are a lot of companies which 




Another similar statement made by a trade union representative during the interviews 
in Warsaw depicts the complexity of the processes which give rise to overwhelming 
state regulation: 
“The representatives of employers’ associations say that we have such detailed and 
complicated labour law at national level that there is no space for negotiations. We have 
detailed regulations on working time, minimum wage and any other issues. They [employers’ 
associations] also say, if trade unions were willing to make the labour law more flexible, they 
would be much more open to negotiations at the sectoral level.  But then the response of trade 
unions is the following: ’you [employers’ associations] want us to make labour law more 
flexible, so that you might or might not come to negotiate with us about the topics which are 
exactly the same as those written now in the labour law’. The problem is therefore that the 
social partners do not trust each other.” 
The above considerations succinctly confirm Bluhm’s finding that CEE countries 
face a liberalisation dilemma, given that the retreat of the state in these countries can 
generate the effect of strengthening managerial unilateralism.337 The two statements 
made during the interviews fully support these findings: given that the trade unions 
are too weak, the statutory labour regulation is the only way to guarantee the 
adequate enforcement of rights. Thus, in this sense, the extensive regulatory style can 
be also viewed as a way of protecting the position of employees and trade unions. 
With these arguments in mind, it can be concluded that relaxing the imperative and 
comprehensive regulatory style can only go hand in hand with ensuring the rights of 
trade unions and encouraging their activities, particularly at the company level. 
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From Accession to the Economic and Financial Crisis: 




The start of the accession process in 2000s has given a new dimension to the on-
going process of labour law transformation in CEE. From the beginning of the 
accession process, the EU played an active role in shaping the landscape of social 
dialogue in the CEE countries, mainly because social dialogue forms part of the 
acquis communautaire which the candidate countries are asked to transpose and 
implement. Building meaningful industrial relations within a relatively short time 
span represented a challenge for the CEE countries and it has been argued that EU 
support was essential to improve social dialogue and the weak organisation of trade 
unions.338 The EU’s reasons for tackling industrial relations in CEE were manifold. In 
the first place, on the eve of the 2004 enlargement, the EU faced a question of 
whether the social and economic dimensions of the CEE countries are compatible 
with those of the existing EU member states.339 The CEE countries that were about to 
join the EU had a substantially different landscape from the member states, with 
lower rates of wages, economic development and labour standards. There was 
therefore an apprehension that enlargement would bring a regime competition in the 
EU, by emphasizing deregulatory incentives and “race to the bottom”.340 
Furthermore, the compatibility with the member states had been questioned in the 
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area of industrial relations: despite great variations in industrial relations, strong and 
independent trade unions represent the backbone of the member states’ systems, a 
feature differentiating the EU from other regions of the world. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the trade unions in CEE had been suffering from weaknesses inherited 
from the previous system. Therefore, closing the social “gap” between the two 
groups of countries represented an important challenge for the EU’s policy of 
enlargement. The other reasons for social dialogue in the candidate countries being a 
concern for the EU, is the fact that the performance of many EU-based mechanisms 
and policies relies on the functionality of national social dialogue mechanisms.341 For 
example, the success of the European social dialogue depends on the capacities of 
national social partners to be able to engage in the same activities as European social 
partners or to implement EU-level collective agreements.342 Also, the successful 
implementation of a number of EU-led instruments, such as the open method of 
coordination, rests on the active involvement of national stakeholders, including 
social partners.  
It is questionable to what extent the EU was able to influence the 
institutionalisation of industrial relations in the candidate countries, given the 
complex nature of this task, as well as the need to accomplish it in a relatively short 
time span. More than ten years after the four CEE countries have become member 
states, it is time to evaluate how the EU affected social dialogue developments in the 
candidate countries. An additional incentive to engage in this exercise is provided by 
the recent economic and financial crisis that has not only tested the collective 
bargaining mechanisms and labour laws in the member states, including those of the 
CEE countries, but has also led the EU to adopt policy responses that have had 
repercussions for member states’ industrial relations. Thus, it appears relevant to re-
evaluate the EU role in CEE industrial relations, by comparing and contrasting the 
pre-accession and post-crisis approach of the EU and by looking for any possible 
inconsistencies. 
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By aiming to deconstruct and evaluate the ways in which the EU affected the 
development of the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in the 
four countries over the past two decades, the analysis in this chapter contributes 
towards answering the second research question. This Chapter is organised in the 
following manner. The following section 2 will be devoted to the role of the EU 
during the accession period. Section 3 explores the role of the EU from the 
perspective of the recent economic and financial crisis, while section 4 compares and 
contrasts its pre-accession role with its role during the recent crisis period.  
 
2. The EU accession process  
It has been already mentioned that throughout the accession process, the CEE 
countries were transposing and implementing the social acquis, and that social 
dialogue represents a part of the accession criteria which candidate countries must 
fulfil in order to join the EU. The statement that social dialogue represents part of the 
accession criteria does not fully explain the nature of the EU’s role in improving the 
social dialogue infrastructure in CEE, as there are a few related issues that require 
further clarification. In the first place, given the limited competence of the EU in the 
area of social dialogue and social sphere (which will be further clarified in section 
2.1), what exactly represents social dialogue as a constituent part of the EU acquis is 
open to question. Also, it remains unclear whether the EU has adequate mechanisms 
at its disposal to ensure the effective transfer of rules on social dialogue and 
collective bargaining to the candidate countries. Finally, bearing in mind the great 
variety in member states’ practices in the area of industrial relations and the variety 
of national legal arrangements in relation to collective bargaining and collective 
agreements, it is questionable whether the EU can actually identify a body of rules 
that can be imposed upon the candidate countries. These are the questions that the 
following subsections will strive to answer.  
In the first place, subsection 2.1 will explore how matters of social dialogue 
were understood in the context of the accession process, or in other words, what was 
the message which the EU directed towards the candidate countries. To determine 
the substance of such a message, the analysis will firstly consider whether there is a 
unique European social model and European model of industrial relations that can be 
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promoted to the candidate countries. After that, closer assessment of how social 
dialogue is understood in the accession acquis will be undertaken. After considering 
the content of the EU message, it is worth asking how it was presented to the 
candidate countries. Thus, the analysis in subsection 2.2 explores the mechanisms for 
its transfer to the candidate countries during the accession process. This analysis will 
be performed by using the analytical framework of Europeanisation. Finally, the 
effects and successfulness of the EU’s efforts will be discussed in subsection 2.3. 
 
2.1. The message of the EU during the accession process 
 
2.1.1. The European social model and the EU model of industrial relations 
In order to induce collective bargaining improvements, the EU might ideally be 
expected to identify a single industrial relations model that the candidate countries 
could copy or use as a source of inspiration. Yet, the ability of the EU to single out a 
comprehensive model is contested and should be understood against the background 
of the great variety of industrial relations, economic and social narratives within the 
EU member states. As a matter of fact, discussions about the existence and content of 
the industrial relations model of the EU arise from more general concerns about the 
European social model (ESM).  
The existence and the content of the so-called European social model have 
been heavily discussed in academic literature and policy debates during the past few 
decades. These debates have so far been unable to generate a well-defined and clear 
conceptualisation of the ESM, even though this phrase gained increased popularity 
when used to describe many different aspects of EU social policies. Existing 
academic and policy explanations have been unable to present a clear definition of 
the ESM, or to link the existing definitions to a set of empirically tested 
assumptions.343 The earliest conceptualisations of the ESM originate in the efforts to 
substantiate the landmark feature distinguishing the EU from the other parts of the 
world: the specific mix of economic and social policy objectives on which the EU 
economies rest. Back in the 1980s, Jacques Delors in an effort to promote social 
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democratic values as a contrast to the forms of capitalism found in the other regions 
of the world, emphasised the salience of combining economic and social progress.344 
One of the first definitions of the ESM was coined by the European Commission in 
the White Paper on social policy.345 This enumerated a set of values such as 
democracy, personal freedom, social dialogue, equal opportunities for all, adequate 
social security and solidarity towards the weaker individuals in society.346 A 
subsequent contribution towards conceptualising the ESM came from the European 
Council which has been emphasizing its constituent elements since the early 2000s. 
The first catalogues of such constituent elements were put forward in Lisbon and 
Nice in 2000, as well as in Barcelona in 2002,347 and included inter alia elements 
such as an active and dynamic welfare state, a high level of social protection, the 
importance of social dialogue, education and good economic performance.348 The 
European Council retained a habit in subsequent conclusions of referring to the ESM 
and to its constituent elements. Nevertheless, the policy efforts described did not 
generate a clear and undisputable definition of the ESM. The main reason for this 
was the lack of a clear understanding of those elements that made up the ESM, given 
the lack of their proper EU meaning.  
Nor did academic debates bring a clear-cut definition of the ESM. In the first 
place, some authors contest the mere existence of the ESM as a model. The ESM is 
sometimes downgraded to the level of an “analytical tool”349 or “normative vision 
[…] of a political project”.350 Similarly, there are views which underline that the 
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economic and social variations among the EU countries preclude formulation of a 
fully-fledged model and that it is only possible to talk about common elements 
shared by member states. For example, according to Schiek, these common elements 
could be societal responsibility towards individuals and prevention of distortion of 
competition.351 For Goetschy, common elements could be the social values and 
principles contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Union social law 
and EU-specific modes of regulation, including collective bargaining.352 Going one 
step further, Vaughan-Whitehead attempted to enumerate a catalogue of constituent 
elements of the ESM, in a fashion which closely resembles the policy attempts of the 
European Council described above. Likewise, Vaughan-Whitehead defined the ESM 
as having six key pillars; including working conditions, universal and sustainable 
social protection, inclusive labour markets, strong and well-functioning social 
dialogue, public services and services of general interest, and finally, social inclusion 
and social cohesion.353  
The recent crisis period has additionally challenged the efforts to establish a 
single definition of the ESM, as the crisis brought deterioration of the social 
landscape in most of the EU countries, with increased levels of inequality and 
unemployment across Europe. A recent study has therefore marked the ESM as 
facing an existential crisis, and raised concerns over the legitimacy, rationale and 
ability of the EU’s social policies.354 With the deterioration of working conditions, 
wages and social expenditures, Vaughan-Whitehead noted that the ESM rapidly 
altered its six foundational pillars.355  
This rather brief overview of otherwise lengthy policy and academic debates 
shows the vagueness of the concept of the ESM as well as the lack of an unequivocal 
understanding of this concept. It also demonstrates that it is not possible to talk about 
a fully-fledged and all-encompassing EU social model which could subsume the 
traits of member states and be presented as such to the candidate countries. However, 
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given that social dialogue has been signified as one of the constituent elements in 
some variations of the ESM definition, it is still valid to ask whether the EU can 
identify a common understanding of this term in a sufficiently precise manner for the 
purpose of presenting it to the candidate countries. Further clarification on the 
existence of and the traits of a European model of industrial relations will be needed.  
A general view in the literature is that the EU contains no fully-fledged 
comprehensive EU model of industrial relations, and that, at best, only some 
common elements and features of member states’ industrial relations can be 
highlighted. Here the most relevant elements of the debate will be presented. In 
relation to the EU accession process, Meardi, as well as Perez-Solorzano Borragan 
and Smismans, claimed that the EU contains no coherent normative theory and single 
industrial relations model that can be promoted to the candidate countries.356 This 
statement has been underpinned by the evidently different industrial relations in the 
member states that are deeply embedded in the country-specific historical context 
and traditions. It has been argued that, although the EU countries’ democratic 
systems rest on the active role of trade unions and employers’ associations in 
governing social and economic issues, the European systems have developed without 
a strong theoretical underpinning and without a common ground that can be 
promoted to the candidate countries.357 Nonetheless, there are scholars who focused 
on identifying common features of the member states’ industrial relations. In the 
early 1990s, Streeck stated that five elements distinguish the EU order of industrial 
relations from the rest of the world: strong and independent trade unions; public 
policy support and participation in the tripartite policy arrangement; a high floor of 
universally defined and publicly secured social rights; the degree of solidaristic wage 
settings; information, consultation and codetermination at firm level.358 Nevertheless, 
in a subsequent evaluation of the five traits, Visser, in a more pessimistic tone, 
concluded that the EU countries share poor common foundations because the EU 
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policies on these matters largely depend on the interests of national policy makers.359 
Furthermore, despite recognising that member states’ models differ substantially, 
Marginson and Sisson claimed that it is possible to identify the main contours of a 
“European industrial relations model”.360 These contours consist of the three distinct 
features which delineate EU industrial relations from the other systems in the world: 
the high degree of interest organisation on both employer and employee side, the 
legally established rights of the weaker party in the employment relationship, and the 
multi-employer structure of collective bargaining (the latter, however, does not exist 
in the UK).361 An effort to identify a model that can be promoted to the candidate 
countries has been made by Lafoucriere and Green. As Chapter 1 already explained, 
Lafoucriere and Green constructed the notion of concerted model of regulation. 
Claiming that this model represents an intrinsic part of the ESM, the authors have 
developed the concerted model around the idea that the participation of social 
partners is the major driver of economic and social progress.362 With this in mind, the 
authors claimed that the concerted model of regulation: 
“focuses more on “process” than on “content” and represents a move away from heavy general 
government legislation, insofar as it provides only a lowest common denominator for all 
sectors of the economy, in order to achieve a more appropriate sector/plant-based concerted 
regulation”363. 
Yet, except for identifying the crucial role of social partners, Lafoucriere and Green 
have not proposed any further description nor provided elements of the proposed 
model. Also, the authors have not suggested how this model can be transferred to the 
candidate countries. These authors have merely directed attention to the fact that a 
lack of EU definition of the basic concepts, such as autonomous social dialogue and 
collective agreement, can be unhelpful for candidate countries that have no 
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developed social dialogue culture and are expecting guidance from the EU.364 As 
explained in Chapter 1, the model suggested by the two authors is complementary to 
the normative model proposed in this study, particularly as both models subsume the 
common traits of industrial relations among the member states. The articulated 
model of multi-employer bargaining of this study, however, has departed from the 
concerted model of regulation by proposing further analytical traits in an effort to 
describe the legal framework underpinning multi-level collective bargaining system.  
The brief overview of literature demonstrates that while it is not possible to 
claim the existence of a comprehensive model of industrial relations at the EU level, 
member states do have certain common traits that could be eventually promoted to 
the candidate countries. But, how can these traits be promoted to the candidate 
countries? To further deconstruct the “message” that the EU delivers to the candidate 
countries during the accession process, one has to take first a closer look at the legal 
and institutional framework of the EU and the understanding of social dialogue 
afforded by the EU within the accession acquis. After that, one can look into the 
mechanisms employed by the EU to transfer these messages to the candidate 
countries. 
 
2.1.2. Social acquis related to the accession process 
The EU has limited competences in the social sphere, shared with the member states 
(Article 4 TFEU). The EU may not fully legislate in this area, and there are some 
areas which have been explicitly excluded from its legislative competences; pay, 
freedom of association, strike and lockouts (Article 153 (5) TFEU). Nevertheless, in 
the areas where the EU may not legislate, it may promote coordination of social 
policies among the member states (Article 156 TFEU). During the accession process, 
the candidate countries are asked to transpose and implement the social acquis. 
Anchored in the Treaties, the EU social acquis consists of several components. In the 
first place, in those areas where the EU has competences to legislate, the social 
acquis refers to hard law. This includes an array of secondary legislation on matters 
such as health and safety, antidiscrimination, information and consultation rights. 
Next to this, the EU social acquis has a soft law component that includes various 
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instruments enabling coordination of national policies in the areas which otherwise 
belong to the national competences. Given that the EU law has limited competence 
in the member’ states social sphere (Article 156 TFEU), soft law coordination of 
national policies is very much encouraged by the EU.365 At the same time, the EU 
encourages social dialogue at the EU level, which can, in principle, also be classified 
as soft law: the Treaties allow social partners at the EU level to reach EU collective 
agreements, which would normally be implemented by social partners in member 
states (Articles 154-155 TFEU). Nevertheless, European social dialogue may also 
have mixed characteristics, because the collective agreements negotiated at the EU 
level can become legally binding, if endorsed by the Council in the form of directives 
(Article 155 (2) TFEU).366  
In a nutshell, the EU cannot legislate in the areas of collective bargaining, 
where its powers of intervention are limited; but it may support and complement the 
activities of the member states in matters related to collective bargaining.367 The 
result is that social acquis contains no closer identification of concepts pertinent to 
collective bargaining at the national level: the definition of major concepts, such as 
collective bargaining and collective agreements, remains the province of the member 
state traditions. EU law, equally, contains no closer specification or suggestion as to 
the levels at which collective bargaining should take place in the member states, even 
though most of the European countries’ industrial relations (with the notable 
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exception of the UK) hone multi-employer bargaining infrastructure. However, the 
principles associated with collective bargaining and social dialogue, upon which the 
national industrial relations systems rest, are principally protected by EU law 
because they represent values which closely reflect major democratic principles, 
particularly democratic participation.368 Likewise, the Treaty rules recognise and 
promote the role of social partners and take into account the diversity of the national 
systems (Article 152 TFEU). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU contains 
provisions guaranteeing freedom of association (Article 12), rights to collective 
bargaining and collective action (Article 53) as well as information and consultation 
rights (Article 27).  
Bearing in mind the legal observations presented, one may conclude that social 
dialogue is part and parcel of the EU legal sphere, but that it is also an imperfectly 
defined concept. This concept is multi-dimensional and broad, covering more than 
one area and being a part of the legal and institutional acquis.369 As a part of the legal 
acquis, social dialogue is an integral element of many secondary legislative acts 
which ask for the social partners to be consulted.370 In an institutional sense, social 
dialogue has been progressively afforded more regulatory space in the past decades, 
primarily via European social dialogue which has been institutionalised as a 
regulatory tool, as explained above.  
The lack of an adequate legal basis for intervening in the national systems of 
collective bargaining of member states also limits the grounds on which the EU may 
intervene in the legal sphere of candidate countries. Since the EU contains no 
adequate description of the major concepts pertinent to collective bargaining, the 
message that the EU can pass onto the candidate countries cannot be sufficiently 
precise. Despite these limits, the European Commission paid close attention to the 
social dialogue developments during the accession process of the four countries 
selected. On what legal basis did the Commission do so? Social dialogue has been 
interpreted to form part of the Copenhagen criteria which were defined by the 
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European Council in 1993 and formulated as the accession criteria for future member 
states. The criteria involve, inter alia, institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights, as well as a functioning market economy.371 The 
Copenhagen summit conclusions did not explicitly call for social dialogue 
improvements. Nevertheless, social dialogue has been interpreted as arising from the 
third Copenhagen criterion of a functional market economy.372 Thanks to these 
criteria, by the end of the 1990s, labour rights and social dialogue had become an 
irreversible part of the accession process.373 
 
2.2. Transferring the message: the mechanism 
 
2.2.1. The role of the European Commission 
The previous observations have indicated that the candidate countries were asked to 
boost industrial relations practices on the legal basis of the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, given the lack of clarity on the substance of definition and elements of 
collective bargaining and social dialogue, it was the European Commission that was 
vested with the powers of translating and interpreting the Copenhagen criteria to the 
realm of the candidate countries. The main policy instruments used to this end were 
the Commission’s yearly assessment reports, evaluating the progress of candidate 
countries in meeting the accession criteria.   
Content-wise, to be able to monitor and opine on social dialogue 
developments, the European Commission had to engage in broad and proactive 
interpretation of the social acquis.374 To some observers, the imprecise wording of 
                                                          
371 European Council (1993), Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. The criteria 
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373 Kahn-Nisser, S. (2013) ‘Conditionality, Communication and Compliance: The Effect of 
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the Copenhagen criteria gave wide “entrepreneurial” powers to the Commission.375 
However, the current study mitigates the latter statement: the ambiguity of the EU’s 
“message” (the lack of precise definition of major concepts and principles upon 
which the industrial relations rest and of guidance on what the CEE collective 
bargaining systems and legal frameworks should look like) actually deprived the 
European Commission of powers to prescribe more than general and vague 
formulations. The annual assessment reports contained only broad formulations, the 
typical ones being “autonomous social dialogue to be promoted and strengthened”, 
“the tripartite structures should operate in a more regular way”.376 In other words, the 
European Commission did not prescribe precise obligations of how industrial 
relations should develop in CEE, and it did not provide clear guidance on what the 
legal framework for collective bargaining should look like. Instead, the Commission 
had a general intention of encouraging collective bargaining at all levels and 
encouraging fruitful cooperation between social partners. Apart from this general 
objective, it does not seem to be the case that the Commission took any closer 
ideological and normative stance on how the collective bargaining systems should 
evolve in CEE. However, judging from the Commission’s intention to boost 
collective bargaining practices at all possible levels, one may note that it was not 
particularly in favour of the existing decentralised systems in the CEE countries. 
Additionally, the European Commission developed a “capacity building 
approach”, with the objective of addressing the weaknesses and boosting the 
organisational and financial capacities of trade unions and associations of employers 
in the CEE countries. The Commission aimed to advance the accession process 
beyond the pure transposition of legal norms into national laws and to support 
collective bargaining activities in a more structural and bottom-up manner. To this 
end, capacity building was facilitated mainly through the financial and technical 
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support channelled by several EU funding sources.377 It is not easy to evaluate the 
success of the capacity building efforts in exact figures. According to one view, the 
capacity building was “too ad hoc and bureaucratic” and “leading to partial adoption 
of industrial relations practices”.378 Furthermore, from a general point of view, it is 
questionable whether programme support of this kind can speed up the national 
processes of learning and transfer of knowledge, as this may not be executed within a 
tight time frame.379 The social partners with whom the interviews for this study were 
held, reflected mainly positively on these EU-led projects, even though they noted 
that the concrete results are hard to estimate.  
 
2.2.2. Europeanisation - notion and mechanism 
The approach of Europeanisation, which represents an explanatory framework for 
describing and assessing the impact of the EU, was originally developed with the aim 
of scrutinising this impact on the institutions and norms of the member states. 
Subsequently, it was extended to the external EU dimension, but the original 
meaning of Europeanisation had to be modified in order to account for the 
differences between the member states and candidate countries. The key difference 
in the approach arises from the fact that the candidate countries, unlike the member 
states, do not participate in decision making at the EU level, and may only engage in 
the top-down process of “downloading” its norms and values.380 Thus, the growing 
literature on Europeanisation in the context of the enlargement process has mostly 
dealt with assessing the effectiveness of the adaptational pressures of the EU towards 
the transposition and implementation of the acquis.381 Rule transfer goes beyond the 
                                                          
377 The capacity-building programmes were mainly financed through assistance programmes such as 
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supporting the economic restructuring in the former communist countries by facilitating various 
assistance projects. Twinning aimed to match civil servants from the EU member states with public 
administration of the candidate countries to help with the transfer of knowledge and exchange of 
practices.  
378 Perez-Solorzano Borragan and Smismans (2012), pp 132-133. 
379 Bailey, D. and de Propris, L. (2004) ‘A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity-
Building in the Candidate Countries’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 42, no 1, pp 77-98. 
380 Further explanations can be found in Lindstrom, N. (2015) The Politics of Europeanisation and 
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pure formal transposition of EU legal provisions into the national legal system and is 
understood in a broader fashion, also involving its implementation. In this context, a 
definition of Europeanisation provided by Radaelli is noteworthy as it puts to the fore 
the processes of going beyond pure formal transposition of rules:  
“Europeanisation consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, identities, politic al structures and public policies.”382 
In a similar fashion, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier understood Europeanisation 
in the context of the accession process as follows: 
“We define “Europeanisation” as a process in which states adopt EU rules. […] The rules in 
question cover a broad range of issues and structures and are both formal and informal. […] By 
analysing rule adoption, we focus on institutionalisation of EU rules at the domestic level - for 
instance, the transposition of EU law into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic 
institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to 
the EU standards.”383 
When attempting to explain Europeanisation of the social dimension of the 
enlargement process, there are two mechanisms that need to be taken into account as 
its drivers: conditionality and social learning. Conditionality represents a mechanism 
facilitating the download of norms and values on the basis of the prospect of reward 
to the candidate countries.384 The reward may come in a form of the prospect of 
membership, but it may also come in various forms of financial and institutional 
assistance. Thus, in the context of the current study, it is vital to understand that 
conditionality has been guiding the effective transposition and implementation of the 
social acquis, based on the monitoring prerogatives of the European Commission 
that assessed the progress in negotiations, and when necessary, utilised powers to 
slow or deter these negotiations.385 As explained by Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier, 
the mechanism of conditionality belongs to “the external incentives model”, under 
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which the rule transfer is facilitated on the basis of external rewards and sanctions. 
The external incentives (including the EU incentives) induce Europeanisation by 
potentially disrupting the “domestic equilibrium”, which can be understood as the 
distribution of preferences and bargaining power in domestic society.386 
Conditionality is effective when several criteria are fulfilled. The conditions should 
be sufficiently clear (containing definition of the implications of the rules) and 
formal (containing binding rules). 387 The size and speed of reward are also relevant, 
as well as the credibility of the EU – in the sense of its powers to withhold the 
reward in the case of non-compliance.388 Moreover, conditionality depends on the 
“adoption costs”: the candidate country will be more likely to adopt the rule if the 
benefits of the award exceed the costs.389 The costs often exist in the form of 
domestic opposition by so-called “veto players”.390 That is to say, the rule adoption 
can empower certain domestic actors (for example, trade unions or associations of 
employers) who may facilitate the progress of Europeanisation.391 The domestic 
actors may speed up the Europeanisation process, but may also slow down the 
process (acting as veto players) should the rules not conform to their interests.392 
While conditionality represents the major mechanism that facilitates rule 
transfer, the mechanism of social learning is also pertinent for explaining the 
transposition and implementation of the social acquis. Social learning dictates 
Europeanisation on the basis of whether the CEE countries consider the rule transfer 
appropriate in light of their own values and identities: social learning does not rest on 
the mechanism of reward or punishment, but on actors’ values and norms.393 In this 
context, non-state actors may particularly dictate the dynamic of social learning, as 
                                                          
386 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), p 11.  
387 ibid., pp 12-16. 
388 ibid. 
389 Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2005) ‘The Impact of EU Political Conditionality’ 
in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds) The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, 
New York: Cornell University Press, p 31. 
390 ibid. 
391 Sissenich (2005), p 161. 
392 Sissenich (2007), p 10. In contrast, Woolfson argues that because of the nature of the accession 
process, which involves mandatory “download” of norms, the role of veto players is limited; 
Woolfson, C. (2006) ‘Working Environment and ‘Soft Law’ in the Post-Communist New Member 
States’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 44, no 1, p 204. 
393 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), p 18; Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, S. (2004) 
‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol 11, no 4, pp 669-687. 
113 
 
they may adapt or promote those EU rules which they perceive as legitimate, and 
when transferring the rules, they can transform them to reflect their interests 
closely.394 Social learning puts non-state actors at the forefront of the process, and it 
also emphasises the importance of a willing transposition of rules: by willingly 
engaging into the rule transfer and adapting the process in accordance with their 
needs, non-state actors guarantee the implementation of the rule. Thus, rule evasion 
will more likely happen in the case of conditionality than of social learning.395 
Bearing in mind the salient position of soft law (as legally non-binding) in the social 
acquis, one may infer that the process of social learning potentially has distinct 
relevance for Europeanisation, by empowering social partners in the candidate 
countries. There is a list of criteria which social learning should fulfil in order to be 
effective. In the first place, it depends on the legitimacy of the rules (the candidate 
countries will more easily accept rules which they perceive as legitimate), identity 
(shared domestic and EU values) and absence of conflicting rules in the internal 
environment.396 Furthermore, social learning can also benefit from the determinacy of 
the rules in the sense of their clear and unambiguous content.397  
The mechanisms of conditionality and social learning are intertwined and may 
interact at the same time. Thus, the ways in which these two mechanisms interacted 
and dictated the transposition and implementation of the EU social acquis is not self-
evident in the CEE countries. What is likely, however, as explained by Sissenich, is 
that the Commission’s accession reports were vital in facilitating the conditionality 
mechanism, by monitoring compliance with the accession conditions, while the 
process of institution and capacity-building relied more on mechanism of social 
learning.398 
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2.3. Assessing the effects of Europeanisation 
Although on the eve of the EU enlargement the hope was raised that the accession 
process would help in enhancing collective bargaining in the candidate countries, in 
all likelihood the EU effects were far less tangible. The existing literature mostly 
evaluates the effects of Europeanisation in the area of social sphere and social 
dialogue as weak. These doctrinal observations, however, arise from a general lack 
of comprehensive cross-country empirical evidence and were mostly generated 
through fragmented pieces of evidence. Overall, scholars have reported that the 
negotiations of the social chapters were as a matter of fact brief, that social policy 
was not a priority in the accession process compared to the other acquis areas, and 
that the negotiating chapters were closed without sufficient evidence of progress in 
the area of labour law.399 The candidate countries found the social acquis to be less 
problematic than the other areas of law, and have also focused on the transposition of 
secondary social legislation, while the other tasks were not necessarily followed 
through, including implementation of the transposed rules and improvements in the 
area of social dialogue.400 Because the accession efforts were limited to the formal 
transposition of rules, a growing discrepancy between written provisions and their 
application arose.401  
 Furthermore, it has been claimed that the transposition and implementation of 
the hard social acquis did not have a substantial effect on the level of social standards 
in CEE,402 and that the transposition of the EU acquis has even contributed towards 
the deteriorating social environment in CEE.403 Of all the areas of social acquis, the 
hope that the EU would leave a visible imprint was highest with respect to 
information and consultation rights, where the candidate countries were expected to 
transpose and implement the Directive on Information and Consultation 
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(2002/14/EC).404 This Directive was expected to lead to the institutionalisation of 
works councils (a topic which will be further discussed in Chapter 7), but studies 
have shown that its implementation had marginal effect on the state of industrial 
relations in the CEE countries.405 However, it is more challenging to evaluate the 
effects of the EU in the other areas of social acquis, where the outcomes are less 
obvious. In a recent study, Meardi provided a breakdown of existing knowledge 
about the EU’s effect on CEE in different spheres of social acquis.406 In the area of 
health and safety and working conditions, Meardi thus noted a lack of credible cross-
country comparison, but in some segments, such as working time, there is evidence 
of a worsening rather than an improvement in workers’ positions as the result of the 
EU accession.407 The compliance with the rules in the area of equal opportunities has 
been limited.408 In the area of the soft acquis, Meardi notes the EU generated only 
some limited influence through the promotion of social pacts as part of the efforts to 
prepare candidate countries for accession to the European monetary union. In the 
area of social dialogue, the effects of the EU were also limited. Meardi notes that 
CEE’s accession-related policy documents (particularly National Reform 
Programmes) contained repeated mention of the necessity of improving social 
dialogue, although no meaningful improvements were followed through.409 In the 
post-accession period, due to the limited Europeanisation on social dialogue, multi-
employer bargaining remained “the weakest link”, with collective bargaining 
deteriorating at sectoral and company level across the CEE countries.410  
 In opposition to the prevailing views demonstrating slight or no tangible effects 
of the EU, a study performed by Cook showed that the EU has had beneficial effects 
on collective labour rights in CEE. The author based her findings on a comparison of 
the state of collective labour rights in two groups of post-communist countries; those 
which underwent the accession process and those which did not, claiming that the 
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improvements had been the result of a combination of democratic changes and the 
effects of the EU.411  
To summarise the previous arguments, the EU’s effects on the industrial 
relations of the CEE countries were indeed limited, and the focus of the EU’s 
adaptational pressures was not directly concerned with the legal framework. The 
weak results came, first and foremost, from the imperfect functioning of the 
conditionality mechanism, given that the social sphere and particularly industrial 
relations improvements were not the focus of the member states and the EU during 
the accession negotiations. Thus, the shortfall of industrial relations improvements in 
CEE did not affect the dynamic of accession negotiations. The social policy issues 
overall enjoyed low political salience and were not considered a priority of the 
accession process.412 At the same time, as demonstrated in the previous sections, the 
candidate countries lacked a precise “message” on how the legal and institutional 
framework for collective bargaining should evolve. The lack of a precise message 
ensues from the described inability of the EU to provide basic common 
understandings of the major industrial relations concepts, such as collective 
agreements. In the capacity-building assistance projects, directed towards structural 
changes in social partners’ functioning, the conditionality mechanism was not 
prominent: social learning had played a greater role. Yet, as argued in the previous 
section, it is rather difficult to assess the extent to which social learning dictated 
Europeanisation with regard to the transposition and implementation of the social 
rules.  
When assessing the effects of Europeanisation in the area of social dialogue, 
the general background of the accession process should be taken into account: the 
candidate countries were already tasked with implementing the far more elaborated 
economic acquis. The economic acquis was deemed to have a pronounced neoliberal 
pretext, and in this sense, the general “message” coming from the EU to candidate 
countries seems to have been rather contradictory, enmeshed between the social and 
economic dimensions.413 The accession acquis reflected the tensions between the 
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economic and the social sphere of the EU policies, as the EU could not have 
provided more social steering to the candidate countries than it could afford to own 
member states. As such, this tension goes beyond the enlargement related matters 
and it is particularly visible in the disputed ability of the EU to connect to member 
states’ labour laws and social sphere, despite the long-standing efforts and undoubted 
great achievements in the social area of the EU.414 
At the same time, one should stress that the Europeanisation effects have been 
enmeshed with influences originating from other external resources. In particular, 
from the legal perspective, ILO architecture has been rather prominent in 
institutionalising industrial relations in CEE. This has been particularly the case in 
the early 1990s, when the CEE countries were ratifying and transposing the treaties 
guaranteeing basic collective bargaining rights and principles and setting the 
autonomy of social partners and their bargaining rights. In this sense, one may argue 
that ILO legal rules have had a more important role in institutionalising industrial 
relations in the CEE countries than the EU, as the former served as a far more 
elaborated source of inspiration for basic collective bargaining principles. When it 
comes to collective bargaining levels, unlike EU law, the ILO rules have explicitly 
stated that social partners should enjoy the discretionary right to bargain collectively 
at whatever level they see fit. The corollary to this is the obligation of the authorities 
to provide conditions that allow collective bargaining at any level, if necessary.415 
In the end, the role of the EU during the accession process in building the legal 
and institutional framework for collective bargaining can be evaluated as limited and 
indirect. As this section has demonstrated, the major reason for this has been the lack 
of a clear “message” that the EU could direct to the candidate countries, and the lack 
of adequate mechanisms to ensure the transposition and implementation of rules.  
 
 
                                                          
414 Hendrickx, F. and Giubonni, S. (2015) ‘European Union Labour Law and the European Social 
Model: A Critical Appraisal’ in M. W. Finkin and G. Mundlak (eds) Comparative Labor Law, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p 402. 
415 ILO Collective Bargaining Recommendation, No 163, 1981; as reported by Gernigon, B., Odero, 
A. and Guido, H. (2000b) ’ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ International Labour 
Review, vol 139, no 1, pp 41-43. 
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3. The role of the EU during the crisis 
 
3.1. The context of the crisis: a changed legal and industrial relations environment 
Europeanisation has structurally changed in CEE in the post-accession period, given 
that this process was no longer driven by the necessity of transposing and 
implementing the accession acquis. One would thus expect a diminished impact of 
the EU on the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in CEE. 
This section will deconstruct this statement in more detail.  
The recent economic and financial crisis affected the European economies in 
asymmetric fashion, challenging the labour markets and methods in which labour 
standards are set. With respect to the four CEE economies examined in this study, 
the worst affected was Slovenia, with sharp falls in GDP and rising public debts 
since 2009.416 The Czech Republic was also fully affected by the crisis, with the fall 
in GDP, mostly because of declining exports, further causing labour market 
imbalances and increased unemployment.417 Slovakia experienced a sharp shrinking 
of GDP in 2009 and recovery in 2010.418 Poland seems to be the least affected of the 
four countries, and has even been seen by some as having managed to avoid the 
consequences of the crisis.419 Industrial relations across Europe also seem to have 
been affected by the crisis: the available studies have so far demonstrated growing 
trends in the decentralisation of industrial relations and growing erosion of sectoral 
                                                          
416 As noted by Stanojević and Klarič, the fall of GDP was 5.8% in 2009 with significant rises of 
public debt, see Stanojević, M. and Klarič, M. (2013) ‘The Impact of Socio-Economic Shocks on 
Social Dialogue in Slovenia’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, no 2, p 
223.  
417 With fall of GDP of 4.7% in 2009, see Verveková, S. (2012) ‘The Case of the Czech Republic’ in 
I. Guardianchich (ed) Recovering from the Crisis through Social Dialogue in the New EU Member 
States: the Case of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, Budapest: ILO, p 50. 
418 Bulla, Czíria, and Kahancová, noting that in the first place, real GDP growth fell to –4.8 per cent in 
2009 and recovered at 4.5 per cent in 2010, see Bulla, M., Czíria , L., Kahancová, M. (2013) ‘Impact 
of Legislative Reforms on Industrial Relations and Working Conditions in Slovakia’ ILO Background 
Study, p 6. 
419 According to available studies, the crisis hit Poland already in 2009, but improvements were 
visible already in 2010; see Guardiancich, I. and Pliszkiewicz, M. (2012) ‘The Case of Poland’ in I. 
Guardianchich (ed) Recovering from the Crisis through Social Dialogue in the New EU Member 
States: the Case of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, Budapest: ILO, pp 71-77. 
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collective bargaining across the member states.420 With respect to the four CEE 
countries selected, as Table 3 demonstrates, the coverage rates of collective 
agreements have been in decline since the pre-crisis period, with the sharpest decline 
in the two countries with the most developed multi-level bargaining framework, 
Slovenia and Slovakia.  
 
Table 3: Collective bargaining coverage before and after the economic and 
financial crisis 
2006    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Czech 
Republic 
50.2 50.4 49.8 44.4 51.2 49.0 50.4 47.3 
Poland n/a  15.7 n/a n/a n/a 14.8 14.7 n/a 
Slovakia 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 n/a 40.0 n/a 24.9 
Slovenia 96.0 94.0 92.0 92.0 80.0 75.0 70.0 65.0 
Notes: Coverage rate is defined as in Visser (2015) as the proportion of all employees covered by a 
collective agreement, calculated as the number of employees enjoying bargaining rights covered by 
collective agreements and as a proportion of all wage earners in employment, adjusted for the 
possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain. Data available 
until 2013. 
Source: ICTWSS database 5.0, Visser (2015). 
 
The crisis also represented a challenge for labour laws across the European continent, 
affecting the ways in which labour standards are set. From the four countries 
examined in this study, Slovakia’s legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining seems to have been the most influenced by the crisis, given that the legal 
changes introduced structurally affected the collective bargaining system. Likewise, 
in 2011 Slovakia’s Labour Code introduced salient innovations in collective 
bargaining by somewhat diminishing trade unions and collective bargaining, 
especially at the sectoral level, although some of these legislative changes were 
short-lived. The 2011 Slovakian Labour Code likewise introduced employers’ 
consent as a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the extension of the validity of 
                                                          
420 Overview of member states’ industrial relations related developments in the crisis period can be 
found in European Commission (2015) Industrial Relations in Europe 2014, Luxembourg: 
Publication Office of the European Union. More legal perspective to the crisis-induced changes can be 
found in Bruun, N., Lörcher, K. and Schömann, I. (2014) (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis 
and Collective Labour Law in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
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collective agreements to third parties.421 This provision had a strong effect on the 
multi-level bargaining framework of industrial relations, given that no sectoral 
collective agreement has been extended until the new legal amendment came into 
force in 2014. At the same time, the crisis-related legal amendments of 2011 imposed 
a rather restrictive threshold for trade union representativeness at company level in 
Slovakia, rendering their organisation at this level difficult. In the same year, the 
Slovakian Labour Code amendments for the first time allowed the conclusion of less 
favourable conditions for employees in collective agreements, as derogations from 
statutory law in peius. These topics will be further discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
3.2. EU responses to the crisis 
Under the general framework of the Strategy for Europe 2020, the EU presented a 
list of institutional responses to the detrimental effects of the crisis across the 
member states, setting an objective of delivering “smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”.422 These EU responses have been versatile. In the first place, from 2009, 
with the aim of strengthening economic governance, prominent legal amendments on 
monetary policies were introduced. These included secondary legislation known as 
“Six-pack” (involving macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance) and “Two-pack” 
(allowing reviews of national budgets by the EU).423 Particularly notable were the 
provisions from the Six-pack introducing macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
(MIP). This enabled the European Commission to take measures, including financial 
                                                          
421 Act No. 557/2010 Coll, which entered into force at the beginning of 2011. 
422 European Commission (2010) Communication ‘Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable 
and Inclusive Growth’ COM (2010) 2020, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Commission.  
423 Six-pack refers to: Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Council Regulation 1177/2011 amending 
Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure; Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Council Directive 2011/85/EU on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States; Regulation 1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances; 
Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on enforcement measures to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. Two-pack refers to: Regulation 
473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States 
in the euro area; Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
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sanctions (up to 0.1% of GDP), against member states facing macroeconomic 
difficulties. Other measures involved the European Stability Mechanism Treaty,424 
providing financial assistance to members of the Eurozone and the Treaty on 
Coordination, Stability and Governance,425 setting national public debt threshold, and 
introducing an obligation for member states to introduce an automatic self-correction 
mechanism in their laws. Moreover, the Euro Plus Pact called for increased 
coordination of financial, tax, employment and several other policies in the Eurozone 
countries, with policy objectives, amongst others, of reducing unit labour costs, 
abolishing wage indexation and supporting decentralised wage bargaining.426 All of 
the enlisted economic governance measures were incorporated into the European 
Semester policy cycle, formally introduced in the EU in 2011.427 Under the European 
Semester, the member states coordinate economic and fiscal policies and have 
become obliged to draft and report on national policy programmes on these areas 
(NRPs), while the European Council has been empowered to adopt legally non-
binding country-specific recommendations in a yearly timetable.  
The EU mechanisms presented rely on a mix of preventive and corrective 
economic and monetary measures, including surveillance of national policies by the 
EU institutions. Much of the described measures is not legally binding and their 
enforcement is ensured predominantly through the policy recommendations, but this 
does not apply to instruments which rest on financial sanctions (European Stability 
Mechanism Treaty, Six-pack, Two-pack).428 Given their overall comprehensive 
nature, the employment and social policies have become deeply embedded into the 
macroeconomic policy structure of the EU.429 These measures also tackle the areas 
closely linked to the functioning of industrial relations. This is particularly the case 
with the Euro Plus Pact and the European Semester. The Euro Plus Pact prescribes 
                                                          
424 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, T/ESM 2012/en, Brussels, 2 February 
2012. 
425 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
T/SCG/en, Brussels, 2 March 2012. 
426 European Council (2011), Conclusions, Anex I Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for 
Competitiveness and Convergence, 24-25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1.  
427 Full information and all documents which belong to European Semester can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm.  
428 For the overview of enforcement mechanisms, see De la Porte, C. and E. Heins (2015) ‘A New Era 
of European Integration? Governance of Labour Market and Social Policy since the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis’ Comparative European Politics, vol 13, p 12.  
429 Bekker, S. and Klosse, S. (2013) ‘EU Governance of Economic and Social Policies’ European 
Journal of Social Law, vol 2, p 108.  
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the member states’ obligation to review wage setting mechanisms, and, where 
necessary, to also review the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the 
indexation systems. Despite obvious interference with the ways in which national 
collective bargaining systems function, the Pact, somewhat contradictorily, proclaims 
the necessity of maintaining the autonomy of social partners. Moreover, by looking 
at the country-specific recommendations adopted pursuant to the European Semester 
policy coordination cycle, one may conclude that European economic governance 
measures have encroached upon the ways in which collective bargaining systems 
work, including minimum wages and wage setting mechanisms.430 In this sense, these 
country-specific recommendations represent a credible pressure on the collective 
bargaining systems of member states, because the Council may issue 
recommendations which can relate to wage setting arrangements.  
 Thus, the EU economic governance measures presented, even though not 
necessarily legally binding, in an overall sense support an environment that is 
conducive to decentralisation pressures. For this reason, existing studies have 
criticised the new institutional and policy architecture of the EU. Likewise, concerns 
have been raised that the effect of these policies is to reduce employee protection and 
trade unions,431 and also that they underpin the erosion of multi-employer bargaining 
across European countries.432 Furthermore, EU policies have been criticised for 
decreasing national discretion over social policies and shifting the focus of collective 
bargaining from multi-employer to company level arrangements.433 Certain efforts 
have been recently made by the EU to address these criticisms, as there were signs 
suggesting that the EU intended to take care of the social policy aspects of post-crisis 
developments. In 2013, the Commission announced a proposal to strengthen the 
                                                          
430 The list of country specific reports by year can be found at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm.  
431 Drahokoupil and Myant (2015), p 335; Keune, M. (2015) ‘Less Governance Capacity and More 
Inequality: the Effects of the Assault on Collective Bargaining in the EU’ in G. Van Gyes and T. (eds) 
Wage Bargaining Under the new European Economic Governance, ETUI: Brussels, pp 285-293.  
432 Marginson, P. (2014) ‘Coordinated Bargaining in Europe: From Incremental Corrosion to Frontal 
Assault?’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 21, no 2, pp 97-114. 
433 Veneziani, B. (2014) ‘Austerity Measures, Democracy and Social Policy in the EU’ in N. Bruun, 
K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law in 
Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishingin, p 123. 
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social dimension of the EMU,434 while in 2015, it called for the establishment of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights to complement the social acquis as a reference 
framework in employment and social areas.435  
The criticism described in the previous paragraph can be safely extended to the 
CEE countries. From the four selected countries examined in this study, Slovenia is 
the only one whose wage setting mechanisms was particularly scrutinised by the EU. 
Specifically, Slovenia has been consistently asked within the country specific 
recommendations to ensure that wage setting mechanisms promote growth in wages, 
with a view to encouraging competitiveness and job creation; to review the minimum 
wage setting mechanisms; and to review the indexation mechanisms linking wages to 
inflation growth.436 What can be concluded is that the EU’s economic governance 
measures may be said to support the trend of decentralisation of collective bargaining 
that already existed in the CEE, and to give no incentive to the CEE countries to 
invest in the institutionalisation of collective bargaining at central levels. However, it 
is questionable to what extent the CEE countries can accommodate these requests. 
Bearing in mind that industrial relations is already decentralised at company and 
local levels (particularly in the Czech Republic and Poland), further downward 
pressure could result in the disintegration of the collective bargaining structure in 
CEE by emasculating the trade unions. In other words, eliminating the role of trade 
unions in the workplace provides more regulatory space for unilateral standard 
setting (employers’ unilateral decision making) and individual negotiations between 
an employer and employee. This not only drives the CEE countries away from the 
multi-employer bargaining model, but also weakens the position of employees by 
shifting the powers from collective to individual standard setting. This topic will be 
more discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                          
434 Olli Rehn’s speech to the European Parliament on 22 May 2013, European Commission (2013) 
‘Social pillar of the EMU – Commission statement in the European Parliament’, SPEECH/13/443, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-443_en.htm. 
435 Jean-Claude Juncker’s speech to the European Parliament on 9 September 2015; European 
Commission (2015) ‘State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity’, available at: 
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm.  






The overarching conclusion of this chapter is that changes within the legal 
framework were not the EU’s primary concern in relation to collective bargaining in 
CEE, and in this sense the EU was providing only indirect pressure and guidance. 
Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated that the EU adaptational pressures have 
changed structurally over time: when comparing and contrasting the pre-accession 
and post-crisis developments, it becomes clear that the content of the EU’s message 
to CEE has changed, both its normative and ideological underpinning, as well as the 
mechanisms for its transfer.  
  Firstly, during the accession process, the candidate countries were called upon 
to enhance collective bargaining structures at all possible bargaining levels. While 
this chapter demonstrated that the EU’s rationale in supporting the candidate 
countries’ industrial relations developments has not been specifically driven by any 
clear ideological or normative framework, the EU formally preached the 
establishment of multi-level bargaining structures and called for enhancing the social 
partners’ voice in social and economic life. The EU’s support was overshadowed by 
several elements, as discussed in section 2, in the first place due to far more 
elaborated economic acquis, which arguably supported market narrative rather than 
institutionalisation narrative of industrial relations in CEE. Furthermore, the message 
on collective bargaining developments lacked clarity and the instruments for 
implementation. The EU was challenged in its efforts to transmit the message to 
CEE, as the result of which the overall role of the EU regarding social dialogue 
developments was limited. At the same time, as this chapter demonstrated, the role of 
the EU in influencing change in the legal framework for collective bargaining in 
these countries was both limited and indirect. 
How have these developments fared in the recent crisis period? The role of the 
EU in building the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in CEE 
in the post-accession phase has seemingly not diminished in the post-crisis phase, but 
it changed in terms of its normative and ideological underpinning, and the 
mechanisms for rule transfer. This chapter has demonstrated that, as in the pre-
accession period, the EU’s adaptational pressures in the post-period did not directly, 
but rather indirectly affected the legal framework for collective bargaining in CEE. 
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But as a contrast to the pre-accession period, the crisis-related developments had a 
more distinct normative underpinning, by either providing support to the process of 
decentralisation of collective bargaining in member states or by creating an 
environment which is conducive to such decentralisation. Even though the EU’s 
post-crisis adaptational pressures do not rely on the strength of the accession-related 
instruments of conditionality and social learning, which may more effectively 
facilitate the transfer of the EU message in the CEE countries, it is evident that these 
measures have the effect of underpinning the already decentralised climate of CEE 
industrial relations, rendering the institutionalisation of collective bargaining at 











































In the early transition period, CEE countries introduced the notion of “tripartism” to 
denote the particular type of social dialogue at the national level between trade 
unions, associations of employers and governments. This form of social dialogue 
quickly spread to the post-communist countries and became a CEE variation of 
similar corporatist experiences in western Europe. In a nutshell, tripartism 
represented: 
“a new postcommunist species of state – society interaction and a new brand of capitalism that 
is distinct from the three major variants of contemporary capitalism, including Western 
European neocorporatism.”437 
By the mid-1990s, all CEE countries had established tripartite bodies, providing 
institutionalised forums for discussion between governments and social partners on 
the most important social and economic matters. In an effort to enhance the 
legitimacy of decision making during the transition process, governments welcomed 
their formation. Their introduction was also encouraged by the EU,438 even though 
tripartite social dialogue did not represent a formal requirement for EU accession, 
and it was not an official part of the acquis. Already by 1990, a tripartite body named 
the Council for Economic and Social Agreement had been established in 
Czechoslovakia. It brought together representatives of the state, employers and trade 
unions. After the dissolution of the federal state in 1993, this body continued 
functioning in its Czech and Slovak variations. Slovenia and Poland formed their 
                                                          
437 Iankova, E. A. (2002) Eastern European Capitalism in the Making, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p 8.  
438 As underlined by Meardi, G. (2012a) Social Failures of EU Enlargement: A Case of Workers 
Voting with Their Feet, New York: Routledge, p 43; Ghellab, Y. and Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2003) 
Sectoral Social Dialogue in Future EU Member States: The Weakest Link, Budapest: ILO, p 28.  
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tripartite bodies in 1994. Tripartism has probably been the most discussed aspect of 
CEE industrial relations in the existing literature, attracting a considerable volume of 
studies. A possible explanation for such academic interest lies in the fact that the 
tripartite fora were the first locus of social dialogue and negotiations between trade 
unions and employers’ associations since the onset of the transitional process, given 
the lack of such practices in the earlier communist period. Overall, the development 
of CEE tripartism has received meagre evaluation; the most frequent labelling of it in 
the literature being “illusory corporatism”, a catchphrase originally coined by Ost.439  
Tripartite functioning has faced various difficulties, including social partners’ 
weaknesses and the lack of a social dialogue tradition, as well as the challenging 
macroeconomic climate marked by persistent unemployment and high inflation rates. 
As this chapter will demonstrate using four countries as its example, CEE tripartism 
has generated low outcomes in terms of the number of tripartite agreements achieved 
(social pacts, concluded between the state, trade unions and associations of 
employers). From the four countries analysed in this study, it is only in Slovenia that 
social pacts have been more or less regularly concluded in the past two decades. As 
this chapter will explain, of the four countries included in the analysis, Poland has 
the poorest record in concluding social pacts, while the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
have had only concluded a few since the early 1990s.  
Even though the primary objective of this study is collective bargaining, the 
role of tripartism in shaping industrial relations in CEE cannot be discounted.440 In 
this context, the primary goal of this chapter will be to look into the role of tripartism 
as a standard-setting locus and the role it has played in shaping the collective 
bargaining system in the past two decades. To that end, it will scrutinise the legal and 
institutional underpinnings of the tripartite bodies and social pacts in the four 
countries. In addition, a smaller segment of the chapter will be dedicated to cross-
                                                          
439 Ost, D. (2000) ‘Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism and Postcommunist 
Class Identities’ Politics & Society, vol 28, no 4, pp 503-530.  
440 As explained in Chapter 1, in this thesis collective bargaining is understood as negotiations 
between trade unions or organisations of workers and employers or employer’ associations, conducted 
with a view to determining terms and conditions of work and employment or relationships between 
them. Social dialogue is understood in a broader fashion, covering all types of negotiations and 
consultations between state authorities, representatives of employers and employees, and all possible 
issues of common interest. 
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sectoral collective bargaining: of the four countries, only Slovenia has had a tradition 
of concluding cross-sectoral collective agreements. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the major features of 
tripartism in the four selected countries. To that end, in addition to data from the 
interviews, it relies on data from existing studies and literature, given that CEE 
tripartism, particularly in Slovenia and Poland, is a frequently studied topic. Section 
3 contains analytical discussion of the cross-country differences. Finally, section 4 
provides concluding thoughts, relevant for answering the two research questions 
posed in Chapter 1.  
 
2. Legal and institutional framework in the four countries 
What follows is an overview of the major elements pertinent to the legal and 
institutional framework in the four countries: the power and functioning of the 
tripartite bodies, representativeness, history of social pacts and crisis-related 
developments. In addition, this section will briefly elaborate on the cross-sectoral 
collective agreements in Slovenia, since this country had collective agreements 
concluded at this level until the mid-2000s. Also, this section will briefly reflect on 
the regional tripartite dialogue which takes place in the Czech Republic, Slovakia 




The tripartite body: power and functioning 
The Economic and Social Council (Ekonomsko socialni svet) is the major tripartite 
body in Slovenia, instituted on the basis of the 1994 tripartite social pact, signed 
between social partners and the government (in Slovenia social pacts are called 
“social agreements”). According to the Slovenian scholar Stanojević, the formation 
of this body was a result of political exchange between trade unions and the 
government: as a quid pro quo, trade unions were able to participate in a more 
institutionalised form of decision making in exchange for supporting anti-inflation 
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measures.441 The aforementioned 1994 social pact remained the legal basis for the 
functioning of the tripartite Council until today. The work of the Council has never 
been given a statutory legal basis, despite it being suggested by the social partners in 
the mid-1990s.442 The powers and competences of the tripartite body are accordingly 
defined within the social pact. Initially gathering five members per side (state, trade 
unions and organisations of employers), the structure of the tripartite Council 
increased to eight members on each side in 2007 (Article 4 of the Rules on 
Operation). The tripartite decides on the basis of unanimity, but its decisions are not 
legally binding and it has only a consulting and advisory role. Notwithstanding the 
fact that it may not issue legally-binding decisions, the substantive competences of 
the Council are broad, involving matters such as social insurance, social assistance, 
employment, labour relations issues, and economic policies. In sum, according to its 
Rules of Operation, the tripartite Council may discuss any economic and social 
matter.443 According to the interviews in Slovenia, this body has indeed been 
systematically involved in discussing all legislation concerning the social and 
economic sphere in the past two decades.  
 
Representativeness 
To participate in the work of the tripartite Council, the trade unions should conform 
to certain representativeness criteria which are defined by the Act on Trade Union 
Representativeness from 1993. This Act, in the first place, sets out criteria that apply 
to trade unions at any level (including the condition of having a democratic character 
and being independent from the state and employers’ organisations). In addition, the 
trade unions at national level should fulfil a quantitative criterion of having a 
membership base of at least 10% of employees in a particular sector or industry. 
                                                          
441 Stanojević, M. (2012) ‘The Rise and Decline of Slovenian Corporatism: Local and European 
Factors’ Europe-Asia Studies, vol 64, no 5, pp 863-864. 
442 Stanojević, M. and Krašovec, A. (2011) ‘Slovenia: Social Pacts and Political Exchange’ in S. 
Avdagic, M. Rhodes and J. Visser (eds) Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution, and 
Institutionalisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 243-244. The Rules on the Operation of the 
Economic and Social Council (version in English) can be downloaded from the webpage of the 
Slovenian government, available at:  
http://www.gsv.gov.si/en/economic_and_social_council/rules_on_the_operation_of_the_economic_an
d_social_council/ [accessed 1 August 2016].    
443 Article 2 of its Rules on Operation. 
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There are no representativeness criteria which the employers’ associations have to 
fulfil in order to participate in tripartite social dialogue.  
 
History of social pacts 
Given that it has led to systematic conclusion of social pacts (social agreements) 
since 1994, the Slovenian tripartite system represents the most institutionalised 
example of tripartite social dialogue of the four CEE countries under analysis. The 
scope of the social agreements in economic and social matters is wide, with the most 
prominent item being the wages policy. With the first wave of post-transitional 
economic reforms in Slovenia, the first social agreements were concluded in the 
years 1994, 1995 and 1996; after which the practice of concluding social pacts 
resumed in 2003.444 The first social agreements concluded in the early 1990s were 
predominantly concerned with income policies, as they were aiming to tackle the 
macroeconomic issues of high inflation and unemployment. In addition, the 1994 
social pact was something of a landmark for instituting the tripartite body. The 1995 
social pact was particularly significant for stipulating collective agreements as key 
instruments of wage determination, but also for defining a minimum wage.445 The 
1996 pact did not introduce any particular innovation; it mostly repeated the 
provisions of the former pacts. After 1996, social dialogue went through a turbulent 
period and no new social pacts were concluded until 2003. Instead, restrictive 
income policies were unilaterally enacted by the government on the basis of the law 
covering the period 1997-1998. Between 1999 and 2001, social partners only 
managed to agree on a narrower social pact solely dealing with income policies. 
Finally, an all-encompassing social pact was concluded in 2003 and it remained valid 
until 2007. This pact was a landmark for its wage setting role and for the fact that its 
provisions were preparing the economy to enter the EU: the economic context of the 
EU was significant in the pact, particularly the component of low inflation.446 
Nevertheless, this pact was soon faced with the problem of implementation: the new 
                                                          
444 The following overview of history of social pacts and their traits is based on Stanojević, M. (2011) 
‘Social Pacts in Slovenia: Accommodation to the EMU Regime and the Post-Euro Development’ 
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology, vol 2, no 1, pp 113-125. 
445 ibid., p 115. 
446 Stanojević and Krašovec (2011), p 247; also see Stanojević (2011), p 120. 
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government elected in 2004 sidelined it, and instead introduced a package of 
unilateral measures, by which is stimulated labour market flexibility and sidelined 
the role of trade unions.447  
Following accession to the EU, there was another social pact signed in 
Slovenia for the period 2007-2009 and aiming to accommodate the entrance of the 
economy to the European monetary union post-factum, for which reason it was 
mainly concerned with restrictive income policies and improving competitiveness.448 
When the recent crisis hit the Slovenian economy, the process of agreeing a social 
pact became difficult. It was only in 2012 that social partners managed to agree on 
principles for the conclusion of a new social pact, and after long negotiations, one 
was concluded to cover the period 2015-2016.449 
As the above paragraphs have demonstrated, the social pacts which were 
consistently concluded in Slovenia played a set of distinct roles. In the first place, 
according to Stanojević, the social pacts concluded in the early 1990s contributed 
towards institutionalising the centralisation of collective bargaining, given that 
collective bargaining system represented an implementing mechanism for the income 
policies set out in the social pacts.450 Another distinct role of social pacts is the fact 
that they led to the establishment of the tripartite body in the early 1990s. Thirdly, in 
contrast with the other CEE countries, in Slovenia social pacts were used to facilitate 
accession to the EU and EMU and the government received the unanimous support 
of social partners in pursuing this goal.451 
 
Crisis 
Slovenia experienced marked GDP growth following its accession to the EU, but the 
crisis left outstanding effects on the economy, and recovery commenced only in 
2014.452 Tripartite social dialogue was particularly challenged during the crisis years. 
                                                          
447 Stanojević and Krašovec (2011), p 248. 
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450 Stanojević (2011), p 108. 
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Following the expiry of the social pact in 2009, the parties to social dialogue could 
not immediately agree on a new pact. Eventually, in 2012 they reached consensus on 
the guidelines for concluding a new pact, and in February 2015 it was concluded to 
cover the period 2015-2016, with fiscal consolidation as its main component.453 A 
further challenge to social dialogue arose with the adoption of a package of anti-
crisis laws which was not supported by the tripartite body. In 2011, after the anti-
crisis laws (on pension reform and on mini-jobs for students) had been promulgated 
despite the lack of tripartite support, the trade unions initiated a referendum. As the 
result of referendum, these laws were declared void.454 
 
Cross-sectoral agreements  
Slovenia is the only country in the selected group which has had a tradition of 
concluding legally-binding cross-sectoral agreements in private and public sector 
(known as “general collective agreements”). These cross-sectoral agreements had 
covered the entire private and public sectors, stipulating a broad range of rules which 
were further specified at sectoral and company levels. A general private sector 
collective agreement was first concluded in 1990, and it was regularly renewed until 
2005. After 2005, the focus of the collective bargaining system shifted onto the 
sectoral level,455 though a general (cross-sectoral) collective agreement remained 
valid in the public sector. After the cancellation of the private cross-sectoral 
agreement in 2005, a number of sectors did not have collective agreements, and to 
provide for those employees no longer covered by any collective agreement, another 
cross-sectoral bilateral general agreement was signed in 2006. This was titled 
Collective agreement on pay, holiday bonuses and the reimbursement of work-
related expenses. The provisions of the latter agreement were applicable only to 
employees in the private sector not covered by any collective agreement. However, 
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such an agreement ceased to exist in 2010, and after that collective bargaining shifted 




The tripartite body: power and functioning 
The history of tripartism started in the federal country of Czechoslovakia in 1990, 
when the federal tripartite Council of Economic and Social Agreement, aimed in the 
first place at maintaining social peace,456 was formed. This federal tripartite body 
dissolved and continued functioning under the two different variations in both 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the following years. The Slovak Economic and 
Social Council (Hospodársky a sociálny výbor Slovenskej republiky) officially 
commenced its work in 1993. Despite common legacies, there is an impression that 
the Slovak variety of tripartism developed differently from its Czech counterpart: in 
particular, during the 1990s, the major difference was a comparatively more 
developed and constructive tripartite dialogue in Slovakia.457 As is the case in the 
other CEE countries, the Slovak tripartite Council has a consultative role and it may 
not issue legally binding decisions. Today this body consists of seven representatives 
per member group (trade unions, employers’ associations and the government) and it 
currently operates on the basis of the statutory legal provisions. However, the legal 
basis and competences of the tripartite body have gone through several phases in the 
past two decades: depending on the actual political environment at the time, this 
tripartite body was provided with narrower or broader sets of competences. In this 
sense, Slovakia has the most vivid history of tripartite institutionalisation of the four 
CEE countries. In brief, these phases were as follows: 
(a) Between 1993 and 1999, the Economic and Social Council functioned on 
the basis of its own statute which represented a tripartite agreement concluded 
between the social partners and the government. Enjoying distinct support from the 
government, this body played a salient role in several areas, including pension and 
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health reform, and even in extending the validity of concluded collective agreements 
to third parties. 458 
(b) After some debate, in 1999 the Act on Economic and Social Partnership 
provided the Council with a statutory legal basis.459 During the formal discussions 
that led to the adoption of this Act, the trade unions also initiated a proposal to 
establish the binding character of the tripartite-level agreements, but this was not 
accepted by the other participants in the social dialogue.460   
(c) Following the major tripartite crisis, by 2001 the Act of 1999 had already 
been abolished. In 2004, a new tripartite Council was established (re-named as the 
Economic and Social Partnership Council – Rada hospodárskeho a sociálneho 
partnerstva). The legal basis of this body was the tripartite statute agreed among the 
government and social partners. Not only was the legal basis of this body 
downgraded from statutory legal act to tripartite statute, but its competences were 
also more narrowly defined, as the tripartite council reverted to being an advisory 
body of the government.461 
(d) In 2007, a new tripartite body, the Economic and Social Council, was 
constituted. The basis of its institutionalisation was the Act on Trilateral 
Consultations at the National Level of 2007.462 Pursuant to the 2007 Act, the Council 
is defined, inter alia, as a body aiming at negotiating and reaching agreement in the 
fields of economic, social development and employment (Article 4). This tripartite 
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The rules on representativeness allowing trade unions and employers’ associations to 
participate in the work of the tripartite body have changed several times in the past 
two decades:464  
(a) Until 2004, the rule was that for national level “peak” organisations of 
social partners to be representative, they needed to be influential in the economy, to 
be active in at least five regions of the country and to represent at least 10% of the 
active population. The representatives of trade unions, businesses and the 
government each had seven representatives in the tripartite body.  
(b) As of 2004, according to the statute of the Economic and Social Partnership 
Council, the national social partners’ organisations were considered representative 
provided they employed (employers’ associations) or represented (trade unions) at 
least 100,000 workers. Both trade unions and employers’ associations would gain 
one seat in the tripartite body for every 100,000 employees.  
(c) With the legislative changes which entered into force in 2007, the rule of 
seven members per group represented in the tripartite body was reintroduced. Trade 
unions are representative if they represent at least 100,000 employees from different 
sectors in the economy. Employers’ associations have to bring together employers 
whose businesses cover several sectors of the economy or have competences in at 
least five regions, and they should employ at least 100,000 employees. 
 
History of social pacts 
The history of social pacts started in the federal state of Czechoslovakia, as the two 
social pacts (”general agreements”) were concluded in 1991 and 1992, before the 
formal dissolution of the country. The first agreement, concluded in 1991, was 
heralded as a building block of tripartism. Nevertheless, implementing this 
agreement was difficult, because of the general economic climate, particularly the 
drop in real wages, and eventually, the federal government found it necessary to 
                                                          
464 The overview of these rules can be found in: Czíria, L. (2013) ’Collective Bargaining and Balanced 
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break the commitments contained within the provisions.465 As a result of these 
implementation problems, the salience of tripartism was somewhat side-lined: 
despite trade union efforts, the second general agreement, signed in 1992, contained 
rather general provisions and no specific wage commitments.466 After the dissolution 
of the federal country, there were several social pacts concluded in Slovakia: 
(a) During the 1990s, several social pacts (general agreements) were 
concluded, respectively in 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996. As explained by Czíria, these 
early general agreements were important in setting the national minimum wage and 
for contributing towards social and economic reforms.467 Yet their overall 
significance was mitigated by the implementation problems that ensued, and these 
problems created tensions between social partners.468  
(b)  The social dialogue reached a deadlock and no social pact could have been 
reached after 1996. Only in 2000 was a social pact eventually signed, but its 
implementation was deemed unsatisfactory by trade unions.469 Since then, no further 
social pacts have been concluded in Slovakia. 
Given that Slovakia has been a member of the Eurozone since 2009 (as has 
Slovenia), a specific form of tripartite accord was adopted in relation to monetary 
union. This was the Declaration on consensus regarding the implementation of the 
euro from 2008, signed between the Slovak government and national cross-sectoral 
employer organisations, AZZZ SR and RUZ SR, together with trade union KOZ 
SR.470 Unlike the situation in Slovenia, this declaration did not represent a fully-
fledged and all-encompassing social pact, although it depicted a set of commitments 
to be undertaken by social partners and the government in view of preparations for 
EMU.471  
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The national social dialogue was particularly challenged during the crisis period and 
the general impression is that the trade unions lost political support and influence.472 
A special, crisis-related tripartite body was formed in 2009, entitled the Economic 
Crisis Council. However, this body did not have any substantial impact on industrial 
relations and was abolished shortly after its establishment.473 No social pact was 
negotiated during the recent crisis period; though some prominent bilateral activities 
took place at national level. The most important moment was the conclusion of a 
bilateral agreement between the confederal trade union KOZ SR and the Slovak 
government in 2009 (Memorandum on cooperation in solving the impact of the 
financial and economic crises on Slovak society), expressing a list of mutual 
commitments towards resolving the negative consequences of the crisis in various 
areas.474 
 
Regional tripartite social dialogue 
Apart from the tripartite structures which exist at national level, it is relevant to add 
that there is some form of regional tripartite social dialogue in Slovakia. The regional 
dialogue started in 1998 with the formation of regional tripartite bodies in four out of 
eight existing regions in the country. These bodies are made up of members of the 
regional state administration and social partners, and the legal basis for their 
activities are statutes agreed between the participating parties.475 The impact of the 
regional social dialogue on industrial relations in Slovakia is nevertheless limited.476  
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2.3. The Czech Republic 
 
The tripartite body: power and functioning 
The tripartite system in the Czech Republic emerged from the federal tripartite body 
of Czechoslovakia. After the dissolution of the federal state, the Czech Republic 
continued its tripartite activity under the Council for Social and Economic Affairs 
(Rada hospodářské a sociální dohody). Myant noted that Czech tripartism was 
mostly dedicated to consultations on legislation and policy, and in fact the tripartite 
Council has never emerged as an “arena for collective bargaining”.477 The Czech 
tripartite Council has never had the legal basis of statutory act. The tripartite Council 
has always operated on the basis of the statute, jointly adopted by the social partners 
and the government and amended a number of times. Today, the Council is 
empowered to conduct tripartite negotiations about fundamental economic and social 
issues.478 Nevertheless, its role is considered predominantly consultative, even 
though, in terms of the topics within its remit, it covers a broad range of areas.479 The 
Council may not issue legally binding decisions, although such ideas were proposed 
from the trade union side.480 The Council gathers eight representatives of 
government, while national peak organisations of trade unions and employers’ 
associations each have seven representatives.  
The competences of the tripartite body, defined under its statute, have been 
subject to a number of amendments in the last two decades, fluctuating from a 
broader range of powers to a more limited set of prerogatives. There are several 
phases that can be identified.  
(a) During the first wave of tripartism, the Council was endowed with a 
broader range of competences, including decision making on important social, 
economic policies and labour relations, as well as negotiations of tripartite 
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agreements.481 The tripartite body was conceived as a forum for reaching social 
compromise on salient matters, particularly wages and unemployment.482 As with the 
Slovak example, the initial set of competences given to the Council has been subject 
to subsequent change; the two most important amendments took place in 1995 and 
1997.  
(b) The 1995 statute narrowed the competences of the tripartite body, 
somewhat diminishing its importance. This change also led to a deterioration in 
social dialogue; after 1994, in fact, there were no social pacts concluded in the Czech 
Republic. The 1995 statute limited the Council’s competences; its objective was 
reduced to providing consultation, and the tripartite Council was no longer seen as an 
agreement-reaching body.483 
(c) The Council’s original (pre-1995) set of competences were eventually 
restored with a major reconfiguration of its powers which took place in 1997, 
following the push from the newly elected government.484 Observers have 
nevertheless noted that the Council never managed to reinstate the influence it had in 
the early 1990s.485 Although important policies came before it for discussion, the 
tripartite body in the Czech Republic failed to establish itself as an institution before 
which all legislation would have to be submitted for discussion.486  
 
Representativeness 
The representativeness criteria were introduced only in 1996. Before then, the statute 
of the tripartite body listed organisations that could participate in social dialogue 
within the tripartite council. The representativeness criteria underwent several 
changes: as Mansfeldova underlined, Czech tripartism “has preserved – and we can 
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say suffers from – a tendency to define who may be a member of the tripartite and 
who may not”:487 
(a)  The 1996 statute defined a high quantitative threshold which social 
partners needed to fulfil in order to participate in tripartite social dialogue: the trade 
unions needed to have membership of at least 300,000 employees, while for 
employers’ associations this threshold was 500,000.  
(b)  In 2000, the threshold for trade unions was set at 200,000 employees, 
while the quantitative threshold for employers’ associations was lifted.  
(c) In 2002, the threshold remained at 200,000 for trade unions, but for 
employers’ associations it was introduced at 150,000. 
(d) Finally, as of 2004, the associations of employers must represent at least 
400,000 employees as members. The threshold for trade unions is 150,000. In 
addition, several qualitative criteria have been defined, including, among others, that 
trade unions should be independent and should be active nationwide, while the 
employers’ associations should cover small, large and medium businesses and 
operate on a nationwide basis.488 
 
History of social pacts 
The Czech Republic does not have a significant record of concluding social pacts. 
Social pacts (called “general agreements”) were concluded on a yearly basis only 
until 1994, and they were predominantly concerned with general economic and 
social issues, particularly wages. Their importance was minimal: these agreements 
were interpreted as vague and difficult to implement in practice,489 and the 
government considered them merely as political intent rather than binding 
instrument.490 On top of that, their negotiations were usually lengthy and 
problematic. Over time, the government lost interest in conducting tripartite social 
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dialogue, for which reason no general agreement was concluded after 1994. There 
were some attempts to conclude social pacts, but for example, in 1998, trade unions 
rejected an initiative of the government to conclude a social pact, believing that these 
types of agreements could too easily be ignored or overruled.491 
 
Crisis 
The recent financial crisis did not bring much legal or institutional change to the 
tripartite system, and no social pact has been concluded in recent years. Some efforts 
on the part of social partners to advance social dialogue were nevertheless visible, 
such as the agreement which was reached in 2010 within the tripartite Council on the 
document titled Ways out of the crisis: 38 common measures of the government, 
trade unions and employers.492 This tripartite success is mitigated: the government 
elected shortly after the document was agreed did not endorse the proposed 
measures.493  
 
Regional tripartite social dialogue 
As is the case with Slovakia and Poland, a limited form of regional social dialogue 
has developed in the Czech Republic since 1991. It operates on the basis of tripartite 
statutes agreed between participating parties.494 No agreements have been concluded 
at this regional level and so the impact of this type of social dialogue is limited. 
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The tripartite body: power and functioning 
The Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs in Poland was formed in 
1994, on the basis of the tripartite Pact on State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Restructuring Process, signed in 1993. The tripartite body which was formed in the 
early 1990s was built on a considerable trade union legacy and the influential role 
played by trade unions in facilitating the transitional processes: the trade union 
Solidarity, which had been established officially in the 1980s, had developed as a 
massive trade union movement and played a major role in anti-communist activities. 
The intention behind forming the tripartite body was to legitimise the restrictive 
economic reforms, particularly given the high unemployment rates.495 At the same 
time, the major goal of the tripartite Commission was maintaining and guaranteeing 
social peace. This body, which has been in existence until a recent reconfiguration 
which took place in 2015, was composed of representatives of the government, trade 
unions (Solidarity, OPZZ, FZZ) and employers’ associations (Lewiatan, ZPR, KPP, 
and BCC).496 Before the major reconfiguration of 2015, the legal basis of the 
tripartite Commission had undergone change in two distinct phases: 
 (a) Until the early 2000s, the Polish tripartite Commission did not have any 
statutory legal basis. It functioned on the basis of governmental decree, passed in 
1994, which defined its powers and competences. In general, the Commission had a 
consultative role and its decisions were non-binding. Only in a smaller segment of its 
remit, related to income policies, did the tripartite Commission function on the basis 
of law: a statutory legal act, passed in 1994, empowered it to set the criteria for wage 
increases at company level.497 Because decisions had to be taken unanimously, the 
functioning of the Commission was substantially hampered. In fact, the Commission 
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managed to reach an agreement on wage increases only in 2006; in other years, these 
decisions were made unilaterally by the government.498  
(b) In 2001, the Act on the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic 
Affairs and the Voivodeship Committees of Social Dialogue,499 valid until recently 
(2015), provided a statutory legal basis for the Committee. The Commission played a 
consultative role and could not issue legally binding decisions. Yet, judging from the 
fact that no social pacts were concluded during this period, the tripartite system has 
not substantially benefited from this formal (statutory) institutionalisation: in 
comparison with the other three countries, Poland has the poorest record of 
agreements concluded at the tripartite level. The major reason behind the low output 
has been the tension and conflict between the social partners, at times the major 
cause of stalemate in social dialogue. A particular case in point has been the frequent 
conflict between the major trade unions, OPZZ and Solidarity.500  
Finally, in July 2015, the Act on the Social Dialogue Council and Other 
Institutions of Social Dialogue was enacted, replacing the former tripartite 
commission with the Social Dialogue Council. This body is designed to have 
substantially broadened competences compared with its predecessor,501 but it is still 
too early to evaluate its work. 
 
Representativeness 
Initially, no representativeness criteria were anticipated when the tripartite body was 
formed: all signatories to the 1993 Pact on State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Restructuring Process were automatically considered members of the tripartite. In 
2001, the aforementioned Act on the Tripartite Commission introduced 
representativeness criteria; but as with the Czech and Slovak examples, these rules 
were subsequently changed several times in the following years. As the result of 
these provisions, several organisations of social partners, in addition to those already 
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existing, were able to join the tripartite system.502 In the first place, the 2001 
representativeness rules listed the organisations of social partners that were 
considered representative and could automatically participate in tripartite social 
dialogue.503 In addition, the provisions defined the conditions which other, non-listed 
organisations of trade unions and employers’ associations should fulfil in order to be 
considered representative. This included a quantitative threshold of 300,000 
employees that trade unions needed to count in their membership, as well as 300,000 
employees working for the entities that are members of the employers’ 
associations.504 The provisions granting automatic membership to the tripartite 
Commission were subsequently lifted. The 2015 Act on Social Dialogue Council and 
Other Institutions of Social Dialogue has once more modified these provisions, 
requiring trade unions to have a membership of at least 300,000 employees working 
in at least half of the sections of the economy. The same threshold applies to 
employers’ associations.505 
 
History of social pacts 
Of the four CEE countries, Poland has the poorest track record of concluded social 
pacts, the main reason being the conflicting relationships among its actors. In fact, 
the entire history of social pacts consists of only two agreements signed before 1990, 
and one agreement signed after 1990. The two pre-1990 pacts assisted in the 
economic and political transition from communism to free market:506  
(a) The 1980 August agreement or Gdansk agreement was famous for allowing 
the formation of trade unions. This represented a landmark political and democratic 
step. In 1981, Solidarity became the first independent trade union in the CEE 
countries to come into existence pursuant to this agreement. Its activities were 
nevertheless soon banned, with the imposition of martial law in the same year, but 
                                                          
502 PKPP Lewiatan, BCC and Trade Union Forum (FZZ). On this topic, see Gardawski, J. and Meardi, 
G. (2008) Explaining Failures and Chances of Polish 'Social Pacts', SASE Annual Meeting, San José, 
21-23 July 2008, p 5.  
503 Thus, from the side of trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, as well as FZZ as of 2003; while on the 
side of employers, KPP, ZRP and PKPP Lewiatan.  
504 Gardawski, J. (2002) ‘The Development of the National Tripartite Commission’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/the-
development-of-the-national-tripartite-commission [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
505 Hajn and Mitrus (2016), p 249.  
506 As reported by Gardawski and Meardi (2010), pp 71-72. 
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even so it continued to operate as an underground organisation. In 1982, the Act on 
Trade Unions allowed the formation of new trade unions. 
(b) The Round table agreement was signed in 1989. It facilitated the 
transformation of the social and economic system, allowing the first free elections in 
the country and reinstating Solidarity as a legal organisation.  
After the onset of transition, only one social pact was concluded. This was the 
1993 Pact on State-Owned Enterprises in the Restructuring Process, in the first place 
notable for establishing the tripartite Commission. Moreover, this pact assisted 
market transformation by providing trade union acceptance for the privatisation of 
the state-owned enterprises.507 At the same time, the Pact contributed towards the 
shape of the current collective bargaining system: it emphasised the role of 
employees in the privatisation of the state-owned companies and determined the 
company as the key level for deciding on social and economic transformation.508 The 
1993 pact did not constitute a typical social pact: it consisted of three separate 
agreements, which taken together represented a fully-fledged social pact. The 
government and the employers’ organisation held separate negotiations with trade 
unions and eventually concluded three agreements, notably with OPZZ, Solidarity 
and the remaining seven trade unions which had participated in the social 
dialogue.509  
As no social pacts were concluded afterwards, the 1993 pact has remained the 
“highest and never repeated achievement” of Polish tripartism.510 Some authors have 
also provided a more balanced assessment of the history of social pacts in Poland. 
Gardawski and Meardi noted that a more thorough assessment of the interaction 
among actors reveals “that there have been very serious attempts at social pacts, and 
there have been some unintended effects of these attempts”,511 in the sense of social 
partners achieveing important bilateral accords. 
                                                          
507 Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A. and Czarzasty, J. (2012) ’Trade Unions in Poland’ Brussels: ETUI, 
p 20, citing Iankova (2002), p 107. 
508 As highlighted by Sewerynski in particular: see Sewerynski, M. (1993) ’Development of the 
Collective Bargaining System in Poland after the Second World War’ Comparative Labour Law 
Journal, vol 14, pp 475-476.  
509 Iankova (2002), pp 106-107. 
510 Gardawski and Meardi (2008), p 3.  
511 Gardawski and Meardi (2010), p 70. 
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One of the most prominent attempts at concluding social pacts took place in 
2003, when the government proposed a comprehensive social pact covering several 
areas, but the trade union side (notably Solidarity) showed no interest in the 
package.512  However, in 2003, a bilateral agreement was signed between OPZZ and 
PKPP proposing labour law changes in several areas. Eventually, these proposals 
were partially accepted by the government and turned into a legislative proposal.513 
Another initiative aiming for a comprehensive social pact was put forward by the 
government in 2007, but the two major trade unions did not agree on the proposed 
measures.514  
Mention may also be made of other examples of bilateral agreements 
concluded between (several) social partners. One example is the 2001 agreement 
concluded between one of the major trade union organisations, OPZZ, and the two 
major employers’ organisations (PKPP Lewiatan and ZRP) on a range of issues 
which could not have been agreed at the tripartite level.515 Furthermore, in 2004, 
trade unions and employers’ associations reacted to the initiative of transposing the 








                                                          
512 ibid., pp 79-81. 
513 Gardawski and Meardi (2010), p 81; also, Gardawski, J. (2004) ‘OPZZ and Four Employers' 
Confederations Sign Bipartite Agreement’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:   
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/01/feature/pl0401108f.htm [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
514 Gardawski and Meardi (2010), p 83. Also, Towalski, R. (2007) ‘Social Partners Sign Social Pact 
Declaration’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2007/02/articles/pl0702049i.htm [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
515 Gardawski, J. (2004) ‘OPZZ and Four Employers' Confederations Sign Bipartite Agreement’ 
Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/01/feature/pl0401108f.htm [accessed 1 August 2016]; 
Gardawski and Meardi (2010), pp 77-83.   
516 See Meardi (2012a), pp 48-49. As Chapter 7 will explain further, following the final 
implementation of the Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 





The crisis temporarily increased social dialogue practices at the tripartite level.517 In 
2009, the social partners bilaterally agreed on thirteen anti-crisis common points, and 
this bilateral agreement was eventually accepted by the government and led to the 
adoption of the anti-crisis law.518 Nonetheless, social dialogue deteriorated after 
2009. In fact, tripartism was experiencing severe crisis, as in 2013 the three major 
trade unions decided to give up their membership of the tripartite body. This has led 
to discussions over reforming tripartism in Poland.519 The conclusion of those 
discussions was the formation of a new tripartite body, the Social Dialogue Council 
(Rada Dialogu Społecznego), in March 2015520 replacing the one which had been in 
operation for more than two decades. 
 
Regional tripartite social dialogue 
Regional tripartite social dialogue is conducted between social partners and national 
and regional government. There are 17 regional social dialogue teams, which have 
been established pursuant to the 2001 Act on Tripartite Commission.521 However, as 
the interviewees from the Polish trade unions explained, the outcome of regional 
social dialogue has been limited, as these bodies do not have real decision-making 
powers, but may only voice opinions which are not legally binding. In addition, in 
several sectors of the economy it is possible to find tripartite sectoral committees 
which have only an advisory role. 
 
 
                                                          
517 Bernaciak, M. (2013) ‘Social Dialogue Revival or 'PR Corporatism'? Negotiating Anti-Crisis 
Measures in Poland and Bulgaria’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, no 2, 
pp 239-251. 
518 Meardi, G. and Trappman, V. (2013) ‘Between Consolidation and Crisis: Divergent Pressures and 
Sectoral Trends in Poland’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, p 199. 
519 Czarzasty, J. (2015) ‘Poland: National-Level Tripartite Social Dialogue Back on Track’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/industrial-
relations/poland-national-level-tripartite-social-dialogue-back-on-track [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
520 ibid. 
521 Gardawski, Mrozowicki and Czarzasty (2010), p 22. Full name is the Act on the Tripartite 




3. Comparative overview of legal and institutional traits 
 
3.1. Social pacts: weak instruments of standard setting in CEE 
The concept of social pact has been not unequivocally defined in the literature. In 
broad terms, social pacts can refer to any form of tripartite agreements concluded 
between organisations of trade unions, organisations of employers and the state, with 
a view to regulating a broad range of social and economic matters, including welfare 
state and income policies. Such a broad conceptualisation of social pacts has also 
been proposed by Natali and Pochet: 
“Social pacts can be defined as a set of formal or informal agreements between representatives 
of governments and organised interests, who negotiate and implement policy change across a 
number of interconnected policy areas.”522 
In a narrower sense, as proposed by Avdagic, social pacts are only publicly 
announced formal policy contracts between the government and social partners over 
income, labour market, or welfare policies that identify policy issues and targets, the 
means to achieve them, and the tasks and responsibilities of the signatories.523 This 
narrower understanding of social pacts excludes other possible forms of agreements, 
such as declaratory agreements, general statements of intent or bilateral agreements 
between trade unions and employers.524 When explaining the social pact, it is also 
crucial to add that its constituent ingredient is state sponsorship, as these agreements 
are concluded in the “shadow of the state”, even when the style of free collective 
bargaining is formally maintained.525  
The history of social pacts in CEE as presented in section 2 consists of 
different forms of tripartite arrangements. Section 2 has attempted to distinguish 
                                                          
522 Natali, D. and Pochet, P. (2010) ‘The Evolution of Social Pacts in the EMU Era: What Type of 
Institutionalisation?’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 15, no 2, pp 148-149.  
523 As defined in: Avdagic, S. (2011) ‘The Conditions for Pacts: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis of the 
Resurgence of Tripartite Concertation’ in S. Avdagic, M. Rhodes and J. Visser (eds) Social Pacts in 
Europe: Emergence, Evolution, and Institutionalisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 25. A 
similar definition can be found in Avdagic, S. (2010b) ‘When Are Concerted Reforms Feasible? 
Explaining the Emergence of Social Pacts in Western Europe’ Comparative Political Studies, vol 43, 
no 5, p 637.  
524 Avdagic (2011), p 25.   
525 As underlined by Traxler, F. (2000) ‘National Pacts and Wage Regulation in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis’ in G. Fajertag and P. Pochet (eds) Social Pacts in Europe: New Dynamics, 
Brussels: ETUI/OSE, p 403. 
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between social pacts in the narrow sense and the other forms of accords that may be 
found in CEE. For example, this latter category would encompass the Slovak 2008 
declaration about the implementation of the euro, or the Polish agreements concluded 
on a bilateral basis between social partners at the national level. The track record of 
concluding social pacts in the four countries is modest: with the exception of 
Slovenia, where social pacts have been systematically concluded over the past two 
decades, the conclusion of the pacts has been more an exception than a rule in the 
other three countries. Slovakia concluded social pacts until 2001, while the Czech 
Republic did so only until 1994. Poland has the poorest track record, with a single 
pact concluded in 1993, and even this was concluded in a specific form, consisting of 
three separate agreements which cumulatively represented a fully-fledged social 
pact. 
The poor track record described above evidences the modest impact of the 
social pact as a source for setting standards in CEE. With the exception of Slovenia, 
the social pacts are simply underused instruments. On a more general level, one may 
note a genuine lack of negotiated outcomes at this level (bilateral or tripartite): within 
a multi-level framework of standard setting, the national level in CEE is therefore a 
weak element. However, it is also true that the practice of concluding social pacts is 
rather inconsistent in the member states of the EU, and for that reason there is no 
clear guidance to be offered, nor standard formula that can be promoted to CEE 
countries. Social pacts were concluded in several countries in the 1990s (among 
others, Italy, Spain, Portugal): they represented comprehensive agreements 
regulating a broad range of matters, but particularly facilitating entry to the European 
monetary union and dealing with economic difficulties.526 The format in which social 
pacts were concluded has also varied. In some cases, social pacts would cover a 
broad range of items at once (horizontal pacts) or they would sequentially cover 
different items in different accords at different times, generating similar effects as 
horizontal pacts (longitudinal pacts).527 The practice of concluding social pacts, 
which was pervasive across several member states of the EU in the 1990s, did not 
run counter to the decentralisation trend, but, rather, ran alongside it. Where social 
                                                          
526 At the EU “periphery”, see Visser, J. (2005) ’Beneath the Surface of Stability: New and Old Modes 
of Governance in European Industrial Relations’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 11, no 
3, pp 288–289; Meardi (2012a), p 44. 
527 Natali and Pochet (2009), p 149. 
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pacts were concluded, they contributed towards a more efficient governability of the 
collective bargaining system, especially by facilitating wage moderation.528 In some 
countries, social pacts perform the role of “procedural rationalisation” of the 
collective bargaining systems (as is the case in Italy or Spain) by introducing the 
provisions relevant for decentralisation and negotiating procedure at other (lower) 
levels.529 In line with the logic of Traxler’s “organised decentralisation” the social 
pacts did not constrain, but rather supported collective bargaining at sectoral and 
company levels.530 An example of a social pact reinforcing the collective bargaining 
system is the Italian social pact of 1993, known for establishing a two-tier system of 
collective bargaining at sectoral and company levels. Or the two Dutch social pacts 
in 1982 and 1993, which facilitated collective bargaining reform and supported 
greater decentralisation.531  
On the whole, the CEE social pacts do not perform the same functions. 
Nevertheless, some CEE pacts did have long lasting effect on industrial relations. 
Clearly, that is the case in Slovenia, where social pacts, together with the national 
level cross-sectoral collective agreements, have facilitated the collective bargaining 
system, setting provisions to be further specified at sectoral and company levels. In 
this sense the national standard-setting level (tripartite or bipartite) has played a 
prominent role in facilitating the normative articulated model of multi-employer 
bargaining (proposed in Chapter 1), by setting the framework of standards at a higher 
level to be further specified or implemented at lower levels. Poland provides a 
contrasting case. The social pact which was concluded in Poland in 1993 postulated 
the enterprise as the main locus of standard setting: the employees in the enterprises 
were given a key role in the privatisation process. This 1993 pact thus represented 
one of the key building blocks of the progressive decentralisation in industrial 
relations that is to be found in today’s Poland. However, a different role was played 
                                                          
528 Molina, O. (2008) ‘Social Pacts, Collective Bargaining and Trade Union Articulation Strategies’ 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 14, no 3, p 400. 
529 Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (2006) European Integration and Industrial Relations: Multi-Level 
Governance in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p 126. 
530 Regini, M. (2000a) ‘Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of European 
Economies to Globalisation’ Politics & Society, vol 28, no 1, p 13; notion of “organised 
decentralisation” coined by Traxler, F. (1995) ‘Farewell to Labour Market Associations? Organised 
versus Disorganised Decentralisation as a Map for Industrial Relations’ in F. Traxler and C. Crouch 
(eds) Organised Industrial Relations in Europe: What Future?, Aldershot: Avebury. 
531 Molina (2008).  
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by the two pre-1990s Polish social pacts which contributed towards the 
institutionalisation of industrial relations by facilitating free trade unionism. In the 
two remaining countries of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, it cannot be said that 
social pacts had tangible impact on the structure of collective bargaining (although, 
at certain periods of time, as demonstrated in section 2, the Slovak tripartite body 
was involved in decision making on the extensions of sectoral collective agreements 
to those employers not covered by these agreements).  
Moreover, as well as having little influence on the collective bargaining 
system, the overall impact of social pacts (outside the framework of collective 
bargaining) was limited. Those that existed in CEE had a rather modest role, 
receiving lukewarm evaluation by the scholars. Avdagic and Crouch, likewise, noted 
that the CEE social pacts had little impact on overall macroeconomic management, 
and could hardly be described as negotiated policy adjustments tailored to improve 
coordination at different levels.532 Instead, these social pacts were used to legitimise 
neoliberal policies and often represented a response to a specific problem.533 Meardi 
noted that Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic opted for unilateral enforcement 
of macroeconomic convergence to deal with public debt rather than concluding 
social pacts.534 Ost noted that social pacts were not used for genuine bargaining 
between two sides, but rather to urge labour complicity for neoliberal policies.535 
Another problem in CEE was the fact that social pacts, when concluded, were 
not fully implemented. The problem of limited or inadequate implementation was 
common to the four countries at different times in the past decades, and this has been 
described in section 2. As Slovak interviewees explained, social pacts in their 
country were considered merely as “gentlemen’s agreements” and were not 
necessarily considered binding by the contracting parties. As section 2 has 
demonstrated, this lack of full implementation was a feature of Czech and Slovak 
industrial relations in particular, and this had a far-reaching effect on industrial 
                                                          
532 Avdagic, S. and Crouch, C. (2006) ‘Organised Economic Interests: Diversity and Change in an 
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relations. In Slovakia, the trade unions’ discontent over the implementation of social 
pacts, and the resultant disagreements between social partners and the government 
led to the breakdown of social dialogue in 1997.536 When another general agreement 
was concluded in Slovakia in 2000, it also was not fully implemented. In the Czech 
Republic, after the unsatisfactory implementation of a series of social pacts in the 
early 1990s, the general interest in tripartite social dialogue diminished and no other 
social pacts have been concluded since.537 How to explain the lack of full 
implementation of the agreed deals? This can certainly be ascribed to the weaknesses 
of the social partners in CEE countries, in addition to the general weaknesses in the 
collective bargaining systems and low coverage rates of collective agreements at any 
level. In industrial relations literature, strong inter-union organisation and organised 
“articulation” of social partners at different levels have been highlighted as 
particularly important for the successful implementation of agreed tripartite 
accords.538 However, the capacities of social partners at sectoral and company level 
are weak in CEE, and the commitments agreed at the tripartite level may not 
necessarily be implemented through collective agreements at sectoral and company 
collective bargaining levels. The CEE social partners, accordingly, may not make 
credible commitments at macro-level that can be implemented at sectoral and 
company levels.539  
The low number of concluded social pacts, their limited scope and their 
problematic implementation are the reasons that CEE tripartism has received 
lukewarm reviews in the scholarship, the most famous and much referenced labels 
being “illusory corporatism” and “fragile shell”.540 The interviewees, particularly in 
                                                          
536 Czíria (2013), p 4.  
537 Cox, T. M. and Mason, B. (2000a) ‘Interest Groups and the Development of Tripartism in East 
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Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland, have also evaluated the role of tripartite 
social dialogue as weak. In fact, it is rather difficult to find a more positive 
assessment of the CEE tripartism in the literature. In a minority opinion, Mailand and 
Due have explained that despite the lack of a solid track record, tripartite social 
dialogue has nevertheless achieved a number of tangible results, and has assisted in 
developing and maturing the social dialogue culture.541 Iankova and Turner have 
argued that tripartism gave voice to the trade unions and represented a model of 
democratisation within the post-communist economic and political setting.542 
Furthermore, the recent crisis period has shown some positive signs, evidencing that 
the role of tripartism cannot be fully dismissed in CEE. The best example is the 
Polish tripartite reform which took place in 2015. 
 
3.2. Institutionalisation of tripartite bodies 
The four countries had their tripartite bodies established in the first half of the 1990s. 
The rationale behind their introduction was mostly related to the idea of maintaining 
social peace and providing greater legitimacy to decision making in difficult 
economic situation which surrounded the process of privatisation. There is also 
evidence that formation of tripartite institutions was seen as favourable by the 
external actors (ILO and EU) and as such was promoted to the candidate countries.543 
In an effort to build meaningful and effective tripartite models, CEE countries were 
looking at the examples of the EU countries, particularly tripartite bodies in Germany 
and Austria.544 The early 1990s period also coincided with the transposition of the 
major ILO treaties which ensured the insertion into the legal systems of the basic 
principles of collective bargaining and social dialogue. In fact, the formation of the 
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tripartite bodies in CEE was a significant moment because it was the first step 
towards the institutionalisation of industrial relations in the post-communist 
environment. Given the lack of experience in social dialogue, participation in the 
tripartite institutions seemed at the time the most convenient way to ensure a “voice” 
for the trade unions.  
The previous section demonstrated that the functioning of various tripartite 
bodies in CEE was sometimes difficult, and their powers and competences have 
changed a number of times in the selected countries. In Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic, the tripartite institution has never been given a statutory legal basis, and in 
Poland it was not until 2001 that tripartism was acknowledged in statutory law. As 
noted by an interviewee in Poland, the legitimacy of the tripartite body was disputed 
until 2001 because it operated on the basis of governmental decree. As section 2 
demonstrated, in Slovakia, particularly, tripartism has gone through different phases 
while the legal basis has fluctuated between statute and tripartite agreement in the 
past two decades. Yet, judging from the examples of these four countries, whether a 
tripartite body functions on the basis of statutory legal act or tripartite agreement 
seems to have no relevance to the frequency and quality of the outcomes of tripartite 
negotiations. This conclusion is underpinned by the fact that the track record in 
concluded social pacts is rather limited (with the exception of Slovenia), regardless 
of the legal basis of the tripartite body. In Slovenia, where tripartite body functions 
on the basis of tripartite agreements, social pacts have been concluded consistently 
since the early transitional period (though it can be also argued that Slovenian 
tripartism enjoyed a wider legitimacy since it was underpinned by tripartite 
agreement rather than statutory act). A telling example is found in Poland, where 
affording a statutory legal basis to the tripartite institution in the early 2000s did not 
generate any social pacts. Regardless of the legal basis on which the tripartite bodies 
function, their competences have been broadly defined in all four countries and did 
not prevent social partners from entering into any tripartite negotiations and 
concluding any forms of negotiated agreements if they wished to do so.  
A further issue is that the tripartite bodies have a predominantly advisory, 
rather than negotiating role, and that in none of the four countries can the tripartite 
body issue legally binding decisions. Despite this, the tripartite institutions have 
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played, at different instances and in different forms, a significant role in relation to 
pressing social and economic matters. In Slovenia and in the Czech Republic the 
interviewees have confirmed that no law was enacted before consultation in the 
tripartite body had taken place. In Slovenia, during the recent crisis period, an 
interesting exception to such a consultative role is found in 2011, when the anti-crisis 
package of laws was enacted without prior consultation at the tripartite level 
(eventually withdrawn, following the referendum initiated by the trade unions). An 
example of a tripartite institution playing a significant role is in the area of wages 
policy in Poland, where tripartite social dialogue is a formal requirement in 
determining minimum wage levels, and where the tripartite body also traditionally 
provides its non-binding opinion to the government regarding wage increases.545 The 
weak outcomes of social dialogue in CEE can be mostly ascribed to the lack of social 
dialogue tradition and to conflicts among the participants in the tripartite dialogue. 
The social partners’ proposals have been in various instances dismissed by the 
governments, or the governments did not at specific periods of time provide enough 
support for social dialogue. An example of the latter is the Czech Republic, where 
Myant mentions that governments considered tripartism a forum to “find out the 
opinion” of the social partners.546 Generalisations on this point, however, should be 
made cautiously, because, as demonstrated in relation to Poland in section 2, 
government initiatives to conclude social pacts were not always met with enthusiasm 
on the social partners’ side. However, one can also find instances where the modest 
outcomes of CEE tripartism were linked to the ways in which the competences and 
powers were legally institutionalised. Examples of this have been evidenced in 
section 2, in relation to the Czech tripartite statute of 1995 and the Slovak 
configuration of tripartism between 2004 and 2007. In both cases, the competences 
of tripartite bodies were narrowly set and this prevented tripartite agreements being 
reached. 
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On a final note, it is worth mentioning that the topic of representativeness had 
particular relevance for the institutionalisation of CEE tripartism in the 1990s as it 
was necessary to identify social partner organisations that could participate in 
tripartite social dialogue. Because they set clear criteria for social partners’ 
participation in social dialogue, the gradual enactment of rules on representativeness 
was an important step for improving the legitimacy of decision making at this level. 
In the 1990s,  new social partner organisations started to appear, particularly on the  
employers’ side and rules on representativeness aimed to set  clear and objective 
criteria for their participation in social dialogue. Section 2 demonstrated that the 
representativeness rules were shaped gradually in these countries. The Czech and 
Slovak examples are particularly telling, with their rules changing several times in 
the past two decades. Nevertheless, as evident from section 2, the introduction of 
rules in 1990s and their further reshaping in subsequent years did not generate any 
impact on the track record of concluding social pacts. 
  
4. Concluding remarks 
 
4.1. Explaining the development of the legal and institutional framework for tripartite 
social dialogue 
This chapter has demonstrated that only in Slovenia did tripartism emerge as an 
important locus for standard setting, although its salience has fluctuated over time. In 
the other CEE countries, the experiences with tripartism were far more modest. 
Moreover, in all CEE countries the significance of tripartism was more pronounced 
in the early 1990s, and it has lost significance over time. Nevertheless, as section 2 
demonstrated, there were some reassuring signs of its revival during the recent crisis 
period.547 Tripartism in CEE has attracted considerable academic attention, so what 
follows as an explanation of how the legal and institutional framework of rules 
developed will draw on sources of rich scholarship. The overall impression 
stemming from the academic literature (and which will be elaborated upon here) is 
                                                          
547 A trend of reviving tripartism in CEE during the recent crisis period has been otherwise underlined 
in a recent study by Kahancová, M. (2015) ‘Central and Eastern European Trade Unions after the EU 
Enlargement: Successes and Failures for Capacity Building’ Transfer: European Review of Labour 
and Research, vol 21, no 3, p 348.   
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that the lack of policy support for tripartite social dialogue has been the most 
influential factor shaping it. In addition, the interviewees, particularly in Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Poland, have underlined that the tripartite dynamic and 
outcome suffered from the conflicts between the parties participating in the tripartite 
social dialogue. 
The previous sections underlined that the Polish variation of tripartism has 
been weakest in the past two decades compared with the other countries. 
Nevertheless, some competences of the Polish tripartite institution were pertinent, 
such as setting minimum wages and maximum wage increases.548 There are two 
major factors which have shaped Polish tripartism. Although the tripartite bodies 
were originally constituted with a view to maintaining social peace, the lack of 
consistent support from the policy makers was the main reason that they did not 
develop into institutions able to have a major say in reformative processes.549 Other 
influential factors were the lack of unity on the trade union side and conflicts among 
the two major trade unions (Solidarity and OPZZ), alongside their ideological and 
political divisions.550  
The Czech variation of tripartism did not generate substantial outcomes in 
terms of social pacts either: it emerged as a consultative body and trade unions 
regarded it merely as a lobbying venue.551 Lack of policy support seems to have been 
the major determinant of Czech tripartism: policy makers lost interest in it 
completely after 1995, opting instead for radical economic reforms which in turn 
lacked support from the trade unions.552 At the same time, Czech tripartism was 
further challenged by trade union weaknesses and the unions’ inability to generate 
tangible impact.553  
                                                          
548 As demonstrated by Avdagic, S. (2010a) ‘Tripartism and Economic Reforms in Slovenia and 
Poland’ in L. Fraile (ed) Blunting Neoliberalism: Tripartism and Economic Reforms in the 
Developing World, Basingstoke: ILO, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 43-45. 
549 Gardawski, Mrozowicki and Czarzasty (2012), p 15; Avdagic, S. (2005) ‘State-Labour Relations in 
East-Central Europe: Explaining Variations in Union Effectiveness’ Socio-Economic Review, vol 3, p 
32; Cox and Mason (2000a), p 342. 
550 Avdagic (2010a), pp 44-45. Furthermore, until 2001, the trade union members were also actively 
engaged in politics and were members of the parliament; see Trappman (2013), p 88. 
551 Myant, Slocock and Smith (2000), p 731. 
552 Cox and Mason (2000a), p 338; Myant, Slocock and Smith (2000), p 730. 
553 Pollert (1997), p 210; Cox and Mason (2000a), p 338-339. 
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Initially, the major determinant of Slovak tripartism was the support which it 
received from the government.554 Gradually, this support faded, leading to the 
marginalisation of tripartism from the mid-1990s onwards.555 An important 
explanatory factor in distinguishing the Czech and Slovak experiences is the 
centralised representation of the Slovak trade unions which remained a blueprint of 
Slovak industrial relations.556 However, a common feature of the Slovak and Czech 
variations of tripartism is that neither has ever emerged as an institution with 
significant say in reform processes.557  
Since it is the only CEE country that could be described as having a 
coordinated market economy (as explained in Chapter 2), and having the most 
elaborated history of social pacts, Slovenia has attracted much attention from CEE 
scholars. Describing the Slovenian “exceptionalism”, Crowley and Stanojević 
offered several explanatory factors: relatively favourable economic circumstances 
during the reform period compared to the other CEE countries, the helpful role of the 
legacies which favoured an active role for social partners, the gradual approach in 
conducting market reforms, and the fact of basic compromise on major social and 
economic items between the social partners and the state.558 Slovenian trade unions 
were exceptional in gradually developing into “neocoporatist, intermediary 
organisations”.559 As the previous section demonstrated, the Slovenian model of 
tripartism has therefore had substantial impact on standard setting and collective 
bargaining, particularly at the beginning of the 1990s. This role has continued despite 
the partial decentralisation which has been taking place since 2006.560  
 
                                                          
554 Myant, Slocock and Smith (2000), pp 733-734. 
555 Pollert (2000); Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2010) ‘Slovakia and Hungary: Successful and Failed 
Euro Entry Without Social Pacts’ in P. Pochet, M. Keune and D. Natalie (eds) After the Euro and 
Enlargement: Social Pacts in the EU, Brussels: ETUI, pp 366-367. 
556 Duman, A. and Kureková, L. (2012) ‘The Role of State in Development of Socio-Economic 
Models in Hungary and Slovakia: the Case of Industrial Policy’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol 19, no 8, p 1217. 
557 Bulla, M., Czíria, L. and Kahancová, M. (2013) ‘Impact of Legislative Reforms on Industrial 
Relations and Working Conditions in Slovakia’ ILO Background Study, p 9. Similar conclusion has 
been reached by Bohle and Greskovits in relation to euro adoption, see Bohle and Greskovits (2010), 
pp 350-351. 
558 Crowley, S. and Stanojević, M. (2011) ‘Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical 
Legacies: Explaining the Slovenian Exception’ Politics & Society, vol 39, no 2, pp 268-295.  
559 Stanojević (2012), p 864. 
560 ibid., p 870. Also, see Stanojević, M. (2014) ‘Conditions for a Neoliberal Turn: The Cases of 
Hungary and Slovenia’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 20, no 2, pp 107-108. 
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4.2. Standard setting at national level 
To what extent does the current legal and institutional framework support and 
promote social dialogue at national level? To summarise the findings of this chapter, 
only in Slovenia can social pacts be considered an important locus for standard 
setting (together with bilateral cross-sectoral collective agreements which, for almost 
two decades, have represented an additional source of standards for all employees in 
the economy). The experiences of the other three countries, regarding tripartite 
and/or bipartite social dialogue and collective bargaining at national level, may not 
fit the logic of the articulated normative multi-employer bargaining model proposed 
in Chapter 1. In these countries, national tripartite rules form a weak link in the 
normative articulated multi-employer model: as this chapter has demonstrated, the 
negotiation of standards at national level is weak and when tripartite agreements 
exist, their impact on the collective bargaining structure is modest. In fact, the Polish 
social pact experience goes against the logic of Chapter 1’s proposed normative 
model: the 1993 Pact did not contribute towards shaping a multi-employer 
bargaining system, instead it generated a resolute support for standard setting at 
decentralised, local levels. The thesis that tripartite rules are a weak element was 
advanced in a study by the European Commission in 2002 which noted a lack of 
linkage between what is discussed at the national and decentralised levels of 
collective bargaining in CEE.561 This argument still appears relevant today.  
Did the legal framework in any way cause such limited tripartite outcomes in 
the three countries? This chapter did not find any conclusive evidence of that: with a 
few exceptions (the restrictively-defined competences of tripartite bodies in Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic during a certain limited period of time), CEE tripartism has 
not been found to be constrained by restrively-defined powers and competences. On 
the contrary, a perfect example of the law not being able to boost tripartite social 
dialogue is the Polish tripartite Commission. Despite being given a statutory legal 
basis in 2001, the outcomes of the Polish tripartite Commission have remained poor.
                                                          
561 European Commission (2002) Industrial Relations in Europe 2002, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, p 106. 
163 
 
Chapter 6  




This chapter scrutinises the legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining at sectoral level in the four CEE countries. In Chapter 1 this study 
underlined weak multi-employer bargaining practices in the CEE, resulting in a low 
number of concluded collective agreements at sectoral level. Yet, as Table 4562 
demonstrates, the country figures vary. Of the four countries examined in the study, 
Slovenia has the most developed sectoral activity, with almost all sectors covered by 
collective agreements. Sectoral activity is fairly developed in Slovakia, with many 
sectors having a collective agreement. The Czech Republic has considerably less 
sectoral activity than Slovakia, and in Poland, sectoral collective bargaining is almost 
of marginal importance: the agreements at this level cover not more than 3% of the 
workforce. 
On the basis of those features of the four countries presented in Chapter 2, it 
can be assumed that the legal framework in Slovenia is by far the most supportive of 
the normative articulated model of multi-employer bargaining which was presented 
in Chapter 1, followed by Slovakia. It can be equally assumed that the legal 
framework in the Czech Republic and Poland is less likely to resemble that model, 
with Poland having the least favourable framework for multi-employer bargaining.  
What this study has so far revealed is that the differences between industrial 
relations in the CEE countries and the other EU member states particularly impinge 
upon the notion and role of sectoral collective agreements: it is sectoral collective 
bargaining which represents the major discrepancy between industrial relations in the 
                                                          
562 The differences in total and sectoral coverage rates presented in Table 4 reflect the use of extension 
mechanisms (as in Slovenia) or the comparatively more developed practice of concluding collective 
agreements at company level (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland). 
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old and new member states of the EU. Sectoral collective agreement represents, to a 
varying extent, a lynchpin of the industrial relations models in the “old” EU, and this 
is not the case in the CEE countries. 
 
Table 4: Industrial relations at sectoral level 
Country No. of sectoral collective 
agreements 




Slovenia Fluctuating between 42 in 
2008 and 41 in 2013 
n.a.** Rates falling 
from 96% in 
2006 to an 
estimated 65% in 
2013 
Slovakia Falling from 37 in 2007 to 
20 in 2013 
<40% between 2008 
and 2011 
Rates falling 
from  40% in 
2006 and 35% in 




Between 18 and 19 
agreements registered in 
the period 2008 - 2013 
15% in 2013; 
according to some 
estimations, falling 
down to 14% in 2014 
Rates falling 
from  40% in 
2006 and 35% in 
2011 to 24.9% in 
2013*** 
Poland 170 in 2012 around 3% in the past 
two decades 
15.7% in 2006, 
14.8% in 2011 
and 14.7% in 
2012 
Notes: *This column refers to the coverage rates regarding collective agreements concluded at all 
existing collective bargaining levels in the country. It contains data on selected years only in view of 
comparing and contrasting pre- and post- crisis coverage rates (for detailed overview of coverage 
rates trends see Table 3 in Chapter 4 and Figure 1 in Chapter 1).  
** No official data on the percentage of sectoral coverage, although the interviewees explained that 
the high level of total coverage is predominantly based on sectoral collective bargaining. 
*** The data includes only the collective agreements concluded by the largest trade union 
confederation ČMKOS.  
Sources: Combined data from Eurofound, Worker-Participation (ETUI); also, Bulla, Cziria and 
Kahancová  (2013), ICTWSS database 5.0 by Visser (2015), data from the interviews.  
 
It could be claimed that sectoral collective agreements were at the forefront of the 
reform of industrial relations in both groups of countries in the past decades, but for 
different reasons. In West European countries, the regulatory role of sectoral 
collective agreement has undergone significant change because of the downward 
pressures of organised decentralisation. These agreements have, as a rule of thumb, 
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become preoccupied with setting the rules and conditions for setting standards at 
lower levels rather than setting themselves the substantive rules.563 However, these 
substantial industrial relations reforms were not necessarily coupled with drastic 
changes to the statutory legal framework of these countries.564  
On the other hand, the instigation of sectoral collective bargaining in CEE 
countries represented a bottom-up process which did not involve the downward 
pressures that existed in the ‘old’ member states. The instigation of legal rules about 
sectoral collective bargaining was embedded in the wider framework of profound 
legal transformation which was presented in Chapter 3. Establishing a functional 
legal framework for sectoral bargaining was subject to successful resolution of 
several challenges. In the first place, defining and identifying the parties to sectoral 
agreements has been a rather challenging task in most of the CEE countries because 
sectoral social partners were being created from scratch from the early 1990s. The 
sudden responsibility given to social partners to autonomously regulate matters that 
had been for decades covered by statutory legal regulation has tied the resurgence of 
sectoral collective agreements to a set of vital questions: will collective agreement at 
sectoral level manage to become the hallmark of the legal and institutional system, as 
has been the case in the majority of the countries in the EU? In which direction will 
labour law transformation evolve and how will it affect sectoral collective 
                                                          
563 The ways in which downward decentralisation affected sectoral collective agreements in the EU 
(with focus on “older” member states) has been widely addressed from various angles in a number of 
studies; for industrial relations aspects, see e.g. Visser, J. (2005) ’Beneath the Surface of Stability: 
New and Old Modes of Governance in European Industrial Relations’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol 11, no 3, pp 287-306; Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (2006) European Integration and 
Industrial Relations: Multi-Level Governance in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. More 
recent crisis-related approach has been provided in Marginson, P. (2014) ‘Coordinated Bargaining in 
Europe: From Incremental Corrosion to Frontal Assault?’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
vol 21, no 2, pp 97-114. For more legal aspects, see e.g. Sciarra, S. (2007) ‘The Evolution of 
Collective Bargaining: Observations on a Comparison in the Countries of the European Union’ 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, vol 29, pp 1-28. Collection of essays providing 
comparative country information in historical context in Hepple, B. and Veneziani, B. (2009) (eds) 
The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of 15 Countries 1945-2004, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing. Recent studies covering legal aspects of trends of decentralisation, which 
was particularly underpinned with the recent crisis, include collection of essays in Bruun, N., Lörcher, 
K. and Schömann, I. (2014) (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law in 
Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
564 Bruun notices that labour law legislation has been quite stable since 1980s in the majority of the 
European countries and that the sectoral collective agreements changed their nature and function 
without major legal transformation, see Bruun, N. (2003) ’The Autonomy of Collective Agreement’ in 
R. Blanpain (ed) Collective Bargaining, Discrimination, Social Security and the European 
Integration, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 48, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
pp 8-9.  
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agreements? Will the emphasis on decentralisation and local standard-setting, aiming 
to support flexible labour relations and economic efficiency, necessarily preclude 
collective bargaining at sectoral level? 
With a view to performing the analysis, this chapter dissects the concept of 
sectoral collective agreement into several thematic elements. Section 2, therefore, 
presents the legal and institutional framework for sectoral collective bargaining in the 
four countries as follows. Section 2.1 explores the definition and origin of sectoral 
collective agreement while section 2.2 examines its content. Section 2.3 explores the 
articulation of sectoral collective agreements with the other standard-setting sources. 
This analysis specifically focuses on how sectoral collective agreements (and 
collective agreements in general) are connected to the statutory legal rules: in a top-
down hierarchical multi-level framework, sectoral collective agreement is a link 
connecting statutory legal regulation with the local collective agreements, the latter 
being the main source of substantive regulation of work and employment.565 The 
question of articulation between the rules at sectoral and company level will be dealt 
with in the following Chapter 7. Section 2.4 addresses the question of who can sign 
sectoral collective agreements. Section 2.5 explores the legal rules on the extension 
of collective agreements, bearing in mind the importance of this legal instrument for 
industrial relations and particularly for sectoral collective bargaining. Section 2.6 
addresses several matters otherwise not covered in the previous sections (personal 
scope, duration, registration and collective bargaining procedure). Section 3 contains 
comparative analysis of the traits presented, and section 4 provides concluding notes 








                                                          
565 As explained in section 4.3 of Chapter 1. 
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2. Four countries: Overview of their legal and institutional framework 
 
2.1. The sectoral collective agreement: definition and origin 
Slovenia 
The Slovenian Collective Agreement Act, adopted in 2006, which regulates the most 
important aspects of collective bargaining and collective agreements, does not 
contain a specific definition of sectoral collective agreement. In fact, the 2006 Act 
does not define the levels at which collective bargaining may take place, in this sense 
giving the social partners freedom to negotiate at whatever collective bargaining 
levels they decide. Sectoral collective agreements are regularly concluded in 
Slovenia and almost all sectors have collective agreements.566 Sector level is the 
predominant level of collective bargaining in Slovenia, despite the trend towards 
decentralisation that has occurred during the past decade, as previously indicated in 
Chapter 1. Even since the crisis period, the available data have demonstrated that 
sectoral collective agreement has remained the dominant instrument for defining 
wages and working time.567 A recent study demonstrated that the legislative 
framework adopted in the recent crisis period (the Employment Relationship Act of 
2013) also reconfirmed the salience of sectoral collective agreements, by providing 
more autonomy for standard setting at this level.568   
The legacy of sectoral collective bargaining to some extent dates back to the 
beginning of the 20th century.569 Although the prominence of collective bargaining 
significantly decreased after the Second World War, a partial revival took place 
                                                          
566 According to data from Eurofound by Kanjuo and Mrčela, in total 46 public and private sector 
agreements had been registered since 2006, although not all collective agreements had been updated 
recently, see Kanjuo Mrčela, A. (2015) Slovenia: Working Life Country Profile, Eurofound: Dublin, 
available at: 
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovenia/slovenia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016].  
567 ibid. 
568 Stanojević, M. and Kanjuo Mrčela, A. (2014) ’Social Dialogue during the Economic Crisis: The 
Impact of Industrial Relations Reforms on Collective Bargaining in the Manufacturing Sector: 
Slovenia’, Project: The Impact of Industrial Relations Reforms on Collective Bargaining in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Brussels: European Commission, p 23. 
569 The concise historical overview of the practice of concluding collective agreements in Slovenia 
provided by Skledar, S. (2003) ’Collective Bargaining Legislation Examined’ Dublin: Eurofound, 
avaliable at:  
http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-bargaining-legislation-examined 
[accessed 1 August 2016].  
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during the 1970s: the first collective agreements after the Second World War were 
concluded pursuant to the 1971 Federal Act on Basic Rights from Employment 
Relationship.570 However, those collective agreements concluded before the 1990s 
did not have a significant regulatory role: they were concluded on behalf of a minor 
part of the economy (small businesses and craftsmen), and they were not fully 
autonomous, because of their scope being limited by statute.571 The economy was 
otherwise based on the paradigm of self-management, by which employees could 
organise themselves into various types of bodies, and could also conclude different 
forms of agreements and accords.572 As explained in Chapter 2, the peculiarity of the 
Slovenian pre-1990s system was exactly this “socialist” conception of labour 
relations, honed under the paradigm of self-management by which the workers were 
deemed to be the “social owners” of the means of production and could set 
conditions of work for themselves. Even though the legacy of self-management 
should be linked to company-level processes in the first place, it should be 
nevertheless considered as one of the reasons behind post-transitional industrial 
relations developments in Slovenia. Self-management, as a way of organising 
employment relations,573 overall, allowed for mobilisation of labour resources and 
consequently led to important institutional arrangements in industrial relations.574 
The instigation of the market economy brought gradual changes to collective 
agreements in Slovenia. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, collective agreements in 
Slovenia have gone through different phases of development in the past two decades 
and in fact, these phases describe the development of sectoral collective agreement, 
                                                          
570 ibid. 
571 ibid. Also, Vodovnik, Z. (2015) ’Labour Law in Slovenia’ International Encyclopaedia for Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 278. 
572 ibid. 
573 As explained earlier (see Chapter 2, section 3.1. and Chapter 3, section 3.1), under the self-
management paradigm workers were considered owners of the company production. Since the 
enterprises were socially owned, workers were enabled to engage in decision making about the 
enterprise’s operation, and they could establish various forms of workers’ representatives’ bodies at 
the level of the workplace. For more explanations on the self-management paradigm, see e.g. Končar, 
P. (1996) ‘Changes and Adaptations of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Slovenia’ in R. 
Blanpain and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe 
(from Planned to Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 31, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, pp 157-172; Stanojević, M. (2005) ‘Avoiding Shock Therapy: Trade 
Unions’ Role in the Transition to a Market Economy in Slovenia’ in Dimitrova and Vilrokx, J. (eds) 
Trade Union Strategies in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards Decent Work, Budapest: ILO, p 202. 
574 This argument has been particularly postulated by Crowley and Stanojević; see Crowley, S. and 
Stanojević, M. (2011) ‘Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical Legacies: Explaining 
the Slovenian Exception’ Politics & Society, vol 39, no 2, p 277.  
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and its importance for industrial relations in that country. In the early 1990s, as 
argued by Slovenian scholar Vodovnik, the “first generation” of collective 
agreements was not delivered autonomously, because the process of privatisation had 
not yet started: the freedom of social partners to negotiate collective agreements in 
not yet privatised sectors was limited by legislation protecting “social property”.575 At 
the same time, the early 1990s’ legislation did not contain clear rules about collective 
agreements: Slovenian scholar Končar noted that the law “insufficiently and 
inadequately” defined collective agreements and that it did not distinguish between 
collective agreements concluded for different types of ownership (private, public or 
social, and mixed).576 The “second generation” of collective agreements was 
concluded with the process of privatisation, and the “third generation” after the 2006 
Collective Agreements Act, which represented a comprehensive and systematic legal 
reform in Slovenia.577 The early 1990s’ legislation stipulated the levels at which 
collective bargaining might take place (national or cross-sectoral, sectoral and 
company levels), but the 2006 Act on Collective Agreements deleted such provision. 
Nevertheless, by the time that the 2006 Act was promulgated, Slovenian industrial 
relations were firmly developed at three major levels (cross-sectoral, sectoral and 
company); thus, the 2006 Act codified the existing practices.  
 
Slovakia 
Slovak labour law does not recognise the concept of sectoral collective agreements 
as such, but a rather different concept of “higher-level collective agreements”. In 
fact, the delineation between enterprise-level collective agreements and higher-level 
collective agreements within the legal framework (the Labour Code and the Act on 
Collective Bargaining, both legal acts as amended) represents one of the building 
blocks of the Slovak legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining. 
These two vital concepts of Slovak labour law were introduced at the very onset of 
                                                          
575 Vodovnik (2015), pp 278-279. 
576 The Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship of 1989, see Končar, P. (1996) ‘Changes 
and Adaptations of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain and L. Nagy 
(eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (from Planned to Market 
Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 31, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 
158. 
577 Vodovnik (2015), pp 278-279.  
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the transitional period, with the 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining, and have never 
been changed. Yet, the legal framework provides no sufficiently precise definition or 
explanation of the higher-level collective agreements. According to the Act on 
Collective Bargaining (Article 2),578 higher-level collective agreements are to be 
understood in relation to the parties involved: these collective agreements are 
concluded between the trade union and the organisation of employers operating at 
the higher level. It remains unclear to what extent these collective agreements can be 
considered sectoral: the concept of higher-level only specifies that these agreements 
be concluded at a higher level than company. It is not clear if these agreements can 
be concluded for an entire sector or for part of it. Neither is it clear whether this 
concept also implies the conclusion of cross-sectoral agreements.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, sectoral collective bargaining is relatively more 
developed in Slovakia in comparison with Poland and the Czech Republic,579 but it 
should be added that in the recent crisis period, the incidence of sectoral collective 
bargaining has decreased.580 In Slovakia, the social partners could not rely on a 
legacy that was favourable to collective bargaining; both the practice of sectoral 
collective bargaining and its legal framework had to develop from scratch from the 
early 1990s. In the pre-1990s period, collective bargaining was marginal and the 
provisions of the 1965 Labour Code did not leave much regulatory space for 
collective agreements, given that most of the matters were regulated by statutory 




                                                          
578 Act on Collective Bargaining (No. 2/1991), as amended. 
579 According to data, the coverage of higher level collective agreements varies from one year to 
another, but it is usually around 40%, see data from Workers participation, Brussels: ETUI, available 
at:  
http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Slovak-
Republic/Collective-Bargaining [accessed 1 August 2016].  
580 According to Czíria, from 60 agreements in 1999; 42 in 2005; to fewer than 40 in the crisis period, 
see Czíria L. (2013) ’Collective Bargaining and Balanced Recovery: The Case of the Slovak 
Republic’ Bratislava: Institute for Labour and Family Research, retrieved from 
http://www.ivpr.gov.sk/IVPR/images/IVPR/2013/collective.pdf [accessed 1 August 2016], p 7.  
581 Pichrt, J. and Štefko, M. (2015) ‘Labour Law in the Czech Republic’ International Encyclopaedia 
for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 94.  
171 
 
The Czech Republic 
Much of what has been said about Slovakia can be here extended to the Czech 
Republic. As in Slovakia, Czech law does not recognise the notion of sectoral 
collective agreement but rather it relies on the concept of “higher-level collective 
agreement”. The division between higher-level and enterprise-level agreements dates 
back to the Act on Collective Bargaining adopted originally in the federal country of 
Czechoslovakia in 1991. As in Slovakia, this division has remained basically 
unchanged in the Czech Republic and here, too, it is one of the building blocks of the 
legal framework for collective bargaining. Slovakia and the Czech Republic define 
higher-level collective agreements in exactly the same manner, by stipulating that 
these agreements are entered into force between the trade union and an employer 
association organised at the higher level. The two countries share the same legacies: 
the legal framework anchored in the 1965 Labour Code which regulated collective 
bargaining in a restrictive fashion and was adopted in the federal country of 
Czechoslovakia. It was with this framework that both the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia entered the transitional period. Thus, the practice of concluding sectoral 
(higher) level collective agreements began only with the onset of transition in both 
countries and these collective agreements have been further shaped in substance 
during the past two decades in line with subsequent Labour Code changes. A key 
difference between the two countries is that sectoral (higher) level collective 
agreements were not the focus of post-transitional transformation processes in the 
Czech Republic; instead, the focus was on enterprise level developments.582 As a 
result, sectoral (higher) level collective bargaining has been in continuous decline in 
the Czech Republic since the 1990s, reaching its lowest point in 1998 with only 
around 11% coverage.583 Today, the incidence of higher-level bargaining is less 
developed than collective bargaining at company level and it has further diminished 
                                                          
582Myant, M. and Smith, S. (1999) ‘Czech Trade Unions in Comparative Perspective’ European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 5, no 3, pp 267-277. 
583 Myant, citing ČMKOS data; see Myant, M. (2010) ’Trade Unions in the Czech Republic’ Report 
115, Brussels: ETUI, citing ČMKOS data, p 18. 
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in the recent crisis period: according to some estimates, higher-level collective 
agreements coverage was around 13% in 2014.584  
 
Poland 
Section XI of the Labour Code postulates collective bargaining freedoms and basic 
institutes of collective labour law. As is the case in Slovakia and in the Czech 
Republic, the law does not contain a definition of “sector” or “sectoral collective 
agreement”. Instead, since 1986, the Labour Code has made a distinction between 
“single-enterprise” and “multi-enterprise agreements”585 and this distinction 
represents one of the cornerstones of the legal framework for collective bargaining in 
Poland. Article 241(14) of the Labour Code defines multi-enterprise collective 
agreements by their signatories, which are the multi-enterprise trade union body and 
the appropriate statutory body of an employers’ association. However, no further 
specification of these agreements is provided in law, for example, whether these 
collective agreements may be concluded for several companies only, or for the entire 
sector or profession.586 In fact, as became evident during the interviews in Poland, 
“sector” is not a legal term at all in labour law and is used only in common parlance 
with a common sense understanding.   
 In reality, multi-enterprise collective agreements have marginal relevance, 
covering not more than 3% of the entire economy.587 A closer look into these 
agreements and the context in which they have been concluded reveals their specific 
nature: because they are mostly concluded by one or more enterprises that dominate 
                                                          
584 According to some estimations, the coverage rates of higher-level collective agreements have 
varied in the past period, but they normally amount to around 15%, with the figure falling down to 
around 13% in 2014; according to data by Eurofound, see Kyzlinkova, R., Lehmann, S., Pojer, P., 
Veverkova, S. (2015) ‘Czech Republic: Working Life Country Profile’, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/czech-republic/czech-republic-working-life-country-profile, Dublin: 
 Eurofound [accessed 1 August 2016].  
585 According to Sewerynski (1993), law promulgated in November 1986, revising Section XI of the 
Labour Code; see Sewerynski, M. (1993) ’Development of the Collective Bargaining System in 
Poland after the Second World War’ Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol 14, p 460. 
586 Trappman, V. (2013) Fallen Heroes in Global Capitalism Workers and the Restructuring of the 
Polish Steel Industry, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p 105. 
587 Data from the interviews conducted in Warsaw. The number of these collective agreements varies 
from one year to another, but approximately there is between 170-175 multi-enterprise collective 
agreements registered in Poland.  
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a given sector, Trappman refers to them as “quasi-single employer agreements”.588 In 
fact, most of them are concluded in the public sector.589 Therefore, Trappman 
underlines that only a limited number of these agreements have a genuine sectoral 
scope: in fact, there are only six collective agreements covering an entire sector 
(collective agreement in the steel industry being one of them).590 The interviews 
highlighted that, in fact, the sectors for which collective agreements were concluded 
were those labelled as “problematic” during the early stages of the privatisation 
process. Concluding a collective agreement was deemed critical for dealing with the 
social aspects of privatisation and restructuring. 
 At the same time, a peculiar feature of Polish industrial relations in the sectors 
which were labelled as problematic is the existence of tripartite sectoral committees, 
formed with the aim of ensuring smoother facilitation of the social aspects of 
transition.591 As explained by interviewees, a total of fifteen tripartite sectoral 
committees were formed: the first was in the coal mining sector in 1992. However, 
their importance has been assessed as limited and diminishing over time; after 
accession to the EU, only two new sectoral committees were established. Moreover, 
they did not bring any additional boost to sectoral collective bargaining structures: 
these committees had the limited function of facilitating the social aspects of sector 
restructuring. 
Sectoral collective bargaining in the post-1990s Poland is underdeveloped 
despite the existence of modest but relatively favourable legacies from the 
communist period, compared to the other CEE countries. The collective bargaining 
which existed in Poland during the communist era was sectoral in nature; the 
economy followed a centralised logic and collective bargaining at enterprise level 
was deemed impossible.592 These communist sectoral collective agreements were 
concluded in the enterprise sector (both public and private), and covered the entire 
sector or profession.593 The conclusion of enterprise level agreements was legally 
                                                          
588 Trappman (2013), p 105. 
589 ibid. 
590 ibid.  
591 Trappman (2013), p 94. 
592 Sewerynski (1993), p 446. Sewerynski explained that legal basis for concluding collective 
agreements after the Second World War was the law dating back from 1937, which was governing 
collective bargaining until the subsequent codification of labour law in 1974.  
593 ibid.  
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enabled only in 1986.594 Nevertheless, it should also be recalled that these 
communist collective agreements were not free and voluntary, given that their scope 
was largely restricted and predetermined by the coercive provisions of the statutory 
legal provisions. As noted by Polish scholar Sewerynski, the collective agreements at 
that time were in fact instruments for implementing the goals of the socialist 
system.595  
Despite these legacies, sectoral collective bargaining did not achieve greater 
prominence in the post-transitional period, the major reason being the policy choices 
of governments which were also supported by social partners.596 Also, the focus of 
post-transitional reforms was the enterprise: there was a genuine lack of interest in 
collective bargaining at higher (central) levels, and this was also compounded by 
weak organisation in the employers’ associations.597 This proposition was also 
confirmed during the interviews, with respondents stating that there have not been 
any serious efforts to build bargaining structures above company level since the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
 
2.2. Content of sectoral collective agreements  
 
Slovenia 
The 2006 Slovenian Act on Collective Agreements does not define matters that 
should be regulated by collective agreements, instead leaving the collective 
bargaining parties free to decide. This Act only stipulates that collective agreement 
consists of the contractual (obligatory) and normative parts (Article 3). In the 
contractual part of collective agreements, the parties may set out mutual rights and 
commitments, including provisions for dispute settlement. The normative part sets 
                                                          
594 ibid.  
595 ibid., p 452.  
596 The post-transitional trade union movement particularly backed the model of economic reforms in 
Poland. The ways in which trade union movement developed and shaped the post-transitional Poland 
has been particularly in the focus of work of David Ost and Agnieszka Paczynska; see e.g. the 
following publications: Ost, D. (2000) ‘Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism 
and Postcommunist Class Identities’ Politics & Society, vol 28, no 4, pp 503-530; Paczynska, A. 
(2009) State, Labor, and the Transition to a Market Economy – Egypt, Poland, Mexico, and the Czech 
Republic, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
597 Sewerynski (1993), p 468; Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A. and Czarzasty, J. (2012) ’Trade Unions 
in Poland’ Brussels: ETUI, p 23.  
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rights and conditions pertinent to the employment relationship, for example, 
conclusion of a contract of employment and its termination, pay for work, health and 
safety conditions and other matters. 
A general lack of comprehensive empirical data on these agreements in 
Slovenia prevents comprehensive analysis of their content and function. Some earlier 
studies have demonstrated that, in principle, collective agreements at different levels 
in Slovenia regulate identical or similar matters, but with different degree of rights 
and benefits afforded to the employees.598 In any case, the items that have been 
traditionally covered by Slovenian sectoral collective agreements are wages and 
various elements of pay. Sectoral collective agreements are vital for defining nine 
wage tariffs, as explained by several respondents during the interviews. Also, the 
interviewees confirmed that sectoral collective agreements represent the most salient 
standard-setting method; as one of the interviewees noted, it is also “the easiest way 
of negotiations”. 
The 2006 Slovenian Act on Collective Agreements contains no restriction on 
the matters that can be regulated within collective agreements. However, this 
freedom is a result of the gradual process of liberalisation of the scope of collective 
agreements that has taken place during the past two decades and was described in 
Chapter 3. That chapter, and the previous section (2.1), have already outlined the 
three generations of collective agreements which had evolved in Slovenia.599 The first 
generation of collective agreements was not autonomous, primarily because statutory 
regulation, aiming at protection of “social” property, restricted the scope of 
agreements.600 The second generation was concluded after privatisation and was 
therefore no longer restricted by the need to protect “social” property. However, the 
second generation of collective agreements was not fully autonomous for another 
reason – the provisions of statutory labour laws, which did not provide precise 
regulation, required that these collective agreements must regulate certain matters 
                                                          
598 Natlacen, M. P. (2004) ’The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe: National 
Report of Slovenia’ Project VS/2003/0219 – SI2.359910, European Commission and University of 
Florence, p 20. 
599 Based on Vodovnik (2015), pp 278-279. 
600 Vodovnik, Z. (2004) ’Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain (ed) The Actors of Collective Bargaining, Bulletin 
of Comparative Labour Relations, no 51, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, no 51, p 233.   
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and issues.601 The collective agreements therefore had a mandatory character. At the 
same time, their character was executive: the task of these agreements was to 
implement the broad and imprecise statutory regulation.602 The third generation of 
collective agreements concluded pursuant to 2006 Act on Collective Agreements is 
fully autonomous and it does not restrict the right of social partners to negotiate on 
any matter they decide. Yet, the executive style of these legal provisions seems to 
have been retained to a certain extent: the statutory legal provisions often provide 
that some items may be regulated by collective agreements, particularly at sectoral 
level. Slovenian scholar Vodovnik explains that the reason for statutory laws calling 
for the regulation of certain items in sectoral collective agreements is so that they are 
not regulated at lower, company level, where employee strength is weaker.603 In this 
way, the law promotes sectoral collective bargaining and at the same time represents 
a barrier against uncontrolled decentralisation. 
 
Slovakia 
The content of collective agreements is not closely prescribed in law, and social 
partners can freely decide their topics. There is a distinction between the normative 
and contractual part of collective agreements, as is the case in Slovenia.604 This 
freedom to bargain on any matter which social partners consider appropriate has 
been the result of the process of gradual liberalisation described in Chapter 3. It was 
also pointed out in that chapter that the 1965 Labour Code continued to be applied in 
a modified version in the early 1990s in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and 
continued to restrict collective bargaining freedoms by honing a mandatory and 
                                                          
601 Eurofound, Skledar (2003). The legal framework prior to the 2006 Act on Collective Agreements 
consisted of the federal (Yugoslav) the Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship of 1989 and 
the Slovenian Employment Relationship Act of 1990. These two acts regulated conclusion of 
collective agreements until 2006 (the provisions of these two acts relevant for collective agreements 
remained valid even after the new Employment Relationship Act was passed in 2003, but only until 
2006).   
602 ibid. 
603 Vodovnik (2015), p 281. 
604 Barancová, H. and Olšovská, A. (2014) ’Labour Law in Slovak Republic’ International 




coercive style of regulation.605 It was only the 2001 amendment to the Labour Code 
that formally enabled social partners to negotiate on any matter which they deemed 
fit. Unfortunately, as in the case of the other CEE countries examined in this study, 
there is no reliable comprehensive empirical data which could provide a list of the 
items regulated by higher-level collective agreements, nor data demonstrating how 
the content of collective agreements changed in the past two decades in line with the 
process of gradual liberalisation of the legislative framework. The existing studies 
made general remarks only. A recent study has claimed that the changes to the 
Slovakian legal framework in the past two decades have ensured its gradual 
adjustment to labour market flexibility, and has also impacted on the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining in that country.606 An earlier study has demonstrated that 
higher-level collective agreements in Slovakia usually cover matters of employment, 
working conditions, health and safety, wages, cooperation and communication 
between trade unions and management, and conflict resolution.607 That study did not, 
however, offer sufficiently detailed specification of these elements as to allow closer 
identification of the nature and function of these agreements. It has also been claimed 
that collective agreements often closely replicate the provisions of the Labour 
Code.608  
 
The Czech Republic 
Czech law does not predetermine the content of collective agreements, even though 
the legal scholarship, as in the other three CEE countries, delineates the normative 
and contractual parts of collective agreements. In the past two decades, this freedom 
                                                          
605 Barancová, H. (1996) ‘Labour Law in the Slovak Republic, Present Situation and Future Trends’ in 
R. Blanpain and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe 
(from Planned to Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 31, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, p 139. 
606 Bulla, M., Czíria, L. and Kahancová, M. (2013) ‘Impact of Legislative Reforms on Industrial 
Relations and Working Conditions in Slovakia’ ILO Background Study, p 1 and p 6. 
607 The result of the survey of 56 higher-level collective agreements conducted by the Slovak Research 
Institute of Labour, Social Affairs and Family conducted for the period between 1999 and 2003; as 
cited in Czíria, L. (2002) ’Collective Bargaining Procedures, Structures and Scope’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-
bargaining-procedures-structures-and-scope [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
608 Czíria, L. (2003) ‘Slovakia: An Example of ‘Emancipated’ Sectoral Social Dialogue?’ in Y. 
Ghellab and D. Vaughan-Whitehead (eds) Sectoral Social Dialogue in Future EU Member States: The 
Weakest Link, Budapest: ILO, pp 392-393. 
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of social partners to regulate matters they wish has undergone a gradual 
transformation. As already stated in Chapter 3, the provisions formally guaranteeing 
basic collective bargaining freedoms had been inserted into the legal framework in 
the early 1990s, but, in practice, social partners could not freely decide on the content 
of collective agreements until 2006 since the legal framework allowed bargaining 
only on listed matters. In 2006, the legal framework fully liberalised bargaining 
scope by introducing a principle stating that anything not expressly forbidden by law 
is permitted in the collective agreements.609 
 As with the other three CEE countries, there are no comprehensive empirical 
data assessing the contents of the existing higher-level agreements. Yet, existing 
studies have suggested that higher-level collective agreements do not regulate more 
than a few rights, due to the detailed and rigid regulation in the Labour Code, and 
that the most important elements of these agreements are wages and the different 
elements of pay.610 The interviewees noted that, in general, these collective 
agreements have “poor content”: the rights prescribed by these agreements represent 
only a slight upgrading of the rights already regulated by statutory labour laws.  
 
Poland 
The previous section has demonstrated the marginal relevance of multi-enterprise 
collective agreements in Poland. Thus, it seems almost redundant to discuss Poland 
in this section. Yet, it is worth commenting that, as in the other CEE countries, the 
Polish Labour Code does not formally predetermine the content of these collective 
agreements. The Labour Code (Article 240) only stipulates that the collective 
agreements consist of normative and obligational parts and provide that social 
partners should respect the rights of third parties and may not derogate from 
unconditionally binding provisions of labour law. As explained during the 
interviews, collective agreements at any level typically include matters such as 
wages, working time and bonuses. Moreover, as already pointed out in Chapter 3, the 
Labour Code in a formal sense fully liberalised collective bargaining freedoms only 
                                                          
609 As noted by Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 95. 
610 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 258; also, Tomes, I. (2004) ’The Evolving Structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe: National Report of the Czech Republic’ Project VS/2003/0219-SI2.359910, 
European Commission and University of Florence, p 11. 
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in 2000, allowing social partners to negotiate on any matters they see fit.611 Yet, as 
explained during the interviews, social partners still consider the Labour Code to be 
fairly extensive. This argument is used by employers as a reason not to engage in 
collective bargaining, claiming that matters pertinent to conditions of work are 
already covered in statutory law in a fairly elaborate manner. The comprehensive 
regulatory style of statutory provisions is a legal remnant from the communist period. 
The 1974 Labour Code contained fairly mandatory and coercive provisions, and the 
collective agreements could have contained more favourable provisions for 
employees only when authorised as such by law, or when justified by the 
circumstances of the sector or profession.612   
 
2.3. The articulation of sectoral collective agreements 
 
Slovenia 
The relationship between statutory legal rules and collective labour agreements in 
Slovenia is based on the principle of a hierarchical top-down relationship between 
different sources of regulation, combined with the principle of favourability. Under 
the logic of top-down hierarchy, collective agreements at higher levels prevail over 
collective agreements at lower levels, and statutory legal regulation prevails over 
collective agreements. At the same time, because of the principle of favourability, the 
lower level agreements may only contain more favourable conditions for 
employees.613 Thus, sectoral and company level collective agreements may only 
improve upon statutory legal rules to the benefit of the employees. Any provisions in 
collective agreements setting lower conditions of employment than those provided 
under the law would be considered invalid. Until 2005, cross-sectoral collective 
agreements, which covered terms and conditions of work and employment for the 
                                                          
611 Swiatkowski, A. M. (2002) ’Are the Post-Socialists’ Current Collective Bargaining Procedures 
Effective as a Means to Implement European Labour Law in Poland?’ Tilburg Foreign Law Review, 
vol 10, p 179; also, Hajn, Z. (2003) ‘Collective Labour Agreements and Contracts of Employment in 
Polish Labour Law’ in M. Sewerynski (ed) Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts of 
Employment, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 193.  
612 Sewerynski notes that in the communist period, the collective bargaining was limited to regulating 
specific conditions of work for a given sector or profession, see Sewerynski (1993), p 444 and p 460. 
613 Končar (1996), p 168. 
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entire economy, were the main link connecting statutory labour regulation with 
collective agreements in Slovenia. When these cross-sectoral agreements ceased to 
exist, the sectoral collective agreements remained the main connector between 
collective agreements at company level and statutory labour law.  
While, as a rule of thumb, collective agreements may not stipulate less 
favourable conditions for employees than the statutory legal provisions, there are 
certain exceptions to this rule, as set out in the Article 4 and Article 5 of the 2006 Act 
on Collective Agreements. These provisions allow that collective agreements may 
stipulate less favourable rights when explicitly permitted to do so by the 
Employment Relationship Act. Specifically, Article 5 prescribes that collective 
agreement may provide less favourable rights and working conditions, under the 
conditions stipulated in collective agreement of higher level. The Employment 
Relationship Act (Article 9) specifies the cases in which collective agreements can 
lay down less favourable rights to employees than the standards of the legislation.614 
These cases, for example, include overtime and working time regulations, as well as 
fixed-term employment contracts. In practice, as reported by interviewees, so-called 
opening clauses are inserted in the sectoral collective agreements based on these 
provisions, allowing derogations in peuis (to the detriment of employees). To protect 
the employees’ side, the Employment Relationship Act sets out detailed conditions 
for these derogations which, consequently, may not stipulate rights below the lowest 
possible statutory limit. There is no reliable empirical data on the use of the 
derogatory statutory provisions, but recent studies have demonstrated their growing 
use in the recent crisis period with a view to alleviating the detrimental effects of 
crisis at the company level.615  
 
Slovakia 
As in the other CEE countries examined in this study, in Slovakia the relationship 
between statutory legal rules and collective labour agreements is based on 
hierarchical top-down logic, combined with the principle of favourability. As in the 
                                                          
614 The unofficial translation in English of the Employment Relationship Act of 2013, which can be 
downloaded at: http://www.mddsz.gov.si/en/legislation/.  
615 Stanojević and Kanjuo Mrčela noted the increased use of derogations regarding the regulation of 
working time in the recent crisis period, see Stanojević and Kanjuo Mrčela (2014), p 33.   
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other three countries, collective agreements may not contain less favourable 
provisions for employees than those stipulated in statutory law. Because the higher-
level collective agreements may only improve the rights afforded to the employees in 
the law, the employers often lose the incentive to conclude collective agreements, or 
these agreements simply reiterate what has been already stipulated by the statutory 
regulation.616 
With the labour market reforms instigated by the recent economic crisis, 
Slovak labour law introduced an important and – for the CEE – quite innovative 
exception to the favourability rule. The exceptions turned out to be only temporary: 
the provisions of the Labour Code promulgated in 2011617 allowed for some form of 
opening clauses, but they were overturned by another set of amendments only a year 
later.618 These legal innovations allowed collective agreements (at any level) to 
stipulate less favourable conditions for employees than the statutory legislation 
provided for, in several thematic areas. The statutory legal provisions aimed however 
at “controlling” the extent of derogation, by not allowing rights to be lowered below 
certain limits, thus protecting employees against the uncontrolled downward spiral of 
their rights at company level. These provisions were set out in the Labour Code as 
follows:   
- Collective agreements were allowed to set a longer probationary period than in 
the statutory legal rules, but no more than six months (Article 45); 
- Collective agreements were allowed to set a longer period of notice for 
workers’ dismissal but only under certain circumstances defined by Article 
62(9); 
- Collective agreements were allowed to set different reasons for dismissal from 
those defined in labour law (Article 63(3)); 
- Collective agreements were allowed to extend the limits of overtime, by 
permitting extra working hours in addition to those already stipulated in labour 
law (Article 97 (12)); 
                                                          
616 Czíria, L. (2002) ’Collective Bargaining Procedures, Structures and Scope’ Dublin: Eurofound, 
available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-bargaining-procedures-
structures-and-scope [accessed 1 August 2016].  
617 Act no. 257/2011 Coll. 
618 Act no. 361/2012 Coll., in effect since 2013. These legal innovations were particularly welcomed 
by the employers, see Bulla et al. (2013), p 27. 
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- Collective agreements allowed employers to suspend an employee from work 
for breaching labour discipline for a different (longer) period of time than 
stipulated in labour law (Article 141).  
 
The Czech Republic 
As in the previous cases, the top-down logic of hierarchy of rules, combined with the 
favourability principle, dominates the relationship between statutory law and 
collective agreements in the Czech Republic. Thus, the rule of thumb is that 
collective agreements may only improve standards from the statutory regulation; but 
there are certain exceptions to this rule that have been introduced into Czech labour 
law since 2006. The Czech Labour Code contains a complex web of rules: it contains 
a general provision which allows stipulating less favourable provisions in collective 
agreements “when not specifically prohibited or when the nature of derogation is not 
impermissible”. It also defines limits to these derogations: the highest or lowest 
admissible levels of Labour Code standards should be respected. Thus, the Labour 
Code aims at “controlling” the extent to which it is possible to stipulate less 
favourable provisions. As highlighted during the interviews, there are, however, only 
two areas where the Labour Code actually further specifies these derogations, and 
where it is, consequently, possible to stipulate opening clauses: extra work and extra 
payments. As explained during the interviews, the practical reach of these provisions 
on derogation is marginal: opening or similar clauses are rarely used in practice. As 
one of the interviewees from the trade union side explained: 
“If you want to avoid collective bargaining, you can always prepare internal regulation and 
therefore you don’t need to count on derogation possibilities.” 
 
Poland 
As is the case in the other countries examined in this study, the Polish Labour Code 
sets the logic of top-down hierarchy, combined with the favourability principle, as 
the guiding principles regulating the relationship between collective agreements and 
statutory labour law. Therefore, as in the other three CEE countries, collective 
agreements may only improve the conditions of work and employment as defined 
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under the statutory law (Article 9 (2) of the Labour Code). The multi-enterprise 
agreements (or any collective agreements) may consequently not set lower standards 
than those stipulated in statutory law. Even if such a legal possibility were to exist, 
its practical reach would be limited, due to the rather marginal importance of multi-
enterprise collective bargaining in Poland. However, an interesting aspect of the 
Polish Labour Code when compared with the other three countries is the possibility 
of suspending either a part or the entire collective agreement at any level. That is, the 
Labour Code provisions allow the suspension of a collective agreement if justified by 
the employer’s financial situation, but only for up to three years. With respect to 
multi-enterprise agreements, there are no data showing how often this legal 
possibility is used in practice.619 
 
2.4. The parties and rules on representativeness 
 
Slovenia 
A specific feature of Slovenian social partners in comparison with the other three 
CEE countries is the comparatively more developed sectoral organisation. This 
feature is important in contributing towards more developed sectoral collective 
bargaining than in the other CEE countries. Sectoral trade unions are mostly 
members of the national confederal associations of trade unions (there are currently 
seven such confederations in Slovenia).620 There are also sectoral (more specifically, 
branch and professional) trade unions, which are not affiliated to confederations.  
When it comes to the employers’ side, a hallmark of Slovenian industrial 
relations is the substantially more pronounced involvement of employers’ 
associations in collective bargaining than in the other CEE countries, contributing to 
relatively more developed sectoral collective bargaining. In this respect, a peculiar 
                                                          
619 As noted by Eurofound sources, see Czarzasty, J. and Mrozowicki, A. (2015) ‘Poland: Working 
Life Country Profile’, Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/poland/poland-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016].   
620 Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (SSS), Confederation of Trade Unions Slovenia 
(Pergam), New Trade Union Confederation of Slovenia (KNSS), Confederation of Trade Unions (K-
90), Slovenian Association of Trade Unions (Alternativa), Association of Workers’ Trade Unions of 
Slovenia (Solidarnost), Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions. 
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feature of Slovenian sectoral collective bargaining has been the traditionally 
important role of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce. The Chamber, which was 
established during the pre-90s socialist era, apart from representing the interests of 
businesses, also engages in collective bargaining. This model of chamber 
organisation had been developed under the German and Austrian influences of the 
beginning of the 20th century.621 At the outset of the transitional period, since no 
other employers’ association existed in Slovenia, the Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce was the only available party to conclude sectoral and cross-sectoral 
collective agreements. The statutory legal rules even contained a reference to the 
Chamber as the main bargaining party at the employers’ side.622 All individual 
employers were obliged to be its members. The mandatory model of membership of 
the Chamber had two distinct benefits. The first was an almost absolute coverage rate 
for collective agreements (as explained in Chapter 2). Some doubts have been raised 
as to whether this mandatory model complied with the principle of voluntary 
collective bargaining as understood by the ILO conventions.623 The second benefit 
was that the Chamber, by actively engaging in collective bargaining from the early 
1990s, compensated for lack of organisation and capacity in the other employers’ 
associations which were slowly emerging.624 However, after the promulgation of the 
2006 Act on Collective Agreements, mandatory membership of the Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce was lifted.  
Trade union freedoms were inserted into constitutional provisions in the early 
1990s, enabling the unions to establish themselves and operate at various levels.625 
However, there are no specific legal rules on the set up of organisations of 
employers. When it comes to regulating representativeness, the legal framework 
contains regulations for trade unions only and no such rules for employers’ 
associations. The legal rules on trade union representativeness were postulated early 
                                                          
621 Skledar, S. (2005) ’Government Wants Voluntary Membership of Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry’, Dublin: Eurofound,  available at:  
http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/government-wants-voluntary-membership-
of-chamber-of-commerce-and-industry [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
622 The 1989 Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship.  
623 Vodovnik (2015), p 267. 
624 Thus, today, apart from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GSZ), and Chamber of Crafts 
(OZS), there are also Slovenian Employers’ Association (ZDS) and Small Companies and Crafts 
Association (ZDODS). These organisations were formed in the 1990s. 
625 Freedom of association, as inserted in the Constitution of Slovenia of 1991 in the Article 76.  
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in the transition period, pursuant to the Act on Trade Union Representativeness from 
1993. These rules have remained unchanged ever since.626 Trade unions will be 
deemed representative on the decision of the minister responsible for labour affairs, 
once several criteria are fulfilled. These criteria prescribe that trade unions should be 
democratic in character, be independent from the state and employers, have been in 
existence for at least six months and have their own funding. In addition, there are 
quantitative criteria which trade unions need to fulfil: the association or 
confederation of trade unions at the national level needs to have in its membership at 
least 10 percent of workers from an individual branch, activity, or profession. For 
employers’ organisations, the criteria for representativeness have been brought in 
through the back door in setting the conditions for extending the validity of a sectoral 
collective agreement to the entire sector. In these cases, an employer association 
must employ at least half of all the workers in the companies covered by the 
proposed extension (Article 12 of the Act on Collective Agreements). 
 
Slovakia 
Collective bargaining at sectoral level usually takes place between trade unions and 
organisations of employers organised at sectoral level. In contrast with Poland and 
the Czech Republic, the sectoral dimension of trade unions and employers’ 
associations is fairly well developed in Slovakia. The most powerful trade union 
confederation, bringing together the largest percentage of trade unionists in the 
country and 28 sectoral trade union organisations which enter into the sectoral 
(‘higher’) level collective agreements, is KOZ SR.627 As is the case in the other CEE 
countries, but with notable exception of Slovenia, the capacities of employers’ 
associations are less developed. The associations of employers had to form from 
scratch in the early 1990s. Currently, there are two major employers’ organisations at 
                                                          
626 Official Gazette no. 13/93. List of representative trade unions can be found at the following 
website (in Slovenian): 
http://www.mddsz.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/delovna_razmerja_in_pravice_iz_dela/socialno_partner
stvo/seznam_reprezentativnih_sindikatov/ [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
627 The other trade union confederations are: Independent Christian Trade Unions of Slovakia 
(NKOS), General Free Trade Union Association (VSOZ), Confederation of Art and Culture (KUK) 
which however have much lower membership base; see Czíria, L. (2015) ‘Slovakia: Working Life 
Country Profile’, Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovakia/slovakia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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confederal level which bring together sectoral organisations of employers.628 An issue 
that came up during the interviews is that individual employers also often give up 
membership of the employers’ associations in order not to be bound by higher level 
collective agreements.  
The legal framework for the organisation of social partners in Slovakia was 
postulated early in the transitional period by inserting freedom of association in the 
Slovak Constitution in 1992 (Article 37). The Act on the Association of Citizens was 
promulgated in 1990 and represented a legal basis for both trade unions and 
associations of employers to be set up. Slovak labour law contains no rules about 
representativeness at “higher” bargaining levels, neither for trade unions nor for 
associations of employers. There are only “quasi-representativeness” rules which 
come into play regarding the extension of the validity of collective agreements. 
These quasi-representativeness rules however have been subject to certain 
modification over the last several years. Until 2009, collective agreements could 
have been extended if the parties which concluded the agreement were the largest in 
the sector (the employers’ associations employing the largest number of employees 
and the trade unions representing the largest number of employees). Since 2009, the 
condition on the trade union representativeness has been lifted, but the condition 
regarding employers’ organisations has remained valid.  
 
The Czech Republic 
With the demise of communist regimes, the Czech trade unions had to go through 
difficult restructuring. Given that their role was insignificant in the communist 
system, Czech scholarship has noted that trade unions were struggling to be accepted 
as social partners in the early 1990s and at the same time they were challenged in 
breaking with the ideology and thinking of the past.629 The post-1990s trade union 
movement was additionally challenged by declining trade union rates and by the 
                                                          
628 Federation of Employers’ Association of the Slovak Republic (AZZZ SR) and National Union of 
Employers of the Slovak Republic (RUZ SR) as the two major confederations; but there is also the 
Association of Cities and Municipalities (ZMOS), according to Czíria , L. (2015) ‘Slovakia: Working 
Life Country Profile’, Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovakia/slovakia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
629 Myant and Smith (1999), p 266. 
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continuous decline of bargaining coverage.630 The estimate is that the trade union 
density rates in 2009 were as high as 10%.631 Today, the trade union picture is 
dominated by one confederation, ČMKOS, which brings together sectoral level trade 
unions. It is worth noting that ČMKOS is a successor of the former Czech and 
Slovak confederation which was formed in 1990, and today represents an association 
of 29 sectoral trade unions that are involved in collective bargaining at higher 
level.632 Apart from ČMKOS, there are also two other trade union confederations.633 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the employers’ associations were formed from scratch 
and, as in other CEE countries, they struggled with building collective bargaining 
capacities.634 A peculiar characteristic of Czech industrial relations is that in the past 
two decades, employers have not always been willing to engage in higher-level 
collective bargaining. As reported by the interviewees, the employers’ organisations 
tended to use the Civil Code as a legal basis for their establishment because 
organising under the Act on the Association of Citizens would oblige them to 
participate in collective bargaining. An example is the metals sector: as explained 
during the interviews, in the automotive industry, which represents a prominent part 
of the Czech economy, there is no collective agreement at the higher level. The 
reason for this is that the association of employers, which represents almost all 
employers in this industry, does not engage in collective bargaining because it was 
not established pursuant to the Act on the Association of Citizens. This legal issue 
was resolved after the interviews had taken place and now the Civil Code represents 
the only legal basis for the establishment of social partners. A further problem is that 
in some cases individual employers give up membership of employers’ associations 
in order to avoid being bound by collective agreements. This issue was partially 
addressed in 2007, with a provision stipulating that individual employers are obliged 
                                                          
630 According to data from the largest trade union confederation ČMKOS, fall-off from union 
membership was from 67 in 1993 to 33% in 1997, ibid., pp 268-269.  
631 Myant, M. (2013) ’The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Collective Bargaining in the Czech 
Republic’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, no 2, p 188. 
632 As reported in Eurofund, Kyzlinkova et al. (2015). The largest sectoral trade union is the Czech 
Metalworkers’ Federation KOVO (OS KOVO). 
633 Apart from Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS), there is Association of 
Autonomous Trade Unions of the Czech Republic (ASO ČR), and Confederation of Art and Culture 
(KUK). 
634 Currently there are two major confederations, affiliating sectoral associations which engage in 
higher-level collective bargaining, Confederation of Employers’ and Entrepreneurs’ Associations of 
the Czech Republic (KZPS ČR) and Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic (SP ČR).  
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to remain bound by collective agreements even after giving up their membership of 
the association.635 
As in other CEE countries, the provision allowing the free organisation of trade 
unions and employers’ associations was inserted into the legal framework early in 
the 1990s. Freedom of association is guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, which is itself an integral part of constitutional order.636 In 
1990, the Act on the Association of Citizens637 allowed free organisation of trade 
unions and employers associations. As already mentioned, since 2014, it has been 
the Civil Code which forms the sole legal basis for the creation of social partners.638 
Czech laws do not contain rules on representativeness at sectoral or company level. 
As is the case in Slovakia, rules concerning representativeness exist only indirectly: 
the extensions of collective agreements’ validity may take effect only if the employer 
association represents the largest number of companies, or the trade union represents 
the largest number of employees in the sector. 
 
Poland 
As in the other countries under examination, basic provisions allowing free and 
voluntary organisation of social partners were introduced at the very outset of the 
transitional period. For employers this meant the Act on Organisation of Employers 
of 1991 and for trade unions, the Act on Trade Unions of 1982 (subsequently 
replaced by the Act on Trade Unions of 1991). However, compared with the other 
three CEE countries, social partners in Poland have the least developed sectoral 
structure. As interviewees explained, the less pronounced sectoral dimension of 
social partnerships is a result of fragmentation of industrial relations and the fairly 
broad independence of company level trade unions. Sectoral trade unions and 
                                                          
635 Hála, J. (2010) ’Czech Republic – Developments in Social Partner Organisations: Employer 
Organisations’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/czech-republic/czech-republic-developments-in-social-partner-organisations-employer-
organisations [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
636 The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms dates from 1993. The English version can be 
accessed at:  
http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/prilohy/Listina_English_version.pdf.  
637 Act no. 83/1990 Coll. 
638 In the version which came into effect on 1 January 2014, Act no. 89/2012 Coll., which labels all 
the organisations as “associations”; see Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 235.  
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sectoral employers’ organisations have very limited influence on what is going on in 
the companies. The sectoral representation of employers’ associations is particularly 
weak,639 and, as is the case with the other CEE countries, these organisations were 
being formed in the early 1990s from no pre-existing base. Another problem, as the 
interviews demonstrated, is that employers’ associations tend to avoid using the Act 
on Organisation of Employers of 1991 as the legal basis of their establishment, since 
this Act would oblige them to participate in collective bargaining. Some interviewees 
(on trade union side) therefore see the employers’ associations as lobbying, rather 
than bargaining, organisations.640 For example, there is no multi-enterprise collective 
agreement in the metals sector, which, according to the interview data, employs 
around two million workers, because the trade unions lack a counterpart to negotiate 
with on the employers’ side.   
The Polish Labour Code introduces a complex web of rules defining the parties 
to multi-enterprise collective agreements. According to the Labour Code, such 
collective agreements may be concluded between a multi-enterprise trade union and 
an employers’ association (Article 241.14).641 When the multi-enterprise trade union 
is a member of a federation, then a federation can also conclude such an agreement. 
Moreover, the Labour Code specifies that if more than one trade union represents 
employees, then a joint representation will be formed, or trade unions will act 
together. On behalf of employers’ organisations, a federation or confederation 
organisation can have the right to conclude multi-enterprise collective agreement. 
The Polish Labour Code contains rules about the representativeness of trade unions 
concluding a multi-enterprise collective agreement.  According to the Article 241.17, 
they should be either: (a) representative under the Tripartite Act, or (b) have in 
association at least 10% of employees covered by its statues, but not less than 10,000 
                                                          
639 Towalski notes that employers’ associations rarely engage in bilateral dialogue with trade unions, 
at sectoral, regional or company levels, having in mind that they are weakly organised; see Towalski, 
R. (2002) ’Employers’ Organisations Examined’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/employers-organisations-examined-0 
[accessed 1 August 2016]. 
640 Otherwise, the main employers’ associations are: Confederation Lewiatan 
(Konfederacja  Lewiatan), Employers of Poland (Pracodawcy RP), Polish Crafts Union (ZRP), 
Business Centre Club (BCC).  
641 Solidarity trade union is the only national “peak” level trade union directly engaging in sectoral 
level collective bargaining, according to Czarzasty, J. (2006) ‘Capacity Building for Social Dialogue 
in Poland’ Dublin: Eurofound, p 15. There are also two trade union confederations, which members 
engage in collective bargaining at this level; these are: All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), 
Trade Unions Forum (FZZ). 
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employees or (c) represent the largest number of employees for whom the multi-
establishment agreement is being concluded. A trade union will automatically be 
considered representative if it is a member of a representative national confederation. 
There are no rules about representative employers’ associations that would govern 
the conclusion of multi-enterprise collective agreements. One interviewee from the 
trade union side touched upon this matter, at the same time explicating the issue of 
the underdeveloped capacity of employers’ associations: 
“One can observe rapid development of different kinds of employer organisations at the 
sectoral level. They are established in accordance with the law on employers’ organisations.  
But, no private employer organisation is a member of any sectoral collective agreement.  Thus, 
I would like employer organisations to change, and we also want to start talking about the 
representative nature of employers’ organisations.” 
 




The practice of extending sectoral collective agreements’ validity to third parties is 
common in Slovenia.642 The rules and conditions for extensions are stipulated in the 
2006 Act on Collective Agreements. Accordingly, the extensions can take place 
under certain conditions – a decision will be delivered by the minister responsible for 
labour affairs, upon the application of one of the parties to the collective agreement. 
The extended validity will cease to exist only upon the termination of the collective 
agreement. The agreement can be extended to an entire sector or to part of it. As this 
chapter has already demonstrated, for collective agreements to be extended certain 
rules of quasi-representativeness apply regarding the associations of employers: their 
members should employ more than half of all the workers working for those 
                                                          
642 According to the latest available data, 8 out 25 sectoral collective agreements in private sectors 
have been extended, see Kovačić, H. (2014) ’Slovenia: Changes to Wage-Setting Mechanisms in the 




the-eus-new-economic [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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employers for whom an extension of the collective agreement has been proposed, 
according to the 2006 Act on Collective Agreements.643  
 The legal rules of extension were initially introduced with the 2006 Act on 
Collective Agreements; before that time the Slovenian legislation did not recognise 
this legal institution.644 However, extension of collective agreements was, in practice, 
delivered through the back door, because of the mandatory membership of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Since the Chamber was the main collective 
bargaining partner on the employers’ side, mandatory membership ensured wide 
coverage of concluded agreements at the sectoral level. At the same time, it should 
also be underlined that the relatively greater coverage of collective agreements in 
Slovenia in comparison with the other three countries could have been ascribed to the 
practice of concluding cross-sectoral collective agreements (called “general 
agreements”), a practice which had existed for some time (prior to 2005) in both 
private and public sectors.  
 
Slovakia 
The extension of collective agreements has been one of the most contentious issues 
in Slovakian labour law in the past two decades. The individual employer’s consent 
to the extension has been the most controversial component of this issue.  In practice, 
an attempt to gain employers’ consent was usually met with opposition, particularly 
from those companies not having trade unions. For many years, therefore, the 
extensions were applied only to a list of certain employers, while ‘real’ extensions, 
which would enable collective agreement to cover an entire sector, were not possible 
in practice. For example, as the interviews in Slovakia revealed, in the metals sector, 
in 2002, out of 126 companies whom the metals trade union OZ KOVO asked to 
apply extensions, only 26 gave permission. This legal issue was partially resolved in 
                                                          
643 See Article 12 of the Act on Collective Agreements, according to the unofficial translation in 
English available at the webpage of the Slovenian Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities, see: http://www.mddsz.gov.si/en/legislation. 
644 Končar, P. (2008) ‘EU v. National Industrial Relations Perspective: The Slovenian Perspective’ in 
M. Ronnmar (ed) EU v. National Industrial Relations Perspective: Comparative and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, p 46.   
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2007, when the extensions were linked to the NACE code:645 a rule was inserted that 
each employer whose business activity belonged to the respective code would be 
bound by the extended agreement. However, the frequent legal changes in the past 
two decades have made the number of extensions variable from one year to another. 
As the data in Table 5 show, the extensions were practiced basically only between 
2008 and 2010, when the legal framework did not contain overly restrictive 
provisions. 
 
Table 5: Slovakia – number of extended agreements 
2006    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
No. of 
extensions 
0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Bulla et al. (2013), p 32, based on data from the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs 
and Family of Slovakia.  
 
The legal framework was developing in the following manner:646  
(a) The 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining originally allowed extensions upon 
the request of one of the signatories of the higher-level collective agreement or the 
ministry responsible for labour and social affairs. The agreement could have been 
extended to employers pursuing similar business activities. The decision on the 
                                                          
645 Berdnarik, R. (2015)’Slovakia: Extension of Multi-Employer Collective Agreements Marks a 
Turning Point’ Dublin: Eurofound,  
available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/working-conditions-
industrial-relations/slovakia-extension-of-multi-employer-collective-agreements-marks-a-turning-
point [accessed 1 August 2016]. The statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community (General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities - NACE) is the basic reference 
aiming to classify the economic activities in the EU. NACE has been transposed and implemented by 
the CEE countries after they became the members of the EU.   
646 This breakdown of legal amendments is based on data from from Eurofound; particularly: Czíria, 
L. (2002) ’Collective Bargaining Procedures, Structures and Scope’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-bargaining-procedures-
structures-and-scope [accessed 1 August 2016]; Czíria, L. (2007) ’Legislation Amended to Extend 
Collective Agreements’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/legislation-amended-to-extend-
collective-agreements [accessed 1 August 2016]; Czíria, L. (2008) ’Employers Oppose New 
Collective Agreement Extension Rules’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/employers-oppose-new-collective-
agreement-extension-rules [accessed 1 August 2016]; Czíria, L. (2010)  ‘Government Plans Changes 
to Collective Bargaining Laws’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/industrial-relations/government-
plans-changes-to-collective-bargaining-laws [accessed 1 August 2016]. See also, Bulla et al. (2013) 
and Barancová and Olšovská (2014), p 189. 
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extension was taken by a tripartite committee formed within the ministry responsible 
for social affairs. 
(b) In 2004, the rules on extensions were changed for the first time, with the 
major change being the insertion of a condition that the employers’ consent be 
requested and, once given, the extension would take place. The provision resulted in 
a drastic reduction of extensions – in 2005 and 2006, only four agreements were 
extended. 
(c) In 2007, the legal rules were modified again and the employers’ consent 
was no longer required. The modified provisions set out that each signed high-level 
collective agreement should be categorized under the respective NACE code, which 
made the extensions automatic against the employers whose prevailing business 
activity fell within the code. The decision on the extension was made by the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs (upon the recommendation of a tripartite committee 
formed for this purpose). The 2007 rules also gave a list of conditions under which 
the extensions could not take place, for example, if the employer were already bound 
by another high-level collective agreement, or if the enterprise at stake was small.  
(d) In 2009, the legal rules on extensions were modified (with effect from the 
beginning of 2010), after ILO experts were consulted. The new provisions did not re-
introduce the consent of the employers, but extensions were made conditional upon 
the request of one or both contracting parties and they could have been applied to 
some or all employers in the sector corresponding to the respective NACE code. The 
extended agreement had to have been concluded originally by a higher-level trade 
union organisation representing the largest number of employees in the sector. A list 
of circumstances setting out reasons for not imposing extensions against certain types 
of employers was added, for example those declared bankrupt, small employers or 
those employing people with disabilities.  
(e) In 2010, the Act No. 557/2010 Coll. which amended the Act on Collective 
Bargaining re-introduced the condition of employers’ consent to the extensions. This 
had the effect in reality of making extension to a whole sector impossible, since 
every individual employer was required to consent to it. Consequently, between 
years 2010 and 2013 no higher-level collective agreement was extended.  
194 
 
(f) As of the beginning of 2014, extensions can again be practiced without the 
consent of the respective employer. The procedure may be initiated by one or both 
parties to the collective agreement and the decision on the extension is delivered by 
the ministry responsible for labour and social affairs. There is a list of exceptions 
under which the extensions may not be imposed against the individual employers, 
such as when the employers are already bound by other higher-level collective 
agreements or are employing more workers than the association which concluded the 
agreement in the first place. Currently, there is a case before the Constitutional Court 
that has already been filed to challenge these provisions, but it has not been resolved 
within the time frame of this study. 
 
The Czech Republic 
There are legal provisions in place which allow the binding effect of collective 
agreements to be extended to non-signatory organisations. Despite this legal 
possibility, these provisions have not been regularly exercised.647 The interviewees 
explained that employers are generally opposed to the extensions. Specifically, 
employers do not see added value in the extensions because they do not generally 
consider sectoral (higher-level) collective agreements useful, claiming that these 
agreements anyways have a “poor content”. The legal framework allowing the 
extensions has gone through several revisions in past decades:648 
(a) The 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining allowed extensions on the basis of 
the decision of the ministry responsible for labour and social affairs, provided that 
the employer had been engaged in comparable business activity or operated a similar 
business.  
(b) This initial provision remained in force for more than a decade, but 
following a Constitutional Court ruling (issued in 2003) it was eventually rescinded 
                                                          
647 According to the data from interviews, only several sectors have had collective agreements 
extended; construction, textile and transportation. The construction sector was the first to have the 
extended collective agreement. 
648 The overview of the legal provisions is based on information from Eurofound; see Kroupa, A. 
(2006) ’Extension of Collective Agreements to Increase Sectoral Coverage’ Dublin: Eurofund, 
available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/extension-of-collective-
agreements-to-increase-sectoral-coverage [accessed 1 August 2016] and Kroupa, A., Hála, J. (2006) 
‘Capacity Building for Social Dialogue in the Czech Republic’ Dublin: Eurofound.  
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in 2005. The claimants argued before the Court that collective agreements are of a 
private law nature and cannot be imposed on third parties against their will.649 While 
in its ruling the Court did not opine on the legal nature of collective agreements, it 
rescinded the said provision. The Court claimed that the conditions for extension as 
previously allowed did not meet the requirements of legitimacy in the context of the 
representativeness of the collective bargaining system, and that the extensions should 
be exceptionally, rather than regularly, applied.  
 Thus, in 2005, following the aforementioned ruling of the Constitutional Court, 
extensions were made conditional upon additional elements: both the signatory trade 
union and the signatory employers’ association had to be the largest in the sector in 
terms of membership. The extensions would be applied on the basis of a joint 
proposal by the signatory parties, and they would be imposed upon all employers 
whose prevailing business activity belongs to the respective NACE sector. 
Extensions would not be applied to small companies with less than twenty workers. 
The extension mechanism designed proved restrictive in practice, as only three 
collective agreements were extended under the 2005 rules (in construction, ceramics 
and textile industry). 
(c) With the major labour law reform in the Czech Republic which became 
legally effective in 2007, extensions remained tied to employers pursuing business 
activity under the prevailing NACE code, but conditions for their application 
changed. The extension proposal should be submitted by both parties and at least one 
of them must fulfil specific condition in terms of membership: (i) the employers’ 
association should employ the highest number of employees in the sector; or (ii) the 
trade union association should represent the highest number of employees in the 
sector. Yet, from the trade union point of view, the legal rules could be interpreted as 
restrictive: the interviewees explained that in the metals sector no higher-level 
collective agreement was extended because there had been no consent between the 
sectoral social partners on this matter.   
 
 
                                                          
649 See the text of the ruling (in English), available on the webpage of the Czech Constitutional Court: 
http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=560&cHash=9e1df2c3fda76cdfcf34e6843bca




It has already been stated that collective agreements concluded at this level are of 
marginal relevance in Polish industrial relations; therefore, extension practices have 
virtually no relevance and they have never been invoked. Nevertheless, the legal 
framework provides the legal possibility of extensions on the basis of the decision of 
the ministry responsible for labour and social affairs. Extensions can be exercised 
against those employers who are not covered by any multi-enterprise agreement and 
are operating in the same or similar business activity. The condition is that the 
extension is justified by social interests. The legal provisions can be interpreted as 
restrictive – since 2008, the approval of all the individual employers concerned is 
needed for the extensions to take place.650  
 
2.6. Other issues 
 




The 2006 Act on Collective Agreements (Article 11) stipulates that if a collective 
agreement was concluded by a representative trade union, it will cover all 
employees, irrespective of their trade union membership. At the same time, the 2006 
Act provides that individual employers who have given up their membership of the 
employers’ association will remain bound by the sectoral collective agreement for a 
maximum of one year. 
 
Slovakia 
Higher-level collective agreement binds the parties that concluded the agreement. 
The collective agreement applies to all employees working for the employers who 
are bound by the agreements, irrespective of their trade union membership. Upon 
                                                          
650 Amendment to the Labour Code of 30 May 2008, see 
http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law/national_legislation/legislative_developments/
prm/109/v__detail/id__286/category__27/index.html [accessed 1 August 2016].  
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conclusion, the collective agreement is accompanied by a list of the employers’ 
associations who are signatories, and it is also marked with the relevant NACE 
classification code so that it can be subsequently extended to employers whose 
prevailing business activity belongs to this code.651  
 
The Czech Republic 
The Czech Act on Collective Bargaining stipulates that the collective agreement is 
binding for signatory employers’ associations and their members. It is a legal rule 
that the individual employers will remain bound by the collective agreement even 
after giving up membership of the association. The collective agreement applies to 
all employees working for the employers who are bound by the agreements, 
irrespective of their trade union membership. 
 
Poland 
The Labour Code stipulates that the provisions of collective agreements cover all 
workers working for employers bound by the agreement, irrespective of their trade 
union affiliation. The legal rules contain no further specification on this topic. 
 
2.6.2. Registration and duration 
The collective agreements concluded at sectoral level in the four CEE countries are 
registered under the respective ministries responsible for social and labour affairs.  
The rules on the duration of sectoral collective agreements vary in the legal 
provisions of the four countries. The Slovenian 2006 Act on Collective Agreements 
sets out that the parties to the collective agreement should determine its duration. If 
they have not done so, they may also determine a notice period during which the 
agreement cannot be rescinded. If the parties have not determined such a period, then 
the collective agreement can be rescinded by each party with at least six months 
advance notice. Similarly, Slovakian law prescribes that the parties should determine 
the duration of higher-level collective agreements, and, unless differently specified, 
                                                          
651 See Bulla et al. (2013), p 31.    
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the agreement will last for one year. In Poland, multi-enterprise collective 
agreements can be concluded for an indefinite period of time, but they may also be 
concluded for a fixed period; according to the Labour Code. Prior to the expiry of the 
agreement, the parties may extend its validity for a definite period or recognise the 
agreement as having indefinite validity. In the Czech Republic, the Labour Code 
prescribes that a collective agreement can be entered for a fixed or indefinite period 
of time, with a notice period of six months. 
 
2.6.3. Procedure for collective bargaining 
The collective bargaining procedure is stipulated in law in the four countries. In 
Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the law stipulates that the bargaining 
procedure starts with a written proposal from a trade union or employers’ 
association. The legal rule is that the other side has an obligation to reply to the 
proposal within a time limit which is set differently. In Slovakia, the other side has 
no obligation to reply to the proposal if it is contrary to its legitimate interests. By 
imposing a duty on the social partners to respond to the initiative to conclude a 
collective agreement, the laws of these countries impose the duty to bargain in good 
faith, even though this does not translate into an obligation to sign a collective 
agreement. In Poland, the collective bargaining procedure is rather specific in 
comparison to the other three countries. According to the Labour Code, there is no 
general obligation on the other party to respond to the bargaining proposal. The 
Polish Labour Code only specifies several circumstances under which the other party 
may not refuse the request for collective bargaining (Article 241(2) of the Labour 
Code). These circumstances include the following: when negotiations concern 
employees not already covered by any agreement, when the agreement would lead to 
significant change to the employers’ economic or financial situation, and if the 
negotiating request was made less than 60 days before the expiry of the current 
agreement, or after the date of the termination notice. Moreover, the Polish Labour 
Code specifies the obligation to bargain in a good faith and even explicitly defines it 
(Article 241(3)): it is understood as making allowances to trade unions as far as 
possible regarding the economic situation; refraining from demands that exceed the 
financial capability of the employer; and respecting the interests of employees not 
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covered by the agreement. Moreover, the Labour Code also explicitly states that 
employers are obliged to provide information to trade unions on their economic 
situation.  
 
3. Comparative overview: Sectoral collective agreements in CEE 
Section 2 has presented an overview of the development of the current legal and 
institutional framework for sectoral collective bargaining in the four countries. The 
task of the current section will be to provide comparative analysis of the elements 
presented with a view to answering the first and second research question of this 
study from the perspective of the sectoral level.  
 
3.1. The concept of sectoral collective agreement in CEE 
 
3.1.1. Definition of sectoral collective agreement in the legal framework 
The legal overview in section 2 has clearly demonstrated that the legal regulation of 
sectoral collective agreements differs in the four CEE countries and that the legal 
notion of sectoral collective agreement has been shaped through specific national 
circumstances. It is only Slovenia’s law which did not explicitly delineate the levels 
at which collective bargaining may take place, and it did not accordingly delineate 
different types of collective agreements. Also, it should be recalled that the 
Slovenian 2006 Act on Collective Agreements represented a codification of already 
established industrial relations practices at different levels652 unlike the other three 
countries where the legal framework preceded the industrial relations practices. 
Thus, from the beginning of the transitional period, the legal frameworks in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia postulated the notions of “higher-level” and “multi-
enterprise” agreements, which subsequently emerged as the building blocks of 
industrial relations in these countries. As the legal overview in the previous section 
has demonstrated, these notions of collective agreements do not necessarily coincide 
with sectoral collective agreements. In fact, the three legal systems do not provide a 
                                                          
652 Stanojević, M. and Klarič, M. (2013) ‘The Impact of Socio-Economic Shocks on Social Dialogue 
in Slovenia’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, no 2, pp 217-226.  
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precise definition of multi-employer and higher-level agreements and how they 
correlate with the notion of sector.  It is most likely that these terms were designed in 
order to distinguish enterprise-level agreements from all the other collective 
agreements. Possible explanations for such an enterprise-focused regulatory style 
arise from the nature of the transitional processes, since at the beginning of 1990s, 
enterprise-level agreements were the predominant (and often the only) method of 
autonomous standard-setting between social partners. At that time, trade unions were 
facing difficulties in post-communist restructuring and employers’ organisations 
were only slowly emerging. This rendered centralised collective bargaining difficult 
at sectoral level. A particular exception to this scenario was Slovenia, where the lack 
of employers’ capacities was compensated for by the bargaining role of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. In the other three countries, in some sectors, the 
employers’ side still faces difficulties organising and engaging in collective 
bargaining at sectoral level.  
 However, it should be made clear that there are no definite criteria against 
which the legal concept of sectoral collective agreements in CEE can be scrutinised. 
The ILO architecture contains broad rules regarding collective agreements and their 
content, but it does not provide precision on sectoral collective agreements. What 
undoubtedly stems from the ILO framework is the binding nature of collective 
agreements and their precedence over individual labour contracts (ILO 
Recommendation No 91 from 1951).653 The ILO architecture explicitly allows the 
bargaining parties to freely choose the level at which collective bargaining will take 
place (ILO Recommendation No 163 from 1981).654 However, the notion of sector 
and sectoral collective agreements does not follow from the ILO rules; nor does the 
ILO architecture imply that countries are obliged to define sectoral collective 
agreements. Equally, the member states’ legal frameworks vary and provide no 
further guidance on how to define sectoral collective agreements. What is certainly 
common to all the continental European countries is that increasingly, over several 
decades, the understanding of sectoral collective agreements has been subject to 
change, due to pressures arising from the trend towards “organised 
                                                          
653 ILO Recommendation concerning Collective Agreements, No 91, 1951. 
654 ILO Recommendation concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, No 163, 1981. 
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decentralisation”.655 This trend has particularly influenced the scope and 
understanding of sectoral collective agreements by reshaping their relationship with 
enterprise-level collective agreements. Accordingly, the general trend across 
European countries has been that sectoral collective agreements no longer contain 
detailed substantive provisions: instead, the trend is that these agreements focus on 
setting the framework for further collective bargaining arrangements at lower, 
company level.656 The economic and financial crisis has further reinforced this trend 
across the European countries, inspiring labour law reforms across the continent, 
mostly with the aim of facilitating the expansion of company-level standard-
setting.657 
 For further understanding of sectoral collective agreement in the four CEE 
countries, it is also necessary to take into account its scope (content) and the legal 
possibilities of extending its validity to the third parties in the sector. 
 
3.1.2. The content of sectoral collective agreement 
The ILO architecture provides no closer identification of the matters which should be 
covered by collective agreements. In principle, it follows from the ILO rules that 
collective agreements should cover terms and conditions of work and employment, 
as well as relations between workers and employers (respectively, the normative and 
contractual parts of collective agreements).658 The ILO rules specify that some 
elements can be excluded from the agreements, such as discriminatory clauses or 
matters which are closely linked to the operation of businesses.659   
                                                          
655 Notion of “organised decentralisation” coined by Traxler, F. (1995) ‘Farewell to Labour Market 
Associations? Organised versus Disorganised Decentralisation as a Map for Industrial Relations’ in F. 
Traxler and C. Crouch (eds) Organised Industrial Relations in Europe: What Future?, Aldershot: 
Avebury. 
656 Marginson and Sisson (2006), pp 163-164.  
657 As discussed by Jacobs, A. (2014) ’Decentralisation of Labour Law Standard Setting and the 
Financial Crisis’ in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis 
and Collective Labour Law in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp 171-192. 
658 As explained by Gernigon, Odero and Guido, who provided the following references: ILO Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, No 98, 1949; Labour Relations (Public Service) 
Convention No 151, 1978; Collective Bargaining Convention No 154, 1981; ILO Recommendation 
concerning Collective Agreements, No 91, 1951; see Gernigon, B., Odero, A. and Guido, H. (2000b) 
’ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ International Labour Review, vol 139, no 1, p 39.  
659 ibid.  
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 Chapter 3 of this study has already explained that the expansion of the 
substantive scope of collective agreements was taking place in a country-specific 
dynamic, but that there were two vital interlinked processes; (a) formal insertion in 
law of rules officially claiming the legal freedoms of social partners to negotiate on 
any matters they see fit and (b) de facto liberalisation, which included gradual 
transformation of statutory regulation style from being predominantly mandatory to 
one which postulates minimum substantive rights and encourages autonomous 
standard setting by means of collective bargaining. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the 
first task (a) was accomplished in the four CEE countries relatively late – more than 
a decade after the onset of the transitional processes. With respect to the second task 
(b), Chapter 3 demonstrated that it was accomplished to varying degrees – there is 
still a rather comprehensive regulatory style of legislation in these countries 
(particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic). Slovenia is somewhat exceptional, 
given that its legal framework (the Employment Relationship Act) specifically hones 
an executive style of legal regulation, whereby legal provisions often provide 
recourse to regulation of certain matters by collective agreements. In this sense, the 
Slovenian legal framework performs a salient promotional role, by explicitly 
suggesting that collective agreements may provide closer regulation on some matters. 
CEE studies suffer from a lack of comprehensive data on collective 
agreements, particularly comparative data, which would otherwise enable this study 
to fully grasp the standard-setting weight of sectoral collective agreements. It would 
be particularly interesting to monitor how the substance of the sectoral collective 
agreements that were concluded changed alongside the alterations to the legal 
framework over the past two decades. What can be summarised from the available 
studies and comments from the interviewees is the following. As far as Slovenia and 
to some extent Slovakia are concerned, sectoral collective agreements play a 
prominent role in industrial relations. This is particularly the case in Slovenia, where 
the interviewees underlined the salience of sectoral collective bargaining in setting 
wages. As far as the available data allow a conclusion for Slovakia, sectoral 
collective agreements have been gradually moving in the direction of 
accommodating the decentralisation of bargaining and of providing gradual 
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adjustment of the legal framework towards labour market flexibility.660 It seems that 
the picture is somewhat different in the Czech Republic and Poland. The existing 
data suggest that higher-level agreements in the Czech Republic usually regulate few 
items and provide a light upgrade of standards for employees’ from those standards 
laid down by statutory regulation.661 Possibly the most extreme example is Poland, 
where the interviewees emphasised that employers often argue that the provisions of 
Labour Code are already so extensive that they see no purpose in engaging in 
collective bargaining. It has been also pointed out during the interviews that, in that 
country, collective agreements often simply reiterate what the law has already stated.  
 
3.1.3. Mechanism of erga omnes extension (general applicability of collective 
agreements) 
Almost all EU countries recognise the legal possibility of extending the validity of 
collective agreement to employers who were not signatory parties to it, but belong to 
the same sector or perform similar business activities.662 From the point of view of 
employers, extensions may not be popular with individual companies because they 
deprive them of opportunities to offer more competitive conditions in the sector. Yet, 
there are many advantages to this instrument. In the first place, extensions can 
substantially increase coverage of collective agreements. In this sense, extension 
represents one of the methods by which the state may promote collective 
bargaining.663 In a legal sense, extensions can ensure the application of minimum 
sectoral standards (defined in a sectoral collective agreement) across the sector; in 
this way, it can even mimic the function of statutory minimum wage.664 
Nevertheless, the extensions may at the same time be criticised for running against 
the logic of voluntary organisation: employers may, by virtue of this mechanism, 
                                                          
660 Particularly underlined in a recent study by Bulla et al. (2013), p 6. 
661 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 258. 
662 Here the discussion does not refer to the extensions of collective agreement to the non-unionised 
employees; as in all the CEE countries, the concluded collective agreement binds all the employees 
who work for the employer covered by the agreement, irrespective of the trade union affiliation. 
663 Bruun (2003). 
664 Bruun, N. (2014) ‘Legal and Judicial Avenues: The ILO’ in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher, and I. 
Schömann (2014) (eds) The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law in Europe, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, p 254-255. 
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become involuntarily bound by collective agreement.665 The topic of extensions has 
not been thoroughly regulated within the ILO system. The ILO has declared this 
instrument compatible with freedom of association, but it also held that the state can 
prescribe limits to its use.666 In this context, the ILO Collective Agreements 
Recommendation No 91 of 1951 stipulates that extensions can be made subject to 
several conditions:  
“(a) that the collective agreement already covers a number of the employers and workers 
concerned which is, in the opinion of the competent authority, sufficiently representative; (b) 
that, as a general rule, the request for extension of the agreement shall be made by one or more 
organisations of workers or employers who are parties to the agreement; (c) that, prior to the 
extension of the agreement, the employers and workers to whom the agreement would be made 
applicable by its extension should be given an opportunity to submit their observations.”667 
When it comes to the four CEE countries, the previous section has demonstrated that 
extensions are underused. This is also evidenced in Table 6. If the use of the 
instrument of extensions is a criterion for assessing the promotional role of the state 
in industrial relations, then in the four countries such state role has been weak. Yet, 
this statement may not be fully applicable to Slovenia, where the extensions have 
been more regularly practised than in the other CEE countries. 
 
Table 6: Number of extended collective agreements at sectoral level 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Slovenia 2 2 6 6 8 
Slovakia 5 0 0 0 0 
Poland                                                            No extensions 
The Czech 
Republic 
4 n/a 4 4 5 
Source: Eurofound.  
 
Even before the year 2006, when Slovenia’s legal framework permitted extensions to 
collective agreements, almost complete coverage by sectoral collective agreements 
had been ensured, mainly because of the mandatory membership of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. In Poland, extensions have never been applied because of 
                                                          
665 ibid. 
666 As reminded by Bruun, ibid. 
667 ILO Recommendation concerning Collective Agreements, No 91, 1951. 
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the overall marginal role of multi-enterprise collective agreements. At the same time, 
Polish law sets somewhat restrictive conditions for extensions by requiring the 
approval of all individual employers in the sector. In the Czech Republic, and also 
particularly in Slovakia, the changing legal framework has directly impinged on the 
frequency of collective agreement extensions during the past two decades. Likewise, 
depending on the wording of the law, the number of extensions varied from one year 
to another.  In some years, the extensions were not applied because of the restrictive 
legal framework (the required consent of individual employers). When looking at the 
developments in Slovakia in the past two decades – particularly the fact that the 
consent of individual employers has been the most discussed item on the agenda and 
that, for a long time, the Slovak system has lacked a genuine concept of “real” 
extensions to the whole sector – one may conclude that the Slovak legal system still 
struggles to recognise and incorporate the mechanism of extension. The latter 
argument can be also extended to the Czech Republic, where, during the past two 
decades, the topic of extension has provoked frequent debate and frequent legal 
amendments. 
 
3.2. Sectoral collective agreement as an instrument for articulation 
The described notion and function of sectoral collective agreements prompts further 
investigation of the relationship between collective labour agreements and statutory 
legal norms as the two distinct sources of labour regulation in CEE. Chapters 1 and 3 
have already given some insights into the topic of articulation; essentially, in this 
study, articulation is understood as a mechanism ensuring complementarity between 
decision-making at different levels. For this chapter it is essential to underline that 
sectoral collective agreements are the key articulating device within the multi-
employer bargaining system, bearing in mind they represent the main link between 
the system of collective agreements and the system of statutory legal rules (insofar as 
there are no concluded cross-sectoral collective agreements in this system, which is 
the case in the four CEE countries - see Chapter 5).  
In the majority of the European countries, there is a rule that collective 
agreements at higher level prevail over agreements at lower levels and that statutory 
legal rules prevail over collective agreements. Additionally, the logic of favourability 
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applies to these systems, as explained in Chapter 1. However, in recent decades the 
legal systems have started to introduce certain exceptions to the principle of firm 
vertical hierarchy of rules. Examples of these exceptions include the French Loi 
Fillon which provides that company level collective agreements have priority over 
agreements at a higher level. Another example is the different types of clauses used 
in sectoral collective agreements, such as opening or hardship clauses in Germany, 
allowing stipulation of less favourable rules for employees at company level 
(derogation in peius).668  
As the overview of the four CEE legal and institutional frameworks in this 
chapter has demonstrated, these countries’ systems mostly rest on a one-way and top-
down vertical hierarchy of rules, further strengthened by the mostly uncompromised 
nature of the favourability principle in the four countries. Deviations from the 
vertical hierarchy in peius (setting lower levels of standards than those prescribed in 
law) are principally discouraged and not widespread in practice in CEE; as the 
overview of the four legal frameworks in Table 7 shows. 
 
Table 7:  Overview of legal possibilities for derogations in peius from statutory 
law  
Slovenia Slovakia The Czech Republic Poland 








and for few items only 
Suspension of 
collective agreement, 
temporary and under 
certain conditions 
 
Table 7 provides an overview of the legal methods chosen by the selected countries 
in view of allowing derogations in peius from statutory law. Slovenia’s legal 
framework is seemingly the most flexible, as it allows deviation in peuis from the 
sectoral level arrangements. In this sense, opening clauses can be used to control the 
degree and substance of derogations within company level collective agreements. 
                                                          
668 As explained by Jacobs (2014), p 177; these clauses have been introduced in the 1980s and 1990s 





Slovak and Czech systems rest on a rigid top-down hierarchy of rules, with no legal 
possibility of deviation in peius (in Slovakia) or derogations under restrictive 
conditions and marginal importance in practice (the Czech Republic). The Polish 
example runs contrary to the logic of organised decentralisation: by allowing 
suspension of collective agreements at multi-enterprise level, the function of 
collective bargaining is frustrated. In these cases, if there is a single-enterprise 
agreement concluded, it will remain the only negotiated source of rights and 
conditions for employees and there will be no central level negotiation to represent 
“checks and balances”.   
   The above arguments have assessed the systems of standard setting in CEE 
from a formal and instrumental point of view, but there has been no scrutiny of how 
the substance (content) of collective agreements relates to statutory legal rules in 
these countries. Previous chapters of this thesis have explained that, regardless of 
their relationship with the statutory legal system, in most of the European countries 
collective agreements are the major instruments for setting work standards and 
employment conditions. With the trend towards decentralisation which has 
dominated the landscape of most of the European countries in the past decades, and 
particularly during the recent crisis period, the substance of sectoral collective 
agreement has been subject to change. The degree to which the sectoral agreements 
have been modified differs in the European countries, but as a general trend, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the universal standard-setting feature of the sectoral 
collective agreement has been compromised, and the role of sectoral collective 
agreements has become one of providing more regulatory space for company-level 
collective agreements.669 At the same time, the extent to which these sectoral 
agreements prescribe parameters to subsequent company collective agreements also 
differs. In this respect, Marginson and Sisson identify several possible scenarios.670 
Firstly, the sectoral collective agreement may prescribe universal substantive 
standards, but leave the implementation to company level. Secondly, there are 
different clauses which can be inserted in sectoral collective agreements, providing 
variation in implementation of the collective agreements, but the universal standard 
remains in place. Thirdly, certain instruments can be used to distribute the 
                                                          
669 Marginson (2014), pp 100-101.  
670 The delineation presented in Marginson and Sisson (2006), pp 163-164; also, Marginson (2014). 
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competences between different bargaining levels. In countries such as Italy, the 
social pact defines the substantive competences of different bargaining levels, and 
decides which matters are regulated at sectoral level and which are regulated at 
company level. Because this delineation is defined in such a way that the 
competences of the two levels are strictly separated, company collective bargaining 
does not take place within the procedural framework defined in sectoral collective 
agreements. Fourthly, the sectoral collective agreement may prescribe deviations 
from the universal standard by using different types of opt-out clauses (Marginson 
and Sisson commented that their use across the European continent has increasingly 
perforated sectoral collective agreements).671 Fifthly, sectoral collective agreements 
may represent incomplete framework agreements, as they may not set the main 
substantive parameters, but instead encourage substantive variation at company level. 
These sectoral agreements do not decide the universal sectoral parameters, nor the 
scope of company level negotiations.  
How do the four CEE countries fit these scenarios? In CEE, the universal 
standard-setting function of sectoral collective agreements is, in general, 
compromised, evidenced by the coverage rates of sectoral collective agreements 
being limited (see Table 4). The universal standard-setting function can be said to 
exist in Slovenia, and in those sectors in the other three CEE countries where sectoral 
collective agreements have been concluded and have been extended to cover the 
sector. The fact that the practice of concluding sectoral collective agreements is not 
widespread is not the only reason to conclude this: it should also be taken into 
account that sectoral collective agreements in the four CEE countries have achieved 
only low levels of standards and merely a marginal upgrade from the standards set 
out in law. At the same time, statutory labour law often predetermines the substantive 
content of collective agreements by containing fairly detailed regulation of work and 
employment. Thus, where they exist, sectoral collective agreements have a modest 
regulatory role: their function is to set minimum levels in a sector, and to encourage 
further substantive variation at company level. But this sectoral minimum is rather 
                                                          
671 Here the term “opt-out” is used in a generic way to denote the variety of clauses used in the 
industrial relations of many European countries, aimed at introducing enterprise-level deviations from 
the terms and conditions set out at sectoral or cross-sectoral collective agreements. The deviations at 
the enterprise level are usually controlled by the framework and conditions stipulated in these sectoral 
or cross-sectoral agreements. 
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low and does not provide much more of an upgrade to the benefit of employees than 
does statutory legal regulation. A clear example of sectoral collective agreements 
having modest regulatory importance was provided during the interviews in 
Slovenia. There, sectoral collective agreements normally include several tariff 
classes on wage. However, the lowest wage tariffs which are negotiated in these 
agreements have no practical importance: the wage levels set in these tariffs go even 
below the statutory minimum wage (the latter sets mandatory provisions for the 
entire economy) and, as such, do not apply in practice. In general, the interviewees in 
all four countries commented that the company is the main locus of decision making. 
It is implied from the previous considerations, as well as from the data presented in 
Table 4, that sectoral collective agreements do not set firm parameters and conditions 
for company-level bargaining. Judging from the arguments presented, sectoral 
collective agreements would mostly resemble the fifth scenario within the proposed 
classifications by Marginson and Sisson: incomplete framework agreements which 
set weak universal standards in the sector and encourage substantive variations 
between companies. 
 
3.3. Parties and representativeness  
The first major challenge for CEE law at the outset of transition was to define legal 
rules allowing the free organisation of social partners and rules on 
representativeness. Therefore, early in the transitional era, most of the CEE countries 
ratified and implemented the relevant ILO provisions which ensured the 
independence of trade unions from the state and from the employers’ side.672 These 
countries, as section 2 demonstrated, also allowed free organisation of trade unions 
and employers’ associations in the early 1990s. Defining these legal rules early on 
was an important formal step towards addressing the weak capacity of social 
partners, a problem stemming from the trade unions needing to to face difficult 
restructuring at the beginning of the 1990s, while, at the same time, the employers’ 
associations where mainly developing from scratch. Regardless of the fact that the 
current legal systems stipulate clear and unambiguous legal rules on the organisation 
                                                          
672 ILO Convention No.87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise of 1948 
and ILO Convention No.98 on Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining of 1949. 
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of social partners, the weakness of social partners is still present to some extent 
today, and has been highlighted as problematic.673 Nevertheless, the role of law in 
addressing this weakness need no be regarded as completely irrelevant, as in many 
instances law helped boost sectoral capacity – particularly on the employers’ side. A 
Slovenian example is particularly illustrative. The legal rules in Slovenia required 
individual employers to be members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
Although this legal solution was criticised as being contrary to the ILO principles of 
the voluntary organisation of social partners,674 it helped in consolidating the sectoral 
capacity of employers’ associations in Slovenia. The Chamber was the main 
negotiating partner on employers’ side and because all the individual employers were 
members, this particular legal solution ensured wider coverage for concluded sectoral 
collective agreements. At the same time, this legal solution did not prevent other 
employers’ associations from emerging, thereby gradually building capacity for 
sectoral collective bargaining. There are other examples showing how the law can 
enhance the sectoral capacity of employers. As section 2 demonstrated, the law in 
some countries (in Slovenia and the Czech Republic) has tackled the issue of 
individual employers giving up membership of the employers’ associations by 
obliging them to respect the sectoral collective agreement, even after renouncing 
membership. A further problem in some countries, as presented in section 2, is that 
the employers’ associations also manage to refrain from collective bargaining by 
establishing themselves on a different legal basis, in this way transforming their role 
from one of participant in collective bargaining to that of lobbying organisation. As 
explained by the Czech trade union representative: 
“In reality, the problem is whether there is a will for collective bargaining, not the form of 
organisation. In our country, it is possible to set up regular associations of employers, but then 
it is common that it is written in their statute that they do not deal with collective bargaining, 
that they are not competent for that. Then they say “we are something like lobbying group, we 
do not bargain”.  
                                                          
673 Ghellab, Y. and Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2003) Sectoral Social Dialogue in Future EU Member 
States: The Weakest Link, Budapest: ILO; Parissaki, M. and Vega Vega, S. (2008) ‘Capacity Building 
for Social Dialogue at Sectoral and Company Level in the New Member States, Croatia and Turkey’ 
Dublin: Eurofound. 
674 Skledar, S. (2006) ’Membership of Chamber of Commerce and Industry to be Voluntary’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/membership-
of-chamber-of-commerce-and-industry-to-be-voluntary [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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In fact, the issue described has been resolved in the Czech Republic recently - as 
section 2 explained, as the Civil Code has become the only possible legal basis on 
which both trade unions and employers’ associations to be set up.   
Another task which the CEE countries faced was drawing up the rules on 
representativeness. Section 2 demonstrated that no such rules exist in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (there are only indirect rules, which apply with respect to the 
mechanism extending collective agreements). In Slovenia and Poland, rules on 
representativeness are formulated for trade unions only. Scrutinising these rules is 
difficult; as there are no well-defined criteria for what representativeness rules should 
look like. The experiences of European countries vary and it is not possible to draw 
any clear conclusions from them. Most of the countries are based on one of the two 
models of representativeness: (a) a proven or actual model, whereby the organisation 
becomes representative based on the actual size of its membership, and (b) assumed 
or implied, in which the representative status is derived from membership of a 
confederation or higher-level organisation which is already recognised as 
representative.675 Slovenia, as discussed in section 2, adopted a proven or actual 
model, while Poland opted for a mixed model spanning the two options. The ILO 
framework requires from national laws that they base representativeness rules on 
objective, unbiased and pre-established criteria, set out out in a procedure which 
ensures their impartiality and the absence of political interference,676 but it contains 
no closer guidance on this matter. In general, representativeness criteria can be 
beneficial for identifying legitimate partners for collective bargaining; but what can 
be concluded from section 2 is that the four countries still struggle to define clear 
criteria for representativeness on the employers’ side. Yet this problem may not 
easily be fixed by the law itself: the collective bargaining capacity of employers 
needs to be boosted in the first place. Many sectors in CEE do not actually have an 
employers’ association at all, so further discussion on representativeness is 
                                                          
675 See Veneziani, B. (1999) ‘The Intervention of the Law to Regulate Collective Bargaining and 
Trade Union Representation Rights in European Countries: Recent Trends and Problems’ Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research, vol 5, no 1-2, p 126. 
676 As demonstrated by Jacobs, A. (2013) ’Article 11 ECHR: the Right to Bargain Collectively’ in F. 
Dorssemont, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds) The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Employment Relation, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
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precluded. The problem, as underlined by several interviewees in the four countries, 




4.1. Development of sectoral collective agreement 
Based on the facts and arguments presented in this chapter, how can the development 
of the legal and institutional framework for sectoral collective agreements in the four 
countries be explained? In all four countries, the development of sectoral collective 
agreement has been enmeshed in a conundrum of policy choices and legacies. This 
Chapter has demonstrated the following. In Slovenia, post-transitional industrial 
relations have been shaped under the favourable influence of self-management 
legacies, and the active role of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry which 
immediately participated in sectoral negotiations in the early 1990s. Inasmuch as 
industrial relations did not develop immediately but only gradually,677 the same can 
be said of the legal framework: the major legal reform which took place in 2006 
aimed at codifying the industrial relations practices which had developed by that 
time – including well developed sectoral collective bargaining. The Czech Republic 
and Slovakia could not benefit from the legacies of the communist era, as their 
sectoral practices were developing from scratch in the early 1990s. In 1991, their 
legal framework had postulated the two levels at which collective bargaining could 
take place (enterprise, and the somewhat more ambiguous concept of higher level). 
After the dissolution of the two countries in 1993, their paths diverged somewhat: 
while the initial focus of the reforms in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic was on 
company-related processes, Slovakia’s industrial relations have subsequently focused 
on sector level. Yet, both countries seem to have been modifying their legal rules in 
an ad hoc fashion: amendments at times reflected a different balance of interests 
between labour and employers, especially when talking about the extensions of 
sectoral collective agreements. Similarly, in Poland, the notion “multi-enterprise” 
agreement had already been created by 1986. As section 2 explained, the model of 
                                                          
677 The “gradualist” approach to market transformation in Slovenia was particularly described by 
Crowley and Stanojević; see Crowley and Stanojević (2011).  
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reforms pursued in Poland was focused on the company. The sectoral level was not a 
priority of policy reform, as was underlined by the interviewees on the trade union 
side:  
“In my personal opinion this was planned since the very beginning of the economic 
transformation.  There was no political will on the side of the actors who were responsible for 
the economic transformation to give powers to trade unions. Due to this reason, although social 
dialogue was of course promoted, it was mostly promoted at the company level. And not at the 
sectoral level.” 
 
“This idea of the decentralisation was politically supported.  What is the problem with Poland?  
When compared to Slovakia, which is trying to do something with sectoral bargaining, the 
approach of the Polish government is that the sector was privatised, therefore we don’t have 
anything to do with sectoral level. This idea of improving competitive position and building 
industrial policy while not having any influence in the sectors which have been privatised is 
crazy for me.“ 
 
4.2. Sectoral collective agreements: the legal and institutional framework in CEE 
The comparative assessment of the four countries’ legal and institutional framework 
for sectoral collective bargaining to a large extent corresponds to Bohle and 
Greskovits’ classifications of CEE capitalism, and to the explanations of the type of 
economy and welfare given in Chapter 2. The country whose legal framework shows 
fewest features of the liberal market economy (LMEs)678 is Slovenia, where the 
legislation does not, in principle, restrict in any way the possibility of convening 
sectoral collective bargaining, and also promotes the sector as a venue of standard-
setting. This was demonstrated in section 2. The Slovenian case also provides a 
specific example of the limited role of the law in shaping industrial relations: by 
2006, when the major legal reform took place, sectoral collective bargaining was 
already well developed. Slovenia has the only legal system of the four selected 
countries which did not aim to define the notion of “sectoral collective agreement” or 
to postulate any similar concept, even though it is the country with the most 
developed sectoral bargaining of the four. The recognition of sectoral collective 
                                                          




agreements exists only indirectly: legal provisions often call for the conclusion of the 
sectoral collective agreements. 
  On the other hand, the Polish legal system has clearly not been shaped with 
sectoral collective bargaining in mind. In fact, there are several legal traits of Polish 
labour law which essentially restrict the ability to build fruitful sectoral collective 
bargaining – to mention the most blatant ones, the notion of multi-enterprise 
collective agreement is not clearly defined, there is no labour law reference to 
“sector”, the collective bargaining procedure is not clearly stipulated and the laws on 
the extension of collective agreements have rendered extension rather difficult. By 
comparison, the Slovak and Czech labour laws are more supportive of sectoral 
collective bargaining. These two countries in fact have rather similar legal 
frameworks. In these two countries, the major problems are the unclear designation 
of higher-level agreements with respect to “sector” and the overly restrictive 
conditions for collective agreements’ extensions (the latter particularly in Slovakia). 
Also, both Slovakia and the Czech Republic struggle to define the legal rules on the 
representativeness of both trade unions and employers’ associations.   
 The four legal systems base the relationship between statutory labour law and 
collective agreements on a strict vertical and top-down hierarchy of rules. From the 
legal point of view, in Slovenia the pyramid of standard-setting sources at different 
levels seems to be the closest to the articulated multi-employer bargaining model 
presented in Chapter 1 and the notion of “organised decentralisation”. The latter 
argument is particularly evident when taking into account the type of articulation 
between the laws and collective agreements, which is based on a flexible relationship 
between sectoral and company level sources and the legal possibility of derogating in 
peius from sectoral standards. The vertical articulation of legal rules at different 
bargaining levels is set differently in Poland and it least resembles the normative 
articulated multi-employer bargaining model postulated in Chapter 1. The reason for 
the latter is the poorly defined concept of “multi-enterprise” level and the fact that, 
under certain legal conditions, the collective agreements at this level can be 
suspended. Thus, the legal articulation mainly takes place between statutory legal 
rules and collective agreements at company level, while the sector represents a weak 
focal point in the Polish system. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the laws are 
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comparatively more supportive of sectoral and “multi-employer” bargaining in 
comparison to Polish law. However, Slovak law seems to be far more rigid than 
Czech law, because of (1) fairly restrictive rules on the extension of collective 
agreements, which made the application of this instrument almost impossible in the 
past decade, except for a short period of time between 2007 and 2010 and (2), the 
lack of flexibility, in the sense that the law absolutely does not provide the possibility 
of collective agreements stipulating less favourable rules for employees (derogation 
in peuis). In the Czech Republic, there is such a legal possibility, although it has not 
been used in practice. 
 Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that certain legal traits of the four 
countries underpin decentralised industrial relations and underdeveloped sectoral 
collective bargaining – with the exception of Slovenia. With a view to protecting the 
rights and working conditions of employees, the legislators in the four countries 
aimed to set a minimum (”floor”) of statutory rights which could eventually be 
upgraded in collective agreements. But, in reality, such a legally defined floor was 
usually low. At the same time the legal framework shows ambiguous support for 
centralised forms of collective bargaining and the employers’ side has no clear 
incentive to engage in sectoral collective bargaining. If any sectoral collective 
agreements exist, they only slightly improve the rights and conditions stipulated in 
law. The regulatory power of the sectoral collective agreements is therefore weak 
and the real standard-setting power has been shifted to the local level, but there are 











This chapter scrutinises the legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining at company level in the four CEE countries. In addition to collective 
bargaining, this chapter will also briefly reflect on the other possible forms of 
standard setting in companies. Some terminological explanations should be 
highlighted at this point. As explained in Chapter 1, the term “company” is used 
when describing collective bargaining practices between an individual employer and 
local trade unions, without further specifying whether it takes place at plant level, 
within the unit of the company or for the entire company. In this sense, in this study 
the term “company-level collective bargaining” is understood as equal to single-
employer collective bargaining, and contrasts with collective bargaining which is 
practised by associations of employers. Similarly, the chapter uses the terms “local” 
and “basic” trade union organisations to denote the form of trade union organisation 
existing at company level, regardless of whether it is formed at plant level or at the 
level of the entire company.  
This study has demonstrated already that company level is the main level for 
collective bargaining in the four CEE countries (with the exception of Slovenia 
where, in principle, the sector represents the cornerstone of industrial relations). The 
company’s prominence in local standard setting emerged as the result of specific 
post-transitional reforms, explained in Chapter 2, combined with the inability of 
trade unions at centralised levels to exert greater influence in the post-transitional 
context. Given the emphasis of industrial relations on decentralised decision making, 
one could expect greater legal encouragement of company-level collective 
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bargaining over bargaining at the other levels. The purpose of this chapter, however, 
is to test this presumption in the four CEE countries. It should be emphasised that 
because there is no practice of registering these collective agreements in any of the 
four countries, there is a lack of reliable and comprehensive statistical data which 
would allow more objective assessment of their content and nature, as well as of their 
linkages with collective agreements at the other bargaining levels. As explained 
during the interviews, the available data should in fact be treated as a mere 
estimation. Table 8 provides an overview of the existing data on the number of 
company collective agreements and their coverage. In Poland, company level is the 
most predominant form of collective bargaining. According to the available data, the 
number of single-establishment collective agreements in Poland was 8.142 in 2013, 
but these rates were slightly higher in pre-crisis years. Czech industrial relations are 
also predominantly developed at company level and the coverage rates of company 
collective agreements are considerably higher than “higher-level” collective 
agreements. Around 31.3% of employees are covered by company collective 
agreements (data from 2014) in contrast to around 15% of employees covered by 
“higher-level” collective agreements (as highlighted in Chapter 6). In Slovakia, the 
percentage of companies having company collective agreements is roughly estimated 
to be around 35%. Slovenia is an exception to the industrial relations trends 
described in the other three countries. As already noted in the previous chapter, 
sectoral collective agreements represent the cornerstone of the Slovenian industrial 
relations system, even though there has been a persistent and gradual trend towards 
the decentralisation of industrial relations in the past decade.  
Furthermore, although the CEE countries are traditionally regarded as having 
decentralised collective bargaining, a closer look into the coverage rates in Table 8 
shows that in reality a significant proportion of employees in the four countries is not 
covered by any collective agreement. In fact, collectively agreed norms and 
provisions do not apply to the majority of the employees in the labour market. 
Statutory legal regulation and internal employers’ regulation (where applicable) 
remain the only applicable rules. The exception to this is Slovenia, but here the 
relatively higher coverage rates of collective agreements (at any level) can be in the 
first place attributed to the regulatory prominence of sectoral collective agreements.  
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Table 8: Industrial relations at company/single-enterprise level  
Country No. of company level 
collective agreements 
Coverage of company 
level agreements 
Total coverage* 
Slovenia No data No data Rates falling from 
96% in 2006 to an 
estimated 65% in 
2013  
Slovakia No data About 35% of 
companies had 
collective agreements 
in 2011, no data on the 
percentage of 
employees covered by 
them  
Rates falling from  
40% in 2006 and 
35% in 2011 to 
24.9% in 2013 
The Czech 
Republic 
No data on the number of 
agreements, but about 1.27 
million employees covered 
in 2014, which is slightly 
below the rates in 2012, with 
about 1.35 million 
employees 
About 31.3% in 2014, 
as compared with 
34.0% in 2012 
About 50.2%  in 
2006; 50.4% in 
2012 and 47.3% in 
2013** 
Poland In 2013 about 8,142 (slightly 
lower than 8,300 in 2008) 
covering about 1.68 million 
people. 
No estimated data on 
the coverage rate 
15.7% in 2006, 
14.8% in 2011 and 
14.7% in 2012 
Notes: * This column refers to the coverage rates regarding collective agreements concluded at all 
existing collective bargaining levels in the country. It contains data on selected years only, in view of 
comparing and contrasting pre- and post- crisis coverage rates. The detailed overview of trends 
regarding coverage rates has been provided in Table 3 (Chapter 4) and Figure 1 (Chapter 1). 
**the data includes only collective agreements concluded by the largest trade union confederation 
ČMKOS 
Sources: Combined data from Worker-participation, Eurofound, ICTWSS database 5.0 by Visser 
(2015), and data obtained at the interviews with the social partners in the four countries. 
 
Although company level collective bargaining is the most predominant form of 
bargaining in CEE industrial relations, it is struggling with its own challenges. In the 
first place, one should account for the fact that the CEE countries have been faced 
with a drastic trade union decline since the early 1990s, as evidenced in Table 9. 
Density rates have been particularly low in Poland in the past two decades. While the 
decline of membership rates have, on the whole, affected the entire industrial 
relations systems, the detrimental effects are the most tangible at company level, 
where trade unions may not have a sufficient number of employees in membership to 
generate company-level agreements. Moreover, the interviews in the four countries 
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revealed that company collective bargaining in CEE is particularly challenged 
because of the predominance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in many 
sectors, where the setting up of trade unions is by nature rather difficult. Setting up a 
trade union is certainly less of a challenge in larger companies, where it is also easier 
to conclude collective agreements. Also, as interviewees in the four countries 
explained, the mere existence of a trade union in company is no guarantee that a 
collective agreement will be concluded. Moreover, in some countries, it is often the 
case that several trade unions are operating at company level, and it can complicate 
the conclusion of collective agreements if these unions cannot reach agreement about 
the content of bargaining.  
 
Table 9: Trends in percentage rates of trade union density 
Slovenia Slovakia Czech Republic Poland 
1993 58.0 67.3 64.4 28.8 
1994 60.2 64.2 51.5 27.2 
1995 50.5 56.1 43.5 20.2 
1996 48.8 47.8 39.5 20.4 
1997 44.1 42.0 36.9 20.4 
1998 42.7 36.2 32.1 20.5 
1999 40.4 34.2 30.0 20.5 
2000 41.6 32.3 27.2 17.5 
2001 40.8 30.5 23.6 15.5 
2002 44.7 27.4 22.2 14.1 
2003 43.7 26.1 22.3 18.8 
2004 40.1 23.6 21.0 19.0 
2005 37.1 22.8 19.7 18.1 
2006 31.4 20.6 18.7 16.3 
2007 29.0 18.8 17.9 15.6 
2008 26.6 17.2 17.4 n/a 
2009 26.3 16.0 17.2 14.6 
2010 25.0 15.2 16.6 n/a 
2011 23.1 14.1 15.8 13.6 
2012 22.0 13.6 14.3 12.7 
2013 21.2 13.3 12.7 n/a 
2014 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: ICTWSS database 5.0, Visser (2015). 
 
In order to fully grasp the regulatory nature and importance of company-level 
collective agreements, the analysis that follows in this chapter focuses on several 
points. Section 2 examines relevant aspects of company collective agreements in the 
four countries. In the first place, it explains company-level collective agreement in 
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the four countries, including its definition, content and articulation with the other 
standard-setting sources (section 2.1). In addition, the parties to collective bargaining 
are described (2.2). The issues not covered by the previous sections are looked at 
briefly in section 2.3 (collective bargaining procedure, duration and the question as 
to whom collective agreements apply). Section 2.4 deals with company-level topics 
which do not arise from collective bargaining but which are important for 
understanding standard-setting processes at company level: the role of works 
councils and the role of unilateral standard setting by employers. Section 3 contains 
comparative analysis of the traits presented, while section 4 contains concluding 
remarks on this chapter.   
   
2. Four countries: Overview of legal and institutional framework 
There is no comprehensive dataset on company-level collective agreements in CEE 
(and no legal obligation in the four countries to register them). The comparative 
analysis of the content and functions of company-level collective agreements in this 
section is limited to knowledge gained from existing studies, combined with 
information from the interviews. Chapter 6 has already presented some 
characteristics of the legal framework in the four countries that can be extended to 
this chapter. Thus, this chapter will not fully reiterate information from Chapter 6, 
especially details of how the legal provisions pertaining to the four countries relate to 
the content (substance) and bargaining scope of collective agreements.  
 
2.1. Explaining company collective agreements 
 
2.1.1. Definition and origin  
 
Slovenia 
As explained in Chapter 6, the existing legal framework (anchored under the 2006 
Act on Collective Agreements) defines no levels at which collective bargaining may 
take place in Slovenia, in this way leaving social partners free to negotiate at levels 
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they decide. Thus, unlike the other three countries, in Slovenia there is no legally 
defined concept of company collective agreement. Before 2006, however, the legal 
framework did delineate collective bargaining at cross-sectoral, sectoral and 
company level.679 It has already been demonstrated in this study (Chapter 6) that the 
Slovenian model of post-transitional transformation focused on centralised collective 
bargaining structures. However, today’s processes at company level can be linked to 
the legacies of self-management, which represents a pervasive paradigm of the pre-
1990s socialist system. Within that system, the “socialist” companies and their 
employees operated with a certain level of autonomy: Stanojević notes that the 
economy was based on large and labour intensive companies which enjoyed semi-
autonomous market status.680 Employees were considered owners of the means of 
production and could adopt different forms of self-management enactment through 
which they established their working conditions.681 Yet, this self-management 
regulatory style was not fully autonomous, because, as Slovenian scholar Končar has 
noted, the role of self-management enactments was mainly to execute what had been 
already determined by legislation and, as such, they did not emanate from the 
autonomous will of employees.682 
Even though the cornerstone of industrial relations is to be found at sector 
level, today the importance of company level cannot be dismissed, especially 
because there has been a visible trend towards decentralisation of industrial relations 
also in Slovenia.683 Company is the locus for standard setting that is more 
                                                          
679 The Act on Basic Rights of Employment Relationship of 1989 and the Employment Relationship 
Act of 1990. 
680 Stanojević, M. (2012) ‘The Rise and Decline of Slovenian Corporatism: Local and European 
Factors’ Europe-Asia Studies, vol 64, no 5, pp 860-862.  
681 See Končar, P. (1996) ‘Changes and Adaptations of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe (from Planned to Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, no 
31, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp 157-158. Role of self-management in shaping today’s 
industrial relations has been particularly underlined in Crowley, S. and Stanojević, M. (2011) 
‘Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical Legacies: Explaining the Slovenian 
Exception’ Politics & Society, vol 39, no 2, p 277. 
682 Končar (1996), pp 157-158. Končar, likewise, noted that the Slovenian self-management system 
was rather different from the other CEE countries, yet, equally inefficient.  
683 Kanjuo Mrčela, A. (2015) ‘Slovenia: Working Life Country Profile’ Dublin: Eurofound, available 
at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovenia/slovenia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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appropriately tailored to the needs of companies, and is the level at which the actual 
rights and conditions of work are decided.  
There are no official data about the number of collective agreements concluded 
at company level in Slovenia. According to the interviewees, there is an evident 
contrast between collective bargaining practices in differently sized companies: all 
large companies and most of the medium-sized companies have collective 
agreements. Interviewees reported that most multinational companies have 
concluded company collective agreements, especially those with European-rooted 
funds. The probability of company collective agreements being concluded in smaller 
and medium-sized companies is considerably reduced.  
 
Slovakia 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Slovak legal framework delineates 
“enterprise-level collective agreements” and “higher-level collective agreements”, 
introduced by the 1991 Act on Collective Bargaining in the former country of 
Czechoslovakia. The law sets out that enterprise-level collective agreements are 
those concluded between trade union and the employer, but provides no further 
designation of these agreements. In principle, these collective agreements are more 
important standard-setting instruments in industrial relations than sectoral (higher-
level) collective agreements, particularly when it comes to regulating wages and 
working-time.684 As explained during the interviews, collective bargaining is more 
likely to take place in bigger companies, and as is the case with Slovenia, it is 
considerably reduced in smaller and medium companies. 
 
The Czech Republic 
As has already been presented in the previous chapter, the legal framework in the 
Czech Republic acknowledges the concept of “enterprise-level collective 
agreement”. The law recognises that these agreements are concluded between a trade 
                                                          
684 According to Czíria, L. (2015) ‘Slovakia: Working Life Country Profile’, Dublin: Eurofound, 
available at:  
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovakia/slovakia-working-life-country-profile [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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union and an employer, but it does not provide further designation. Scholarship has 
explained that this type of collective agreement does not necessarily cover an entire 
enterprise, and that it is possible to have more than one such agreement under a 
single employer.685 It has also been underlined that it is possible to conclude a group-
undertaking collective agreement involving more than one employer (for example, in 
the case of holdings).686 In the Czech Republic, standards are set predominantly at 
company level. Nevertheless, as in the other CEE countries, company-level 
collective bargaining remains the province of certain parts of the economy, as it is 
mainly the bigger companies that have collective agreements. For example, in the 
metals sector, the interviewees have reported that the coverage rates of company 
collective agreements is approximately 65% – a stark contrast with the 10% coverage 
rate of higher-level collective agreement.  
Post-1990s industrial relations focused on the company as the principal unit of 
decision making.687 Collective bargaining rates were marginal in the pre-transitional 
federal country of Czechoslovakia, but, to some extent, the legacies of that era have 
predetermined the current industrial relations landscape. Some form of company 
collective bargaining had been in existence in the pre-1990s Czechoslovakia: trade 
unions in companies were able to sign different types of collective accords with 
management.688 These agreements were not autonomous, though, as their content was 
greatly restricted by the administrative regulations in place at the time.  
 
Poland 
Polish law recognises the notion of “single-enterprise collective agreements” which, 
according to the Labour Code, are concluded between an employer and the trade 
unions operating within the enterprise. In Poland, these collective agreements 
                                                          
685 Pichrt, J. and Štefko, M. (2015) ‘Labour Law in the Czech Republic’ International Encyclopaedia 
for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 257. 
686 ibid. 
687 Pollert, A. (1997) ’The Transformation of Trade Unionism in the Capitalist and Democratic 
Restructuring of the Czech Republic’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 3, no 2, p 207. 
688 Deak explained that these collective accords had the aim of ensuring social and economic 
development of the organisation and fixing the standards of employees as well as regulating their 
mutual cooperation, see Deak, L. (1994) ‘Customary International Labour Laws and their Application 
in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic’ Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
vol 2, no 1, p 40; also, Myant, M. (1993) ’Czech and Slovak Trade Unions’ Journal of Communist 
Studies, vol  9, no 4, pp 59-84.  
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represent the main standard-setting method as far as collective bargaining is 
concerned.  
The focus of Polish industrial relations on single-enterprise agreements can be 
otherwise linked to specific legacies and to the type of economic transformation 
undertaken in the past two decades. Poland had already started economic 
transformation by the 1980s – well before the other CEE countries. These early 
reforms were notable for encouraging company collective bargaining by allowing 
far-reaching autonomy to plant organisations, and by opening up possibilities for 
company-level bargaining in state-owned enterprises (the Act on Workers’ Self-
Management in State-Owned Enterprises of 1981).689 Company standard setting was 
further encouraged with a law adopted in 1984, which introduced the possibility of 
negotiating wages at company level. These developments led to the adoption of a law 
in 1986 which delineated collective bargaining at multi-enterprise and enterprise 
level.690 This legislative framework, adopted in the 1980s, together with the policy 
choices made in the 1990s (as described in Chapter 2), played a major role in 
designating the company as the main locus of collective bargaining in modern 
industrial relations in Poland.  
 




There is a lack of comprehensive empirical data on the content of company collective 
agreements, and available studies have been able to present only general descriptions 
of these agreements. The earlier study on Slovenian industrial relations demonstrated 
that, in general, company collective agreements regulate similar matters as 
agreements at sectoral level; thus, collective agreements at different levels do not 
                                                          
689 Sewerynski, M. (1993) ’Development of the Collective Bargaining System in Poland after the 
Second World War’ Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol 14, pp 452-454. On this topic, Florek 
noted that Poland started searching for the new labour relations model seven years earlier than the 
other CEE countries, and that the pre-transitional economic crisis started earlier in Poland, see Florek, 
L. (1992) ’Problems and Dilemmas of Labour Relations in Poland’ Comparative Labour Law Journal, 
vol 13, p 112. 
690 Sewerynski (1993), p 458-460.  
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differ much on the subjects they regulate, but mainly with respect to the scope of the 
rights and benefits of the employees.691 The most frequent items regulated in 
company collective agreements are wages and different types of benefits.692 There is 
no comprehensive data on the content of company collective agreements in the 
recent crisis period: recent studies have only confirmed the decentralisation trend in 
Slovenia, including the greater powers that employers have at company level, more 
flexibility in the workplace and the lowered capacity of trade unions at local levels.693 
Nevertheless, despite these crisis-related trends, the sector remains the cornerstone of 
Slovenian industrial relations. 
The previous chapter noted that the principles of favourability and the vertical 
hierarchy of rules are the building blocks of the relationship between standard-setting 
norms at different levels in Slovenia and in the other three CEE countries. Thus, 
company collective agreements should respect the terms and conditions in sectoral 
(or cross-sectoral) collective agreement and statutory law and may not set less 
favourable rules for employees than these sources of regulation. The previous 
chapter has already explained that opening clauses in the sectoral collective 
agreements that allow deviation from the sectoral standard by setting less favourable 
conditions for employees at company-level collective agreements are legally allowed 
in Slovenia. However, there are no clear data about the frequency of their use, 




Earlier studies have demonstrated that enterprise-level collective agreements cover 
similar topics as higher-level collective agreements, particularly wages and 
                                                          
691 Natlacen, M. P. (2004) ’The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe: National 
Report of Slovenia’ Project VS/2003/0219 – SI2.359910, European Commission and University of 
Florence, p 20.  
692ibid.  
693 Stanojević, M. and Kanjuo Mrčela, A. (2014) ’Social Dialogue during the Economic Crisis: The 
Impact of Industrial Relations Reforms on Collective Bargaining in the Manufacturing Sector: 
Slovenia’, Project: The Impact of Industrial Relations Reforms on Collective Bargaining in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Brussels: European Commission, p 17, p 23 and p 35.  
694 ibid. p 33, particularly in the area of working time. 
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conditions of employment.695 The interviewees in Slovakia explained that although 
these collective agreements usually cover the same type of issues as higher-level 
agreements, they represent an important tool for specifying rights and conditions and 
are the level at which the “real agreement” on wages and remuneration can be 
reached. Also, the interviewees explained that sectoral collective agreements 
(referred to as higher-level agreements in Slovakia) tend to have a more general 
nature, and often only restate the provisions of labour laws. A study performed in the 
metals sector demonstrated that there is actually only a weak link between collective 
bargaining at the sectoral and company levels: both levels play an important role, but 
lack mutual coordination, as company collective agreements are often negotiated 
before agreements at sectoral level.696 There is no clear empirical evidence on the 
effects which the crisis had on company-level collective bargaining. The available 
data only generally suggest that company collective bargaining gained an increased 
role.697   
Principles of favourability and top-down hierarchy are also relevant here: 
enterprise-level collective agreements may only upgrade the provisions of higher-
level collective agreements and the statutory labour law to the benefit of employee. 
Also, employment contracts may not define less favourable rights for employees than 
collective agreements or statutory labour law. The previous chapter showed that the 
relationship between norms at different levels is top-down: it is not possible to 
include opening clauses or similar clauses which would allow less favourable rights 
to be negotiated at company level. The previous chapter underlined that this 
opportunity existed in Slovakia for only a short time during the crisis period (these 
                                                          
695A survey performed by Research Institute of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (RILSAF) in 2000, 
as interpreted by Czíria, L. (2002) ’Collective Bargaining Procedures, Structures and Scope’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-
bargaining-procedures-structures-and-scope [accessed 1 August 2016]. See also a report by Handiak, 
who noted that the main issues are wages and remuneration related conditions, in Handiak, P. (2004) 
‘The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe: National Report of Slovakia’ Study 
VS/2003/0219SI2–359910, European Commission and University of Florence, p 14. 
696 Brngálová, B. and Kahancová, M. (2013) ‘Governing the Metal Sector in Slovakia: Socio-
Economic and Policy Context, Industrial Relations and the Challenge of Flexibility and Security’ FP7 
GUSTO Working Paper 6.20, p 26. 
697 Czíria, L. (2013) ‘Slovakia: Impact of the Crisis on Industrial Relations’ Dublin: Eurofound, 
available at: 
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/slovakia/slovakia-impact-of-the-crisis-on-industrial-relations [accessed 1 August 2016].   
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provisions were promulgated in 2011 and rescinded in 2012), but it was never 
availed of in practice.  
 
The Czech Republic 
Similarly to Slovakia, enterprise-level collective agreements in the Czech Republic 
cover the same or similar topics as higher-level collective agreements, but they offer 
solutions more appropriately tailored to local needs, particularly with respect to 
wages and different elements of pay.698 In fact, the company is the cornerstone and 
the most developed collective bargaining level in the Czech Republic, but there is a 
lack of comprehensive and accurate empirical data on the content of these 
agreements. At the same time, there is also a lack of empirical data on the effects 
which the crisis has had on enterprise-level collective bargaining. However, there is 
anecdotal evidence from the interviewees (in the construction sector) that the crisis 
affected the stipulation of wage increases at company level.     
The principles of favourability and vertical hierarchy determine the 
relationship between legal rules at different levels in the Czech Republic, too. 
However, as the previous chapter has explained, derogation clauses which would 
allow setting less favourable conditions at the company for employees than in the 
higher-level agreements are virtually non-existent and have no practical importance. 
In addition, the legal framework for these derogations is restrictively set. In practice, 
enterprise-level collective agreement may therefore only improve rights established 
by higher-level agreement.  
 
Poland 
Despite the general lack of comprehensive empirical data, data from earlier studies 
suggested that single-enterprise collective agreements first and foremost regulate 
wages, as well as working time and social benefits, while other topics are of marginal 
                                                          
698 This was demonstrated in an earlier study, Hála, J., Kroupa, A., Mansfeldova, Z., Kux, J., Vaskova, 
R. and Pleskot, I. (2002) Development of Social Dialogue in the Czech Republic, RILSA 2002, 
available at: praha.vupsv.cz/fulltext/dialen.pdf [accessed 1 August 2016], pp 58-61. Similar arguments 
can be found in: Tomes, I. (2004) ’The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe: 
National Report of the Czech Republic’ Project VS/2003/0219-SI2.359910, European Commission 
and University of Florence, p 10. 
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relevance.699 The available evidence suggests that the crisis did not change the 
collective bargaining landscape in Poland very much, although some deterioration of 
enterprise-level collective bargaining is visible.700 A similar narrative has been given 
by respondents at the interviews, who added that single-enterprise collective 
agreements usually do not much exceed the provisions of the Labour Code:  
“The general position that employers present is: we are willing to sign collective agreement if 
its conditions don't exceed Labour Code regulations, meaning they are not more favourable for 
employees than Labour Code. Thus, signing a collective agreement has absolutely no sense as 
the whole idea of collective bargaining is that it provides regulations that exceed Labour Code 
in favour of employees.” 
The principles of favourability and vertical hierarchy rule the relationship between 
legal norms at different levels. Thus, the single-enterprise collective agreements may 
only improve standards set by multi-enterprise agreements and statutory legal 
regulation. Opening clauses or clauses with similar functions do not exist in Polish 
law. However, it is possible to suspend the application of collective agreement, in its 
entirety or partially, at any level, including enterprise level. The rules on suspensions 
were introduced in 2002 and allow suspension for up to three years, the condition 
being that the employer is experiencing financial difficulty.701 The decision on 
suspension should be taken jointly by the parties to the collective agreement (if no 
trade union operates, then by representatives of employees in the company). Thus, 
such a joint decision can be said to represent some form of a collective accord. 
However, suspension may not be used to diminish employees’ rights that are 
anchored in the Labour Code: the minimum statutory rights must be respected. There 
is no comprehensive data on the use of these clauses in Poland – which could provide 
                                                          
699 Towalski, R. (2004) ‘Single-Establishment Bargaining in 2003 Examined’ Dublin: Eurofound, 
available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/single-establishment-bargaining-in-
2003-examined [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
700 Czarzasty, J. (2013) ‘Poland: Impact of the Crisis on Industrial Relations’ Dublin: Eurofound, 
available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/poland/poland-impact-of-the-crisis-on-industrial-relations [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
701 Gardawski, J. (2003) ‘More Flexible Labour Code Comes into Force’ Dublin: Eurofound, available 
at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/more-flexible-labour-code-comes-
into-force [accessed 1 August 2016].  
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interesting insight into industrial relations in that country – and existing studies have 
made only vague remarks that suspensions have not been used frequently.702  
 
2.2.  Collective bargaining parties 
 
2.2.1. Who can conclude collective agreements? 
Slovenia 
In Slovenia, only trade unions can sign collective agreements. Other forms of 
employee organisations at workplace level (such as works councils) cannot be parties 
to collective agreements. If more than one trade union operates in the workplace, a 
bargaining team can be formed pursuant to the provisions of the 2006 Act on 
Collective Agreements, in which case each trade union participating in the collective 
bargaining will be considered a signatory to the concluded agreement. According to 
the Act on Trade Union Representativeness of 1993, in order to become 
representative, and therefore to be able to sign company collective agreements, trade 
unions need to fulfil a set of qualitative criteria: to be independent from the state and 
employer, to have existed for at least six months, to be democratic in character and to 
have their own funding. Also, at company level the trade union should fulfil one 




Collective agreements are concluded only by trade unions, as other forms of 
employee representation cannot be parties to collective agreements. There are legal 
rules governing the collective bargaining parties when more than one trade union 
operates at company level. In these cases, the trade unions should firstly try to reach 
an agreement about their representation among themselves; but if such accord cannot 
be reached in 15 days, the decision of the trade union with the highest membership 
                                                          
702 E.g. 176 times in 2004, see Towalski, R. (2004) ‘Collective Agreements in 2004 Examined’ 
Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/collective-agreements-in-2004-
examined [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
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will be considered decisive in negotiations. There are no rules on representativeness 
in Slovakia. Such legal rules were only in existence for a short while during the crisis 
period, when an amendment of the Labour Code in 2011 stipulated that at least 30% 
of employees in the company should be members of a representative trade union (this 
provision was rescinded in January 2013, before it was even applied in practice).703 
This amendment has been interpreted as controversial by the interviewees: even 
though the rule applied only to newly established trade unions, the 30% threshold 
was seen as high, and also as not compatible with the ILO framework. At the same 
time, the interviewees saw this provision as possibly detrimental to company 
collective bargaining, because most companies lack already a trade union, and the 
largest part of some sectors consists of small companies only, where such a high 
threshold is difficult to reach.  
 
The Czech Republic 
As in the other countries examined in this study, in the Czech Republic collective 
agreements are concluded only by trade unions. Any other types of employee 
representation may not engage in collective bargaining. As more than one trade 
union may sometime operate in a workplace, the Labour Code specifies that in these 
cases the employer should negotiate collective agreement with all the trade unions. 
The unions are supposed to act jointly and in mutual consent, unless they agree 
differently amongst themselves about representation (Labour Code, section 24). This 
legal solution resulted from the Constitutional Court ruling of 2008 which repealed 
the earlier rule that an employer should negotiate with the largest trade union when 
no mutual consent is reached.704 A general feature of the Czech legal framework is 
the lack of rules on representativeness at any level. Differing from the Slovaks, the 
                                                          
703 Act no. 361/2012 Coll. 
704 Constitutional Court intervened in several areas with this ruling, repealing in total 11 provisions of 
the Labour Code (version of 2006 – Act No. 262/2006). This ruling was interpreted as weakening the 
overall trade union position, see Hála, J. and Verveková, S. (2008) ’Unions Claim Court’s Repeal of 
Labour Code will Diminish Trade Union Role’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/unions-claim-courts-repeal-of-labour-
code-will-diminish-trade-union-role [accessed 1 August 2016]; Hála, J. (2007) ‘Opposition to New 
Law on Union Plurality in Collective Bargaining’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/de/observatories/eurwork/articles/opposition-to-new-law-on-union-
plurality-in-collective-bargaining [accessed 1 August 2016].  
232 
 




The parties to single-enterprise agreements in Poland are the employer and the trade 
union organised at company level. As in the other three countries, only trade unions 
may conclude collective agreements and, as underlined by several interviewees, quite 
often in Poland several trade unions co-exist at the workplace. Because this can 
render the conclusion of collective agreement difficult, the law provides the 
possibility of all trade unions which operate at the workplace negotiating jointly. 
Negotiations can also be conducted with a few of the trade unions only, but in this 
case, at least one of them should fulfil the representativeness criteria. The Labour 
Code (Article 241.25) specifies conditions which trade unions must fulfil to be 
considered representative at this single-enterprise level:   
- If a trade union belongs to a multi-enterprise representative trade union, it 
should employ at least 7% of employees in the company,  
- If a trade union does not belong to a multi-enterprise trade union, it should 
employ at least 10% of employees,  
- If none of the trade unions fulfil these criteria, then the representative union 
will be considered to be the one employing the highest number of employees.  
The topic of trade union representativeness is particularly relevant for the pluralistic 
and fragmented industrial relations in Poland; the trade unions with whom the 
interviews were conducted considered the topic of representativeness particularly 
problematic. They pointed out that the problem of concluding single-enterprise 
collective agreement is not so much related to the plurality of trade unions at this 
level, as it is to the fact that these trade unions are too small to be representative. 
Interviewees have also reported cases of “yellow” trade unions. According to one of 
the interviewees from the trade union side, there are examples of the employers 
unofficially financing and supporting such “yellow” trade unions, with the aim of 




2.2.2. Organisation of trade unions and competences 
 
Slovenia 
There are no official data about the number of trade union organisations set up at 
company level. Trade unions are established pursuant to the Employment 
Relationship Act, without any specific legal restrictions. The trade unions negotiate 
collective agreements and share information and consultation rights together with the 
works councils (the division of their responsibilities is defined within the 
Employment Relationship Act).  
 
Slovakia 
The legal framework embodied in the Act on the Association of Citizens of 1990 
contains no specific restrictions on the trade union set up. The trade unions can 
mostly be found in medium or large enterprises, as it is difficult to set up unions in 
smaller companies. The Labour Code defines the rights of trade unions in the 
workplace, which, in addition to collective bargaining, includes a range of 
information and consultation powers and the supervision of the application of health 
and safety provision at the workplace. These trade union rights have been 
significantly curbed in comparison with the previous communist period. The 
communist trade union prerogatives, anchored under the 1965 Labour Code, were 
relatively broad, including the powers of trade unions to define working time, 
holidays and other aspects of working life.705 This argument should however be 
nuanced – the communist trade unions were not fully autonomous organisations, they 
were instruments of the communist party and the employees did not have the right to 
join the organisation of their choosing.706  
 
 
                                                          
705 Majtan, B. (2005) ‘The Labour Code in the Republic of Slovakia’ Employee Relations, vol 27, no 
6, p 605; also, Deak (1994), p 40 and Belina, M. (1996) ’Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the 
Czech Republic’ in R.  Blanpain and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Central 
and Eastern Europe (from Planned to Market Economy), Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 




The Czech Republic 
In the past two decades, the legal basis for establishing trade unions in the Czech 
Republic has been the 1990 Act on the Association of Citizens, enacted in the former 
state of Czechoslovakia. Since 2014, trade unions can be established only pursuant to 
the Civil Code.707 As in Slovakia, there are no specific legal restrictions concerning 
trade union establishment. The only legal condition which has been recently 
introduced is that a trade union should have as its members at least three 
employees.708 As respondents explained in interviews, this provision has been 
enacted as a form of legal insurance that a trade union can exist and be active in the 
workplace.  
The trade union landscape in the Czech Republic has been characterised as 
fragmented.709 The legacies of fragmentation can be found in the former communist 
period when the enterprise was the main sphere of operation for communist trade 
unions.710 The fragmentation was further underpinned by the very nature of the 
transitional process: the focus of the 1990s reforms was on enterprise and on 
enhancing trade union decentralisation. The focus on decentralisation reflected a 
deliberate rejection of the former centralised system and marked a return to 
individualism and freedoms.711 These reformative processes have given substantial 
leeway to local trade unions.712 The trade unions starting to operate at enterprise level 
were either those that had disassociated from the previously established unions at a 
higher level or were those that had emerged from scratch.713 
Today, according to estimated data obtained during the interviews, around 30% 
of companies have trade unions. As with the other countries of CEE, trade union 
organisation is more likely to be found in the larger than in the medium or small 
companies that predominate in some sectors (construction sector, for example). It 
should be stressed that the presence of a trade union in the workplace does not 
automatically mean that a collective agreement will be concluded. For example, 
                                                          
707 Act no. 89/2012 Coll, which came into effect on 1 January 2014. 
708 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 252.  
709 Myant, M. (2010) ’Trade Unions in the Czech Republic’ Report 115, Brussels: ETUI, p 12. 
710 Pollert (1997), p 207.  
711 Myant, M. and Smith, S. (1999) ‘Czech Trade Unions in Comparative Perspective’ European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 5, no 3, p 267; also Myant (2010), p 16; and Pollert (1997), p 218.   
712 Myant and Smith (1999), pp 276-278. 
713 Myant (2010), p 12. 
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according to recent data, around 23% of employees working in companies with trade 
unions were not covered by any company collective agreement in 2009.714  
The rights of trade unions are defined in the Labour Code. Apart from the 
rights to collective bargaining, trade unions may also enjoy rights of co-decisions as 
in many instances the Labour Code requires the trade union’s consent (for example, 
regarding the dismissals of employees).715 The trade unions also have rights of 
information and consultation, which are shared with works councils (for example, 
employers have an obligation to inform their employees on wage related issues or to 
consult them on various items).  
 
Poland 
The current picture of trade unionism in Poland is labelled as “competitive 
pluralism”,716 due to its fragmented and pluralised traits. This pluralisation and 
fragmentation, which appears in the form of a number of small trade union 
organisations operating in companies, and often not affiliated to any central 
organisation, has been emerging since the early period of economic transformation. 
Respondents at interviews explained that trade unions in companies rarely coordinate 
their activities with sectoral trade unions, and that trade union associations cannot 
control the outcome of single-establishment collective bargaining. According to 
available data, 55% of the total workforce in Poland is employed in companies where 
there is no trade union presence.717 The current trade union landscape originates in 
the legacies from the 1980s, when the trade union movement, Solidarity, famous for 
its engagement in anti-communist activities, was established. Legislation allowing 
trade unionism appeared earlier in Poland than in the other CEE countries. As the 
result of massive social unrest, on 25 September 1981 the Act on Workers’ Self-
Management in State-Owned Enterprises was passed, well known for establishing 
                                                          
714 Data from trade unioin confederation ČMKOS for 2009; see Myant (2010), p 20.  
715 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), pp 242-243.  
716 Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A. and Czarzasty, J. (2012) ’Trade Unions in Poland’ Brussels: ETUI, 
p 11.  
717 According to data presented in Hajn, Z. and Mitrus, L. (2016) ’Labour Law in Poland’ 
International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, p 244.  
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the principle of employee decision making in public enterprises.718 In December 
1981, there was martial law which aimed at lessening the influence of political 
opposition; it resulted in the banning of Solidarity’s activities and a ban on all the 
trade unions which operated at that time.719 In 1982, a new law had been passed 
enabling the formation of “new” trade unions, while the existing trade unions had 
been declared illegal (including Solidarity, which continued working 
‘underground’).720 This 1982 Act on Trade Unions paved the way for a decentralised 
trade union structure in Poland by encouraging the autonomy of company-level trade 
unions. The law reflected the intention of the authorities, afraid of any political 
engagement and opposition on the side of trade unions, to avoid the formation of any 
new Solidarity-like union in the near future.721 As the Polish scholar Sewerynski has 
noted, however, the 1982 law, which remained valid until the early 1990s, 
significantly weakened the trade union picture in Poland for several reasons: the 
1982 Act allowed the formation of trade unions at workplace level only, and it 
allowed the establishment of one trade union per one workplace only.722 As a 
consequence, these “new” trade unions were formed in a small percentage of 
workplaces only and operated in conflict with the underground organisation of 
Solidarity.723  
Following the demise of communism, in 1991 an amendment to the Act on 
Trade Unions allowed free trade union establishment in Poland. The trade union 
organisation was made free and independent from the state and employers, and it was 
possible to set up several unions in one workplace.724 This Act also represented a 
transposition of the ILO-based freedom of association into Polish national law.725 
According to this law, as few as 10 employees can form a trade union, but in 
practice, as explained throughout the interviews, setting up a trade union is a rather 
                                                          
718 Florek (1992), p 124; also, see Matey, M. (1986) ‘The Prospects for Labor Law Reform in Poland’ 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol 7, pp 621-622. 
719 Florek (1992), p 113. 
720 Sewerynski (1993), p 453. 
721 Gardawski, Mrozowicki and Czarzasty (2012), p 17; see also, Matey (1986), pp 621-632. 
722 Sewerynski (1993), p 453. 
723 ibid. 
724 Sewerynski, M. (1996) ‘Changes in Polish Labour Law and Industrial Relations during the Period 
of Post-Communist Transformation’ in R. Blanpain and L. Nagy (eds) Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (from Planned to Market Economy), Bulletin of 




challenging task. As the interviews revealed, trade unions are usually found in the 
companies that had been state-owned in the communist period and had been 
subsequently privatised. These companies had practiced some limited form of 
collective bargaining during the communist period and had therefore developed to 
some extent a collective bargaining culture. However, the interviewees explained 
that it is rather difficult to find a trade union in a company that had been organised 
from scratch in the post-communist period: the major reason is the lack of 
willingness on the employers’ side to support their set-up. They also said that the 
probability of finding a trade union in companies with foreign capital and 
multinationals is higher. The interviewees claim that setting up a trade union in 
smaller companies, with less than 20 employees is “virtually impossible”, which is 
the case, for example, in the construction sector.  
The trade unions engage in collective bargaining and enjoy a variety of 
information and consultation rights and rights of codetermination. The information 
and consultation rights are shared with works councils. 
 
2.3. Other issues  
 
2.3.1. Procedure of collective bargaining 
The collective bargaining procedure is uniformly prescribed for collective 
agreements concluded at any level in all four countries. Thus, this section will not 
reiterate what has already been said about this in Chapter 6. However, specific 
characteristics of the Polish legal framework will be mentioned again at this point, 
given their particular relevance for company collective bargaining. Differing from 
the provisions of the other three countries, the Polish Labour Code does not impose a 
general obligation on the bargaining party to reply to the written proposal, a process 
which would normally herald the beginning of the collective bargaining procedure. 
However, the Polish Labour Code sets out the conditions under which the bargaining 
party (usually the employer) may not refuse to enter into collective bargaining: when 
the employees are not covered by any agreement, when the bargaining is aimed at 
amending the current collective agreement to address the difficult economic situation 
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of employer or employees, and when the bargaining proposal has been issued prior to 
the expiry of the current agreement. The Polish Labour Code furthermore sets out the 
obligation of parties to bargain in good faith and provides a definition of it (Article 
241.3): trade unions may only issue “justified demands” in line with the financial 
capacities and economic situation of the employer. For employers, bargaining in 
good faith means that they should respect the interests of those employees not 
covered by the agreement. The Labour Code also explicitly lays down the obligation 
of the employer to disclose information on the economic situation to employees, but 
such obligation exists only when “necessary to hold responsible negotiations” 
(Article 241(4) of the Labour Code).  
 
2.3.2. Duration 
In Slovenia, the company collective agreement may be concluded for a definite or 
indefinite period, whilst in the latter case it may be cancelled provided six months’ 
notice is given. In Slovakia, collective agreements usually last for one year, unless 
otherwise specified by the parties to its provisions. In the Czech Republic, unless 
differently stipulated by the parties, collective agreements will last for up to one year. 
In Poland, the Labour Code stipulates that if the agreement has not been concluded 
for a definite period, a notice period of three months will apply (Article 241.7).  
 
2.3.3. To whom does the company collective agreement apply? 
In the four countries, the concluded company-level agreement binds all employees in 
the company, regardless of whether they are trade union members.  
 
2.4.  Beyond collective bargaining 
 
2.4.1. Employers’ unilateral standard setting 
Slovenia 
Individual employers in Slovenia can define rules and conditions of work and 
employment unilaterally in general acts which are regulated by the Employment 
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Relationship Act (the detailed procedure is covered in Article 10).726 In particular, if 
no trade union operates at the workplace, the general acts can regulate matters which 
would be otherwise covered by collective agreements. However, general acts cannot 
lower the conditions or reduce the rights of employees that have been guaranteed in 
the existing applicable collective agreements and statutory legal regulation. The 
adoption of such general acts is subject to certain conditions: before laying down the 
rules, the employer should consult the trade unions and works councils operating at 
the workplace. If no such employees’ representatives operate (which may be the case 
in smaller companies), the employer is obliged to consult the employees.  
 
Slovakia 
The employer can issue several forms of internal regulation at the level of the 
workplace. The provisions of these unilateral acts must conform to the provisions of 
the Labour Code: they may not contain provisions which are less favourable to the 
employees than those laid down by collective agreements and statutory labour law. 
One of such unilateral acts can be work rules which specify the rules and conditions 
of the Labour Code in line with the specific conditions at the workplace. These work 
rules can be issued, however, only with the prior consent of the employee 
representatives.  
 
The Czech Republic 
According to the Labour Code, the employers may engage in two different types of 
unilateral standard setting at the workplace. The first relates to internal regulations, 
which may specify wages and remuneration, but cannot contain provisions contrary 
to the applicable collective agreements and statutory labour laws. These provisions 
are issued for a least a year. The second type of unilateral acts are work rules which 
detail the provisions of the labour laws in line with the specific conditions at the 
workplace. The Labour Code explicitly notes that if a trade union is present in the 
company, the employer can issue or alter these work regulations only with the prior 
written consent of the trade union organisation. However, there are no legal rules in 
                                                          
726 The Employment Relationship Act adopted in 2013, Official Gazette, No. 21/13, 78/13.  
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place asking for prior consent or consultation with employees or employees’ 
representatives when no trade union is present in the company. With respect to the 
internal regulations, there is no obligation whatsoever on the employer to consult or 
obtain consent, even when a trade union operates at the workplace. 
  
Poland 
The employers can issue two types of unilateral acts. The first is work regulations 
(Article 104 of the Labour Code) which, in the absence of collective agreement, 
regulate working conditions in companies with more than 20 employees. The Labour 
Code broadly specifies that work regulations can cover items such as health and 
safety, methods of payment of remuneration, and working time. Work regulations 
can even deal with mass dismissals.727 Work regulations are agreed between an 
enterprise trade union and the employers – but, if there is no trade union in a 
company, these regulations can be issued unilaterally by the employer without any 
further consultation (as defined in the Article 104.2 of the Labour Code). The second 
type is remuneration regulations (regulated in Article 77.2 of the Labour Code). The 
employer is obliged to adopt these regulations in companies with at least 20 
employees if the company is not covered by any collective agreement. These 
regulations may determine remuneration for work and work-related benefits. If there 
is a trade union within the enterprise, then these regulations must also be agreed with 
the union. However, according to the Labour Code, there is no obligation on the 
employer to consult or obtain the consent of the employees or their representatives 
when no trade union operates at the workplace.   
 
2.4.2. Other forms of employee representation: works councils 
 
Slovenia 
The legal basis for works councils is the Act on Participation of Workers, adopted in 
1993 (amended in 2007). This Act, which was styled after the German model of 
                                                          
727 According to Sewerynski, M. (2004) ’The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe: 
National Report of Poland’ Project VS/2003/0219-SI2.359910, European Commission and University 
of Florence, p 11. 
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codetermination, provides rights of information and consultation to works councils.728 
Thus, unlike the other CEE countries, where their introduction resulted from the 
implementation of the EU acquis (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and to some 
extent Poland, as will be explained below), in Slovenia works councils were formed 
in the early 1990s. In support of its accession to the EU, Slovenia implemented the 
relevant EU acquis in 2002,729 but, available data shows no significant impact on 
industrial relations.730  
Slovenia has a comparatively more pronounced institutional legacy of works 
councils than the other three countries, because the self-management style of 
socialism in the former country of Yugoslavia helped Slovenia to hone a tradition of 
employee involvement. As explained in this study, the self-management paradigm 
centred on the idea of employees being the owners of the means of production and 
deciding collectively on all the relevant aspects of company’s life. The workers, 
organised through several bodies, managed to enjoy a certain level of autonomy in 
decision making. One of the most prominent forms involved “basic organisations of 
associated labour” which existed in units of socialist enterprises; these organisations 
could sign agreements and accords regulating the operation of the enterprise and its 
working conditions.731 Today, works councils, which are directly elected by 
employees, may be established in enterprises with more than 20 employees, but in 
the smaller companies it is possible to have a worker trustee. In Slovenia, works 
councils can coexist alongside trade unions. Scholars report that, initially, the 
introduction of works councils was well received by trade unions, but shortly 
afterwards, the unions began to see them as competitors.732 Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
728 Končar (1996), p 171.  
729 The Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure 
in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees was transposed in 2002. Directive 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community was transposed in 2007. 
730 Pavlin, S. (2009) ’Slovenia: The Impact of the Information and Consultation Directive’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-
information/national-contributions/slovenia/slovenia-the-impact-of-the-information-and-consultation-
directive [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
731 Concise classification and explanation of these self-management bodies can be found in Warner, 
M. (1990) ‘Yugoslav ‘Self-Management’ and Industrial Relations in Transition’ Industrial Relations 
Journal, vol 21, no 3, pp 209-220.  
732 Vodovnik, Z. (2004) ’Slovenia’ in R. Blanpain (ed) The Actors of Collective Bargaining, Bulletin 
of Comparative Labour Relations, no 51, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, no 51, p 238.  
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Slovenian experience with works councils has been more positive than in the other 
CEE countries.733 According to some estimates, there are works councils in around 
19% of companies,734 mostly in large companies. They cannot conclude collective 
agreements or any other type of binding agreements. Their powers are restricted to 
information and consultation, and these powers are shared with trade unions.735 In 
addition, works councils also enjoy rights of joint consultation and co-decision in 
certain cases.736 The powers of works councils have also been discussed before the 
Constitutional Court. In 2009, the Constitutional Court affirmed the right of works 
councils to be consulted in companies where no trade union operates; likewise, the 




Works councils were formally introduced in the Slovak legal system in the early 
2000s, with the implementation of the relevant EU directives.738 Certain forms of 
works councils had been in existence in the early period of communism (until 1959), 
and these communist works councils had the powers to protect the interests of 
employees by negotiating each relevant aspect of work and employment.739 After 
1959, trade unions became the only possible form of employee representation, and 
                                                          
733 Buchen, C. (2007) ‘Estonia and Slovenia as Antipodes’ in D. Lane and M. Myant (eds) Varieties of 
Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p 69. 
734 Eurofound, Kanjuo Mrčela (2015). 
735 The classification by Vodovnik, Z. (2015) ’Labour Law in Slovenia’ International Encyclopaedia 
for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 306.  
736  ibid.  
737 Plachtej, B. (2011) ‘Slovenia: EIRO CAR on the Effect of the Information and Consultation 
Directive on Industrial Relations in the EU Member States Five Years After its Transposition’ Dublin: 
Eurofound, available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-
information/national-contributions/slovenia/slovenia-eiro-car-on-the-effect-of-the-information-and-
consultation-directive-on-industrial  [accessed 1 August 2016].  
738 With the Labour Code, amendment No. 311/2001 which entered into force in 2002 (with the effect 
as of May 2004, following Slovakia’s membership of the EU) the Council Directive 94/45/EC on the 
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees was 
implemented. Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, was 
implemented with the Act 210/2003 which came into force on 1 July 2003. 
739 The historical overview provided in Munkova, M. (2003) ’Law on Employee Participation 
Amended’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/law-on-employee-participation-
amended [accessed 1 August 2016].  
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works councils were enabled only in the early 2000s.740 In reality, the introduction of 
works councils has not been welcomed by trade unions: they are perceived as 
competition. When introduced, works councils could not operate in parallel to trade 
unions. This state of affairs changed soon after works councils were introduced in 
law: since 2003, trade unions and works councils may coexist in a company. 
According to estimates, there are works councils in only around 17% of 
companies.741 They can be set up in companies with more than 50 employees, while 
in smaller companies it is possible to have works trustees (with the same type of 
responsibilities as works councils). Under to the Labour Code, works councils have 
information and consultation rights. They may also engage in joint decision-making 
with the employer and perform inspection activities at the workplace but the division 
of competences, in principle, favours trade unions. According to the provisions, if 
both trade union and works council operate at the workplace, it is the trade union that 
will have the right to collective bargaining, joint decision making, receiving 
information and inspection activities. Nevertheless, the division of competences 
between the works councils and the trade unions have changed a few times in the 
past decade, but, in a nutshell, the trade unions have always had more rights at the 
workplace, including the right to collective bargaining and co-decision making.742 
 
The Czech Republic 
The institutional legacies of works councils have been briefly mentioned above in 
relation to the Slovakian example. In the post-transitional context, works councils 
were officially introduced in the Czech Republic in 2000, following the 
implementation of the EU Directive on European Works Council 94/45/EC.743 The 
                                                          
740 ibid., however, with a short period from 1988-1990 when the specific form of ’self-administrative 
bodies’ consisting of all company employees was made available. 
741 Data available at:  
http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Slovak-
Republic/Workplace-Representation.  
742 Current framework described by: Czíria, L. (2013) ’Collective Bargaining and Balanced Recovery: 
The Case of the Slovak Republic’ Bratislava: Institute for Labour and Family Research, retrieved 
from http://www.ivpr.gov.sk/IVPR/images/IVPR/2013/collective.pdf [accessed 20 May 2015], p 5.  
743 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 237. Furthermore, the Directive 2002/14/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 




interviewees claimed that their introduction was problematic given that the country 
lacked a tradition of such bodies. The interviewees also explained that this particular 
way of giving employees a voice in the workplace has not spread widely. Today, 
works councils can be established in companies with more than 25 employees. 
Initially, the Labour Code did not allow the coexistence of works councils and trade 
unions (this was a Czech model which was also adopted in the other CEE countries). 
Following a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2008, works councils were 
eventually enabled in workplaces where trade unions already existed.744 As is the 
case in the other countries at the focus of this study, works councils may not engage 
in collective bargaining, and their role is limited to information and consultation 
rights, a role which is also shared with the trade unions. Yet, as noted by scholarship, 
the statutory legal regulation prefers trade unions over works councils, providing the 
former with broader powers, not only regarding collective bargaining (as a 
competence solely of trade unions), but also regarding information and consultation 
rights and rights of co-decision.745  
 
Poland 
Polish works councils have a certain legacy: some form of works councils had been 
in existence in the 1950s.746 These “socialist” works councils were replaced in the 
1980s with another type of works council which could be formed in state owned 
enterprises, pursuant to the Act on Workers’ Self-Management in State-Owned 
Enterprises of 1981.747 The transposition of the relevant EU laws enabled works 
councils to be formed in private sector companies, too. Thus, today works councils 
can be formed on the basis of two different legal acts:  
(a) the Act on Workers’ Self-Management in State-Owned Enterprises of 1981, 
thus in the state-owned (public) sector, or 
                                                          
744 Pichrt and Štefko (2015), p 238.  
745 Pichrt, J. (2010) ‘Czech Republic: European Works Council Country Report’ in R. Blanpain andF. 
Hendrickx (eds) International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, p 18. 
746 Federowicz, M. and Levitas, A. (1995) ’Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism’ 
in J. Rogers and W. Streeck (eds) Works Councils: Consultation, Representation and Cooperation in 
Industrial Relations, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p 289.  
747 See Federowicz and Levitas (1995), pp 293-294.  
245 
 
(b) the 2006 Act on Information and Consultation, which implemented the 
respective EU Directive on Information and Consultation 2002/14/EC, allowing 
works councils in the private sector. 748 
The 2006 Act allowed works councils to be established in private companies 
with more than 50 employees. These works councils have information and 
consultation rights only and may not conclude collective agreements. Initially, works 
councils could be established only in workplaces where no trade union operated, but 
since the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 2008, works councils can coexist with trade 
unions in workplaces.749 They are not widespread in Poland: in the first place, this 
can be explained by the predominance in the Polish economy of small enterprises 
where setting up works council is difficult, but it can also be attributed to reluctance 
of employers to support workers involvement.750 This reluctance was the reason that 
works councils were introduced in the private sector only in the mid-2000s. At the 
same time, as interviewees explained, the trade unions were fiercely opposed to their 
instigation, perceiving them as competition. A possible additional explanation lies in 
the fact that the works councils in the public sector were traditionally opposed to 
policy making (more concretely, to the policy of privatisation) and, thus, the policy 
makers were reluctant to introduce works councils to the private sector.751 In fact, the 
tripartite social pact signed in 1993 eliminated the possibility of establishing works 
councils in those companies which were undergoing the privatisation process.752 The 
2006 Act, which eventually allowed their formation in the private sector, was 
adopted after a lengthy debate, where the items most hotly discussed were the 
powers of works councils, the model for their election processes, and whether the 
“Czech model” of a single-representation channel should be adopted.753 
                                                          
748 It is also relevant to add that the Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees was implemented in 2002. 
749 Gardawski et al., p 25. Also, Meardi, G. (2012a) Social Failures of EU Enlargement: A Case of 
Workers Voting with Their Feet, New York: Routledge, p 34. 
750 Gardawski et al. (2012), p 25. 
751 Flanagan, R. (1998) ’Institutonal Reformation in Eastern Europe’ Industrial Relation, vol 37, no 3, 
p 349.  
752 Cox, T. M. and Mason, B. (2000b) ‘Trends and Developments in East Central European Industrial 
Relations’ Industrial Relations Journal, vol 31, no 2, p 101. 
753As summarised by Czarzasty, J. and Towalski, R. (2006) ‘Information and Consultation Bill 
Adopted’ Dublin: Eurofound, available at:  
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3. Comparative overview: Company collective agreements and the company as 
the locus of standard setting in CEE 
 
3.1. Introduction: Explaining the legal and institutional framework for company 
standard setting 
The company evolved as the predominant level for standard setting in CEE for a few 
reasons. In the first place, as outlined in section 2, the company has been perceived 
in CEE countries as the most appropriate venue to deliver tailor-made decisions for 
employees. At the same time, the focus on the company was vital in order to 
facilitate competitiveness and adjustments to market demands: “flexibility” became 
the catchphrase of CEE economies,754 and the company has become the locus “where 
many industrial relations processes of CEE have been developed”.755 
However, a number of issues made a development of legal framework 
particularly challenging at this level. Likewise, there is a lack of trade union presence 
in the SMEs which dominate many sectors of the economy.756 It is possible to argue 
that labour laws in CEE are based on the tacit assumption that large companies are 
the dominant mode of work organisation (as the legacy of the communist system) 
and that it is hard to find provisions which are tailor-made for small companies.757 
Additionally, the change in ownership structures throughout the privatisation process 
has, in the first instance, affected processes at company level.758 Privatisation was one 
of the key processes driving the outcome of company collective bargaining because 
the change in the ownership structure dictated developments at this level. At the 
same time, private companies were less likely to sign collective agreements than 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/information-and-consultation-bill-
adopted [accessed 1 August 2016]. 
754 Bronstein, A. (2006) ‘Trends and Challenges of Labour Law in Central Europe’ in J. D. R. Craig 
(ed) Globalisation and the Future of Labour Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 197.  
755 As noted by Vickerstaff, S. A. and Thirkell, J. E. M. (2000) ‘Instrumental Rationality and 
European Integration: Transfer or Avoidance of Industrial Relations Institutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe?’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 6, no 2, p 241. 
756 Yet the problem of employee representation and collective bargaining in SMEs is not restricted to 
CEE; for more information, see Biagi, M. (1994) ‘Labour Law in Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises: Flexibility or Adjustment?’ Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol 16, pp 439-466.  
757 This argument was particularly underlined by Bronstein (2006), p 200. 
758 Aguilera and Dabu particularly argued that privatisation was one of the factors which brought the 
issue of labour governance at the forefront at the enterprise level in CEE, see Aguilera, R. V. and 
Dabu, A. (2005) ‘Transformation of Employment Relations Systems in Central and Eastern Europe’ 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 47, no 1, p 17 and p 22.   
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(former) public ones:759 the newly founded private companies did not have any 
collective bargaining culture. Moreover, the trends of decreasing trade union density 
rates contributed to weakening trade unions at this level and shifting the powers to 
employers. Bearing in mind all the arguments listed, collective bargaining at 
company level in CEE can be rightfully described, as Pollert notes, as “an amorphous 
term” with unorganised labour and powerful management.760  
How can the legal framework for company collective agreements in the four 
countries be best explained? The practices of European countries differ and it is not 
possible to identify a “golden” formula for what a legal framework should look like. 
Despite the national variations, in continental European countries, company-level 
agreements do represent a relevant locus for standard setting, but are also part and 
parcel of the multi-level system. Thus, in explaining these agreements it is first and 
foremost critical to understand the role that these agreements play in a broader 
system. With the persisting trend of downward decentralisation in Europe, collective 
agreements at sectoral and company level have been subject to substantial changes. 
Sectoral collective agreements have been providing leeway for a more substantial 
arrangements to be made at company level where they can be more responsive to 
local needs. The opening up of regulatory space for company level has also changed 
the function of sectoral collective agreements – they are less concerned with 
prescribing standard levels, but rather with setting minimum levels in a sector, as 
noted by Visser.761 Consequently, company collective agreements have become 
instruments for fine-tuning working conditions in line with the needs of companies. 
Being part of a broader system, company collective agreements remained connected 
to the other standard-setting levels with the logic of top-down and bottom-up 
processes, as explained by Marginson and Sisson.762 Within the top-down processes, 
the company collective agreements derive their powers from collective agreements 
concluded at sectoral and cross-sectoral levels, which determine their scope and 
                                                          
759 Vaughan-Whitehead,  D. (2003) EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain Future of 
the European Social Model, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 241-243. 
760 Pollert, A. (2000) ‘Ten Years of Post-Communist Central Eastern Europe: Labour’s Tenuous 
Foothold in the Regulation of the Employment Relationship’ Economic and Industrial Democracy, 
vol 21, no 2, p 186.  
761 See Visser, J. (2012) ’The Rise and Fall of Industrial Unionism’ Transfer: European Review of 
Labour and Research, vol 18, no 2, p 139. 
762 Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. (2006) European Integration and Industrial Relations: Multi-Level 
Governance in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p 166. 
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function. Within the bottom-up processes, as Marginson and Sisson note, sectoral 
collective agreements in some countries are periodically and regularly reviewed and 
altered to reflect company-level dynamics.763 In explaining the mechanisms which 
connect the company level to the other levels, it is relevant to reiterate what has been 
said in Chapter 1, that the checks and balances which in various forms may exist in 
the articulated model of multi-employer bargaining are crucial for defending the 
system against uncontrolled decentralisation. Sectoral collective agreements can have 
the role of checks and balances, since they prescribe conditions for company 
collective bargaining and set sector-wide standards. The extent to which sectoral 
collective agreements may perform this role varies (different scenarios postulated by 
Marginson and Sisson have been presented in the previous Chapter 6). In any case, 
all scenarios involve different degrees of what these authors termed the “hollowing-
out” of sectoral collective agreements, which takes place at the expense of expanding 
company-level standard setting.764  
The focus of the following sections will not only be on scrutinising about how 
CEE company collective agreements are connected to sector and other levels. 
Bearing in mind the lack of collective bargaining tradition in CEE, it will also be 
necessary to check whether the basic postulates related to social partners and 
collective bargaining are in place in the four countries. In this respect, it is useful to 
underline that one of the purposes of collective bargaining regulation is workplace 
democracy. As explained by Davidov, the quest for workplace democracy is justified 
by inequalities in bargaining powers at the workplace level and the democratic 
deficit which is inherently built into the employment relationship.765 Without 
“joining forces” and redeeming their bargaining powers, the individual employees 
may not take part in decision making on the matters which are of direct concern for 
them.766 With workplace democracy in mind, collective bargaining has two distinct 
attributes: (a) it subjects the employer to the rule of law and prevents arbitrariness in 
decision making; (b) it also provides the employees with a “voice”, enabling them to 
                                                          
763 As it is the case in Germany and Italy, see Marginson and Sisson, ibid., p 166.  
764 ibid, p 165.  
765 Davidov, G. (2004) ‘Collective Bargaining Laws: Purpose and Scope’ The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol 20, no 1, p 83.  
766 ibid., 84. 
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engage in decision making.767 Rule of law has been also underlined by Ewing, who 
postulated three guiding principles of workplace democracy which emanate from it:  
“the relationship between employer and worker should be governed by clear rules; the rules 
governing the employment relationship should be comprehensive in their coverage unless there 
are rational grounds for discriminating between different groups of workers; the rules 
governing the employment relationship should not confer unnecessary discretionary power on 
management; and any such discretionary powers should be fair, consistent and rational in their 
application [emphasis added].”768 
 These “workplace democracy” principles will be taken into account when assessing 
the legal provisions from the four countries.  
 
3.2.  Company collective agreements: Notion and articulation                
Based on the overview of the legal framework in the previous section (but also in 
Chapter 6), it can be argued that, at the beginning of the 1990s, CEE laws focused on 
the company. The legal framework’s focus on the company emerged from the 
general orientation of the post-transitional systems towards decentralisation. This 
focus of CEE political and economic systems on the company also ensued from a 
shift from the previous system of state centralisation, and from the process of 
democratisation and newly founded freedoms and private property.769 At any rate, 
this is evident in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia where the concept of 
collective agreements concluded at the company level (known as single-enterprise or 
enterprise agreements in these countries) were legally contrasted against the “other” 
types of collective agreements (multi-enterprise or higher-level collective 
agreements). This delineation was already in place in the early 1990s and has 
remained unchanged in these countries. Slovenia represents a somewhat a specific 
case in that its laws initially specified demarcation of the collective bargaining levels 
at company, sectoral and cross-sectoral level, but, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, the Slovenian Act on Collective Agreements of 2006 removed reference to 
                                                          
767 ibid., p 85. 
768 Ewing, K. D. (1995) ‘Democratic Socialism and Labour Law’ Industrial Law Journal, vol 24, no 
2, pp 127-128.  
769 Iankova, E. A. (2002) Eastern European Capitalism in the Making, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p 17; also Martin, R. (2006) ‘Segmented Employment Relations: Post-Socialist 
Managerial Capitalism and Employment Relations in Central and Eastern Europe’ The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, vol 17, no 8, p 1359.   
250 
 
specific collective bargaining levels. In Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the 
law does not specify the meaning of single-enterprise or enterprise collective 
agreements: these agreements are defined by the parties that can conclude them, but 
it is not clear if they should refer to the entire company or to part of it, and whether 
more than one agreement can be concluded at the company level.  
What is the role of CEE company collective agreements in terms of content 
and what position do they occupy in the multi-level system? Unfortunately, the 
general lack of comprehensive data on the content of these agreements prevents 
reasonable assessment. The previous section demonstrated that, in principle, 
company-level agreements in the four countries cover the same or similar matters as 
any existing collective agreements at higher levels, but their role is to specify rights 
and conditions in line with the company or workplace environment. During the 
interviews in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland, respondents claimed that 
company-level collective agreements are a more prominent source of workplace 
standards than sectoral collective agreements. This claim was confirmed during 
interviews in Slovenia, too, although there the interviewees also emphasized the 
relevance of the sector. Generally, in all four countries, the significance of company-
level bargaining was particularly underlined in relation to wages and different forms 
of remuneration. As long as there are company collective agreements (bearing in 
mind the relatively modest coverage rates presented in Table 8 of this chapter), they 
represent the “real” locus of standard setting in the four countries.  
Yet there is an issue which was explained in the previous chapter and which 
remains valid when discussing company collective agreements. In all four countries, 
the substantive scope of collective agreements (sectoral and company) has been 
affected by a gradual transformation in the style of statutory regulation. This 
involved the transformation from a style which regulates all relevant aspects of work 
in a comprehensive and mandatory manner to one which postulates minimum 
substantive rights and further encourages collective bargaining, as explained in 
Chapter 3 (section 4.2) and in Chapter 6 (section 3.1.2).  These chapters explained 
that it was only in the 2000s that the four CEE countries formally inserted legal rules 
claiming the freedom of social partners to negotiate on any matters. However, the 
statutory legal regulation remains comprehensive in these countries (particularly in 
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Poland and the Czech Republic) and it is questionable, therefore, whether this 
process of gradual transformation has been fully accomplished. The comprehensive 
regulatory style demotivates social partners from collective bargaining, as explained 
in Chapter 3 (see section 4.2.1), as they often see no added value in negotiating over 
matters that have already been stipulated in law. 
To fully judge company collective agreements one has to take into 
consideration their articulation with the other sources of standard setting. The legal 
frameworks presented in section 2 are based on rigid top-down articulation between 
different sources, anchored by the favourability principle. The rigidness is reflected 
in the legal framework discouraging the option of stipulating less favourable 
standards and rights for employees at company level than standards set at other 
levels. It is further accentuated by the fact that the Labour Codes tend to regulate 
matters in a comprehensive and detailed manner, in this sense predetermining the 
content of collective agreements. As explained, one respondent in the Czech 
Republic has even claimed that individual employers see no point in allowing the 
possibility of opening clauses or clauses with a similar function, as the law provides 
them with the opportunity to avoid collective bargaining altogether and to simply 
resort to internal regulation at company level. 
With these arguments in mind, how can the connection between company-level 
agreements and sectoral agreements be explained? Both cover the same or similar 
issues, yet it is useful to recall that sectoral collective agreements (where they exist) 
set low standards, often reiterating statutory labour provisions (as explained in 
Chapter 6). As an extension of what has been explained in Chapter 6, it should be 
added that sectoral collective agreements thus represent a weak authority over 
company-level agreements: the sector level encourages a wide variation in company-
level solutions, being only weakly “controlled” from above.  
Nevertheless, when speaking about articulation, certain variations among the 
countries can be observed. These variations have been already discussed in Chapter 
6. It has been observed that Slovenia’s system resembles the normative model of 
articulated multi-employer bargaining set out in in Chapter 1 most, while Poland 
resembles it least. In addition to what has been presented before, a specific case is the 
legal possibility in Poland of allowing the suspension of the collective agreement (at 
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any level). When suspension is activated, it is no longer possible to speak about 
articulation, as the logic of the multi-level system becomes frustrated. If Polish 
single-enterprise agreements are suspended (which is more likely to occur than the 
suspension of multi-enterprise agreements in Poland), employees will, in most cases, 
derive rights directly from statutory legal rules or from internal regulation by 
employers where applicable.  
 
3.3.  Parties to company collective agreements 
From a comparative perspective, the right to be a party to company collective 
agreement is sometimes restricted to trade unions, but on occasion it can also be 
granted to works councils or even to a few employees.770 The legal rules on 
representativeness may also vary. Many countries legally require trade unions to be 
representative if they are to be permitted to sign collective agreements; the 
quantitative threshold that trade unions must fulfil varies between 10 and 65 percent 
of employees.771 It should be noted that the ILO framework allows, but does not 
oblige, countries to establish rules on representativeness, but it contains no closer 
guidance on this point. The ILO rules only require trade unions to be independent, to 
be able to organise their activities without interference from the public authorities 
and to be independent from employers’ associations.772 The ILO rules also require 
any criteria for representativeness to be based on objective and pre-established 
conditions in order to avoid bias or abuse.773  
Before commenting on the legal rules of the four CEE countries, it is important 
to reiterate two salient points. Firstly, the issue of declining trade union membership 
rates in CEE is most evident at company level, hindering the formation of basic trade 
unions. Secondly, there is a problem in the lack of trade union presence in the 
otherwise prevailing small and medium enterprises across the CEE economies. This 
                                                          
770 As noted by Jacobs, A. (2013) ’Article 11 ECHR: the Right to Bargain Collectively’ in F. 
Dorssemont, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds) The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Employment Relation, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p 316.  
771 ibid., pp 318-319, but also mentioning that in one case the ILO bodies considered the threshold of 
one-third of workers to be too high. 
772 Gernigon, B., Odero, A. and Guido, H. (2000b) ’ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ 
International Labour Review, vol 139, no 1, pp 37-38. 
773 Jacobs (2013), p 320. 
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problem has been identified and warned of in the literature.774 The previous section 
demonstrated that rules on setting up trade unions were established early on in the 
transitional period, and while rules on representativeness are in place in Slovenia and 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia still struggle to establish them. Slovenian 
and Polish rules set no restrictive conditions (though the Slovakian 30% rule which 
was in force for a short period could be interpreted as restrictive).775  
Inter-union rivalry represents a specific issue which has been documented 
elsewhere as common in CEE countries.776 It was also deemed particularly important 
during the interviews in the Czech Republic and Poland. The previous section 
suggested that the legal framework struggles to identify in a clear manner who 
should be the collective bargaining party on the employees’ side when more than one 
trade union exists in the workplace. The Czech, Slovak and Polish legal frameworks, 
especially, provide a complex set of rules for these situations. However, in some 
instances, when laws require trade unions to cooperate and reach joint agreement 
about their representation, it is unclear what should happen if they fail to reach such 
an agreement (in Slovenia and the Czech Republic). 
 
3.4.  Procedure 
Here only a short commentary can be made about the Polish Labour Code, which 
seems to more resolutely protect the employers’ interests than do the provisions in 
the other three countries. This observation stems from the legal obligation of trade 
unions to refrain from making demands which exceed the employers’ financial 
capacity and the limitation of the employers’ obligation to disclose information on 





                                                          
774 Vaughan-Whitehead (2003), p 242.  
775 This was also mentioned during the interviews in Slovakia. 
776 As noted by Pollert (2000), pp 194-195. 
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3.5.  Beyond collective bargaining 
 
3.5.1. Works councils 
Despite legacies from the previous communist period (as demonstrated in section 
2.4.2) during which some form of works councils had been in existence in CEE, their 
formal instigation in the post-transitional period has taken place relatively recently. 
Their introduction was welcomed by the EU, especially since it was part of the social 
acquis.777 However, the role of the EU seems to have been limited: in a recent 
evaluation by Meardi, works councils were labelled as weak and insignificant in the 
overall industrial relations landscape of CEE.778 Meardi noted that the transfer of 
information and consultation rights from the EU acquis unfortunately did not lead to 
significant improvements in industrial relations in CEE; what the EU has neglected is 
that works councils have been successfully introduced only in those European 
countries which already had strong organised labour.779 The general antagonism of 
trade unions (and even employers) to works councils, attested to by the interviewees 
in the four countries, was the reason that the Czech Republic initially allowed them 
only in companies where no trade union operated, and this model was adopted in 
other countries in the early 2000s.780 As the previous sections have demonstrated, this 
“Czech model” was subsequently changed in the selected countries - today the four 
countries allow the coexistence of trade unions and works councils in the same 
workplace.  
In comparative labour law systems, works councils can, in principle, be granted 
certain standard-setting powers by being allowed to conclude some form of 
collective accords.781 In CEE this has not been the case, and, in all likelihood, it will 
not happen in the near future. Because of the general reluctance to have works 
councils, in the four countries they are not provided with any legal possibility of 
                                                          
777 Weiss, M. (2004) ‘The Future of Workers’ Participation in the EU’ in C. Barnard, S. Deakin and 
G. Morris (eds) The Future of Labour Law: Libber Amicorum Bob Hepple QC, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, pp 248-251. 
778 Meardi (2012a), pp 32-33. 
779 ibid. 
780 ibid. 
781 For example, in Germany, where certain set of matters such as dismissals and occupational health 
and safety are decided by works councils; see Davidov, G., Freedland, M. and Kountouris, N. (2015) 
‘The Subjects of Labor Law: ‘Employees’ and other Workers’ in Finkin, M. W. and Mundlak, G. 
(eds) Comparative Labor Law, Cheltenham: Edvard Elgar, pp 311-313. 
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engaging in collective bargaining and standard setting. The previous section has 
noted that they enjoy information and consultation rights, and that these rights are 
usually shared with trade unions. However, examining the four countries’ legal 
provisions gives the overall impression that there is actually no crystal clear 
demarcation of the responsibilities between trade unions and works councils in any 
of the four countries. A blatant example is the Polish Labour Code which makes no 
reference to works councils at all. Instead, their powers are regulated by the Polish 
2006 Act on Information and Consultation.    
 
3.5.2. Managerial powers: individualisation of terms and conditions of work  
The unilateral standard-setting role of employers represents a significant source of 
rights for employees in CEE. This can be concluded from the industrial relations data 
presented in Table 1 (Chapter 1): low coverage rates of company agreements, 
combined with the low coverage of collective agreements at other levels in CEE 
(with the exception of Slovenia). For the majority of the workforce, the source of the 
rights and conditions at the workplace resides in statutory labour law only. Internal 
rules, therefore, may be useful to mimic the function of collective agreements in the 
sense of specifying and interpreting labour law in line with the requirements of the 
workplace. This is most likely to take place in SMEs: traditionally having no 
attachment to collective bargaining, their focus is shifting to more pronounced 
unilateral managerial powers.782 However, the issue described is not restricted to 
small companies as internal rules may also be issued in larger companies. In fact, in 
countries such as Poland, internal regulations may not be issued in companies with 
less than 20 employees, where the rules and conditions are therefore most likely to be 
decided only on the basis of the individual employment relationship.  
The high incidence of standard setting by unilateral acts of employers results 
from the overall orientation of the decentralised and fragmented system of industrial 
relations in CEE. In these countries the lack of a centralised framework suits 
employers, and the system favour the emergence of managerial elites dominating at 
                                                          
782 Bluhm, K. (2008) ’Resolving Liberalisation Dilemma: Labour Relations in East-Central Europe 
and the Impact of European Union’ in M.A. Moreau and M. E. Blas-López (eds) Restructuring in the 
New EU Member States: Social Dialogue, Firms Relocation, and Social Treatment of Restructuring, 
Brussels: Peter Lang, p 68. 
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enterprise level.783 Weak labour and powerful employers’ prerogatives shift the focus 
away from collective bargaining and drive it towards the individual relationship 
between employer and employee. The standards are no longer prescribed in 
collective agreements, but they are prescribed by unilateral acts and individual 
employment contracts. To Vickerstaff and Thirkell, the process of individualisation 
as described further fragments the world of work in CEE.784 It has been observed by 
Pollert, based on the example of the Czech Republic, that such a trend towards 
individualisation has been fostered since the early 1990s because the reforms were 
focused on strengthening company identity, rather than collective voice.785 However, 
taking into consideration the general industrial relations landscape in CEE, especially 
at company level, it is doubtful if such a trend is welcome from the point of view of 
the institutionalisation of collective bargaining in CEE. It is, nevertheless, a positive 
development that the legal framework in each of the four countries contains rules 
which, in line with Ewing’s postulates on workplace democracy, control the 
prerogatives of the employer and also restrict the employer’s ability to act 
arbitrarily.786 In all four countries, likewise, the law asks for prior consultation with 
trade unions, works councils or employees before any internal regulations can be 




4.1. Notes on development 
In the communist period, collective bargaining has been rather limited and the trade 
union’s role has been the one of protecting employees and facilitating achievement 
of the centrally administered goals.787 The membership rates were high. Since trade 
                                                          
783 Martin, R. (2013) Constructing Capitalisms: Transforming Business Systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 213; Martin, R. (2002) ‘Politicised Managerial 
Capitalism: Enterprise Structures in Post-Socialist Central and Eastern Europe’ Journal of 
Management Studies, vol 39, no 6, p 833. 
784 Vickerstaff and Thirkell (2000), p 241.  
785 Pollert, A. (2001) ‘Labour and Trade Unions in the Czech Republic, 1989-2000’ in S. Crowley and 
D. Ost (eds) Workers after Workers’ State: Labour and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, 
Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 25-26; also, Pollert (1997).  
786 Ewing (1995), p 127. 
787As explained by Flanagan (1998), p 338. 
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unions administered a significant portion of employees’ benefits, such as housing 
and holidays, they were even labelled as “servicing machines”.788 Accordingly, 
communist companies were considered as not only economic but social units, due to 
their pronounced social and welfare functions.789 The transition from communism to 
an open market economy involved the transformation of trade union functions, and 
companies (employers) merely lost the social component. This change seems to have 
impacted on trade unions first and foremost at company level, given the emphasis of 
post-transitional industrial relations on localised standard-setting as well as the need 
for trade unions to continue to present membership as an attractive option.  
In order to explain which factors were crucial for building a legal framework at 
company level, following the analytical framework based on Bohle and Greskovit’s 
delineation (Chapter 2), one may conclude the following. Of all CEE countries, 
Slovenia stands out as having the most developed legacy from the previous socialist 
period, the legacy of self-management, which helped this country hone a tradition of 
employee involvement in decision making. However, the nature of Slovenian post-
transitional reforms, as already explained in this study, has been more concerned 
with centralised collective bargaining levels. In fact, the company was not a priority 
of policy reforms. The Polish example serves as a contrast to the Slovenian model. 
The legal framework encouraging collective bargaining at single-enterprise level 
started emerging in the 1980s, before the official commencement of the transitional 
period (the aforementioned 1982 Act on Trade Unions and the 1981 Act on Workers’ 
Self-Management in State-Owned Enterprises). As a result of these Acts, trade 
unions and works councils were formed in Poland. Since the 1990s, the Polish 
transformation has been all about the enterprise: the legal framework, created in the 
1980s, paved the way for the company to occupy a dominant position in the current 
system. This argument is complementary to the one postulated in Chapter 6, that 
development at sector and cross-sector levels was not a priority of policy reforms. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia share common legacies. Anchored by the 1965 
Labour Code, under the communist regime the trade unions nominally enjoyed wide 
powers: they could determine wages and working conditions and participate in the 
                                                          
788 Ost, D. (2002) ‘The Weakness of Strong Social Movements: Model of Unionism in the East 
European Context’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 8, no 1, p 37.   
789 Ost, D. and Weinstein, M. (1999) ‘Unionists against Unions: Toward Hierarchical Management in 
Post–Communist Poland’ East European Politics and Societies, vol 13, no 1, p 14.  
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management of the company. After the demise of the common state, both countries 
started developing their own systems. As suggested in the previous chapter, the basic 
difference between the Slovak and Czech system is that transitional policy making in 
the Czech Republic was more influenced by neoclassical market ideas and was more 
oriented towards company standard setting. Slovakia was more concerned, 
comparatively, with centralised standard-setting. 
 
4.2. Assessing the legal framework for company collective bargaining 
As already outlined in Chapter 6 (section 3.1.1), in the early 1990s, the laws of 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland postulated the company as the main tenet 
of their collective bargaining systems. This conclusion was reached primarily on the 
basis of the delineation of enterprise-level and multi-enterprise or higher-level 
agreements in these countries. Yet, the extent to which these countries today manage 
to support and promote meaningful collective bargaining at company level is subject 
to further debate. In line with the analytical remarks postulated in Chapter 3 (section 
2.2), one can observe the active involvement of both institutionalisation and market 
narrative in shaping the company collective agreement in these countries. 
Although  these laws put the company at the forefront of legal transformation 
in the early 1990s, there remains the impression that, during the past two decades, the 
institutionalisation of company collective bargaining has not been a greater policy 
priority, overall, than the other (centralised) collective bargaining levels. Two major 
factors give rise to such an impression. In the first place, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, the policy makers defined the most important elements of company 
collective bargaining in the early 1990s, but the subsequent legal amendments were 
not specifically aimed at promoting the company to any greater extent than any other 
collective bargaining level. Subsequent legal amendments of the past two decades 
were concerned, almost by default, with the issue of rivalry between trade unions, 
and rivalry between trade unions and works councils. Yet further refinement of the 
concept of the company collective agreement, with elements which could enhance 
company collective bargaining, was not a specific policy priority. Today it still 
remains unclear whether single-enterprise or enterprise collective agreements can be 
concluded for a part of the company only. Also, in countries such as the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia, there are no legal rules about trade union representativeness 
at this level.  
Secondly, company collective bargaining still faces major challenges which the 
law has not managed to address. It is striking that, because of the limited coverage 
rates of company agreements, a substantial proportion of the labour market in the 
countries examined (with the exception of Slovenia) still remains outside the 
collective bargaining system. Additionally, negotiated standard setting in small 
companies still represents a major challenge for these countries, while the laws 
contain no tailor-made solutions for collective standard setting in these companies. 
The market narrative has played a visible role at company level. In the first 
place, as discussed in section 3.4, in Poland the collective bargaining procedure is 
formulated in a way which protects the employers’ side from excessive financial 
demands on the trade union side. On a more general level, the market narrative is 
visible through several aspects in the four CEE countries, which overall, undermine 
the efforts of institutionalisation of company collective bargaining. Firstly, there is a 
visible shift from collective bargaining to the internal regulation, which represents an 
alternative to collective agreements in these countries. The internal regulation 
generally undermines the collective bargaining role of trade unions. Secondly, 
internal regulation is often decided unilaterally, without any involvement of the 
employee side: as explained in section 2.4.1., in the Czech Republic and Poland, if 
no trade union is present in the company, the employer has no obligation to consult 
employees or their representatives. This substantially strengthens the powers of 
employers. Thirdly, another example of market narrative occurs when the internal 
regulation is not a viable option in law. For example, in Poland, internal regulation 
cannot be used in small companies (below 20 employees), where conditions of work 
can be therefore determined only by individual negotiations between an employee 
and employer. Here we see a visible shift from collective to individual standard 
setting.  
The observations made raise the question of whether and how the law can 
promote company collective bargaining in a more functional manner. Although no 
universal answer can be provided to that question, it is obvious that, following the 
analytical framework of “workplace democracy” postulated in section 3.1, more 
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clarity could be provided at company level. Clarity would be especially beneficial 
with regard to the collective bargaining procedure, particularly when more than one 
trade union operates at the workplace (as in Slovenia and the Czech Republic). As 
has been noted, in many instances, there are no clear legal rules on how to resolve 
the deadlock that arises when several trade unions disagree on collective 
representation. More clarity on the delineation between the competences of trade 
union and works councils could also be provided. In Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, legal rules do not call for any representativeness criteria. In Poland, 
collective bargaining procedure could be more detailed, and more balanced in 
relation to trade unions. None of the four countries has any rules on employee 
representation in small and medium companies. While this is an issue common to 
many European countries, a way of addressing it could be, for example, the 
introduction of alternative types of employee representation in these companies, and 
a review of the ways in which the actual number of employees is calculated in any 
company.790 
On a final note, when the four countries under examination are viewed through 
the lens of the normative model postulated in Chapter 1, certain features are observed 
that create resistance to the suggested articulated multi-employer model. The first of 
these is the legal possibility of collective agreements being suspended (in Poland), 
and the second is the emphasis on internal regulation in all four countries (but 
particularly notable in Poland and the Czech Republic). It is a positive development 
that laws usually require some form of trade union or employees’ consent in these 
situations (though with some exceptions to this, as explained above). Yet, at the same 
time, both suspension and internal regulation drive the process of standard setting 
further from the model of negotiated outcomes and generally undermine the role of 
trade unions at the company level.
                                                          
790 The “underrepresentation” is a common problem to many countries, as acknowledged by Biagi. An 
overview of ways how different legal systems address SMEs has been provided in Biagi, M. (1994) 
and Biagi, M. (1992) ‘Employee Representation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A 








This thesis has scrutinised the legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining in the four CEE countries and the ways in which it has been developing in 
the past two decades. To that end, the thesis formulated two research questions (Chapter 
1, section 3):  
(1) To what extent does the current legal and institutional framework in the four 
selected countries support and promote collective bargaining at different levels (cross-
sectoral, sectoral and company)?  
(2) How can the development of the legal and institutional framework of rules for 
collective bargaining in the selected CEE countries be explained? What role does the 
EU play in this respect? 
This chapter aims at providing concluding thoughts on these research questions. 
To discuss the research findings, the chapter is structured in the following manner. 
Section 2 presents a brief summary of findings by chapter. Section 3 aims at providing 
more detailed interpretations of the findings, in the first place by linking back to the 
proposed normative model (subsection 3.1) and secondly, by sketching an answer to the 
two research questions. Section 4 outlines the limits of the study, outlook and some 
challenges for the future. 
 
2. Summary of findings   
Starting from the existing legal scholarship which in a somewhat ad hoc and 
noncomprehensive manner studied the collective bargaining laws in CEE,791 this study 
                                                          
791 As presented in section 3.2 of Chapter 1. 
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attempted to provide a comprehensive comparative study of the systems selected. With 
a view to reflecting the most pressing concerns of industrial relations - decentralised and 
underdeveloped systems of collective bargaining and weak social partners - the research 
was framed with the intention of interpreting the law in the context of the industrial 
relations setting. The study was deliberately designed to reflect CEE countries having 
different industrial relations models. As explained in Chapter 1, comparatively, 
Slovenia has the most centralised model of collective bargaining and Poland has one of 
the least centralised models. Slovakia and the Czech Republic come somewhere in-
between: Slovakia has a reasonably developed centralised collective bargaining system, 
more so than the Czech Republic.  
To be able to scrutinise the legal and institutional frameworks, the study designed 
a normative model of articulated multi-employer bargaining. In industrial relations 
terms, this model reflects the reality of most of the European countries. To the greatest 
extent possible, the legal traits and principles of the model have been postulated and 
explained in Chapter 1. This chapter explained that the proposed normative model is 
based on the standard-setting role of social partners, and also on the complementarity 
between collective agreements and statutory law, as the two different sources of 
standard setting (section 4.3). The chapter presented three major analytical traits of the 
model (section 4.3):  
(a) Chapter 1 postulated that the role of law is the one of supporting and 
promoting collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements (auxiliary 
role).792 Moreover, law should also protect employees: the statutory legal rules should 
set out legal minima that can be further upgraded and elaborated in collective 
agreements. Also, the role of law is not only to protect employees, but also to serve 
economic objectives (such as supporting productivity, efficiency, and 
competiveness).793 
(b) In such a model, collective agreements perform more than one function: 
Supiot claimed that collective agreements can be instruments of flexibilisation and 
company management, or they can implement legal regulations or perform legislative 
                                                          
792 As explained by Kahn Freund, see Chapter 1, section 4.3; based on: Davies, P. and Freedland, M. 
(1983) Kahn Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd edition, London: Stevens & Sons, p 87. 
793 Davidov, G. and Langille, B. (2011) ‘The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic and Human 
Development’, in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
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functions.794 Bruun claimed that collective agreements can have regulatory, flexibility 
or management functions.795 Sectoral collective agreements play a particular role in 
most of the European countries: they tend to be predominantly concerned with 
providing rules and conditions for company-level bargaining, rather than setting 
universal substantive standards for a specific sector.796  
(c) The suggested normative model rests on procedural mechanisms ensuring 
complementarity between various sources of standard setting (collective agreements and 
statutory legal rules). The aim of these mechanisms is to provide checks and balances 
against uncontrolled decentralisation.  
As Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, labour law reforms in these countries did not 
take place in isolation, but within the wider political, social, economic and industrial 
relations context. Chapter 2, drawing on a non-legal approach and the existing 
theoretical knowledge explaining capitalism, welfare and industrial relations, provided 
country-specific explanations of that context. After presenting the existing theoretical 
framework and approaches in relation to the CEE countries, this chapter concluded that 
the peculiar economic reforms undertaken in the 1990s underpinned decentralisation of 
industrial relations in these countries. This conclusion is more evident in the CEE 
countries that opted for a non-gradual, shock therapy style of macroeconomic 
reforms.797 Chapter 2 particularly highlighted theoretical observations postulated by 
Bohle and Greskovits, and factors which these authors considered crucial for explaining 
the post-transitional framework of CEE (policies, including legacies, and external 
factors).798  
This chapter highlighted the following country elements. In many aspects, 
Slovenia resembles continental European countries and it is the only country from the 
                                                          
794 Supiot, A. (2001) Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 97-100. 
795 Bruun, N. (2003) ’The Autonomy of Collective Agreement’ in R. Blanpain (ed) Collective 
Bargaining, Discrimination, Social Security and the European Integration, Bulletin of Comparative 
Labour Relations, no 48, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 9. 
796 Visser, J. (2005) ’Beneath the Surface of Stability: New and Old Modes of Governance in European 
Industrial Relations’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 11, no 3, p 297.    
797 As underlined in section 4 of Chapter 2. 
798 Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2007) ‘Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism: 
Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe’ West European Politics, vol 30, no 3, p 
445, citing Polanyi, K. (1957) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, Boston: Beacon Press. 
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group selected which can be labelled as a coordinated market economy (section 3.1).799 
Despite resolute market orientation which was pertinent until 2006,800 Slovakia has 
developed a more centralised collective bargaining structure and a better organised 
central representation of social partners801 than the Czech Republic (section 3.2). Czech 
industrial relations have developed with a pronounced pro-market policy orientation and 
a lack of policy support for autonomous regulation by social partners (section 3.3).802 
Polish industrial relations developed alongside the resolute liberalisation of the 
economy and the state has provided only a modest support for social dialogue and 
collective bargaining (section 3.4).803 
Chapter 3 explained national responses to the challenges surrounding labour law 
transformation in the four countries. In an effort to group the factors of transformation, 
this chapter built on the elements postulated by Bohle and Greskovits (initially 
presented in Chapter 2):804 policy choices (support for the legal and institutional 
framework for collective bargaining), labour law legacies and external influences 
(section 2.1). Moreover, in an effort to identify the guiding paradigm of labour law 
transformation in CEE, this chapter identified institutionalisation and market narratives. 
Whereas the institutionalisation narrative entailed a long-term process of building legal 
and institutional framework which guarantees free and voluntary collective bargaining, 
the market narrative entailed a process of restoring contractual freedoms805 and ensuring 
that labour law provisions facilitate, rather than hinder economic growth (section 2.2). 
This chapter (section 2.2) underlined that the market narrative has been often confused 
with outright deregulation. Inspired by the belief that free market should govern labour, 
market narrative in this way paved the way for the unfettered freedom of employers at 
local levels and rendered the narrative of institutionalisation difficult in CEE.806  
                                                          
799 CMEs, according to VoC classification, depictured in section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
800 So-called Dzurinda era, as explained in section 3.2 of Chapter 2. 
801 Duman, A. and Kureková, L. (2012) ‘The Role of State in Development of Socio-Economic Models in 
Hungary and Slovakia: the Case of Industrial Policy’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol 19, no 8, pp 
1207-1228. 
802 See section 3.3. of Chapter 2. See Myant, M. (2010) ’Trade Unions in the Czech Republic’ Report 
115, Brussels: ETUI, pp 53-54.  
803 See section 3.4 of Chapter 2. 
804 Bohle and Greskovits (2007). 
805 Kollonay Lehoczky, C. (2004) ‘European Enlargement: A Comparative View of Hungarian Labour 
Law’ in G. A. Bermann and K. Pistor (eds) Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, p 212. 
806 Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. 
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After presenting country specific traits, Chapter 3 reached the following 
conclusions. The process of creating the legal and institutional framework for collective 
bargaining was gradual in the four countries, although the basic pieces of law were 
introduced in the early 1990s. The content of collective agreements has been changing 
in line with the evolving legal framework in the past two decades, which allowed 
gradual broadening of their regulatory space. However, the chapter also underlined that 
in some countries (in particular, Poland and the Czech Republic) the law still consists of 
comprehensive and all-encompassing mandatory regulation of work and employment, 
which undermines the substantive scope of collective agreements: the items which the 
social partners can negotiate about are already prescribed within statutory regulation 
(section 4). This represents a legacy of the previous communist period, when collective 
agreements played only a marginal role, while work and employment were regulated by 
coercive and all-encompassing statutory legal rules and administrative regulations. 
Furthermore, this chapter noted that collective agreements and labour law have made a 
transition from the sphere of public law to that of private law  in the past two decades. 
Yet, such a transition has been slower in some countries: in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, labour law retained its predominantly public character during the 1990s 
(section 4.1). Chapter 3 also highlighted that labour law transformation was marked by 
country-specific legacies. In particular, Slovenia’s socialist self-management paradigm 
deserves mentioning because it enabled some form of employees’ standard setting even 
before the 1990s. Moreover, the Polish legislation of the 1980s has been notable for 
postulating the enterprise as the basic tenet of standard setting, paving the way towards 
the decentralised industrial relations found in modern Poland.    
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the EU has played only an indirect role in building 
the legal and institutional framework for collective bargaining in the past two decades. 
This chapter showed that the EU aimed at enhancing collective bargaining structures at 
all possible levels during the accession process. However, by using the approach of 
Europeanisation, this chapter demonstrated that the EU could not impose the desired 
changes: the conditionality mechanism was undermined by the low political salience of 
social issues during the accession process (see section 2.2.2) and the EU also lacked a 
precise “message” about what the legal framework should look like in CEE (sections 
2.1 and 2.3). Moreover, after the recent crisis period, the mechanism for rule transfer 
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and the normative and ideological underpinnings of the EU role has changed. With the 
recent crisis, there has been no visible incentive for the EU to influence the 
improvement of the centralised collective bargaining structures in CEE. On the 
contrary, many of the ‘crisis packages’ the EU issued during the financial crisis era 
emphasized the need for further decentralization of bargaining towards company level. 
In this respect ‘Europeanisation’ became a somewhat ambivalent and even confusing 
message that did not contribute to the strengthening of collective bargaining structures 
in CEE countries. 
The second part of the study investigated collective bargaining, and, where 
applicable, other forms of standard setting at the national, sectoral and company levels. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that there is a weak link between what is discussed in tripartite 
institutions and collective agreements. The tripartite bodies have a consultative role 
only and may not issue legally-binding decisions. Social pacts, with the exception of 
Slovenia, have a poor track record, and as such, do not have tangible impact on 
collective bargaining.807 Another exception is the Polish social pact of 1993, which has 
contributed towards a decentralised landscape, by emphasising the regulatory powers of 
the enterprise.808 The chapter found that the limited tripartite outcomes in CEE may not 
be linked to restrictively or ill-defined tripartite competences. There are notable 
exceptions to this general observation. As the Slovak and Czech examples 
demonstrated, in certain periods the competences of tripartite bodies did not allow 
agreements to be reached. Nevertheless, these exceptions were temporary (as described 
in section 2): the Czech tripartite statute narrowed down the competences of the 
tripartite body from agreement reaching to consultation in 1995, restoring them in 1997. 
In Slovakia, the 2004 tripartite statute, which was valid until 2007, narrowly defined the 
competences of the tripartite body, not allowing it to reach agreements.  
Chapter 6 examined sectoral collective agreements. There are some common 
traits that can be identified at this level. What is common to the countries examined is 
the lack of a precise meaning of “sector” and “sectoral collective agreement”. Legally, it 
                                                          
807 As explained in section 2.1 of Chapter 5. In particular, centralised collective bargaining, according to 
Stanojević, represented an implementation mechanism for the income policies defined in social pacts, see 
Stanojević, M. (2011) ‘Social Pacts in Slovenia: Accommodation to the EMU Regime and the Post-Euro 
Development’ Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology, vol 2, no 1, p 108.   




remains unclear how the Polish “multi-enterprise” and Czech and Slovak “higher-level” 
agreements actually relate to sector level agreements. Moreover, sectoral collective 
argreements have a modest regulatory role: where they exist, they usually set a low 
sectoral minimum, encouraging substantive variation at company level (see section 3.2). 
The instrument for the extension of collective agreements is in place in the four 
countries, but it is not regularly applied. With some country variations (presented in 
Table 7), derogations to the detriment of employees in peius are generally discouraged.  
Slovenia somewhat represents an exception to this general picture – the pre-2006 
legal framework defined levels at which collective bargaining may take place. The 2006 
legal reform deleted the reference to the bargaining levels, but by that year, collective 
bargaining practices had already been firmly set at sectoral level. Slovenian statutory 
law stimulates the sectoral level by suggesting that some matters be more closely 
regulated in sectoral collective agreements (section 2.2). Extensions of collective 
agreements are regularly exercised in Slovenia, and it is possible to derogate from the 
statutory laws to the detriment of employees (sections 2.3 and 2.5). Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic have a similar legal framework in place. These two countries contain no 
clear definition of sectoral collective agreement, and no rules of representativeness at 
this level. Yet, two important differences delineate the two countries. Firstly, until 2014, 
Slovak laws prescribed more restrictive conditions for collective agreements extensions 
than the rules in the Czech Republic (individual employers’ consent has been a factor 
rendering extensions virtually impossible in Slovakia, as described in section 2.5). As 
shown in Chapter 6, Slovak legal rules on extensions were relaxed in 2014: yet it 
remains to be seen if these conditions will be subject to changes in the future. Secondly, 
Slovak rules prescribe no possibility of derogation from statutory legal rules in peius, 
unlike the Czech rules, which allow some limited opportunities in that respect (section 
2.3). Polish laws have not been designed with the sector in mind. Apart from the lack of 
definition of sector, the rules on extension of collective agreements are restrictively 
defined and there is no possibility of derogation to the detriment of employees in 
Poland. Yet, Polish law is specific for allowing the suspension of collective agreements 
(section 2.3).  
Chapter 6 has also demonstrated that the role of policies, in various degrees and 
forms, was decisive for shaping the sector as a locus of standard setting in the four 
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countries. The model of reforms pursued in Poland, likewise, was focused on the 
company as the main tenet of policies. Slovenia’s policies were tailored with the 
mindset of gradual reforms: in this study the gradualism philosophy, which was leading 
the industrial relations reforms,809 was observed as a powerful determinant of legal 
reforms. When it comes to Slovakia and the Czech Republic, initial legal reforms 
postulated the company as the main tenet of collective bargaining. Later on, Slovakia’s 
industrial relations managed to develop more prominent standard-setting at sectoral 
level. Yet, after more than two decades, Slovakia’s laws provide fewer stimuli for 
sectoral collective bargaining than the Czech Republic. How can the difference between 
the two countries be explained? In Slovakia, the social partners on both sides have more 
pronounced centralised capacities and representation, as well as more coordinated 
structures for industrial relations.810 In contrast, Czech trade unions are fragmented and 
decentralised.811 This study understands that the comparatively more developed sectoral 
structures which exist in Slovakia, cannot, therefore, be ascribed to law.    
During the interviews, the company was highlighted as the most important locus 
for standard setting. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 demonstrated that standard setting at 
company level is not fostered by the legal systems more than any other level. Company 
level is not clearly designated in the laws of Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland: 
here it is not clear if company collective agreements refer to the entire company or part 
of it. Slovenia contains no designation of company collective agreements at all. In the 
countries examined, complicated and sometimes unclear set of rules are in place when 
more than one trade union operates at company level (the latter is specifically the case 
in Slovenia and the Czech Republic).812 Moreover, in the countries researched, internal 
employers’ regulation is considered an alternative to collective bargaining, which 
diminishes the collective bargaining role of trade unions. The laws usually prescribe 
that employers should consult trade unions or employees’ representatives before issuing 
                                                          
809 Crowley, S. and Stanojević, M. (2011) ‘Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical 
Legacies: Explaining the Slovenian Exception’ Politics & Society, vol 39, no 2, pp 268-295.  
810 As underlined by Duman and Kureková (2012), p 1217.  
811 See Myant, M., Slocock, B. and Smith, S. (2000) ‘Tripartism in the Czech and Slovak Republic’ 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol 52, no 4, pp 265-285. 
812 As argued in section 2.2.1., in Slovenia, a bargaining team is formed when more than one trade union 
operates in a company, but law contains no further rules on collective bargaining procedure if no such 
team can be formed. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, when more than one trade union exists in a 
company, they are supposed to act jointly (or to agree on a specific type of representation) when engaging 
in collective bargaining  - yet, no further specification is offered in law on collective bargaining procedure 
if these trade unions cannot agree on representation.  
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the internal regulation. Yet, Chapter 7 has found examples where no such employer’s 
obligation exists (the Czech Republic and Poland, see section 2.4.1). Sometimes internal 
rules cannot be issued and standards can be decided on an individual basis only - this is 
the case in small companies (below 20 employees) in Poland. 
 This chapter has also demonstrated that the role of policies and legacies, to 
varying degrees and in various forms, shaped standard setting at company level. 
Slovenia’s post-transitional framework has focused rather on the sector as the main 
locus of standard setting, but one may note that the legacy of self-management helped 
this country to hone a tradition of employee involvement in company decision making. 
Hence, works councils developed in Slovenia earlier than in the other CEE countries - 
already by the early 1990s (section 2.4.2). Slovakia and the Czech Republic have had 
some modest legacy of company level collective bargaining in the communist period 
(section 2.1.1.) and the post-transitional industrial relations particularly focused on 
enterprise as the principal decision-making unit (especially in the Czech Republic).813 
The Polish post-transitional framework emerged from the 1980s legislation, which 
postulated the company as the main standard-setting level (section 2.1.1).  
 
3. Interpreting the findings 
 
3.1. Normative model of articulated multi-employer bargaining 
3.1.1.  Country variations 
How do the four countries fare with respect to the proposed normative model of 
articulated multi-employer bargaining? Polish laws resemble the proposed model the 
least. As explained in Chapter 6, the sector is the missing level in Poland, not only in 
practice (bearing in mind the marginal coverage of multi-enterprise agreements), but 
also in law. The articulation between different sources is rather rigid: Polish single-
enterprise collective agreements may not under any circumstances derogate in peius 
from the rights postulated at other (higher) bargaining levels and statutory law. While it 
is possible to suspend an application of a collective agreement for a temporary period, 
                                                          
813 Pollert, A. (1997) ’The Transformation of Trade Unionism in the Capitalist and Democratic 
Restructuring of the Czech Republic’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 3, no 2, p 207. 
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Chapter 7 underlined that such a mechanism actually represents a negation of 
articulation: suspension annuls the possibility of standard setting at a certain level.814 
Articulation has the function of facilitating the relationship between standard setting at 
different levels, but suspension has no such effect. If a multi-enterprise agreement is 
suspended, the link between the company level and statutory law will be annulled. If 
single-enterprise agreement is suspended (which will be the more likely scenario, 
because multi-employer agreements have marginal importance and thereby are less 
likely to undergo suspension), employees might cease to be covered by any collective 
agreement. Furthermore, in Poland, there is no legal solution in place to protect 
employees in small and medium enterprises where they are exposed to trends towards 
individualisation and to fragmentation of standard setting. According to the Labour 
Code, the employer is not obliged to issue internal regulation to regulate working 
conditions for employees in companies with less than 20 employees (section 2.4.1 of 
Chapter 7). As underlined by the interviewees in Warsaw, Polish laws, clearly, have not 
been designed with the sector level in mind and there have been no efforts to generate 
any meaningful standard setting at this level. The resurgence of sector in the law is 
scarcely imaginable, nor, in the future, its appearance in practice. In fact, one of the 
interviewees pointed out that: 
“if we meet in 5-10 years’ time, there will be no sectoral agreements at all in Poland. The reason is 
that decentralisation is a European trend and there is no pressure from Western Europe to build 
sectoral structures. Also, there will be no power on the side of Polish trade unions to force their 
signing”. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Slovenia’s legal framework is the one which 
resembles the proposed normative model the most. Even though a certain trend to 
decentralisation has been visible in Slovenian industrial relations since the mid-
2000s,815 the legal framework created in 2006 may not be interpreted as restricting 
collective bargaining at sectoral or cross-sectoral levels. The sector is promoted in law 
in several ways. The law stipulates rules on the extension of collective agreements, and 
                                                          
814 See section 3.1. 
815 As observed in Chapter 1, based on data in tables 2 and 3. As further explained in Chapter 2 (section 
3.1), the main drivers of this decentralisation was the abolishment of mandatory membership to the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the fact that cross-sectoral collective agreements were no longer 
concluded after the mid-2000s; see Stanojević, M. and Klarič, M. (2013) ‘The Impact of Socio-Economic 
Shocks on Social Dialogue in Slovenia’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, vol 19, no 
2, pp 217-226. 
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these provisions are regularly exercised. Statutory laws often encourage regulation of 
certain items via sectoral collective agreements (section 2.2 of Chapter 6). The 
articulation between sources at different levels is facilitated with the mechanism of 
derogation described in Chapter 6, allowing derogation to the detriment of employees 
and the stipulation of opening clauses in sectoral collective agreements (section 2.3). 
Czech and Slovakian laws share a common legal legacy and have legal 
frameworks which largely resemble each other. Yet, in line with the previously 
mentioned observations, Slovakian laws resemble the proposed normative model less, 
despite the fact that centralised standard setting is more pronounced than in the Czech 
Republic. However, the number and content of legal amendments in the recent years 
show that both the Czech and Slovak legal systems are still in flux. In fact, some of the 
recent amendments have encouraged the idea of sector level bargaining, showing that 
these two countries could potentially move closer to the proposed normative model in 
future. Slovakia lifted the condition of employers’ consent on extensions in 2014. And 
in recent years, Czech laws have introduced salient elements which support sector level 
collective bargaining: despite giving up the membership of employers’ associations, 
individual employers should remain bound by relevant collective agreements. Also, 
since 2014, the legal basis on which the Czech employers’ associations are set up has 
been changed, ensuring that collective bargaining remains within the remit of their 
activities. However, there are other areas where further improvements could facilitate 
more meaningful sectoral collective bargaining in both countries and lead them towards 
the proposed normative model. For example, this could be by encouraging different 
forms of derogations in peius, controlled by provisions at sectoral (higher-level) 
agreements. Rules on extensions could be made more relaxed in the Czech Republic. 
Neither country has rules on the representativeness of social partners at this level: such 
rules could facilitate more legitimate collective bargaining. 
 
3.1.2. The legal architecture of the normative model: three analytical elements 
As suggested in Chapter 1 (section 4.3), the normative model consists of three analytical 
elements: (a) the law has an auxiliary and regulatory role; (b) the collective agreements 
may perform several functions and (c) the articulation ensures complementarity between 
standard setting at different levels and between different standard sources; and as such, 
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it provides checks and balances against uncontrolled decentralisation. The following 
lines will reflect on these elements in relation to the four CEE countries.  
(a) In the CEE countries, the auxiliary role of the statutory laws is not fully 
developed. The auxiliary role of the state – the state promoting collective bargaining at 
all levels and ensuring that trade union interests are protected816 – has been missing, in 
various forms and degrees. After the analysis in the second part of the study has been 
performed, it is evident that, in several instances, laws could support and stimulate 
collective bargaining in a more meaningful manner. Furthermore, this observation leads 
to the question whether collective agreements have emerged as autonomous standard-
setting sources in CEE. Sciarra has written that “the autonomy of a collective 
bargaining system is measured comparatively in relation to the degree of incisiveness 
exhibited by statute law”.817 Judging the CEE laws from this premise, one may conclude 
that collective agreements, after more than two decades, have not fully emerged as the 
autonomous standard-setting source. A major reason behind this is that the statutory law 
still exhibits a great influence on collective agreements by exerting control over their 
substance. By providing a comprehensive and detailed mandatory regulation of 
substantive conditions of work, instead of providing only minimum rules, the laws do 
not stimulate conclusion of collective agreements. This observation, which was made in 
Chapter 3, has been particularly underlined by the interviewees in Poland and the Czech 
Republic.818 The second part of the study has revealed that in Slovakia, also, the 
statutory law exhibits great influence on collective agreements, given that these 
agreements often replicate the provisions of statutory laws.819 In Slovenia, such 
statutory influence seems to have had the least impact on collective agreements.  
(b) Corollary to the described regulatory style of statutory laws is the limited role 
and function of collective agreements in CEE. Company collective agreements in CEE, 
in principle, play a more meaningful role than sectoral collective agreements: they are 
usually employed to specify the terms and conditions of statutory laws and sectoral 
collective agreements (Chapter 7, section 2.1.2). The role of sectoral collective 
                                                          
816 As explained in Chapter 1, in section 4.3; the term auxiliary legislation has been succinctly explained 
by Kahn Freund, see Davies, P. and Freedland, M. (1983) Kahn Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd 
edition, London: Stevens & Sons, in particular p 60 and p 87. 
817 Sciarra, S. (2007) ‘The Evolution of Collective Bargaining: Observations on a Comparison in the 
Countries of the European Union’, Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, vol 29, p 7. 
818 See section 4.2.1 of Chapter 3. 
819 See section 2.2 of Chapter 6. 
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agreements is far less ambitious. As demonstrated in Chapter 6 (sections 2.1.2, 3.1.2 
and 3.2) the sectoral collective agreements, where existing, have a low regulatory role, 
given that they embody only a slight upgrade from those standards prescribed in law. In 
addition, in Slovenia, the implementing function of sectoral collective agreements – the 
role of these agreements in substantiating the terms and conditions of statutory law 
(which prescribe only general and broad terms) – seems to be more pronounced than in 
the other three countries. But, a general impression which emanates from the four 
countries is that broadening the scope of collective agreements – by allowing them to 
stipulate more thematic elements and areas and making them substance-wise less 
dependent on law – would facilitate more meaningful collective bargaining and expand 
the roles and functions of collective agreements. Here it is useful to go back to the 
postulates of collective agreements, presented in Chapter 1 and the delineation of 
Supiot’s functions of collective agreements.820 Sectoral collective agreements in CEE 
could be employed, for example, as instruments of flexibility, by expanding the legal 
possibilities of setting less favourable rules for employees (derogation in peius) and 
allowing stipulation of different types of derogation clauses.821 Also, company 
collective bargaining could be made more meaningful if collective agreements were 
used more as company management tools. Allowing company collective agreements to 
expand and to regulate more elements of company organisation would be a welcome 
development to offset the trend to individualisation described in Chapter 7.822 However, 
none of these transformations in the functions of collective agreements can be 
performed without ensuring that the issues related to the organisation and capacities of 
social partners at distinct levels are addressed. For the sectoral level, the issue of 
employers’ capacities seems to be the most topical: while trade unions often claim they 
have no negotiating partner, employers’ associations need an incentive to engage in 
sectoral bargaining. At the company level, the most topical challenge is to empower 
trade unions. Currently the company trade unions may perform a salient consulting role 
before the unilateral employers’ acts are issued, but the focus of trade union activities 
should be more on collective bargaining.823 In addition, improving employee 
                                                          
820 Section 4.3 of Chapter 1; see Supiot (2001), pp 96-100. 
821 This would lead to what Supiot called “negotiated flexibilisation”, ibid., p 98. 
822 Supiot, p 99. 




representation, particularly in smaller enterprises, represents a distinct challenge in 
CEE. 
(c) When it comes to articulation, this study has explained that the four countries 
rest on a rigid top-down ordering, which dictates that collective agreements at lower 
hierarchical levels may only set more favourable conditions for employees. While there 
are some important exceptions – the Slovenian system is notably the least rigid (as 
depicted in chapters 6 and 7), the legal systems presented generally discourage 
deviations. This argument was repeated several times during the interviews in the four 
countries as a problematic trait, which demotivates collective bargaining, particularly on 
the side of employers. 
 
3.2. Sketching answers to the research questions 
A general picture emanating from this study is that in many instances the law has 
provided a pretext for the trend towards decentralised collective bargaining and, 
likewise, that it has not always provided a stimulus for sectoral and cross-sectoral 
collective bargaining. Thus, regarding the first research question, one may conclude 
that the laws could, in a more resolute manner, support and promote collective 
bargaining at all levels. This, of course is both a legislative and political matter. As 
demonstrated in the second part of the study, the laws provide no clear designation of 
either sectoral or company collective agreements in the four countries. To sum up the 
most prominent elements depicted in the second part of the study; except in Slovenia, 
the rules on the extension of collective agreements are restrictive and cannot be easily 
put into practice. The rules on representativeness are especially missing in Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic. The articulation between the different standard-setting levels is 
rigid overall and deprives social partners from incentives to engage in collective 
bargaining. Nevertheless, although these systems are decentralised, the study did not 
find that the four countries’ laws offer more resolute support to company level. In fact, 
company level faces a set of distinct challenges, which, as elaborated in Chapter 7, 
underpin the individualisation of standard setting and the shift to employers’ powers. In 
particular, laws could support collective bargaining at company level, as discussed in 
Chapter 7 (section 4.2), for example, by clarifying the collective bargaining procedure 
when more than one trade union operates at the company level. 
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The above observations represent general remarks, but there are remarkable 
country variations. These variations can be summarised as follows. Slovenia is an 
exceptional example for obvious reasons: it not only has the most developed centralised 
collective bargaining structure, but also has a legal system that supports and promotes 
collective bargaining at any level. At the other end of the spectrum, Polish laws have 
not been designed to underpin centralised (sectoral or cross-sectoral) collective 
bargaining as the predominant locus for standard setting. In fact, Polish laws are very 
much company-centred, rather than sector-centred. Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
have rather similar legal frameworks. Surprisingly, whereas Slovakia has comparatively 
more developed sectoral collective bargaining, in comparison, its laws do not provide a 
more stimulating climate for collective bargaining at sectoral level than the Czech laws.  
The major difference between Slovakian and Czech laws lies in the approach to the 
extension of collective agreements and the legal possibilities for derogation to the 
detriment of employees in peius.824  
When it comes to the second research question, the study has found that the laws 
of the countries selected for study have experienced slow and gradual transformation: 
the legal transformation which began in the early 1990s formally instigated basic rights 
and freedoms, but this represented only the beginning of reform. In the subsequent 
years, legal frameworks were reshaped, slowly and steadily introducing free and 
voluntary collective bargaining. In fact, this study demonstrated that none of the CEE 
systems examined were based on free and voluntary collective bargaining at any time in 
the 1990s. The most prominent legal reforms took place only in the mid-2000s. The 
recent crisis period did not bring any substantial change in the existing legal and 
institutional frameworks in the four countries. Exceptionally, some changes were 
envisaged in Slovakia (regarding the collective agreements’ extensions, opening clauses 
and trade union representativeness),825 but most of these innovations were only short-
lived.  
The study has found that the legal transformation was shaped in a national-
specific mix of policy choices and the path dependant role of legacies originating from 
the previous communist setting. The role of the EU in shaping these laws has been only 
indirect and rather limited. Regarding Slovenia, this study argued that the philosophy of 
                                                          
824 As explained in chapters 6 and 7.  
825 See Chapter 6, sections 2.5 and 2.3, and Chapter 7, section 2.2.1. 
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gradualism facilitated the transformation of both industrial relations and law, 
particularly by facilitating the evolvement of three generations of collective 
agreements.826 The 2006 Act on Collective Agreements enabled full implementation of 
freedom of association (Chapter 3, section 3.1). Yet, some elements of the pre-2006 
legal framework were vital for establishing the collective bargaining practices at 
sectoral level, in particular the mandatory membership of the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and the mandatory nature of collective agreements (Chapter 3, section 3.1). 
Polish laws have not developed with the sector in mind. The laws enacted in the 1980s 
paved the way for decentralised collective bargaining by emphasising the company 
level.827 In 1993, the tripartite social pact further highlighted decision making at 
company level.828 The interviewees in Poland, overall, claimed that the sector was never 
a policy priority in the past two decades. When it comes to the Czech Republic, this 
study found evidence of the company being the main tenet of policies in the post-
transitional framework.829 Some form of company collective bargaining had been in 
existence in pre-1990s Czechoslovakia, because company trade unions could sign 
different types of collective accords with management.830 Yet, as already mentioned, 
post-transitional Slovakia managed to build more reasonably developed sectoral 
structures compared with the Czech examples, thanks to the well-organised centralised 
representation of social partners.831 
This study claimes that institutionalisation and market narrative shaped the 
process of labour law transformation in CEE. As evidenced in the second part of the 
study, the process of institutionalisation has been developing slowly and gradually: 
collective agreements have been slowly widening their substantive scope and changing 
their legal nature from the public to the private sphere. It can be claimed that the process 
of institutionalisation has not been fully accomplished in CEE, as the auxiliary role has 
not fully developed and collective agreements may undergo further transformation in 
                                                          
826 See Chapter 2 (section 3.1) and Chapter 6. On gradualism in Slovenian industrial relations, see 
Crowley and Stanojević (2011). 
827 Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
828 1993 Pact on State-Owned Enterprises in the Restructuring Process, see Chapter 5, section 2.4. 
829 See Chapter 7, section 2.1.1; based on Pollert (1997), p 207. 
830 See Chapter 7, section 2.1.1, based on Deak, L. (1994) ‘Customary International Labour Laws and 
their Application in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic’ Tulsa Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, vol 2, no 1, p 40; also, Myant, M. (1993) ’Czech and Slovak Trade Unions’ Journal of 
Communist Studies, vol  9, no 4, pp 59-84.  
831 As argued in Chapter 7, section 2.1, see also Duman and Kureková (2012). 
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future. Moreover, as this study claimed, market narrative has been often translated into 
outright decentralisation. As such, market narrative has slowed down the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining. This is most evident at company level, as 
Chapter 7 demonstrated: here the lack of support for company collective bargaining 
translated into trends in the individualisation of standard setting and diminution of the 
role of trade unions. The overall impression is that the market narrative has played the 
most resolute role in Polish legal transformation, but it has also been present in the other 
countries examined, particularly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 On a final note, there are important observations which stem from the answers 
provided to the two research questions. This study has highlighted the role of law in 
facilitating meaningful collective bargaining in CEE. It is clear that CEE collective 
bargaining is facing a number of challenges for which solutions cannot be found in law: 
declining trade union density rates and the general lack of a collective bargaining 
culture. Notwithstanding these issues, the aim of the study was to emphasise that the 
transformation of industrial relations in CEE prompts careful appraisal of the legal 
frameworks: the main rationale for such appraisal is that laws enabling social partners to 
bargain collectively have emerged only relatively recently. A legal framework 
facilitating free and voluntary organisation of social partners and collective bargaining 
is a necessary prerequisite for meaningful collective bargaining, but it is not its 
guarantee.     
With the described regulatory style of statutory labour laws, the state in CEE 
clearly performs a protective function: given the weaknesses on the side of social 
partners, these countries have opted to provide more extensive statutory regulation, 
rather than to have standards prescribed by collective agreement. This observation has 
been already made in Chapter 3.832 Yet, this regulatory style can be also seen as a legacy 
from the communist times, when the statutory legislation was rather comprehensive and 
all-encompassing. The culture of collective bargaining, on the other hand, is still young 
in post-communist CEE. This protective function has rendered the institutionalisation of 
                                                          
832 And, as mentioned in that chapter (section 5), this created a “liberalisation dilemma” in these 
countries, because the retreat of the state in these countries could generate the effect of strengthening 
managerial unilateralism, see Bluhm, K. (2008) ’Resolving Liberalisation Dilemma. Labour Relations in 
East-Central Europe and the Impact of European Union’ in M.A. Moreau and M. E. Blas-López (eds), 
Restructuring in the New EU Member States: Social Dialogue, Firms Relocation, and Social Treatment of 
Restructuring, Brussels: Peter Lang, p 60. 
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collective agreements slow in post-transitional terms, because collective agreement in 
these countries could not formally regulate any matter social partners wished until the 
last decade.833  
One may also claim that the protective function described facilitates market 
narrative.834 As this study has demonstrated in its second part, the legal ordering of 
these countries is peculiar in the way it facilitates market narrative in CEE: whilst the 
collective bargaining system is labelled as decentralised, the predominant and most 
powerful source of standards remains centralised at the statutory level. Such 
centralisation of regulation translates into poor regulatory power and poor scope for 
collective agreements, a lack of incentive on the employers’ side to engage in collective 
bargaining and in tension over the regulation of matters via employers’ prerogatives 
(through unilateral standard-setting or even individual bargaining) rather than collective 
bargaining. 
 
4. Limits, outlooks and future challenges 
A limitation of this study is the general lack of comprehensive and reliable industrial 
relations data on collective agreements in CEE. This holds particularly for collective 
agreements at company level, because there is no legal obligation to register them in 
none of these countries. More detailed empirical data, particularly on the content of 
collective agreements (at any level), but also on their number and coverage, could lead 
to a more objective assesment of the labour law transformation in CEE. It would be 
particularly useful to monitor how the function of collective agreements has evolved in 
line with the changes (liberalisation) of the substantive legal framework. Further 
research providing synergy between legal and industrial relations approaches could 
provide more insights into the functions and nature of the CEE collective agreements, 
and it could more comprehensively pinpoint areas where laws could provide more 
support for collective bargaining. 
                                                          
833 As Chapter 3 (section 4.2.1) demonstrated, the legal provisions formally allowing social partners to 
negotiate on any matters they wish have been introduced in these countries in the 2000s. 
834 As mentioned in Chapter 3, section 2.2; on this topic see Regini, M. (2000) ‘The Dilemmas of Labour 
Market Regulation’ in G. Esping-Andersen and M. Regini (eds) Why Deregulate Labour Markets, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 21-24. 
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This study has designed a normative articulated multi-employer bargaining model 
as a legal benchmark against which CEE laws have been scrutinised. To the fullest 
extent possible, this study has pointed out shortcomings and pinpointed areas where the 
legal framework could be enhanced in order to facilitate collective bargaining. 
However, this study did not offer concrete solutions to the issues identified: this could 
be the task of further research. Likewise, it would be useful to study the laws of the EU 
member states with a view to exploring different models of legal regulation and 
providing solutions to particular issues. Such a comparative perspective could 
investigate, for example, how different member states deal with the issues related to 
employee representation in small companies, how they use instruments the extension of 
collective agreements, or what kind of models of derogation in peius and mechanisms 
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The following interviews were conducted in Ljubljana in January 2012: 
 
Trade unions 
1.  Trade Union of Metal and Electro Industry of Slovenia (SKEI) - President 
 
2.  Svet Gorenjskih Sindikatov (SGS) - President 
 
Employers’ associations 
3.  The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GZS) - Chief Legal Officer 
 
4.  Association of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS) - Adviser to the Secretary 
General 
 
5.   Združenje Kovinske Industrije (Association of the Metal Industry, within the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce) - President  
 
Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities  




The following interviews were conducted in Bratislava in April 2012: 
 
Trade unions 
7.  Energy and Chemical Sectors Trade Union Association (ECHOZ), which is 
associated to the trade union confederation KOZ SR - Joint meeting with the 
Adviser on Internal Relations, the Legal Specialist and the Economic Policy 
Specialist 
 
8.  Metalworkers’ Trade Union Federation (OZ KOVO) - Joint meeting with the 
Vice President and the Legal Specialist 
 
9.  Integrated Trade Union Association (IOZ), which affiliates trade unions from 
different sectors, including construction - Regional Coordinator 
 
Employers’ associations 




Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family 
11.  Head of the Department of Labour Relations  
 
 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
The following interviews were conducted in Prague in April 2012:  
 
Trade unions 
12.  Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Union (ČMKOS) - Joint meeting 
with the Chief of the Legal Department and Wage Bargaining Specialist 
  
13. Czech Metalworkers’ Federation (OS KOVO) - Joint meeting with Vice 
President and the Head of the Trade Union Policy Department  
 
14.  Trade Union of Building Workers of the Czech Republic (OS STAVBA) - 
and Collective Bargaining Specialist 
 
Employers’ associations 
15.  Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic - Senior Expert 
 
16.  Association of Building Entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic (SPS CZ) - 
Chief of the Legal Department  
 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
17.  Joint meeting with the Head of the Department for Collective Bargaining, 




The following interviews were conducted in Warsaw in November 2012: 
 
Trade unions 
18.  NSZZ Solidarnosc, Legal Adviser (specialist in tripartite dialogue) 
 
19.  NSZZ Solidarnosc, Legal Adviser (specialist in branch and sectoral issues) 
 
20.  All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) - Director, Department for 
International Co-Operation and European Integration 
 
21.  Federation of Metalworking Trade Unions in Poland (KZZMP) - President 
  





23.  Polish Craft Association (ZRP) - Social Dialogue Specialist - Phone interview 
 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
24.  Joint meeting with the Head of Division, International Cooperation; the Head 
of Division, Mediation; the specialists in Collective Agreements, National 
and Regional Social Dialogue, and International Cooperation 
 
25.  An academic interview, Dr Jan Czarzasty, Warsaw School of Economics 
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